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M. Tullii Ciceronis

De Natura Deorum

Libri Tres

With the Commentary of G. F. Schoemann

Translated and Edited by

Austin Stickney

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EDITOR'S NOTE.

The text of this edition of Cicero's De Natura Deorum is substantially that of C. F. W. Müller, Leipsic, Teubner, 1878. The few changes made are noted after the Appendix, and the reasons for them are given in the Notes.

The Introduction, Summaries and Commentary are translated from G. F. Schoemann's fourth edition, Berlin, Weidmann, 1876. A few additions of the editor are enclosed in brackets.
INTRODUCTION.

CICERO’S essay on the nature of the gods is at once our most accessible and most complete original authority on the theology of the ancients: it gives us a brief outline of the views of the older thinkers and a complete exposition of the doctrines of those schools of philosophy which in later times included the greater number of educated people. The reader will perhaps be better able to understand the book after a few introductory remarks on the ancient theology and its various schools.

The philosophy of religion has to deal with the most important questions which can occupy the human mind. These regard the existence and nature of those unseen powers which are felt by man to control both his own inner and outer life, and the visible world about him. There is one answer ever ready for these questions: religion, older than any philosophy, offers a body of more or less definite conceptions which constitute the popular faith; and this faith is realized in the public worship and in the whole religious tone of the people. But in this as in all other matters there comes a time in the intellectual development of all nations when the more advanced minds feel a need, which is the beginning and end of all philosophy, the need of positive knowledge. People are no longer able to accept the traditions of religion upon mere faith; they ask for the reason of faith, for the ground of the prevailing ideas: and if religion cannot make good its claims by appeal to a higher authority, to a divine revelation, and thus raise its domain above all doubt or cavil (a thing which the religions of antiquity neither were able nor pretended to do), the necessary consequence is that reason makes an attempt to find an answer to these questions in her own way; and she then concedes the truth of the traditional faith only in so far as it coincides with or at least does not contradict her own conclusions.
This is sufficient to indicate in general the relation of the philosophy of religion to the popular religion; it would of necessity be variously modified according to the greater or less degree in which speculation had freed itself from the influence of the popular faith; to hold a quite free and independent position was never an easy matter. The faith in which a person was brought up, and which prevailed around him, necessarily exercised an influence upon philosophy; and the latter, instead of taking its own course regardless of the result it might reach, was often directed to a foregone conclusion from a desire to keep in harmony with the common faith. Although there was in antiquity no catechetical instruction, yet the universal belief operated with the same force; and implanted prejudices and modes of thought in the mind, before it could test and judge them, from which it afterwards found it difficult to break loose. Even where speculative reason was least affected by such influences the factors of the problem differed according to the ability and culture of individuals; and hence the inevitable consequence, that instead of sure and demonstrable results one reached only theories and opinions; and the confusing variety of these fully justified the most conscientious persons in concluding that it was useless to hope for any positive knowledge in these matters, and that every one must adopt such opinions as best satisfied his own reason and temperament; and we find this confession to be the result which Cicero reaches in the present essay.

The treatise consists of four parts: first, a brief sketch of the most noteworthy opinions on the subject from the beginning of philosophic speculation down to the complete development of the Epicurean and the Stoic systems; second, a detailed exposition of the Epicurean, and third, of the Stoic philosophy; fourth, a criticism of both these systems from the standpoint of the Academic scepticism.

We have to lament that the first part affords us only incomplete, often obscure, and always untrustworthy indications\(^1\); enough perhaps for the Epicurean to whom Cicero assigns them, but quite insufficient to give us any real insight into the development of religious philosophy and its various systems. Unfortunately we have no

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\(^1\) Compare the similar but shorter summary in the Academ, II, c. 37, where many things appear in a quite different light.
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means of supplying this defect satisfactorily; a few general remarks however, for which there was no room in the notes, may not be out of place here.

The earliest speculation of the Greeks, if it deserves the name, on the origin of the world and the forces that formed it coincides at least partially with the ideas which we find more or less plainly indicated in the oldest poetry of Homer and Hesiod. The primæval water of Thales may be recognized in the Homeric Oceanus, the origin of all things; and the primæval air of Anaximenes may correspond to the Hesiodic Chaos. But the popular religion of the Greeks left the origin of things quite out of consideration; and, taking for granted the existence of the universe and of the gods, insisted only upon reverence to the gods as exercising the government of the world and presiding over human life, each in his own sphere and office. No one of the older philosophers thought it necessary to contradict this faith in general, although they might not have been led to it by their own speculations. They either left it to stand upon its own merits, or felt its influence so strongly as to recognize it, and so to keep religion and speculation separate. Although they criticised certain popular and mythological conceptions, and sometimes incurred opposition and persecution for so doing, yet on the whole we hear very little of any aggressive contradiction on their part, or even of remarks implying indifference or disparagement. The reason is, that as there were no religious dogmas or doctrine authorized and protected by the state or the priesthood, the ritual worship was the only thing established and inviolable; this simply

1 It is only necessary to compare the writings of the best known investigators of the history of ancient philosophy to see how the scanty and unreliable statements of later writers, which are our only source of knowledge, have been differently understood and explained by one or another; so that the pretended results are not unfrequently very wide apart in the most important points; while very little remains that is generally accepted as true. For this reason it has been thought best not to refer in this commentary to any particular historian of ancient philosophy as a reliable guide.

2 On the Chaos and the various explanations of it see Schöm. Opusc. Acad. II, p. 29, and 68 ff.

3 Anaxagoras was prosecuted for infidelity, because he explained the sun to be a glowing mass of stone, and thus appeared to deny the god of the sun. Diog. L. I, 12. But this was surely not the only ground of the action. Comp. Schöm. Gr. Alterth. II 8, p. 585.
prescribed certain symbolic acts which were quite consistent with
different conceptions of the gods, and might be understood and ex-
plained by different persons in different ways; so that any one,
though not sharing in the prevailing belief, or even though quite
breaking loose from it in his philosophical speculations, might still
have adhered to the common ritual so as to avoid collision with the
people or priesthood. When therefore Xenophanes declared that
man had only opinions, but no positive knowledge in regard to the
gods, no fault was found with him, because he did not thereby deny
their existence; still less when he rejected the fables of the gods
given by Homer, Hesiod, and other poets, pronouncing them ridicu-
lous, undignified, and in part blasphemous. We are not to suppose
that the priests or the people ever regarded these fables as anything
more than entertaining stories or perhaps picturesque allegories, not
to be taken literally; they did not consider them as real histories
which the poets had received by revelation and which it was sinful
not to believe.\(^1\) Undoubtedly the fables had a real influence upon
the belief of the multitude, and gave rise to very unworthy and per-
verted conceptions of the gods, which were only too easily taken up
and held fast when the deities were imagined to be like men. The
more clear-thinking minds however, though not themselves sharing
these anthropomorphic conceptions, doubtless saw very well the use-
lessness of attempting to convince the people of their error, and
were satisfied if they could succeed in clearing them of all the
attendant lowness and immorality. We have, it is true, no definite
information of the attitude of the older philosophers in this matter;
but all that we know is quite in harmony with the view here ad-
vanced. Although Xenophanes for example and Parmenides recog-
nized only one true god, and did not consider the popular deities as
gods at all in the real sense, but only as something between god and
man, they yet accommodated their language to the common usage,
and designated them also as gods.\(^2\) We have express evidence too

\(^1\) Particular fables might certainly for some reason or other be held in espe-
cial veneration among the people, so that any one who denied them passed
among believers for a godless free-thinker. See Lucian. Philops. c. 3. But
except for this the phrase, πολλας ψειδονται ἀωδοί, had even become proverbial,

\(^2\) See Xenophanis carm. reliquiae, ed. Karsten, p. 103, and 113 ff.
that Pythagoras paid a pious reverence to the popular gods\(^1\); and none of the older philosophers seems to have been accused of the contrary. It is true that Socrates was reproached by his accusers with denying the gods of the people and introducing new ones; but this reproach was in fact rather a deduction drawn by themselves from certain utterances of Socrates than one which he had deserved by his actual opinions. We know on the contrary by the most credible evidence\(^2\) that he by no means withdrew from the traditional worship of the gods, and hence did not deny their existence; although he imagined them as different from the common conception, and thought it most advisable not to touch upon the mythological fables unless occasion required.\(^3\) Nor did the pupils of Socrates find it necessary to deny the existence of the popular deities, although Plato held that there was a higher god above them whose creatures and servants they were: and we do not find that he was attacked for despising the popular religion. His opinion of the mythological fables may be sufficiently gathered from the fact that he banishes from his ideal state the poets who originated and circulated them; although he is not at all opposed in itself to a mythological form of discourse upon divine things: indeed he often makes use of it to express figuratively what he cannot express literally. Antisthenes too assumed, like Plato, only one supreme deity, but did not hesitate to make the multitude of popular deities subordinate to him. He regarded the mythological fables, at least in part, as allegories: and expressed in the severest manner his disapproval of the conceptions of the gods which corresponded to the literal sense of the fables.\(^4\) Aristotle took the same course\(^5\): and what we read of his disciples, as for example Heraclides of Pontus or Theophrastus (Cic. Nat. Deor. I, 13, 34, 35), shows only views which, though foreign to the popular religion, are still not irreconcilable with it. No more did Strato come into collision with the popular faith in accepting,

\(^2\) See Xenophon, Mem. I, 1, 2; II, 6, 8; IV, 3, 12; 7, 10. Anab. III, 1, 5.
\(^3\) Plat. Phaed. p. 118 A.
\(^4\) Comp. Plat. Phaedr. p. 220 C; Republ. III, 378 D.
\(^6\) Comp. C. Zell, De Aristotelis patriarum religionum aestimatore, Heidel. 1847.
according to Cicero and others, a blind, unconscious natural force as the beginning of things; for he might have derived the gods also from this force, just as for example the Hesiodic theogony derives them from Chaos.

The relation then between the philosophers thus far spoken of and the popular religion was, at the least, a peaceful one; although they did not expressly defend, they still did not attack it; they easily kept on good terms with it, and allowed it all the influence it could command. But the Sophists took up a hostile position; and the most noted among them, however differing in other matters, had this in common, that, as Protagoras expressed it, they made man the measure of all things; that is, they denied to the human mind the faculty of forming anything more than a subjective judgment of things, and held that objective truth was unattainable. For them therefore, least of all things, could the substance of the popular religion lay claim to pass for anything more than a subjective conception. Protagoras expressed himself thus: that whether there were gods or not, that is, whether there was any actual reality corresponding to the common religious conceptions, he did not attempt to say. Prodicus seems to have regarded the belief in the gods in the same way; he thought that mankind had revered, deified and worshipped the objects they found most beneficial and indispensable to their life, such as the sun, moon, stars, fire, rivers and the like. Others declared religion to be simply the invention of shrewd lawmakers who tried to control the passions and bridle the fierceness of men by the fear of supernatural powers.1 Finally, others explained the supposed gods to be only men of old times, rulers and heroes, who had been deified; and they regarded the myths as distorted accounts of their doings and sufferings. This last view is called the historic or pragmatic, because it claimed to find in the myths actual events, though not free from falsification; it is also called the Euhemeristic view, after Euhemerus of Messana spoken of in the note to I, 42, 119, who elaborated it and applied it to almost all the popular deities, although many similar explanations of the myths had been tried before him. But Euhemerus does not seem to have set out from a distinct philosophical system or any positive views on the deity

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based upon it. The circumstance that he is spoken of as an atheist must not be taken for a proof that he entirely denied the existence of a deity; for that term was not unfrequently applied to such as only declared their disbelief in the gods of the people. Euhemerus had many followers. Among them were the theologi, mentioned by Cicero, III, 21, 53; from the same passage we learn that, in consequence of the many and contradictory fables that were current about each of the gods, it had been found necessary to distinguish several persons of the same name, in order to remove the contradictions. For this reason Johannes the Lydian (De Mensibus IV, 48) calls this view the heroic and separatist view, τὸν ἡρωικὸν καὶ μεριστικὸν λόγον; the first, because it explained the gods to be heroes of the olden time, the second, because it distinguished the fables in the manner just alluded to.

Other philosophers, antagonists of the popular belief, directed their arguments not against the existence of gods of all sorts, but only of such gods as the people imagined. To this class belong especially Democritus and Epicurus, who conceded the truth of the popular faith only to a limited extent; they held that a belief so universally diffused and so fast-rooted in the minds of men must be more than a mere illusion, that some reality must lie at the foundation of it. But further than this they did not go; they allowed no voice to the common belief in regard to the nature of the gods, to their power and influence over the world and mankind; on these points they claimed that speculation alone had a right to be heard. Accordingly Democritus explained the gods to be atomic shapes, emanations from a universal divine substance, evidently very different beings from the popular deities; yet not without influence, sometimes benevolent, sometimes hostile, upon the lives of men. But Epicurus went further. His gods, atomic shapes like those of Democritus, lived in happy idleness, without the slightest influence upon the world, with no evident relations to human life; and when he spoke of a religious reverence due to the gods in view of their happiness and their majesty, he evidently did so with no real conviction; although it would be too much to say that he did not believe the existence of any gods, and only pretended to do so

1 See the note on I, 43, 120.
for fear of persecution. The reasons against this opinion may be found at the end of the Summary of the first book.

The Stoics maintained a very different attitude towards the popular belief; to a certain degree at least they undertook to support and defend it. They distinguished at the outset a threefold theology: the political, the mythical or poetical, and the philosophical or physical. By the first they understood the religious ordinances recognized in the various states, and placed under the control of the public authority; that is, the traditional or legally established regulations about the deities to be worshipped in the state, and the manner of paying this worship. The second head comprised the fables recounted by the poets of the gods and their doings. So far as these pretended to be narratives of actual events, they were entirely rejected by the Stoics as being equally destitute of external or internal truth; that is, they neither contained any basis of fact, nor were they in harmony with the nature of the gods. Of course they thought they discovered a kernel of truth in many fables, a physical or ethical proposition under a mythical form, but certainly not in all; and they disapproved in general of the mythical form of treatment of these subjects, because few persons understood it, and the majority were misled by it into false and perverted conceptions of the gods. They thought, however, to find the key to the understanding of the most important fables in the third part, the physical or philosophic theology; this not only undertook to prove in general the existence of divine beings and a divine order and government of the world, but also recognized the deities proposed by the political theology as objects of worship; and although not representing this recognition as necessary, it at least sought to justify it as reasonable and probable. As the chief heads of this physical theology of the Stoics are contained in Cicero's second book, and are grouped together in the Summary of that book, we may refer to that for the details, adding however here a few observations.

It is customary to call the theology of the Stoics pantheistic; and it is so in so far that it places the deity in the world, and regards it as coextensive with and pervading all its parts. The deity of the

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1 Comp. Ps. Plutarch De plac. phil. I, 6, 8. Varro and Scævola made the same distinctions. See Augustine C. D. IV, 27; VI, 5. Comp. also Eusebius pr. evang. IV, 1, p. 138, Heinich.
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Stoics is not a purely spiritual, immaterial being; it is at once matter and spirit inseparably united. But this spiritual and material essence manifested itself in the creation of the world in such a way that two modes of its activity may be distinguished. Its material essence, represented as the finest, fire-like ether, condensed itself in part to a coarser nature, and thus arose the matter of the world, the ἅλη, at first only an ἀτομος οὐσία with no definitely marked qualities; this matter then divided itself in gradations into different elements, from the continual action of which each on the other, under the influence of the law implanted in them by the original divine being, a well ordered whole, the κόσμος, the universe proceeded. The universe is thus an emanation from the deity, the connection between the two still of course subsisting. We may regard it as a body, in which the deity is present as the animating soul. But we must not be misled into considering the deity only as the soul of the universe; it is rather only a part of the original deity that is embodied in the universe; the deity does not itself for that cease to exist, exalted above the universe; it is not simply immanent, it is also transcendent. The divine ether mingled with no grosser stuff encircles the world that has proceeded from it; from it soul and life continually flow forth into the world, without its ever being exhausted; the grosser elements rather, out of which the corporeal world has been formed, will all gradually be dissolved by it and absorbed into it; the world returns to the deity, to come forth again from it anew.

The primæval deity is conceived of as a self-conscious, thinking, willing, wise, or in other words as a personal being; but in the universe that has proceeded from it there arise, as individual manifestations of the all-pervading divine ether other beings likewise self-conscious, thinking, willing, hence personal beings; and these are of two sorts: the less perfect, laden with coarser bodies, limited to a short life, burdened with manifold weaknesses and defects, but still capable of perfection and of wisdom; these are mankind; and, secondly, the

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3 See note on II, 46, 118.
more perfect beings, of purer etherial substance, without gross bodies, sinless and wise from the beginning; these are the gods (see II, 13, 35). Considered in this respect the theology of the Stoics may be characterized as a monotheism and a polytheism combined. For the one being, whence everything has proceeded, is alone God in the true sense of the word, uncreated, imperishable, and eternal. The other gods are not eternal, but created and perishable beings, that at the universal dissolution of all things will return into the primæval being whence they came. Further, in the recognition by the Stoics of different sorts of such created gods we may recognize on the one hand a logical deduction from their speculative physics, on the other only a concession to the popular faith. It followed from their physical views of the constitution of the fire-like ether, that they also had to explain the constellations, which consisted of it, to be gods. But when they accepted gods that were only deified mortals, or gods only as originators and controllers of certain human relations and moral forces, or as givers of various gifts, they evidently only followed the popular belief; and so in Cicero's account of their doctrines (II, 23, 60) we do not find, as in the case of the highest deity and of the constellations, a demonstration of the existence of these gods, but only the simple remark, that such deities were accepted by wise men without reason. The same is the case with the gods which we may designate as natural spirits, which bear rule in various parts of the world, the earth, the sea, the fire, &c. The Stoics accepted these too, because they found the belief in them among the people, and because they felt obliged, not to reject, but rather to recognize a sort of natural revelation in the popular faith, so far as it contained nothing contradictory to reason, nothing plainly false and perverted. But it cannot be ignored, that all these deities occupied an uncertain and ambiguous position in their system of theology; and if we had fuller accounts than have actually come down to us of the views of individual Stoics, we should doubtless find not only that they had differed among themselves on this point, but that the same thinker had not always consistently held the same opinion. The Stoics were reproached by their antagonists with believing that the popular gods were such only in name, not in reality; partly because they represented them as created and perishable beings, and conceded immortality only to the one highest being, whom it is true they called
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Zeus,¹ and partly because these gods according to the Stoic explanations were no persons, but things, relations, capacities, &c.²; hence the Stoics have been attacked as being atheists. But these two reproaches are easily seen to neutralize each other; for if these gods were for the Stoics only things, relations and capacities, and if they were only called gods by way of personification, the Stoics could not be blamed for considering them mortal; they could not of course exist longer than the world. The other reproach could only reasonably be made by those persons who acquitted the Stoics of the second (namely that the gods were only to be held as such by a figure of speech), while they recognized their belief in the personality of the gods. And in reality it is difficult to see why the Stoics, if not all, at least some or perhaps many of them might not have held that belief. The consistency of the system certainly in no wise forbade their acknowledging the existence of superhuman beings who, as servants and helpers of the supreme god, presided over the world and human life in various spheres and relations; and thus they could always without hesitation assent to the popular faith which offered them such deities. It was a contradiction with the popular faith that they conceived them to be mortal, but not one worthy of blame. The popular faith was not shocked at the idea of gods that had had a beginning; and if in spite of this it held such gods as immortal, the Stoics were on the other hand more consistent; and the whole reproach, carefully examined, amounts to no more than this, that, since immortality is necessarily included in the idea of the deity, their gods, as not being immortal, were really no gods, but only superhuman, demonic beings: but on the other hand as a compensation for this they conceived the one supreme God of a majesty truly divine.

A third reproach, which is often made against the Stoics, is that they degraded the gods by teaching that man owed to them only inferior endowments and external goods, while he could attain to wisdom and virtue by himself alone.³ This reproach too has no sense except we concede that the gods were for the Stoics real

¹ Plutarch. contra Stoic, c. 31, and De Stoic. repugn. c. 38.
³ Plutarch. adv. Stoic, c. 32.
persons, and not simply names; and secondly it does not touch them all, nor does it touch the system at all. The only idea in harmony with the system was that the origin of all virtue and wisdom is in the one highest, the only true God. Man, whose spirit is an emanation from the divine being,\(^1\) bears within him for this reason the capacity for virtue and wisdom; but this is much restrained and borne down by the body to which it is bound; and the task of man is to break loose from the fetters. But there was in the system of the Stoic theology no clear decision whether in this task man must rely simply on himself and his own power, that is on the power of the indwelling divine being, or whether he could have the comforting aid of friendly gods; and a person might think as he pleased on this question.\(^2\) It is undoubtedly true that we very often find among the Stoics proud utterances, which seem to imply a presuming arrogance, a self-sufficient reliance upon one's own power, far removed not only from Christian humility, but even from the self-knowledge and modesty of the heathen; but we must not overlook the fact that such utterances always speak of the God in man, that is, of the part of the divine being that dwells in him; and that they rest only upon the consciousness of the true and higher nature of man and of its becoming attitude towards the exterior world. When the Stoic appeals to this consciousness, he does so in a sense not materially different from that in which the Christian teacher reminds men that they are the children of God and that the spirit of God dwells in them.\(^3\) Nor must we forget another thing, that in such utterances the reference is only to the wise man, or the man in whom the ideal of human perfection is realized; an ideal which the individual rarely or never succeeds in reaching. But the Stoic Balbus (Cic. N. D. II, 66) states very plainly that in the struggle for perfection man needs the help of those higher powers that are kindly disposed towards him and are free from the imperfections and faults of human nature; and the assertion, that we must rely upon ourselves and our own powers for wisdom and virtue, and can ask and expect from the

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\(^2\) Comp. Antonin. IX, 40, with Gataker's notes.

\(^3\) This is also the opinion of Fleury in his book Saint Paul et Sénèque, I, p. 93. Comp. Upton on Epictet. I, 14, 6; II, 8, 11; 16, 42.
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gods external good things only, is not made by the Stoic, but by the Academic as against the Stoic (III, 36, 87). He is wrong in representing this view as generally prevailing (as is shown in the note to that passage); but those who consider it as the only opinion held by the Stoics are no more in the right; for in the Stoic system there was nothing which clashed at all with the directly opposite view.

While the Stoic theology attempted in the manner just described partly to correct and complete, partly to explain and so support the popular religion, it encountered, in common with the irreligion of Epicurus, which in reality was little better than atheism, the opposition of the critical scepticism of the New Academy, which held any certain knowledge on any subject to be impossible, conceding only a greater or less degree of probability; and hence carried on a continual strife with the dogmatism of the other schools. Arcesilas, the founder of this later Academy, not only repeated the famous proposition of Socrates, that he knew only one thing, and that was, that he knew nothing; but he went beyond him, saying that even this, that he knew nothing, he did not know, but only surmised it. He and his followers considered nothing as absolutely certain but reason and the right of using it; even this however they held could not help us to a sure knowledge of things. All thought, so they argued, can only proceed upon certain data; the only data we have are those of experience, which come from impressions on the senses; but these impressions are unreliable, they are undoubtedly often false, and there is no perfectly sure criterion whereby to distinguish the true from the false. Hence complete certainty of knowledge is impossible; we can only attain to mere opinions. These may be true, they may be false as well; and after all testing and comparing we can do no more than distinguish various grades of probability; and, since actual knowledge is beyond our reach, we must content ourselves with reasonable opinion and belief. Hence, whenever a definite opinion was advanced on any subject, they were accustomed to take the opposite side, in order to show that there was nothing which did not admit of discussion, and that it became the wise man to withhold any definite and confident judgment; assen-

— Cicero himself held this doctrine, as

1 Cic. Acad. I, 12, 45. For Socrates, however, comp. Plat. Men., p. 98 B.
he also professes in the present book I, 5, 10–12; reserving at the same time his right, while giving up the hope of certainty, to hold the opinion, which might in any case seem the most probable. We notice that he uses this right at the end of the third book. While Velleius declares his entire agreement with the simply negative criticism which Cotta had made of the discourse of Balbus, Cicero says that for himself the positive views of Balbus seemed the more probable; and there is no reason to doubt that he thereby expressed his real opinion. For however much he recognized the want of scientific rigor in the Stoic dogmatism, and however strong he found many of the objections made by the Academic, his faith in the existence of higher beings and a divine providence and government of the world was none the less a living one. But it is not necessary to suppose that all the details of the Stoic system, all the sorts of gods they accepted, and all that they held in regard to divine apparitions and revelations were equally a part of his faith. He held only to the general truth of the existence of divine beings and the divine government of the world\(^1\); and as the Stoics held this too, their doctrine appears to him for this reason to come nearer to the truth than the Academic negation, which however, as Cotta plainly enough remarks, is not so much a negation of religion itself as of the reasoning advanced by the Stoics in its behalf. The Academic way of thinking is quite in harmony with a sort of Eclecticism which seems to have been the only resource for a heathen of religious and thoughtful mind in a matter like this, where the limits of human nature make absolute knowledge impossible.

The opinion, held by some, that Cicero has inserted much in the discourse of Balbus that was gathered not from his Stoic predecessors but from other quarters, seems to be not well founded. It has been remarked above that various views about the gods and divine things were found in the Stoic system without regard to consistency; and it is capable of proof that in fact the most noted Stoics held conflicting views on many points. Hence there is no sufficient reason to suppose that Cicero did not really take from some Stoic or other the whole discourse which he puts into the mouth of Balbus.

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\(^1\) Comp. De Divin. II, 72, 148.
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We cannot say with certainty who this predecessor was; but many reasons, which need not be given here in detail, point to the Rhodian Posidonius, who is spoken of in the note to I, 3, 6, and who, as Cicero says in that passage, had been his teacher; and doubtless the teacher of Balbus also, since Cotta I, 44, 123, calls him familiaris omnium nostrum. His work περὶ θεῶν was one of considerable extent: Diogenes Laertius, VII, 138, cites the thirteenth book; so that Cicero gave only a short extract. It is possible, though we have no evidence, that he also made use of other Stoic writings. All that he cites from Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus and Panaetius, even if he had ever read them, he might have found in Posidonius: and even what he says in II, 34 of the sphere of Posidonius could have been found in the same author. He however differs from him in some particulars, as for example the size of the moon, II, 40, 103; and the whole astronomical part of § 104 appears to have been worked up independently. Of course the etymologies of the Latin names of the gods, II, 26, 27, as well as the examples from Roman history are Cicero's own, given perhaps in place of others used by Posidonius.1 Besides in I, 44, 123 he himself cites the fifth book of Posidonius De Natura Deorum.

It has been conjectured that Cicero took his account of the Epicurean doctrine from a work of the Epicurean Phaedrus περὶ θεῶν which he requests the loan of in a letter to Atticus (XIII, 39)²; and as we find among the fragments of an Epicurean theological treatise discovered at Herculaneum a portion with which the exposition of Cicero in the first book, c. 15, 39-41, though much shorter, yet in the main coincides, the conclusion has been drawn that those fragments were a part of this treatise of Phaedrus.³ But it is now conceded that the fragments of Herculaneum, which were published subsequently in the Herculensium collectio altera, Neap. 1862, tom. II, belonged rather to a treatise of Philodemus περὶ ἐνθουσίας. It is very probable that Cicero made use of this

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1 Comp. De Divin. II, 3, 8.
2 The Mss. have there, it is true, περὶ σοφῶν; but the emendation περὶ θεῶν seems open to no doubt.
3 Under the title Phaedri Epicurei, vulgo anomymi Herculanensis, de natura deorum fragmentum instauratum et illustratum, what was then known was published and commented upon by Chr. Petersen in the Programm zum Lectionsverzeichniss des Hamburg. Akad. Gymnasium, 1833.
treatise, considering the coincidence of several passages above alluded to, but not quite certain; for similar notices and opinions doubtless occurred in many other Epicurean documents.\(^1\)

The discourses assigned by Cicero to the Academic in the first book against the Epicurean doctrine, and in the third book against the Stoics, were without any doubt taken from one of the many writings of Clitomachus. There existed no less than four hundred books of this philosopher, in which he had made note of the oral teachings of his master Carneades. But not only does Cicero himself several times appeal to Carneades, but many of the arguments which he makes against the Stoics are found in the same form in Sextus Empiricus in the ninth book of the treatise against the mathematicians, i.e., against the dogmatics, and they are there ascribed to Carneades. Although they are in part evidently sophistical, they are still in general well adapted to prove what Cicero makes Cotta say, that there is a great difference between religious faith and scientific knowledge; that faith rests upon something different from dialectic argument, and that whoever seeks to found it upon such runs the risk rather of weakening it. But we may well suppose that many among the ancients were reasonable enough to see with Cotta that faith itself was not overthrown by the refutation of insufficient rational grounds, and that there was such a thing as an immediate certainty of faith, independent of the strength or weakness of logical arguments.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) This is also the opinion of the reviewer of the Herculaneum, published by Drummond and Walpole (London, 1820), in the Quarterly Review, Vol. III, No. 5, p. 15.

\(^2\) A te enim philosopho rationem accipere debo religionis, maioribus etiam nulla ratione reddita credere says Cotta III, 2, 6. Now it is of course beyond all doubt that it was utterly impossible for a thinking man at that time really to hold such a position toward all the tenets of the traditional religion of the people as Cotta in this passage professes himself to hold, and that much, perhaps the most of it, was professed only for political reasons as a means to any thing but religious ends; but still it would not be just for this reason utterly to deny to the thinkers of those times any religious faith whatever, as has in fact been done. "What is more unworthy of a philosopher than to deny the existence of the gods?" says Cotta III, 17, 44; and he was certainly sincere. But the appeal to the tradition handed down from the forefathers indicates in general a consciousness that a real knowledge of divine things is impossible for man, and that therefore religion, which as a matter of fact was everywhere existent, must have some other source than knowledge. It is not to be wondered at
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It remains now to add something in regard to the persons whom Cicero has introduced as advocates of the three schools of philosophy. We know little more of the Epicurean Velleius, probably of Lanuvium (see Orelli on I, 29, 82), than that he was tribune of the people in the year 664. In De Orat. III, 21, 78, Cicero calls him a familiaris of the famous orator L. Licinius Crassus, but himself rudem in dicendi exercitatione. We will not discuss the truth of the compliment that he was considered the most noted representative among the Romans of the Epicurean school. Lucretius, of whom we have a didactic poem, excellent in its way, on the Epicurean philosophy, was much younger than Velleius, but was no longer living when Cicero wrote this.

We know no more of the speaker for the Stoic school than we learn from Cicero. It seems from a fragment of the Ciceronian Hortensius (Orelli, p. 484) that he was also introduced in that treatise as one of the speakers.

C. Aurelius Cotta, the Academic, born in 630, and so eighteen

therefore that the idea sprang up, that the gods had once revealed to man somewhat about themselves and their relation to him and to the universe, more or less, according to his need of or capacity to receive such revelation. And it was so very evident that such original revelation had been in the course of time in many ways misunderstood and counterfeited, misrepresented and corrupted, now from carelessness, now from malice, that no sensible man could shut his eyes to the fact; but there was the greatest variety of views as to how far one could or must go in separating the true from the false, revelation from the devices of men, what was to be held from what to be rejected. There were believers and free-thinkers of all grades; but we can no more say that the freethinker must necessarily and unconditionally have been destitute of faith, than that the believer necessarily believed everything. — In regard to the appeal to a revelation made to the men of old, an appeal which, more or less seriously meant, occurs innumerable times among the ancients, the reader is referred to the essay of Prof. Schoemann, "Ueber das sittlich-religiöse Verhalten der Griechen," Greifswald, 1848, p. 35. — There is no want of modern well-known and much-read delineations of the religious condition of the thinkers of those times, the authors of which take pleasure in bringing out into prominence chiefly the weaknesses and errors from which of course few were free, but who allow nothing like a really religious feeling, and are especially fond of ridiculing the Stoic religious philosophy as empty talk. This is easily explained. The writers of these descriptions stand upon much higher ground, and cannot easily recognize in others a religious frame of mind that is so far inferior to their own.
years older than Cicero, was one of those who were accused of maiestatis under the Lex Varia (see note on III, 33, 81). He went into exile; but returned to Rome with Sulla in 672, where he was made pontifex and consul in 679. In the latter office he carried a lex tribunicia: ut tribunis plebis liceret postea alios magistratus capere, quod lege Sullae iis erat ademptum. Ascon. in Corn., p. 78 Or. After his consulate he went to Gaul and succeeded in establishing a claim to the honor of a triumph, which was granted him; he did not live to enjoy it, but died a few days before it was to happen. Ascon. in Pison., p. 14. He is very highly spoken of not only for a most exact knowledge of philosophy, but also as an orator; and even when a young man he had made a bold defence in court of Rutilius, his maternal uncle (see note on III, 32, 80). He was plainly in every respect a fitting representative of Cicero, who takes for himself in the conversation only the part of a quiet listener.

Cicero represents these three men as assembled on one occasion during the Latin feast at the house of Cotta, probably in one of his villas, — and as giving their various views about the nature of the gods in a conversation, where he was himself present, as he happened to be visiting Cotta at the time. The date of this supposed conversation must be placed between the year 679, the year of Cotta’s consulship, and 676, in which Cicero returned from a prolonged absence in Greece, where he had busied himself particularly with philosophic studies; and these are alluded to doubtless in I, 6, 15.

The book opens with a dedication to M. Junius Brutus, afterwards the murderer of Caesar, a man whose finished philosophical culture and writings are often mentioned with the greatest deference by Cicero, who was himself twenty-one years his senior. Excellens omni genere laudis, he says of him in Acad. I, 3, 12, sic philosophiam Latinis litteris persequitur, nihil ut iisdem de rebus Graecia desideret. He professed the doctrines of the Academy of Antiochus, for which the note to I, 3, 6 may be consulted. We have none of his works remaining; but Seneca, Consol. ad Helv. c. 9, quotes a short passage from his book De Virtute, and in epist. 95 something from that peri kalókounos (de officiis’); but Quintilian, X, 1, 123, says that in

his philosophical writings he was egregius multoque quam in orationibus praestantior; and further suffecti ponderi rerum; scias eum sentire quae dicit. Besides the books De Natura Deorum Cicero dedicated to him De Finibus, the Tusculan Disputations, the Para- doxa and the Orator; and called by his name the book De Claris Oratoribus, where Brutus is one of the speakers.

The date of writing this book may be determined, if not with entire certainty, yet with the greatest probability. That it was written before the murder of Cæsar, that is before the Ides of March, 710, follows without any doubt from the manner in which Cæsar’s supremacy is spoken of in I, 4, 7; and that Cicero was occupied upon it in the summer of 709 may be inferred from the letter\(^1\) to Atticus written in June of this year (XIII, 39, 2), where he asks him for the book of Phædrus ἐρεί βεὼν doubtless to make use of it in the composition of this book. — But the greater part of Cicero’s philosophical works, the Academica, De Finibus, Tusculan Disputations, De Divinatione, De Fato, De Senectute, De Officiis, De Amicitia, and the De Universo or Timaeus, a translation of that of Plato, among those which are wholly or in part extant; and the De Consolatione, Hortensius, De Gloria, and perhaps De Virtutibus among those which are lost with the exception of a few fragments, were written in the short interval between the spring of 709 and the autumn of 710, in the sixty-second and sixty-third years of his life; and while we are astounded at a literary activity of such extent, we learn, partly from the prefaces to these treatises and partly from the letters to Atticus, the occasion of writing them, and Cicero’s state of mind at the time. Hortata est, he says, N. D., I, 4, 9, ut me ad haec conferrem, animi aegritudo, fortunae magna et gravi commota iniuria, cuius si maiorem aliquam levationem reperire potuisset non ad hanc potissimum configissem. This hard stroke of fortune alluded to was the death in March, 709, of his daughter Tullia, his favorite child, to whom he was most tenderly devoted, and whose loss afflicted him most deeply. He expresses his state of mind in a letter to Atticus (XII, 14, 3), written in March, 709: Nihil de maerore minuendo scriptum ab ullo est, quod ego non legerim; sed

DE NATURA DEORUM.

omnem consolationem vincit dolor. Quin etiam feci, quod profecto ante me nemo, ut ipse me per litteras consolaver.1 Affirmo tibi nullam consolationem esse talem. Totos dies scribo, non quo proficiam aliquid; sed tantisper impediorn, non equidem satis,—vis enim uryget,—sed relaxor tamen enitorque ad animum reficiendum. There was no opportunity, as public affairs were at the time, for him to engage in them with dignity and success, and so obtain relief from his sorrow; and this condition of the state itself for a man like Cicero was no less a source of sadness, than his own domestic grief.

When we consider these circumstances we are little disposed to pass a strict judgment on Cicero's philosophical works, but rather to excuse many undoubted shortcomings in an old man afflicted and borne down by sadness and care. Even a philosopher by profession would hardly have been able in such a state of mind and in so short a time to write satisfactorily upon all the most difficult problems of philosophy at such length; how much less a man, who, however earnestly he had studied these subjects, was really only a dilettante; and who for the larger and better part of his life had been occupied as a statesman and an advocate with great activity and brilliant success. His philosophical writings are in fact little else than translations or extracts from Greek predecessors2; and we should not wonder at many misunderstandings or other traces of haste and carelessness, which have been occasionally noticed in the notes of this volume, and which have given a welcome opportunity to critics fond of emendations to show their skill. A striking case of this haste is the hesterno die II, 29, 73, and nudius tertius III, 7, 18, as if the conversation had occupied three days, whereas the beginning of the second as well as that of the third book represent it as begun and finished on one and the same day.3 These defects must not however prevent us from a thankful recognition of Cicero's merits even as a philosophical writer. He was the first to develop the Latin

1 This refers to the lost De Consolatione, the fragments of which are found in Orelli IV, 2, p. 489 ff.

2 He himself once calls them ἀπόγραφα. Ad Attic. XII, ep. 52: Ἀπόγραφα sunt; minore labore sunt; verba tantum affero, quibus abundo.

3 Nudius tertius would be an error too with the division into three days, as in that case the discourse of Balbus, to which it refers, been made on the day immediately preceding, and not two days.
language so as to make it fit for the treatment of philosophical subjects; more than any one else he promoted and made easy the pursuit of these studies for his countrymen; and finally we owe to him an acquaintance with many portions of the ancient philosophy of which we should otherwise be quite ignorant; and however disparaging the judgment of many people nowadays, no one can deny the importance of these works for the history of philosophy.
BOOK FIRST.

SUMMARY.

THE first book opens with a preface addressed to M. Brutus stating the subject of the present work, noting its importance in a theoretical and practical way, and calling attention to the great difference of opinions held upon it by thinkers from the earliest times (§§ 1-5). Cicero then excuses himself for treating a subject of this sort as against certain persons who had been surprised at his beginning to write upon philosophical subjects so late in life, and especially at his preference for the Academic philosophy; and he closes his defence with the very just remark that it is precisely on the question of the nature of the gods that this endless variety of opinions would seem to warrant the attitude of the Academics, who gave up anything like dogmatic certainty, and contented themselves with simple probability (5-14). He passes on then to the narrative of a supposed conversation upon this matter between Cotta, Velleius and Balbus, at which he was present and which forms the subject of the following books.

Velleius the Epicurean commences his discourse with a few preliminary remarks against Plato and the Stoics, whose views about the deity as creator of the world and about the divinity of the universe he ridicules as absurd and arbitrary (18-24), and then passes on to a critical summary of all the opinions advanced from the days of Thales down to the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon (25-41)\(^1\); a summary which, however superficial and unsatisfactory as well in the relation of the opinions themselves as in the reasons adduced against

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\(^1\) We know from the Hercul. Fragm. (see Introd., p. 15) and from Lucret. I, 635-920 that the Epicureans were accustomed to commence the exposition of their own doctrine with a criticism of other systems of natural philosophy.
them, is still not without value for the history of philosophy, because no fuller compilation of this sort has come down to us from antiquity. — After a cursory glance at the myths of the poets and the fantastic notions of some foreign nations (42, 43) there follows the exposition of the doctrine of Epicurus, as being the first satisfactory solution after so many fruitless attempts.

Epicurus starts from the natural and universal consciousness of god as the only sure and irrefragable proof of the existence of the gods. This very consciousness too testifies to their happiness and immortality; from which it further follows, that they neither are occupied about anything nor interfere at all with other beings; they are disturbed by no affections such as love or hate; and so because of the sublimity and excellence of their nature they may be objects of reverence, but never of fear (44, 45). In regard to their form and other matters the data of natural consciousness taken with reasonable inferences lead to the following conclusions: first, that the gods have human forms, because nobody has ever conceived them under any other, none other is more beautiful and more worthy of the gods, and none other is ever found united with reason (46, 47): second, that they have not a coarse material body like an earthly one, cognizable by the senses, but that their bodies consist of an infinitely finer substance which is only quasi body and quasi blood, perceptible not by the senses but by the mind, which is continually and directly affected by impressions (imagines) which flow forth from the gods (48, 49). Upon further reflection, to which they prompt the human mind, we arrive at the conception of the gods as happy and immortal beings, in conformity with the law of isonomy or of equal proportion¹; this law forces us to the conclusion that, as there exists an infinite number of destroying forces, there must also be an infi-

¹ This law of isonomy we find mentioned only in Cicero; other writers say nothing of it even when occasion seemed to require it, as, e.g., Sext. Emp. adv. Math. IX, 46. It reminds one of the law of equilibrium of the elements, spoken of by Origen, cfr. Cels. IV, 63: τὸ ἰσοστάσιον τῶν στοιχείων ἀπὸ τῆς προνοίας γίνεται οὐκ ἐπιτρεπόντος πλεονεκτεῖν τὸ ἐν, ἵνα μὴ δ κόσμος φθαρῇ. Comp. Plutarch, Def. orac. c. 34; Heralclid., p. 444 Gal. This doctrine was surely older than Epicurus, see Ps. Arist. De mundo c. 5; and his isonomy evidently resembles this much more than it resembles the Platonic doctrine, Phaed., p. 70, E: γίγνεται πάντα οἷς ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, with which it is compared by Wytenbach in the Disputat. before Plato's Phaedo, p. XXXVII.
nité number of conserving forces; and in like manner that for the great number of mortal beings there must be an equal number of immortal beings; and we can imagine only the gods as corresponding to this conception (50). But if with the Stoics we suppose the universe itself to be God, or if we accept the existence in the universe of a God that governs it, we only inflict upon the deity a burden and a care, which is in plain contradiction with the idea of happiness (51, 52). Nor is there any need of a divine ruler or creator of the world, since it has arisen from atoms by the force of nature; and not only one, but innumerable worlds have come, are coming and will continue to come into being in the same manner (53, 54). The Stoic doctrine inflicts upon men rulers, of whom they must be in continual dread; it leads to a belief in a necessary fatality, in soothsaying and the like; from which the doctrine of Epicurus makes them free, and inspires them with reverence for the gods without any fear (55, 56).

After this exposition of the Epicurean philosophy Cotta commences his discourse in refutation of it. He opens, after a few compliments to Velleius, with the declaration, in conformity with the principles of his school, that he is much more capable of detecting what is false, than of ascertaining what is true; and that he finds himself, with respect to the question in debate, in the same position with the poet Simonides, namely, that the longer he thinks on the subject, the more obscure it seems to him (57–60). He is very far from disputing the existence of the gods; he believes in it heartily; but if it be a question of substituting for this faith a knowledge based upon logical proof, he cannot allow the arguments adduced by Velleius to be convincing. For the circumstance adduced by Velleius, that all men believe in the existence of gods, is neither a proof of that existence, nor itself correct as a matter of fact (61–64). Nor is he any more satisfied with what was said of the essence and

1 The reversing of the order of these two propositions in Cicero has led to the misunderstanding that the gods are to be considered as the conserving forces; which of course would be in direct contradiction with the view of Epicurus; for this reason Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. III, i, p. 240, n. 1, regards the phrase about the conserving and destroying forces as an erroneous addition of Cicero’s. But Cicero merely intended, after giving the contrast between mortal and immortal, to add that of the destroying and conserving forces, which really underlies the other.
nature of the gods. The doctrine of atoms, as being the original elements of all things, is silly and untenable; but even granting it to be true, and so supposing the gods to have arisen from atoms, their immortality would be in contradiction with it (65–68). But in order to be able to maintain this immortality Epicurus takes his usual course when he wishes to escape the consequences of his own principles; he flies to other arbitrary and inconceivable propositions. The gods, says he, are not corporeal, but only quasi corporeal beings. But this quasi corporeality is a word devoid of sense, conveying no idea even to Epicurus and his disciples (69–75). But let this pass, if we will, the case is no better for the assertion that the gods have human forms. The reasons given by the Epicureans in support of this are next refuted one after another; and especially the assertion, that no person can imagine the gods under any other form, is rejected as practically false, since many represent them under the figures of beasts (76–82). But it is quite unworthy of a philosopher to appeal to representations of that sort. A person might with equal justice also maintain that the gods really bear the names that are traditionally used to denote them; and the foolishness of this is directly apparent, when we observe that the same gods are differently called among different nations.

If now we may not attribute to the gods either the human form, as we have proved, nor in deference to Epicurus any other form, it would not be venturing too much to deny their existence entirely; yet the Epicureans do not venture this for fear not only of men but also of the gods themselves (83–86). But if the assertion is made that reason can exist only in union with the human form, because we have no experience of it in any other shape, we may answer that it is quite unphilosophical to maintain that a thing of which we have no experience may not for all that have existence (87, 88).

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1 When Cotta states that Epicurus assumes this finer bodily substance, the quasi corpus of the gods, only for the purpose of explaining their immortality, it is certainly either misunderstanding or intentional misrepresentation. The immortality could only be explained according to Epicurus by the law of isonomy; at the same time he might add that the finer corporeal substance of the gods was in itself less liable to dissolution and corruption than the coarser bodies of other things. — For another misrepresentation, that Epicurus explained the immortality from the infinite multitude of atoms, see note to c. 39, 109.

2 The answer Epicurus might have made is not difficult to discern; comp. the letter to Herodotus in Diog. L. X, 75. 76.
Moreover Epicurus ought properly to have said, not that the gods had the form of men, but that men had the form of gods, because the gods, as being immortal, must have existed before men.¹ Or else he must have assumed that, when the human race came into being, chance which brought the atoms together made such a wonderful hit that men sprang up similar to the gods; and it would not be worth the trouble to argue against this (89, 90). But furthermore, the human form would be quite useless to the gods, because they have not the same necessities and occupations to which the human organization is adapted (91–94). And if the human form is still insisted upon for the gods, because without it they cannot possess reason, and hence cannot be happy, the objection must be repeated that it is idle to maintain that reason can only exist in union with the human form because we have never seen it joined with any other, and on the other hand not to see how absurd it is to attribute to the gods limbs and organs for which they can have no possible use, being according to Epicurus entirely without activity of any sort; a view, be it observed, which strips the gods of that very thing which in reality is essential to any happiness (95–102).

Suppose we grant that the gods have the human form: where do they live? Do they ever change their abode? And why? Have they any impulses at all? Do they make any use of their reason? Lastly, on what ground are they called immortal and happy?—The only answer the Epicureans have for all these questions is to talk

¹ The Academic here takes "immortal" (aeterni) as importing "without beginning" as well as "without end." But Epicurus only spoke of the life of the gods as being endless and imperishable, which was also the popular belief; he considered the gods not as without beginning, but as having come into being. In order, if not to prove, at least to render this immortality possible and credible, he had recourse to the law of isonomy, which required imperishable as the counterpart to perishable beings. Admitting the gods however to have had a beginning, he was not at all obliged to assume that their existence was prior to that of the human race. Moreover the assumption that the gods had the human form did not necessarily involve the other, that their form was imitated from it, but only that it was similar to the human form. This similarity he maintained to be a fact of universal consciousness, in virtue of the πρόληψις resulting from the impressions coming to us from the gods; he added other reasons only as cumulative arguments. When his adversaries regarded this similarity as a wonderful freak of chance, he hardly needed to mind it; for, so long as the fact was established, he could not be expected to explain the reason.
about impressions which flow to us from the gods; and these impressions, they say, received not by the senses, but by the mind, give rise in it to the conception of a happy and immortal being (103–105). Impressions of this sort however, which are simply creatures of the imagination, are more properly called dreams and fancies, and the whole theory is idle talk (106–108). If the immortality of the gods is to be deduced from the law of isonomy, we have just as good a right to conclude that there must be immortal men, because there are mortal men, and men living in the water, because there are men living on land.¹ Finally it remains unexplained, how these impressions can arise from the atoms, and the immortal gods in this way therefore are completely inexplicable (109, 110). The case is just as bad in regard to the happiness of the gods. For this cannot exist without virtue, and virtue without action is inconceivable. If with the Epicureans we place happiness in sensual enjoyment, this is itself inconceivable in the case of such gods (111, 112). There remain then only freedom from pain and the consciousness of eternal, never-ending comfort. But this is beset with difficulties; for we cannot understand how with the continual stream of atoms flowing in upon them, and taking form again flowing forth from them, the gods can have any certainty of never being annihilated. So then the Epicurean god is no more happy than he is immortal. When Epicurus speaks of piety and reverence for the gods, those are only phrases with no basis of truth; for nobody can feel reverence for such gods as his (113–116). And when he boasts of freeing men from superstition, that is all very easy if at the same time you substantially abolish the belief in the gods; the same boast may be made by those who deny the existence of any gods (117–119). Democritus too, from whom Epicurus borrowed the greater part of his doctrine, gives no satisfactory teaching about the gods, although he allows them at least to exercise a benevolent or a harmful influence on men; but Epicurus annihilates all religion out and out, and Posidonius is quite right in saying that Epicurus really did not

¹ Epicurus might answer here, that the idea of “man” is one derived only from our experience, and as such necessarily excludes the attribute of immortality and of life in the water. Beings that might be immortal, or live in the water, even if they resembled men, could not for this reason be included under the term “man.”
believe in any gods, but only made a pretence of doing so, in order to avoid unpopularity (120–124).

This is the summary of the first book; a few observations on the Academic's criticism of the theology of Epicurus have been already made in the notes; but it may not be amiss to weigh it a little more carefully. Any person possessing a moderate acquaintance with the history of ancient philosophy and the contests of the various schools knows that the fighting was not always done with fair weapons, but that misrepresentation and unjust deductions from the adversaries' propositions were not uncommon. There is no want of this in Cotta's discourse. We must recognize the reproach as well founded that the Epicurean theology undermined and destroyed all religion worthy of the name; and when Epicurus notwithstanding this talked of pious reverence for the gods because of their essential excellence, we may at least doubt whether he was really in earnest. So far as we can see from the remains of his writings or those of his followers, the idea of ἐναρέθεα was limited simply to a belief in the immortality and perfect happiness of the gods, and the rejection of all such conceptions as were inconsistent with it; and these included not only the mythological fables and many perverted and contradictory notions of the common crowd, but the teachings of other philosophers as well, who ascribed to the gods the government of the world and a care for earthly and human affairs; for Epicurus thought that this would give the gods an occupation so troublesome, burdensome and vexatious, that such a thing as happiness would be for them impossible. If the Epicureans did not entirely withdraw from the traditional rites of religion, they did so chiefly in order to give no offence, which might perhaps have brought them into danger (Plutarch, Non posse suav. vivi etc., c. 21); they did not disdain even to hold the priestly offices (Lucian, conviv. s. Lapith., c. 9); and it is quite credible, as Cicero assures us (c. 30, 85), that many of them, however free-thinking they may have been in theory, were yet in practice exceedingly superstitious. Similar contradictions between theory and practice have always been common in this matter.1

1 In regard to Epicurus personally we may confidently assume that in spite of all breaking away from religion in his philosophical speculations he still had a leaning to it at heart, for there are many signs of it in his letters and in
The other reproach made against Epicurus, that he did not in reality believe at all in the existence of the gods, plausible as it is, we may reject as unfounded. It is quite true that there was no place for the gods in his atomistic physics; and if he had contented himself simply with explaining the origin of the world and natural phenomena, he might or must have passed over the gods in silence, as in fact he really does in the letter to Herodotus (Diog. L., X, 45 ff.) which contains a short outline of his physics; it is only at the end that he characterizes the notion of a government of the world by happy and immortal beings as inadmissible. He wished however to explain psychological phenomena, the facts presented by the mind itself; and finding the belief in the gods a κοινὴ ἐννοια or πρόληψις (see note on c. 16, 43), that is, a conception generally prevalent, and, as it seemed, one naturally suggested, he found himself obliged to enter upon the subject. But his system recognized no empty and purely subjective pictures of the fancy; every conception of the mind must necessarily have come to it from outside, and that in such a manner, that the atomic pictures affected the soul either mediatey through the senses, or immediately without their intervention. He could not then explain the conception of the gods as an empty figment of the fancy; it must have been due to the action of atomic pictures upon the soul; and as the gods plainly are not perceived with the physical senses, it resulted that the soul must be directly affected by those pictures. But he was precluded from explaining these as coming up by chance (for such pictures there were) because of their continued uniform repetition; this was explicable only on the supposition that they proceeded from an object having real existence. Hence the gods must have a real existence. Furthermore since the κοινὴ ἐννοια represented the gods as happy and immortal, and this conception was warranted by the law of isonomy, they must then in reality be so. Furthermore, because they not only differed from all other worldly beings in their immortality, but also because of their happiness they could not possibly have anything to do with the world and the cares for worldly things,

other writings: his last directions in regard to the ἔναθεμα (Diog. L., X, 18) shows very well that he had not such unlimited confidence in his philosophical doctrines as to consider the traditional customs of religion quite unreasonable. Comp. Schömann, Gr. Alterth. II 8, p. 582.
SUMMARY.

it was quite consistent to assign them a separate abode in the inter-mundia (see note on c. 8, 18). Epicurus probably did not express himself further on their manner of life in the intermundia, but simply ascribed to them the undisturbed enjoyment of the highest happiness, without entering into details; for he was shrewd enough to see that it was impossible to know anything about it, and that everybody must be allowed to fancy it as it seemed to him most probable, with the limitation of course that the conception did not conflict with their happiness and immortality.

His opponents especially ridiculed his theory of the quasi corporality of the gods, which was really undeserving of it (see note on c. 18, 49). The bodily likeness of the gods to men, which Epicurus assumed for the reasons indicated by Velleius, was considered by them as ridiculous on the ground that the gods, in the utter quiet and inactivity of their lives, would have no use for the organs and members of the human body; as if Epicurus had really meant by quiet and inactivity an absolutely immovable torpidity (67–102), and not rather a simple freedom from everything like labor and trouble, which was quite compatible with a life spent in pleasures and enjoyments, only of other and more refined sorts than the earthly and human pleasures; compatible too with virtues, though of course not quite the same as those springing from earthly and human relations, but rather those corresponding to the conditions of the divine existence. Again when his opponents ridiculed Epicurus on the one hand for setting up male and female deities, including naturally the sexual relations between them; and on the other for making them all alike, and hence unable to distinguish one another (80–84), it is evident that one objection contradicts the other, and one of the two must be false. The truth probably is this: Epicurus taught that by means of the impressions or pictures which come from the gods to the soul of man we acquire only a general conception of gods similar to men, not one of individual distinguishable divine personalities; this does not however exclude the possibility of their actual existence; and when he spoke of sexual and other

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1 Objections similar to those brought by Cotta against the bodily nature of the gods of Epicurus have long ago suggested themselves to Christian theologians against the bodily nature of men after the resurrection from the dead. The reader may, if he desires, consult Strauss Christl. Glaubenslehre, Th. II, Absch. III, c. 1, § 103.
differences among the gods, he must have conceded these only as not impossible and inconceivable, but certainly he did not assert them to be certain. The objection which Cotta makes to Velleius (82–100), that this or that deity always presented himself to him under a definite form and with definite attributes, might have been easily answered by saying that all this might of course present itself to his mind; but it was only the result of seeing every day about him statues and pictures which passed for representations of the gods, but which he himself was far from considering as anything more than pictures of fancy, which had no claim whatever to truth.

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1 Cum multae res in philosophia nequaquam satis adhuc explicatae sint, tum perdifficilis, Brute, quod tu minime ignoras, et perobscura quaestio est de natura deorum, quae et ad agnitionem animi pulcherrima est et ad moderandam religionem necessaria. De qua tam variae sunt doctissimorum hominum tamque discrepantes sententiae, ut magno argumento esse debeat causam et principium philosophiae esse inscientiam, prudenterque Academicos a rebus incertis ad sensionem cohibuisse. Quid est enim temeritate turpius? aut quid tam temerarium tamque indignum sapientis gravitate atque constantia quam aut falsum sentire aut, quod non satis explorate perceptum sit et cognitum, sine ulla dubitatione defendere?

2 Velut in hac quaestione plerique, quod maxime veri simile est, et quo omnes duce natura venimus, deos esse dixerunt, dubitare se Protagoras, nullos esse omnino Diogoras Melius et Theodorus Cyrenaicus putaverunt. Qui vero deos esse dixerunt, tanta sunt in varietate et dissensione, ut eorum molestum sit dinumerare sententias. Nam et de figuris deorum et de locis atque sedibus et actione vitae multa dicuntur, deque his summa philosophorum dissensione certatur; quod vero maxi-
me rem causamque continet, utrum nihil agant, nihil moliantur, omni curatone et administratione rerum vacent, an contra ab iis et a principio omnia facta et constituta sint et ad infinitum tempus regantur atque moveantur, in primis magna dissensio est, eaque nisi diiudicatur, in summo errore necesse est homines atque in maximarum rerum ignorance versari. Sunt enim philosophi et fuerunt, qui omnino nullam habere censerent rerum humanarum procurationem deos. Quorum si vera sententia est, quae potest esse pietas, quae sanctitas, quae religio?

Haec enim omnia pure atque caste tribuenda deorum numini ita sunt, si animadvertuntur ab iis, et si est aliquid a dei immortalibus hominum generi tributum. Sin autem dei neque possunt nos iuvare nec volunt nec omnino curant nec, quid agamus, animadvertunt, nec est, quod ab iis ad hominum vitam permanare possit, quid est quod ullos dei immortalibus cultus, honores, preces adhibeamus? In specie autem fictae simulationis, sicut reliquae virtutes, item pietas inesse non potest, cum qua simul sanctitatem et religionem tolli necesse est, quibus sublatis perturbatio vitae sequitur et magna confusio; atque haud scio an pietate adversos deos sublata fides etiam et societas generis humani et una excellentissima virtus, iustitia, tollatur. Sunt autem alii philosophi, et ii quidem magni atque nobiles, qui deorum mente atque ratione omnem mundum administrari et regi censeant, neque vero id solum, sed etiam ab isdem hominum vitae consuli et provideri; nam et fruges et reliquia, quae terra pariat, et tempestates ac temporum varietates caelestae mutationes, quibus omnia, quae terra gignat, maturata putescant, a dis immortalibus tribui generi humano putant multaque, quae dicentur in his libris, colligunt, quae talia sunt, ut ea ipsa dei inmortales ad usum hominum fabricati paene videantur.

Contra quos Carneades ita multa disseruit, ut excitaret homines non socordes ad veri investigandii cupiditatem. Res enim nulla est, de qua tantopere non solum indocti, sed etiam docti dissentiant; quorum opiniones cum tam variae sint tamque inter se dissidentes, alterum fieri profecto potest, ut earum nulla,
alterum certe non potest, ut plus una vera sit. Qua quidem in causa et benivolos obiurgatores placare et invidios vituperatores confutare possimus, ut alteros reprehendisse paeniteat, alteri didicisse se gaudeant; nam qui admonent amice, docendi sunt, qui inimice insectantur, repellendi. Multum autem fluxisse video de libris nostris, quos compluris brevi tempore edidimus, variumque sermonem partim admirantium, unde hoc philosophandi nobis subito studium exitisset, partim, quid quaque de re certi haberemus, scire cupidium. Multis etiam sensi mirabile videri eam nobis potissimum probatam esse philosophiam, quae lucem eriperet et quasi noctem quandam rebus offunderet, desertaeque disciplinae et iam pridem relictae patrocinium necopinatum a nobis esse susceptum. Nos autem nec subito coeptum philosophari nec mediocrem a primo tempore aetatis in eo studio operam consumpsimus et, cum minime videbamus, tum maxime philosophabamur, quod et orationes declarant referatae philosophorum sententias et doctissimorum hominum familiaritates, quibus semper domus nostra floruit, et principes illi, Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus, Posidonius, a quibus instituti sumus. Et si omnia philosophiae praecepta referuntur ad vitam, arbitramur nos et publicis et privatis in rebus ea praestitisse, quae ratio et doctrina praeeditarit. Sin autem quis requirit, quae causa nos inpulerit, ut haec tam sero litteris mandaremus, nihil est, quod expedire tam facile possimus. Nam cum otio langueremus, et is esset rei publicae status, ut eam unius consilio atque cura gubernari necesse esset, primum ipsis rei publicae causa philosophiam nostris hominibus explicandam putavi magni existimans interesse ad decus et ad laudem civitatis res tam gravis tamque praeclaras Latinis etiam litteris contineri; eoque me minus instituti mei paenitet, quod facile sentio, quam multorum non modo discendi, sed etiam scribendi studia commoverim. Complures enim Graecis institutionibus eruditi ea, quae didicerant, cum civibus suis communicare non poterant, quod illa, quae a Graecis accepissent, Latine dici posse diffiderent. Quo in
genere tantum profecisse videmur, ut a Graecis ne verborum quidem copia vinceremur. Hortata etiam est, ut me ad haec conferrem, animi aegritudo fortunae magna et gravi commota injuria; cuius si maiorem aliquam levationem reperire potuisset, non ad hanc potissimum confugisse; ea vero ipsa nulla ratione melius frui potui, quam si me non modo ad legendos libros, sed etiam ad totam philosophiam pertractandam dedissem. Omnes autem eius partes atque omnia membra tum facillume noscuntur, cum totae quaestiones scribendo explicantur; est enim admirabilis quaedam continuatio seriesque rerum, ut alia ex alia nextra et omnes inter se aptae conligataeque videantur. Qui autem requirunt, quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt, quam necesse est; non enim tam auctores in disputando quam rationis momenta quaedam sunt. Quin etiam obest plerumque iis, qui discere volunt, auctoritas eorum, qui se docere profitentur; desinunt enim suum iudicium adhibere, id habent ratum, quod ab eo, quem probant, iudicatum vident. Nec vero probare soleo id, quod de Pythagoreis accepmus, quos ferunt, si quid adfirmarent in disputando, cum ex eis quae reretetur, quare ita esset, respondere solitos: ‘Ipse dixit’. ‘Ipse’ autem erat Pythagoras. Tantum opinio praeiudicata poterat, ut etiam sine ratione valeret auctoritas. Qui autem admirantur nos hanc potissimum disciplinam secutos, iis quattuor Academicis libros satis responsum videtur. Nec vero desertarum relictarumque rerum patrocinium suscepimus; non enim hominum interitu sententiae quoque occidunt, sed lucem auctoris fortasse desiderant; ut haec in philosophia ratio contra omnia disserendi nullamque rem aperte iudicandi profecta a Socrate, repetita ab Arcesila, confirmata a Carneade usque ad nostram viguit aetatem; quam nunc prope modum orbam esse in ipsa Graecia intellego. Quod non Academiae vitio, sed tarditate hominum arbitror contingisse. Nam si singulas disciplinas pericere magnum est, quanto maius omnis? quod facere iis necesse est, quibus propositum est veri reperiendi causa et contra omnis philoso-
phos et pro omnibus dicere. Cuius rei tantae tamque difficilis
facultatem consequutum esse me non profiteor, secutum esse
praec me fero. Nec tamen fieri potest, ut, qui hac ratione
philosophentur, ii nihil habeant, quod sequantur. Dictum est
omnino de hac re alio loco diligentius, sed, quia nimis in-
dociles quidam tardique sunt, admonendi videntur saepius.
Non enim sumus ii, quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii,
qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adiuncta esse dicamus tanta
similitudine, ut in iis nulla insit certa iudicandi et adseniendi
nota. Ex quo exstitit illud, multa esse probabilia, quae quam-
quam non perciperentur, tamen, quia visum quendam haberent
insignem et inlustrem, iis sapientis vita regeretur.

Sed iam, ut omni me invidia liberem, ponam in medio sen-
tentias philosophorum de natura deorum. Quo quidem loco
convocandi omnes videntur, qui, quae sit earum vera, iudicent. Tum
demum mihi procax Academia videbitur, si aut consen-
erint omnes, aut erit inventus aliquis, qui, quid verum sit,
invenerit. Itaque mihi libet exclamare, ut est in Synephebis:

Pró deum, populárium omnium, ómnium âdul-
scéntium.

Clámo, postulo, óbsecro, oro, plóro atque in-
plóró fidem,

non levisuma de re, ut queritur ille ‘in civitate fieri faci-
nora capitalia’:

ab amico amante argentum accipere meretrix
non vult,
bitare coget doctissimorum hominum de maxima re tanta dissension. Quod cum saepe alias, tum maxime animadverti, cum apud C. Cottam, familiarem meum, accurate sane et dili-genter de dis inmortaliibus disputatum est. Nam cum feriis Latinis ad eum ipsius rogatu arcessituque venissem, offendi eum sedentem in exedra et cum C. Velleio senatore disputantem, ad quem tum Epicurei primas ex nostris hominibus deserebant. Aderat etiam Q. Lucilius Balbus, qui tantos progressus habebat in Stoicis, ut cum excellentiibus in eo genere Graecis compararetur. Tum, ut me Cotta vidit, Peropontune, inquit, venis; oritur enim mihi magna de re altercato cum Velleio, cui pro tuo studio non est alienum te interesse. Atque mihi quoque videoe, inquam, venisse, ut dicis, oportune. Tres enim trium disciplinarum principes convenistis. M. au- tem Piso si adesset, nullius philosophiae earum quidem, quae in honore sunt, vacaret locus. Tum Cotta: Si, inquit, liber Antiochi nostri, qui ab eo nuper ad hunc Balbum missus est, vera loquitur, nihil est, quod Pisonem, familiarem tuum, desi- deres; Antiocho enim Stoici cum Peripateticis re concinere videntur, verbis discrepare; quo de libro, Balbe, velim scire quid. sentias. Egone? inquit ille. Miror Antiochum, homi-nem in primis acutum, non vidisse interesse plurimum inter Stoicos, qui honesta a commodis non nomine, sed genere toto diiungerent, et Peripateticos, qui honesta commiscerent cum commodis, ut ea inter se magnitudine et quasi gradibus, non genere different. Haec enim est non verborum parva, sed rerum permagna dissension. Verum hoc alias; nunc, quod coepimus, si videtur. Mihi vero, inquit Cotta, videtur. Sed ut hic, qui intervenit, (me intuens), ne ignoret, quae res agatur, de natura agebamus deorum, quae cum mihi videretur perob-scura, ut semper videri solet, Epicuri ex Velleio sciscitabar sententiam. Quam ob rem, inquit, Vellei, nisi molestum est, repete, quae coeperas. Repetam vero, quamquam non mihi, sed tibi hic venit adiutor; ambo enim, inquit adridens, ab eodem Philone nihil scire didicitis. Tum ego: Quid didiceri-
mus, Cotta viderit, tu autem nolo existimes me adiutorem huic venisse, sed auditorem, et quidem aequum, libero iudicio, nulla eius modi adstrictum necessitate, ut mihi, velim nolim, sit certa quaedam tuenda sententia.

Tum Velleius fidenter sane, ut solent isti, nihil tam verens, quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur, tamquam modo ex deorum concilio et ex Epicuri intermundiis descendisset, Audite, inquit, non furtilis commentaciasque sententias, non opificem aedificatoremque mundi, Platonis de Timaeo deum, nec anum fatidicam, Stoicorum πρόβολαν, quam Latine licet providentiam dicere, neque vero mundum ipsum animo et sensibus praeditum, rotundum, ardentem, volubilem deum, portenta et miracula non dissenterium philosophorum, sed somni-antium. Quibus enim oculis [animi] intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam tanti operis, qua construi a deo atque aedificari mundum facit? quae molitio, quae ferramenta, qui vectes, quae machinae, qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt? quem ad modum autem oboedire et parere voluntati architecti aëris, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt? unde vero ortae illae quinque formae, ex quibus reliqua formantur, apte cadentes ad animum afficiendum pariendosque sensus? Longum est ad omnia, quae talia sunt, ut optata magis quam inventa videantur; sed illa palmaria, quod, qui non modo natum mundum introduxerit, sed etiam manu paene factum, is eum dixerit fore sempiternum. Hunc censes primis, ut dicitur, labris gustasse physiologiam, id est naturae rationem, qui quicquam, quod ortum sit, putet aeternum esse posse? Quae est enim coag-mentatio non dissolubilis? aut quid est, cuius principium ali-quod sit, nihil sit extremum? Pronoea vero vestra, Lucili, si est eadem, eadem requiro, quae paulo ante, ministros, machi-nas, omnem totius operis dissignationem atque apparatum; sin alia est, cur mortalem fecerit mundum, non, quem ad modum Platonicus deus, sempiternum. Ab utroque autem sciscitor, cur mundi aedificatores repente extiterint, innumerabilia sae-cla dormierint; non enim, si mundus nullus erat, saecla non
erant. Saecla nunc dico non ea, quae dierum noctiumque numero annuis cursibus conficiuntur; nam fateor ea sine mundi conversione effici non potuisse; sed fuit quaedam ab infinito tempore aeternitas, quam nulla circumscripturn temporum metiebatur; spatio tamen qualis ea fuerit, intellegi non potest, quod ne in cogitationem quidem cadit, ut fuerit tempus aliquod, nullum cum tempus esset. Isto igitur tam immenso spatio quaero, Balbe, cur Pronoea vestra cessaverit. Laboremne fugiebat? At iste nec attingit deum nec erat ullus, cum omnes naturae numini divino, caelum, ignes, terrae, maria, parerent. Quid autem erat, quod concupisceret deus mundum signis et luminibus tamquam aedilis ornare? Si, ut deus ipse melius habitaret, antea videlicet tempore infinito in tenebris tamquam in gurgusto habitaverat. Post autem varietatene eum delectari putamus, qua caelum et terras exornatas videmus? Quae ista potest esse oblectatio deo? quae si esset, non ea tam diu carere potuisset. An haec, ut fere dicitis, hominum causa a deo constituta sunt? Sapientiumne? Propter paucos igitur tanta est facta rerum molitio. An stultorum? At primum causa non fuit, cur de inprobis bene mereretur; deinde quid est asecutus? cum omnes stulti sint sine dubio miserrimi, maxime quod stulti sunt; miserris enim stultitia quid possumus dicere? deinde quod ita multa sunt incommoda in vita, ut ea sapientes commodorum compensatione leniant, stulti nec vitare venientia possint nec ferre praeuentia. Qui vero mundum ipsum animantem sapientemque esse dixerunt, nullo modo viderunt, animi natura intelligenls in quam figuram cadere posset; de quo dicam equidem paulo post; nunc autem hactenus: admirabor eorum tarditatem, qui animantem inmortallem et eundem beatum rotundum esse velint, quod ea forma neget ullam esse pulchriorem Plato. At mihi vel cylindri vel quadrati vel coni vel pyramidis videtur esse formasior. Quae vero vita tribuitur isti rotundo deo? Nempe ut ea celeritate contorqueatur, cui par nulla ne cogitari quidem possit; in qua non video ubinam mens constans et vita beata possit insistere. Quodque in nostro
corpore si minima ex parte sic afficiatur, molestum sit, cur hoc idem non habeatur molestum in deo? Terra enim proiecto, quoniam mundi pars est, pars est etiam dei. Atqui terrae maxumas regiones inhabitabilis atque incultas videmus, quod pars earum adpulsu solis exarserit, pars obriguerit nive pruina-que longinquo solis abscessu; quae, si mundus est deus, quoniam mundi partes sunt, dei membra partim ardentia, partim refrigerata dicenda sunt.

Atque haec quidem vestra, Lucili. Qualia vero vetera sint, ab ultimo repetam superiorum. Thales enim Milesius, qui primus 10 de talibus rebus quasesvit, aquam dixit esse initium rerum, deum autem eam mentem, quae ex aqua cuncta fingeret. Si di possunt esse sine sensu et mente, cum aquae mentem, menti autem cur aquam adiunxit, si ipsa mens constare potest vacans corpore? Anaximandri autem opinio est nativos esse deos longis intervallis orientis occidentisque, eosque innumerabilis esse mundos. Sed nos deum nisi sempiternum intelligere qui possimus? Post Anaximenes æra deum statuit, eumque gignesesse inmensum et infinitum et semper in motu; quasi aut ær sine 25 ulla forma deus esse possit, cum praesertim deum non modo aliqua, sed pulcherrima specie deceit esse, aut non omne, quod ortum sit, mortalitas consequatur. Inde Anaxagoras, qui accepit ab Anaximene disciplinam, primus omnium rerum discriptionem et modum mentis infinitae vi ac ratione dissipinari et confici voluit; in quo non vidit neque motum sensui iunctum et continentem in infinito 30 ullum esse posse neque sensum omnino, quo non ipsa natura pulsa sentiret. Deinde si mentem istam quasi animal aliquod voluit esse, erit aliquid interius, ex quo illud animal nominetur; quid autem interius mente? cingatur igitur corpore externo. Quod quo- 35 niam non placet, aperta simplexque mens nulla re adiuncta, qua sentire possit, fugere intelligentiae nostrae vim et notionem videtur. Crotoniates autem Alcmaeo, qui soli et lunae reliquisque sideribus animoque praeterea divinitatem dedit, non sensit sese mortalibus rebus inmortalitatem dare. Nam Py-
thagoras, qui censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentum et commeantem, ex quo nostri animi carperentur, non vidit distractione humanorum animorum discerpi et lacerari deum et, cum miseri animi essent, quod plerisque contingencyet, tum dei partem esse miseram; quod fieri non potest. Cur autem quicquam ignoraret animus hominis, si esset deus? quo modo porro deus iste, si nihil esset nisi animus, aut infixus aut infusus esset in mundo? Tum Xenophanes, qui mente adiuncta omne praeterea, quod esset infinitum, deum voluit esse, de ipsa mente item reprehenditur, ut ceteri, de infinite autem vehementius, in qua nihil neque sentiens neque coniunctum potest esse. Nam Parmenides quidem commenticiun quiddam coronae simile efficit (στεφάνης appellat) continente ardore lucis orbem, qui cingat caelum, quem appellat deum; in quo neque figuram divinam neque sensum quisquam suspicari potest; multaque eiusdem modi monstra, quippe qui bellum, qui discordiam, qui cupiditatem ceteraque generis eiusdem ad deum revocet, quae vel morbo vel somno vel oblivione vel vetustate delentur; eademque de sideribus, quae reprehensa in alio iam in hoc omissantur. Empedocles autem multa alia peccans in deorum opinione turpissum habitur. Quattuor enim naturas, ex quibus omnia constare cerset, divinas esse vult; quas et nasci et extinguere perspicuum est et sensu omni carere. Nec vero Protagoras, qui sese negat omnino de deis habere quod liqueat, sint, non sint qualesve sint, quicquam videtur de natura deorum suspicari. Quid? Democritus, qui tum imagines earumque circumitus in deorum numero refert, tum illam naturam, quae imagines fundat ac mittat, tum scien-tiam intellegentiamque nostram, nonne in maximo errore versatur? cum idem omnino, quia nihil semper suo statu maneat, neget esse quicquam sempiternum, nonne deum omnino ita tollit, ut nullam opinionem eius reliquam faciat? Quid? aër, quo Diogenes Apolloniates utitur deo, quem sensum habere potest aut quam formam dei? Iam de Platonis inconstantia longum est dicere, qui in Timaeo patrem huius mundi nominari
neget posse, in Legum autem libris, quid sit omnino deus, anquiri oportere non censeat. Quod vero sine corpore ullo deum vult esse, ut Graeci dicunt, ἀνάφυαρον, id quae esse possit, intellegi non potest; careat enim sensu necesse est, careat etiam prudentia, careat voluptate; quae omnia una cum deorum notione comprehendimus. Idem et in Timaeo dicit et in Legibus et mundum deum esse et caelum et astra et terram et animos et eos, quos maiorum institutis accepirimus; quae et per se sunt falsa perspicue et inter se vehementer repugnantia. Atque etiam Xenophon paucioribus verbis eadem fere peccat; facit enim in iis, quae a Socrate dicta rettulit, Socratem disputantem formam dei quae non oportere, eundemque et solem et animum deum dicere, et modo unum, tum autem plures deos; quae sunt idem in erratis fere, quibus ea, quae de Platone diximus. Atque etiam Antisthenes in eo libro, qui physicus inscribitur, popularis deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens tollit vim et naturam deorum. Nec multo secus Speusippus Platonem avunculum subsequens et vim quandam dicens, qua omnia regantur, eamque animalem, evel-lere ex animis conatur cognitionem deorum. Aristotelesque in tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro suo Platone non dissentiens; modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinitatem, modo mundum ipsum deum dicit esse, modo alium quandam praeficit mundo eique eas partis tribuit, ut replicatione quadam mundi motum regat atque tueatur, tum caeli ardem deum dicit esse non intellegens caelum mundi esse partem, quem alio loco ipse designarit deum. Quo modo autem caeli divinus ille sensus in celeritate tanta conservari potest? ubi deinde illi tot di, si numeramus etiam caelum deum? cum autem sine corpore idem vult esse deum, omni illum sensu privat, etiam prudentia. Quo porro modo deus moveri carens corpore aut quo modo semper se movens esse quietus et beatus potest? Nec vero eius condiscipulus Xenocrates in hoc genere prudentior, cuius in libris, qui sunt de natura deorum, nulla species divina describitur; deos enim octo esse dicit, quinque eos, qui in
stellis vagis nominantur, unum, qui ex omnibus sideribus, quae infixa caelo sunt, ex dispersis quasi membris simplex sit putandus deus, septimum solem adiungit octavamque lunam; qui quo sensu beati esse possint, intellegi non potest. Ex eadem Platonis\textsuperscript{5} schola Ponticus Heraclides puerilibus fabulis refersit libros et modo mundum, tum mentem divinam esse putat, errantibus etiam stellis divinitatem tribuit sensuque deum privat et eius formam mutabilem esse vult codemque in libro rursus terram et caelum refert in deos. Nec vero Theophrasti inconstantia fera\textsuperscript{35}enda est; modo enim menti divinum tribuit principatum, modo caelo, tum autem signis sideribusque caelestibus. Nec audiendo eius auditor Strato, is qui physicus appellatur, qui omnem vim divinam in natura sitam esse censet, quae causas cogniendi, augendi, minuendi habeat, sed careat omni sensu et figura.\textsuperscript{10} Zeno autem, ut iam ad vestros, Balbe, veniam, naturalem legem\textsuperscript{14} divinam esse censet, eamque vim obtinere recta imperantem prohibitemque contraria. Quam legem quo modo efficiat animantem, intellegere non possimus; deum autem animantem certe volumus esse. Atque hic idem alio loco aethera deum\textsuperscript{20} dicit, si intellegi potest nihil sentiens deus, qui numquam nobis occurrit neque in precibus neque in optatis neque in votis; aliis autem libris rationem quandam per omnem naturam rerum pertinentem vi divina esse adfectam putat. Idem austris hoc idem tribuit, tum annis, mensibus annorumque mutationibus. Cum vero\textsuperscript{25} Hesiodi theogoniam [id est originem deorum] interpreta\textsuperscript{36} tur, tollit omnino usitatbas perceptasque cognitiones deorum; neque enim Iovem neque Iunonem neque Vestam neque quemquam, qui ita appelletur, in deorum habet numero, sed rebus inanimis atque mutis per quandam significationem haec docet tributa nomina. Cuius discipuli Aristonis non minus magno in errore sententia est, qui neque formam dei intellegi posse censeat neque in deis sensum esse dicat dubitetque omnino, deus animans necne sit. Cleanthes autem, qui Zenonem audivit una cum eo, quem proxime nominavi, tum ipsum mundum deum\textsuperscript{35} dicit esse, tum totius naturae menti atque animo tribuit hoc
nomen, tum ultimum et altissimum atque undique circumfusum et extremum omnia cingentem atque complexum ardorem, qui aether nominetur, certissimum deum indicat; idemque quasi delirans in iis libris, quos scripsit contra voluptatem, tum fingit formam quandam et speciem deorum, tum divinitatem omnem tribuit astris, tum nihil ratione censet esse divinius. Ita fit, ut deus ille, quem mente noscimus atque in animi notione tamquam in vestigio volumus reponere, nusquam prorsus apareat.

At Persaeus, eiusdem Zenonis auditor, eos dicit esse habitos deos, a quibus magna utilitas ad vitae cultum esset inventa, ipsasque res utiles et salutares deorum esse vocabulis nuncupatas, ut ne hoc quidem diceret, illa inventa esse deorum, sed ipsa divina. Quo quid absurdius, quam aut res sordidas atque deformis deorum honore adficere aut homines iam morte deletos reponere in deos, quorum omnis cultus esset futurus in luctu? 

Iam vero Chrysippus, qui Stoicorum sonniorum vaferreus habetur interpres, magnam turbam congregat ignotorum deorum, atque ita ignotorum, ut eos ne coniectura quidem informare possimus, cum mens nostra quidvis videatur cogitatione posse depingere; ait enim vim divinam in ratione esse positam et in universae naturae animo atque mente, ipsumque mundum deum dicit esse et eius animi fusionem universam, tum eius ipsius principatum, qui in mente et ratione versetur, communemque rerum naturam universitatemque omnia continentem, tum fatalem vim et necessitatem rerum futurarum, ignem praeterea et eum, quem ante dixi, aethera, tum ea, quae natura fluenter atque manarent, ut et aquam et terram et aeram, solem, lunam, sidera universitatemque rerum, qua omnia continerentur, atque etiam homines eos, qui immortalitatem essent consecuti. Idemque disputat aethera esse eum, quem homines Iovem appel-larent, quique aer per maria manaret, eum esse Neptunum, terramque eam esse, quae Ceres diceretur, similique ratione perseveruitur vocabula reliquorum deorum. Idemque etiam legis perpetuae et aeternae vim, quae quasi dux vitae et magistra officiorum sit, Iovem dicit esse eandemque fatalem necessitatem.
appellat, sempiternam rerum futurarum veritatem; quorum nihil tale est, ut in eo vis divina inesse videatur. Et haec quidem in primo libro de natura deorum; in secundo autem volt Orphei, Musaei, Hesiodi Homericque fabellas accommodare ad ea, quae ipse primo libro de deis immortalis dixerat, ut etiam veterrimi poëtae, qui haec ne suspicati quidem sint, Stoici fuisse videantur. Quem Diogenes Babyloniæ consequens in eo libro, qui inscribitur de Minerva, partum Ioæ ortumque virginis ad physiologiam traducens diiungit a fabula.

10 Exposui fere non philosophorum judicia, sed delirantium somnia. Nec enim multo absurdiora sunt ea, quae poëtarum vocibus fusæ ipsæ suavitate nocuerunt, qui et ira inflammatis et libidine furentis induxerunt deos feceruntque, ut eorum bella, proelia, pugnas, vulnera videremus, odia praeterca, discidia, discordias, ortus, interitus, querellas, lamentationes, effusas in omni intemperantia libidines, adulteria, vincula, cum humano genere concubitus mortalisque ex immortali procreatos. Cum poëtarum autem errore coniungere licet portenta magorum Aegyptiorumque in eodem genere dementiam, tum etiam vulgi opiniones, quae in maxima inconstantia veritatis ignorantione versantur. Ea qui consideret quam inconsulte ac temere dicantur, venerari Epicurum et in eorum ipsorum numero, de quibus haec quaestio est, habere debeat. Solus enim vidit primum esse deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quae est enim gens aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum? quam appellat πρόληψις Epicurus, id est anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intellegi quicquam nec quæri nec disputari potest. Cuius rationis vim atque utilitatem ex illo caelesti Epicuri de regula et judicio volumine accepimus. Quod igitur fundamentum huius quaestionis est, id praecclare iactum videtis. Cum enim non instituto aliquo aut more aut lege sit opinio constituta maneatque ad unum omnium firma consensio, intellegi necesse est esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatas cogni-
iones habemus; de quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est; esse igitur deos confitendum est. Quod quoniam fere constat inter omnis non philosophos solum, sed etiam indoctos, fateamur constare illud etiam, hanc nos habere sive anticipationem, ut ante dixi, sive praenotionem deorum (sunt enim rebus novis nova ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus ipse πράξεις appellavit, quam antea nemo eo verbo nominaret) — hanc igitur habemus, ut deos beatos et inmortales putemus. Quae enim nobis natura informationem ipsorum deorum dedit, eadem insculpsit in mentibus, ut eos aeternos et beatos haberemus. Quod si ita est, vere exposita illa sententia est ab Epicuro, quod beatum aeternumque sit, id nec habere ipsum negotii quicquam nec exhibere alteri, itaque neque ira neque gratia teneri, quod, quae talia essent, imbecilla essent omnia. Si nihil aliud quaereremus, nisi ut deos pie coloremus et ut superstitione liberaremur, satis erat dictum; nam et praestans deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum et aeterna esset et beatissima (habet enim venerationem iustam, quicquid excellit), et metus omnis a vi atque ira deorum pulsus esset; intellegit enim a beata inmortalisque natura et iram et gratiam segregari; quibus remotis nullos a superis impedire metus. Sed ad hanc confirmandam opinionem anquirit animus et formam et vitae actionem mentisque agitationem in deo.

Ac de forma quidem partim natura nos admonet, partim ratio docet. Nam a natura habemus omnes omnium gentium speciem nullam aliam nisi humanam deorum; quae enim forma alia occurrat umquam aut vigilanti cuiquam aut dormienti? Sed ne omnia revocentur ad primas notiones: ratio hoc idem ipsa declarat. Nam cum praestantissumam naturam, vel quia beata est vel quia sempiterna, convenire videatur eandem esse pulcher- rimam, quae compositio membrorum, quae conformatio linamentorum, quae figura, quae species humana potest esse pulchrior? Vos quidem, Lucili, soletis (nam Cotta meus modo hoc, modo illud), cum artificium effingitis fabricamque divinam, quam sint omnia in hominis figura non modo ad usum, verum
etiam ad venustatem apta, describere. Quodsi omnium animantium formam vincit hominis figura, deus autem animans est, ea figura profecto est, quae pulcherrima sit omnium; quoniamque deos beatissimos esse constat, beatus autem esse sine virtute nemo potest nec virtus sine ratione constare nec ratio usquam inesse nisi in hominis figura, hominis esse specie deos confitendum est. Nec tamen ea species corpus est, sed quasi corpus, nec habet sanguinem, sed quasi sanguinem. Haec quamquam et inventa sunt acutius et dicta subtilius ab Epicuro, quam ut quivis ea possit agnoscere, tamen fretus intellegentia vestra dissero brevius, quam causa desiderat. Epicurus autem, qui res occultas et penitus abditas non modo viderit animo, sed etiam sic tractet, ut manu, docet eam esse vim et naturam deorum, ut primum non sensu, sed mente cernatur; nec soliditate quadam nec ad numerum, ut ea, quae ille propter firmitatem στερέινα appellat, sed imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis, cum infinita simillumarum imaginum series ex innumerabilibus individuis existat et ad nos adfluat; tum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines mentem intentam infixamque nostram intellegendiam capere, quae sit et beata natura et aeterna. Summa vero vis infinitatis et magna ac diligenti contemplatione dignissima est, in qua intellegi nesses est eam esse naturam, ut omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant. Hanc ἵσονομιαν appellat Epicurus, id est aequabilem tributionem. Ex hac igitur illud efficitur, si mortalium tanta multitudo sit, esse inmortalium non minorem, et si, quae interimant, innumerabilia sint, etiam ea, quae conservent, infinita esse debere. Et quae rerere a nobis, Balbe, soletis, quae vita deorum sit, quaeque ab iis degatur aetas. Ea videlicet, qua nihil beatius, nihil omnibus bonis affluentius cogitari potest. Nihil enim agit, nullis occupationibus est implicatus, nulla opera molitur, sua sapientia et virtute gaudet, habet exploratum fore se semper cum in maximis, tum in aeternis voluptatibus. Hunc deum rite beatum dixerimus, vestrum vero laboriosissimum. Sive enim ipse mundus deus est, quid potest esse minus quietum quam nullo puncto temporis inter-
misso versari circum axem caeli admirabili celeritate? nisi qui-
etum autem nihil beatum est; sive in ipso mundo deus
inest aliquis, qui regat, qui gubernet, qui cursus astrorum,
mutationes temporum, rerum vicissitudines ordinesque conser-
vet, terras et maria contemplans hominum commoda vitasque
5 tueatur, ne ille est implicatus molestis negotiis et operosis! Nos
autem beatam vitam in animi securitate et in omnium vacat
merum ponimus. Docuit enim nos idem, qui cetera, natura
effectum esse mundum, nihil opus fuisse fabrica, tamque eam
rem esse facilem, quam vos effici negatis sine divina posse sol-
lertia, ut innumerabilis natura mundos effectura sit, efficiat,
50 effecerit. Quod quia quem ad modum natura efficere sine
aliqua mente possit non videtis, ut tragici poëtae, cum explicare
argumenti exitum non potestis, confugitis ad deum; cuius ope-
ram profecto non desideraretis, si inmensam et interminatam in
omnis partis magnitudinem regionum videretis, in quam se ini-
ciens animus et intendens ita late longeque peregrinatur, ut nul-
lam tamen oram ultimi videat, in qua possit insistere. In hac
igitur inmensitate latitudinem, longitudinum, altitudinem infinita
vis innumerabilium volitatum atomorum, quae interiecto inani co-
hæreant tamen inter se et aliae alias adprehendentes con-
tinuantur; ex quo efficiuntur eae rerum formae et figurae, quas
vos effici posse sine follihus e incidibus non putatis. Itaque
inposuisitis in cervicibus nostris sempiternum dominum, quem
dies et noctes timeremus. Quis enim non timeat omnia provi-
dentem et cogitantem et animadvertentem et omnia ad se per-
tinere putantem curiosum et plenum negotii deum? Hinc
vobis extitit primum illa fatalis necessitas, quam εἰμαρμέρην dicitis,
ut, quicquid accidat, id ex aeterna veritate causarumque con-
tinuacione fluxisse dicatis. Quanti autem haec philosophia
aestimanda est, cui tamquam anicus, et ipsis quidem indoctis,
55 fato fieri videantur omnia? Sequitur ματρικῇ vestra, quae
Latine divinatio dicitur, qua tanta inbueremur superstitione,
si vos audire vellemus, ut haruspices, augures, harioli, vates,
50 coniectores nobis essent colendi. His terroribus ab Epicuro
soluti et in libertatem vindicati nec metuimus eos, quos intel-
legimus nec sibi fingere ullam molestiam nec alteri quaerere, et
pie sancteque colimus naturam excellentem atque praestantem.
Sed elatus studio vereor ne longior fuerim. Erat autem difficile
rem tantam tamque praecipiam inchoatam relinquere; quam-
quam non tam dicendi ratio mihi habenda fuit quam audiendi.

Tum Cotta comiter, ut solebat: Atqui, inquit, Vellei, nisi tu
aliquid dixisses, nihil sane ex me quidem audire potuisses.
Mihi enim non tam facile in mentem venire solet, quare verum
sit aliquid, quam quare falsum; idque cum saepe, tum, cum te
audirem, paulo ante contigit. Roges me, qualem naturam deo-
rum esse ducam, nihil fortasse respondeam; quaeras, putemne
talem esse, qualis modo a te sit exposita, nihil dicam mihi videri
minus. Sed ante quam adgrediar ad ea, quae a te disputata
sunt, de te ipso dicam quid sentiam. Saepe enim de familiaris
illo tuo videor audisse, cum te togatis omnibus sine dubio ante-
ferret et paucos tecum Epicureos e Graecia compararet, sed,
quod ab eo te mirifice diligi intellegebam, arbitrabar illum pro-
pter benivolentiub serius id dicere. Ego autem, etsi vereor
laudare praeidentem, iudico tamen de re obscura atque difficili a
te dictum esse dilucide, neque sententiis solum copiose, sed
verbis etiam ornatusi, quam solent vestri. Zenonem, quem
Philo noster coryphaeum appellare Epicureorum solebat, cum
Athenis essem, audiebam frequenter, et quidem ipso auctore Phi-
lone, credo, ut facilius iudicaret, quam illa bene refellerentur,
cum a principe Epicureorum accepissem, quem ad modum
dicerentur. Non igitur ille, ut plerique, sed isto modo, ut tu,
distincte, graviter, ornate. Sed quod in illo mihi usu saepe
venit, idem modo, cum te audirem, accidebat, ut moleste ferrem
tantum ingenium (bona venia me audies) in tam leves, ne dicam
in tam ineptas sententias incidisse. Nec ego nunc ipse aliquid
adseram melius. Ut enim modo dixi, omnibus fere in rebus,
sed maxime in physicis, quid non sit, citius, quam quid sit, dix-
erim. Roges me, quid aut quale sit deus, auctore utar Simo-
nide, de quo cum quaesivisset hoc idem tyrannus Hiero,
deliberandi sibi unum diem postulavit; cum idem ex eo post-tride quae reret, biduum petivit; cum saepius duplicaret numerum dierum admiransque Hiero requireret, cur ita faceret, 'Quia, quanto diutius considero', inquit, 'tanto mihi res videtur obscurior'. Sed Simoniden arbitror (non enim poëta solum suavis, verum etiam ceteroqui doctus sapiensque traditur), quia multa venirent in mentem acuta atque subtilia, dubitatem, quid eorum esset verissimum, des sperasse omnem veritatem. Epicurus vero tuus (nam cum illo malo disserere quam tecum) quid dicit, quod non modo philosophia dignum esset, sed mediocris prudentia?

Quaeritur primum in ea quaestione, quae est de natura deorum, sintne di necne sint. Difficile est negare. Credo, si in contione quaeratur, sed in huius modi sermone et consensu facillimum. Itaque ego ipse pontifex, qui caeremonias religionesque publicas sanctissime tuendas arbitror, is hoc, quod primum est, esse deos, persuaderi mihi non opinione solum, sed etiam ad veritatem plane velim. Multa enim occurruit, quae conturbent, ut interdum nulli esse videantur. Sed vide, quam tecum agam liberaliter; quae communia sunt vobis cum ceteris philosophis, non attingam, ut hoc ipsum; placet enim omnibus fere mihiique ipsi in primis deos esse. Itaque non pugno; rationem tamen eam, quae a te adferetur, non satis firmam puto.

Quod enim omnium gentium generumque hominibus ita videretur, id satis magnum argumentum esse dixisti, cur esse deos confiteremur. Quod cum leve per se, tum etiam falsum est. Primum enim unde tibi notae sunt opinions nationum? Equidem arbitror multas esse gentes sic inmanitate efferatas, ut apud eas nulla suspicio deorum sit. Quid? Diogoras, Ætheos qui dicitus est, posteaque Theodora nonne aperte deorum naturam sustulerunt? Nam Abderites quidem Protagoras, cuius a te modo mentio facta est, sophistes temporibus illis vel maximus, cum in principio libri sic posuisset: 'De divis, neque ut sint neque ut non sint, habeo dicere'; Atheniensium iussu urbe atque agro est exterminatus librique eius in
contione combusti. Ex quo equidem existimo tardiores ad 
hanc sententiam profitendum multos esse factos, quippe cum 
poenam ne dubitatio quidem effugere potuisset. Quid de sacri-
legis, quid de impius periusisque dicemus?

Tubulus si Lucius umquam,
Si Lupus aut Carbo, Neptuni filius,

ut ait Lucilius, putasset esse deos, tam periusus aut tam in-
purus fuisset? Non est igitur tam explorata ista ratio ad id, 64
quod vultis, confirmandum, quam videtur. Sed quia commune
hoc est argumentum aliorum etiam philosophorum, omittam hoc
tempore; ad vestra propria venire malo.

Concedo esse deos; doce me igitur, unde sint, ubi sint, 65
quales sint corpore, animo, vita; haec enim scire desidero.
Abuteris ad omnia atomorum regno et licentia; hinc, quodcum-
que in solum venit, ut dicitur, effingis atque efficis. Quae pri-
num nullae sunt. Nihil est enim † quod vacet corpore; cor-
poribus autem omnis obsidetur locus; ita nullum inane, nihil
esse individuum potest. Haec ego nunc physicorum oracula
fundo, vera an falsa, nescio, sed veri tamen similiba quam ves-
tra. Ista enim flagitia Democriti sive etiam ante Leucippi, esse
 corpuscula quaedam levia, alia aspera, rotunda alia, partim
autem angulata, hamata quaedam et quasi adunca, ex his effec-
tum esse caelum atque terram nulla cogente natura, sed con-
cursu quodam fortuito, hanc tu opinionem, C. Vellei, usque ad
hanc aetatem perduxisti, priusque te quis de omni vitae statu
quam de ista auctoritate deiecerit; ante enim iudicasti Epicu-
reum te esse oportere, quam ista cognovisti. Ita nescesse fuit
aut haec flagitia concipere animo aut suscepetae philosophiae
nomen amittere. Quid enim mereas, ut Epicureus esse desinas? 67

Nihil equidem, inquis, ut rationem vitae beatae veritatemque
deseram. Ista igitur est veritas? Nam de vita beata nihil re-
pugno, quam tu ne in deo quidem esse censes, nisi plane otio
langueat. Sed ubi est veritas? In mundis, credo, innumera-
bilibus omnibus minimis temporum punctis aliis nascentibus,
aliis cadentibus. An in individuis corpusculis tam praeclara opera nulla moderante natura, nulla ratione fingentibus? Sed oblitus liberalitatis meae, qua tecum paulo ante uti coeperam, plura complector. Concedam igitur ex individuis constare omnia. Quid ad rem? deorum enim natura quae rerunt. Sint sane ex atomis; non igitur aeterni. Quod enim ex atomis, id natum aliquando est; si natum, nulli dei ante quam nati; et si ortus est deorum, interitus sit necesse est, ut tu paulo ante de Platonis mundo disputabas. Ubi igitur illud vestrum beatum et aeternum? quibus duobus verbis significatis deum; quod cum efficeret vultis, in dumeta conrepitis. Ita enim dicebas, non corpus esse in deo, sed quasi corpus, nec sanguinem, sed tamquam sanguinem.

Hoc persaepe facitis, ut, cum aliquid non veri simile dicatis et effugere reprehensionem velitis, adferatis aliquid, quod omnino ne fieri quidem possit, ut satius fuerit illud ipsum, de quo ambigebatur, concedere quam tam inpudenter resistere. Velut Epicurus cum videret, si atomi ferrentur in locum inferiorem suopte pondere, nihil fore in nostra potestate, quod esset earum motus certus et necessarius, invenit, quo modo necessitatem effugeret, quod videlicet Democritum fugerat; ait atomum, cum pondere et gravitate directo deorsus feratur, declinare paululum. Hoc dicere turpius est quam illud, quod vult, non posse defendere. Idem facit contra dialecticos; a quibus cum traditum sit in omnibus diijunctionibus, in quibus ‘aut etiam aut non’ poneretur, alterum utrum esse verum, pertimuit, ne, si concessum esset huius modi aliquid: ‘Aut vivet cras aut non vivet Epicurus’, alterutrum fieret necessarium, totum hoc ‘aut etiam aut non’ negavit esse necessarium; quo quid dici potuit obtusius? Urguebat Arcesilas Zenonem, cum ipse falsa omnia diceret, quae sensibus viderentur, Zenon autem non nulla visa esse falsa, non omnia. Timuit Epicurus, ne, si unum visum esset falsum, nullum esset verum: omnis sensus veri nuntios dixit esse. Nihil horum nimis callide; graviorem enim plagam accipiebat, ut leviorem repelleret.
Idem facit in natura deorum; dum individuorum corporum concretionem fugit, ne interitus et dissipatio consequatur, negat esse corpus deorum, sed tamquam corpus, nec sanguineum, sed tamquam sanguinem. Mirabile videtur, quod non rideat haeretici spex, cum haruspicem viderit; hoc mirabilia, quod vos inter vos risum tenere possitis. 'Non est corpus, sed quasi corpus.' Hoc intellegerem quale esset, si in ceris fingeretur aut fictilibus figuris; in deo quid sit 'quasi corpus' aut 'quasi sanguis', intellegere non possum; ne tu quidem, Vellei, sed non vis fateri. Ista enim a vobis quasi dictata redduntur, quae Epicurus oscitans halucinatus est, cum quidem gloriaretur, ut videmus in scriptis, se magistrum habuisse nullum. Quod ei non praedicanti tamen facile equidem crederem, sicut mali aedificii domino glorianti se architectum non habuisse; nihil enim olet ex Academia, nihil ex Lycio, nihil ne e puerilibus quidem disciplinis. Xenocraten audire potuit, quem virum, di inmortales! et sunt qui putent audisse; ipse non vult; credo plus nemini. Pamphilum quendam, Platonis auditorem, ait a se Sami auditum; ibi enim adulescens habitabat cum patre et fratribus, quod in eam pater eius Neocles agripeta venerat; sed cum agellus eum non satis aleret, ut opinor, ludi magister fuit. Sed hunc Platonicum mirificum comemnit Epicurus; ita metuit, ne quid uquam didicisse videatur. In Nausiphan Democriteo tenetur; quem cum a se non neget auditum, vexat tamen omnibus contumeliis. Atqui si haec Democritea non audisset, quid audierat? quid est in physicis Epicuri non a Democrito? Nam etsi quaedam commutavit, ut quod paulo ante de inclinatione atomorum dixi, tamen pleraque dicit eadem, atomos, inane, imagines, infinitatem locorum innumerabilitatemque mundorum, corum ortus, interitus, omnia fere, quibus naturae ratio continetur. Nunc istuc 'quasi corpus' et 'quasi sanguinem', quid intellegis? Ego enim te scire ista melius quam me non fateor solum, sed etiam facile patior; cum quidem semel dicta sunt, quid est, quod Velleius intellegere possit, Cotta non possit? Itaque corpus quid sit, sanguis quid sit, intellego, quasi corpus.
et quasi sanguis quid sit, nullo prorsus modo intellego. Neque tu me celas, ut Pythagoras solebat alienos, nec consulto dicis occulte tamquam Heraclitus, sed (quod inter nos liceat) ne tu quidem intellegis. Illud video pugnare te, species ut quaedam sit deorum, quae nihil concreti habeat, nihil solidi, nihil expressi, nihil eminentis, sitque pura, levis, percluida. Dicemus igitur idem, quod in Venere Coa: corpus illud non est, sed simile corporis, nec ille fusus et candore mixtus rubor sanguis est, sed quaedam sanguinis similitudo; sic in Epicureo deo non res, sed similitudines rerum esse. Fac id, quod ne intel-10 legi quidem potest, mihi esse persuasum; cedo mihi istorum adumbratorum deorum liamamenta atque formas. Non deest hoc loco copia rationum, quibus docere velitis humanas esse formas deorum; primum quod ita sit inforatum anticipaturn-que mentibus nostris, ut homini, cum deo cogitetur, forma 15 occurrat humana; deinde quod, quoniam rebus omnibus excel-lat natura divina, forma quoque esse pulcherrima debeat, nec esse humana ullam pulchriorer; tertiam rationem adfertis, 77 quod nulla alia figura domicilium mentis esse possit. Primum igitur quidque considera quale sit; arripere enim mihi vide- mini quasi vestro iure rem nullo modo probablem. Omnino quas tam caecus in contemplandis rebus umquam fuit, ut non videret species istas hominum conlatas in deos aut consilio quodam sapientium, quo facillis animos imperitum ad deorum cultum a vitae pravitate converterent, aut superstitione, ut 25 essent simulacra, quae venerantes deos ipsos se adire crederent? Auxerunt autem haec eadem poetae, pictores, opifices; erat enim non facile agentis aliiquid et molientis deos in aliarum formarum imitatione servare. Accessit etiam ista opinio for-tasse, quod homini homine pulchrius nihil videbatur. Sed tu 30 hoc, physice, non vides, quam blanda conciliatrix et quasi sui sit lena natura? An putas ullam esse terra marique beluam, quae non sui generis belua maxime delectetur? Quod ni ita esset, cur non gestiret taurus equae contractatione, equus vac-cae? An tu aquilam aut leonem aut delphinum ullam ante-
ferre censes figuram suae? Quid igitur mirum, si hoc eodem modo homini natura praescripsit, ut nihil pulchrius quam hominem putaret[, eam esse causam, cur deos hominum similis putaremus]?

Quid censes? si ratio esset in beluis, non suo quasque generi plurimum tributaras fuisse? At mehercule ego (dicam enim, ut sentio) quamvis amem ipse me, tamen non audeo dicere pulchriorem esse me, quam ille fuerit taurus, qui vexit Europam. Non enim loco de ingenii aut de orationibus nostri, sed de specie figuraque quaeritur. Quodsi fingere nobis et iungere formas velimus, qualis ille maritimus Triton pingitur, natantibus invehens beluis adiunctis humano corpori, nolis esse. Difficili in loco versor. Est enim vis tanta naturae, ut homo nemo velit nisi hominis similis esse. Et quidem formica formae.


Constiteram exorientem Auroram forte salutans,
Cum subito a laeva Roscius exoritur.
Pace mihi liceat, caelestes, dicere vestra,
Mortalis visust pulchrior esse deo.

Huic deo pulchrior; at erat, sicuti Hodie est, perversissimis oculis. Quid refert, si hoc ipsum salsum illi et venustum videbatur? Redeo ad deos.

Ecquo, si non tam strabones, at paetulos esse arbitramur? ecquis naevum habere? ecquis silos, flaccos, frontones, capitone, quae sunt in nobis? an omnia emendata in illis? Detur
id vobis; num etiam una est omnium facies? nam si plures, aliam esse alia pulchriorem necesse est. Igitur aliquid non pulcherrimus deus. Si una omnium facies est, florere in caelo Academiam necesse est; si enim nihil inter deum et deum differt, nulla est apud deos cognitio, nulla perceptio. Quid, si etiam, Vellei, falsum illud omnino est, nullam aliam nobis de deo cogitantibus speciem nisi hominis occurrere? tamenne ista tam absurda defendes? Nobis fortasse sic occurrit, ut dicis; a parvis enim Iovem, Iunonom, Minervam, Neptunum, Vulp-num, Apollinem reliquisque deos ea facie novimus, qua pictores factoresque voluerunt, neque solum facie, sed etiam ornatu, aetate, vestitu; at non Aegyptii nec Syri nec fere cuncta barbaria; firmiores enim video apud eos opiniones esse de bestiis quibusdam quam apud nos de sanctissimis templis et simulacris deorum. Etenim fana multa spoliata et simulacra deorum de locis sanctissimis ablata videmus a nostris; at vero ne fando quidem auditus est crocodilum aut ibin aut faele violatum ab Aegyptio. Quid igitur censes? Apim illum, sanctum Aegyp-tiorum bovem, nonne deum videri Aegyptiis? Tam hercle quam tibi illam vestram Sospitam, quam tu numquam ne in somnis quidem vides nisi cum pelle caprina, cum hasta, cum scutulo, cum calceolis repandis. At non est talis Argia nec Romana Iuno. Ergo alia species Iunonis Argivis, alia Lanuvinis, aliqua nobis. Et quidem alia nobis Capitolini, alia Afris

Hammonis Iovis. Non pudet igitur physicum, id est specula

...
ris, sic idem in Italia Volcanus, idem in Hispania. Deinde nominum non magnus numerus ne in pontificiis quidem nostris, deorum autem innumerabilis. An sine nominibus sunt? Istud quidem ita vobis dicere necesse est; quid enim attinet, cum una facies sit, plura esse nomina? Quam bellum erat, Vellei, confiteri potius nescire, quod nescires, quam ista effutientem nauseare atque ipsum sibi dispicere! An tu mei similem putas esse aut tui deum? Profecto non putas. Quid ergo? solem dicam aut lunam aut caelum deum? Ergo etiam beatum? Quibus fruentem voluptatibus? Et sapientem? Qui potest esse in eius modi trunco sapientia? Haec vestra sunt. Si igitur nec humano visu, quod docui, nec tali aliquo, quod tibi ita persuasum est, quid dubitas negare deos esse? Non audes. Sapienter id quidem, etsi hoc loco non populum metuis, sed ipsos deos. Novi ego Epicureos omnia sigilla venerantes; quamquam video non nullis videri Epicurum, ne in offensionem Atheniensium caderet, verbis reliquisse deos, re sustulisse. Itaque in illis selectis eius brevibusque sententiis, quas appellatis κυρίας δόξας, haec, ut opinor, prima sententia est: 'Quod beatum et in-morte est, id nec habet nec exhibet cuiquam negotium.' In hac ita exposita sententia sunt qui existiment, quod ille inscitia plane loquendi fecerat, fecisse consulto; de homine minime vafro male existimant. Dubium est enim, utrum dicit aliquid beatum esse et inmortale an, si quid sit. Non animadvertunt hic eum ambigue locutum esse, sed multis aliis locis et illum et Metrodorum tam aperte quam paulo ante te. Ille vero deos esse putat, nec quemquam vidi, qui magis ea, quae timenda esse negaret, timeret, mortem dico et deos. Quibus mediocrem homines non ita valde moventur, his ille clamat omnium mortalium mentes esse perterritas. Tot milia latrocinandur morte proposita, alií omnia, quae possunt, fana complicant. Credo, aut illos mortis timor terret aut hos religionis.

Sed quoniam non audes (iam enim cum ipso Epicuro lo-quar) negare esse deos, quid est, quod te inpediat aut solem
aut mundum aut mentem aliquam sempiternam in deorum numero ponere? 'Numquam vidi', inquit, 'animam rationis consiliique participem in ulla alia nisi humana figura'. Quid? solis numquidnam aut lunae aut quinque errantium siderum simile vidisti? Sol duabus unius orbis ultimis partibus definiens motum cursus annuos conficit; huius hanc lustrationem eiusdem incensa radiis menstruo spatio luna complevit; quinque autem stellae eundem orbem tenentes, aliae propius a terris, aliae remotius, ab isdem principiis dispersibus temporibus eadem spatia conficiunt. Num quid tale, 88 Epicure, vidisti? Ne sit igitur sol, ne luna, ne stellae, quoniam nihil esse potest, nisi quod attigimus aut vidimus; quid? deum ipsum numne vidisti? Cur igitur credis esse? Omnia tollamus ergo, quae aut historia nobis aut ratio nova adfert. Ita fit, ut mediterranei mare esse non credant. Quae sunt 15 tantae animi angustiae? Ut, si Seriphi natus esses nec quam egressus ex insula, in qua lepusculos vulpeculasque saepe vidisses, non crederes leones et pantheras esse, cum tibi, quales essent, diceretur; si vero de elephanto quis diceret, etiam rideri te putares. Et tu quidem, Vellei, non vestro more, sed dialecticorum, quae funditus gens vestra non novit, argumenta sententiae conclusisti: Beatos esse deos sumpsisti. Concedimus. Beatum autem sine virtute neminem esse posse. Id quoque damus, et libenter quidem. Virtutem autem sine ratione constare non posse. Conveniat id quoque necesse est. 85 Adiungis: nec rationem esse nisi in hominis figura. Quem tibi hoc daturum putas? si enim ita esset, quid opus erat te gradatim istuc pervenire? sumpsisses tuo iure. Quid autem est istuc gradatim? nam a beatis ad virtutem, a virtute ad rationem video te venisse gradibus; a ratione ad humanam figuram quo modo accedis? Praecipitare istuc quidem est, non descendere. 90 Nec vero intellego, cur maluerit Epicurus deos hominum similis dicere quam homines deorum. Quaeres, quid intersit; si enim hoc illi simile sit, esse illud huic. Video; sed hoc dico, non ab hominibus formae figuram venisse ad deos; di enim 35
hortus habuit licentiae. Et soletis queri; Zeno quidem etiam litigabat. Quid dicam Albucium? Nam Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius; sed stomachabatur senex, si quid aspersius dixeram, cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime, Phaedoni Socratico turpissime male dixerit, Metrodori sodalis sui, fratrem, Timocraten, quia nescio quid in philosophia dissentiret, totis voluminibus conciderit, in Democritum ipsum, quem secutus est, fuerit ingratus, Nausiphanen, magistrum suum, a quo non nihil didicerat, tam male acceperit. Zeno quidem non eos solum, qui tum erant, Apollodorum, Silum ceteros, figebat maledictis, sed Socraten ipsum, parentem philosophiae, Latino verbo utens scurram Atticum fuisse dicebat, Chrysippum numquam nisi Chrysippam vocabat; tu ipse paulo ante cum tamquam senatum philosophorum recitares, summos viros desipere, delirare, dementis esse dicebas. Quorum si nemo verum vidit de natura deorum, verendum est, ne nulla sit omnino. Nam ista, quae vos dicitis, sunt tota commenticia, vix digna lucubratione anicolarum; non enim sentitis, quam multa vobis suscienda sint, si inpetraritis, ut concedamus eandem hominum esse et deorum figuram. Omnis cultus et curatio corporis erit eadem adhibenda deo, quae adhibetur homini, ingressus, cursus, accubitio, inclinatio, sessio, conprehensio, ad extremum etiam sermo et oratio; nam quod et maris deos et feminas esse dicitis, quid sequatur, videtis. Equidem mirari satis non possum, unde ad istas opiniones vester ille princeps venerit. Sed clamare non desinitis retinendum hoc esse, deus ut beatus immortalisque sit. Quid autem obstat, quo minus sit beatus, si non sit bipes? aut ista, sive beatitas sive beatitudo dicenda est (utrumque omnino durum, sed usu mollienda nobis verba sunt), verum ea, quae- cunque est, cur aut in solem illum aut in hunc mundum aut in aliquam mentem aeternam figura membrisque corporis va- cuam cadere non potest? Nihil aliud dicis nisi: 'Numquam vidi solem aut mundum beatum.' Quid? mundum praeter 'numquamne vidisti? Negabis. Cur igitur non sescenta
milium esse mundorum, sed innumerabilia ausus es dicere? Ratio docuit. Ergo hoc te ratio non docebit, cum praestantissima natura quaeratur, eaque beata et aeterna, quae sola divina natura est, ut inmortalitate vincamus ab ea natura, sic animi praestantia vinci, atque ut animi, item corporis? Cur igitur, cum ceteris rebus inferiores simus, forma pares sumus? ad similitudinem enim deorum propius accedebat humana virtus quam figura. An quicquam tam puerile dici potest (ut eundem locum diutius urgeam), quam si ea genera beluarum, quae in rubro mari Indianae gignantur, nulla esse dicamus? Atqui ne curiosissimi quidem homines exquirendo audire tam multa possunt, quam sunt multa, quae terra, mari, paludibus, fluminibus existint; quae negemus esse, quia numquam vidi-mus? Ipsa vero quam nihil ad rem pertinet, quae vos delec-tat maxime, similitudo! Quid? canis nonne similis lupo? atque, ut Ennius,

Simia quam similis, turpissima bestia, nobis!

at mores in utroque dispares. Elephanto beluarum nulla prudentior; at figura quae vastior? De bestis loquor; quid? inter ipsos homines nonne et simillimis formis dispares mores et moribus similium figura dissimilis? Etenim si semel, Velleii, suscipimus genus hoc argumenti, attende, quo serpat. Tu enim sumebas nisi in hominis figura rationem inesse non posse; sumet alius nisi in terrestri, nisi in eo, qui natus sit, nisi in eo, qui adoleverit, nisi in eo, qui didicerit, nisi in eo, qui ex animo constet et corpore caduco et infirmo, postremo nisi in homine atque mortalii. Quodsi in omnibus his rebus obstis, quid est, quod te forma una conturbet? His enim omnibus, quae proposui, adiunctis in homine rationem esse et mentem videbas; quibus detractis deum tamen nosse te dicis, modo liniamenta maneant. Hoc est non considerare, sed quasi sortiri, quid loquare. Nisi forte ne hoc quidem attendis, non modo in homine, sed etiam in arboare, quicquid supervacaneum sit aut usum non habeat, obstare. Quam molestum est uno digito plus habere! Quid
ita? Quia nec ad speciem nec ad usum alium quinque desiderant. 
Tuus autem deus non digito uno redundat, sed capite, collo, cervicibus, lateribus, alvo, tergo, poplitibus, manibus, pedibus, feminibus, cruribus. Si, ut inmortalis sit, quid haec ad vitam membra pertinent? quid ipsa facies? Magis illa, cerebrum, cor, pulmones, iecur; haec enim sunt domicilia vitae; oris quidem habitus ad vitae firmitatem nihil pertinet. Et eos vitiuperabas, qui ex operibus magnificis atque praecellis, cum ipsum mundum, cum eius membra, caelum, terras, maria, cumque horum insignia, solem, lunam stellasque, vidissent, cumque temporum maturitates, mutationes vicissitudinesque cognovissent, suspiciati essent aliquam excellentem esse praestantemque naturam, quae haec effecisset, moveret, regeret, gubernaret. Qui etiamsi aberrant coniectura, video tamen, quid sequantur; tu quod opus tandem magnum et egregium habes, quod effectum divina mente videatur, ex quo esse deos suspicere?
Habebam, inquis, in animo insitam informationem quandam dei. Et barbati quidem Iovis, galeatae Minervaë; num igitur esse talis putas? Quanto melius haec vulgus imperitorum, qui non membra solum hominis deo tribuant, sed usum etiam membrorum. Dant enim arcum, sagittas, hastam, clipeum, fuscinanum, fulmen, et si, actiones quae sint deorum, non vident, nihil agentem tamen deum non queunt cogitare. Ipsi, qui invidentur, Aegyptii nullam beluam nisi ob aliquam utilitatem, quam ex ea caperent, consecraverunt; velut ibes maximam vim serpentium conficiunt, cum sint aves excelsae, cruribus rigidis, corneo proceroque rostro; avertunt pestem ab Aegypto, cum volucris anguis ex vastitate Libyae vento Africo injectas interficiunt atque consumunt; ex quo fit, ut illae nec morsu vivae noceant nec odore mortuae. Possum de ichneumonum utilitate, de crocodilorum, de faelium dicere, sed nolo esse longus. Ita concludam, tamen beluas a barbaris propter beneficium consecratas, vestrorum deorum non modo beneficium nullum extare, sed ne factum quidem omnino. Nihil habet, inquit, negotii. Profecto Epicurus quasi pueri delicati.
nihil cessatione melius existimat. At ipsi tamen pueri, etiam cum cessant, exercitacione aliqua ludicra delectantur; deum sic feriatum volumus cessatione torpere, ut, si se commoverit, vereamur, ne beatus esse non possit? Haec oratio non modo deos spoliat motu et actione divina, sed etiam homines inertis efficit, siquidem agens aliquid ne deus quidem esse beatus potest.

Verum sit sane, ut vultis, deus effigies hominis et imago; quod eius est domicilium? quae sedes? qui locus? quae deinde actio vitae? quibus rebus, id quod vultis, beatus est? utatur enim suis bonis oportet et fruatur, qui beatus futurus est. Nam locus quidem iis etiam naturis, quae sine animis sunt, suus est cuique proprius, ut terra infimum teneat, hanc inundet aqua, superior aer, aetheris ignibus altissima ora reddatur. Bestiae autem terrenae sunt aliae, partim aquatiles, aliae quasi ancipites in utraque sede viventes; sunt quaedam etiam, quae igne nasci putentur appareantque in ardentibus fornacibus saepe volitantes. Quaero igitur, vester deus primum ubi habitet, deinde quae causa eum loco moveat, si modo movetur aliquando, porro, cum hoc proprium sit animantium, ut aliquid adpetant, quod sit naturae accommodatum, deus quid appetat, ad quam demique rem motu mentis ac ratione utatur, postremo quo modo beatus sit, quo modo aeternus. Quicquid enim horum attigeris, ulcus est. Ita male instituta ratio exitum reperire non potest. Sic enim dicebas, speciem dei percipi cogitatione, non sensu, nec esse in ea ullam soliditatem, neque eandem ad numerum permanere, eamque esse eius visionem, ut similitudine et transitione cernatur, neque deficiat unusquam ex infinitis corporibus similium accessio, ex eoque fieri, ut in haec intenta mens nostra beatam illam naturam et sempiternam putet.

Hoc, per ipsos deos, de quibus loquimur, quale tandem est? Nam si tantum modo ad cogitationem valent nec habent ullam soliditatem nec eminentiam, quid interest, utrum de Hippocentauro an deo cogitemus? omnem enim talem conformationem animi ceteri philosophi motum inanem vocant, vos
oportere. Isto modo, quoniam homines mortales sunt, sint aliquid inmortales, et quoniam nascentur in terra, nascantur in aqua. — Et quia sunt quae interimant, sint quae conservent. — Sunt sane, sed ea conservent, quae sunt; deos istos esse non sentio. Omnis tamen ista rerum effigies ex individuis quo modo corporibus oritur? quae etiam si essent, quae nulla sunt, pellere se ipsa et agitari inter se concursu fortasse possent, formare, figurare, colorare, animare non possent. Nullo igitur modo immortalem deum efficitis. Videamus nunc de beato. 40 Sine virtute certe nullo modo; virtus autem actuosa, et deus vester nihil agens; expers virtutis igitur; ita ne beatus quidem. Quae ergo vita? Suppeditatio, inquis, bonorum nullo malorum interventu. Quorum tandem bonorum? Voluptatum, credo, nempe ad corpus pertinentium; nullam enim novistis nisi pro- fectam a corpore et redeuntem ad corpus animi voluptatem. Non arbitror te, Vellei, similem esse Epicureorum reliquorum, quos non pudeat quarundam Epicuri vocum, quibus ille testatur se ne intellegere quidem ullum bonum, quod sit seinctum a delicatis et obscenis voluptatibus; quas quidem non erubescens persequitur omnis nominatim. Quem cibum igitur aut quas 112 potiones aut quas vocum aut florum varietates aut quos tactus, quos odores adhibebis ad deos, ut eos perfundas voluptatibus? Et poetae quidem [nectar ambrosiam] epulas conparant et aut Iuuentatem aut Ganymedem pocula ministrantem, tu autem, Epicure, quid facies? Neque enim, unde habeat ista deus tuus, video, nec quo modo utatur. Locupletior igitur hominum natura ad beate vivendum est quam deorum, quod pluribus generibus fruitur voluptatum. At has leviorem ducis voluptates, quibus 113 quasi titillatio (Epicuri enim hoc verbum est) adhibetur sensibus. 30 Quousque ludis? Nam etiam Philo noster ferre non poterat aspennari Epicureos mollis et delicatas voluptates; summa enim memoria pronuntiabat plurimas Epicuri sententias iis ipsis verbis, quibus erant scriptae; Metrodori vero, qui est Epicuri collega sapientiae, multa inpudentiora recitabat; accusat enim Timo- 35 cratem, fratrem suum, Metrodorus, quod dubitet omnia, quae
ad beatam vitam pertineant, ventre metiri, neque id semel dicit, sed saepius. Adnuere te video; nota enim tibi sunt; proferrem libros, si negares. Neque nunc reprehendo, quod ad voluptatem omnia referatur (alia est ea quaestio), sed doceo deos vestros esse voluptatis expertes, ita vestro iudicio ne beatos quidem. At dolore vacant. Satin est id ad illam abundantem bonis vitam beatissimam? Cogitat, inquiet, adsidue beatum esse se; habet enim nihil aliud, quod agitet in mente. Comprehende igitur animo et propone ante oculos deum nihil aliud in omni aeternitate nisi 'Mihi pulchre est' et 'Ego beatus sum' cogitantem. Nec tamen video, quo modo non vereatur iste deus beatus, ne intereat, cum sine ulla intermissione pulsetur agiteturque atomorum incursione sempiterna, cumque ex ipso imagines semper affluant. Ita nec beatus est vester deus nec aeternus.

At etiam de sanctitate, de pietate adversus deos libros scripsit Epicurus. At quo modo in his loquitur? Ut Thi. Coruncanium aut P. Scaevolam, pontifices maximos, te audire dicas, non eum, qui sustulerit omnem funditus religionem nec manibus, ut Xerxes, sed rationibus deorum inmortalium templum et aras evertet. Quid est enim, cur deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, cum dei non modo homines non colant, sed omnino nihil carent, nihil agant? At est eorum eximia quaedam praestansque natura, ut ca debet ipsa per se ad se colendam alicere sapientem. An quicquam eximium potest esse in ea natura, quae sua voluptate laetans nihil nec actura sit umquam neque agat neque egerit? quae porro pietas ei debetur, a quo nihil acceptis? aut quid omnino, cuius nullum meritum sit, ei debere potest? Est enim pietas iustitia adversum deos; cum quibus quid potest nobis esse iuris, cum homini nulla cum deo sit com-munitas? Sanctitas autem est scientia colendorum deorum; qui quam ob rem colendi sint, non intellego, nullo nec accepto ab iis nec sperato bono.

Quid est autem, quod deos veneremur propter admirationem eius naturae, in qua egregium nihil videamus? Nam supersti-
tione, quod gloriari soletis, facile est liberari, cum sustuleris
omnem vim deorum; nisi forte Diagoram aut Theodorum, qui
omnino deos esse negabant, censes supersticiosos esse potuisse.
Ego ne Protagoram quidem, cui neutrum licuerit, nec esse deos
nec non esse. Horum enim sententiae omnium non modo su-
perstitionem tollunt, in qua inest timor inanis deorum, sed etiam
religionem, quae deorum cultu pio continetur. Quid? ii, qui
dixerunt totam de dis inmortalibus opinionem factam esse ab
hominibus sapientibus rei publicae causa, ut, quos ratio non
possit, eos ad officium religio ducet, nonne omnem religio-
num funditus sustulerunt? Quid? Prodicus Cius, qui ea, quae
prodessent hominum vitae, deorum in numero habita esse dixit,
quam tandem religionem reliquit? Quid? qui aut fortis aut
claros aut potentis viros tradunt post mortem ad deos per-
venisse, esque esse ipsos, quos nos colere, precari venerarie
soleamus, nonne expertes sunt religionum omnium? Quae ratio
maxime tractata ab Euhemero est, quem noster et interpretatus
et secutus est praeter ceteros Ennius. Ab Euhemero autem et
mortes et sepulturae demonstrantur deorum. Utrum igitur hic
confirmasse videtur religionem an penitus totam sustulisse?
Omitto Eleusinem sanctam illam et Augustam,

Ubi iniantur gentes orarum ultimae,
praetereor Samothraciam eaque, quae Lemni

Nocturno aditu occultá coluntur,

Silvestribus saepibus densa.

Quibus explicatis ad rationemque revocatis rerum magis natura
cognoscitur quam deorum.

Mihi quidem etiam Democritus, vir magnus in primis, cuius
fontibus Epicurus hortulos suos inrigavit, nutare videtur in na-
tura deorum. Tum enim censet imagines divinitate praeditas
inessae in universitate rerum, tum principia mentis, quae sint in
eodem universo, deos esse dicit, tum animantes imagines, quae
vel prodesse nobis soleant vel nocere, tum ingentis quasdam
imagines tantasque, ut universum mundum complectantur ex-
DE NATURA DEORUM.

trinsecus; quae quidem omnia sunt patria Democriti quam 121 Democrito digniora. Quis enim istas imagines comprehendere animo potest? quis admirari? quis aut cultu aut religione dignas iudicare? Epicurus vero ex animis hominum extraxit radicibus religionem, cum dis immortalibus et opem et gratiam sustulit. Cum enim optimam et praestantissimam naturam dei dicat esse, negat idem esse in deo gratiam; tollit id, quod maxime proprium est optimae praestantissimaeque naturae. Quid enim melius aut quid praestantius bonitate et beneficiencia? Qua cum carere deum vultis, neminem deo nec deum nec hominem carum, neminem ab eo amari, neminem diligivultis. Ita fit, ut non modo homines a deis, sed ipsi dei inter se ab aliis aliis neglegantur. Quanto Stoici melius, qui a vobis reprehenduntur! Censent autem sapientes sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos. Nihil est enim virtute amabilius; 15 quam qui adeptus erit, ubicumque erit gentium, a nobis diligatur. Vos autem quid mali datis, cum in inbecillitate gratificationem et benivolentiam ponitis! Ut enim omittam vim et naturam deorum, ne homines quidem censetis, nisi inbecilli essent, futuros beneficos et benignos fuisse? Nulla est caritas naturalis inter bonos? Carum ipsum verbum est amoris, ex quo amicitiae nomen est ductum; quam si ad fructum nostrum referemus, non ad illius commoda, quem diligemus, non erit ista amicitia, sed mercatura quaedam utilitatum suarum. Prata et arva et pecudum greges diliguntur isto modo, quod fructus 25 ex iis capiuntur, hominum caritas et amicitia gratuita est. Quanto igitur magis deorum, qui nulla re egentes inter se diligunt et hominibus consulunt! Quod ni ita sit, quid veneramur, quid precamur deos? cur sacris pontifices, cur auspiciis augures praesunt? quid optamus a deis immortalibus? quid 30 vovemus? At etiam liber est Epicuri de sanctitate. Ludimur ab homine non tam faceto quam ad scribendi licentiam libero. Quae enim potest esse sanctitas, si dei humana non curant? quae autem animans natura nihil curans? Verius est igitur nimirum illud, quod familiaris omnium nostrum Posidonius 35
dissertuit in libro quinto de natura deorum, nullos esse deos Epicuro videri, quaeque is de deis inmortalibus dixerit, invidiae detestandae gratia dixisse. Neque enim tam desipiens fuisse, ut homunculi similem deum fingeret, liniamentis dumtaxat extremis, non habitu solido, membris hominis praeditum omnibus, usu membrorum ne minimo quidem, exilem quedam atque per lucidum, nihil cuiquam tribuentem, nihil gratificantem, omnino nihil curantem, nihil agentem. Quae natura primum nulla esse potest, idque videns Epicurus re tollit, oratione relinquit deos; deinde, si maxime talis est deus, ut nulla gratia, nulla hominum caritate teneatur, valeat; quid enim dicam 'propitius sit'? Esse enim propitius potest nemini, quoniam, ut dicitis, omnis in inbecillitate est et gratia et caritas.
BOOK SECOND.

SUMMARY.

COTTA having finished the refutation of the Epicurean theology, Balbus begins his exposition of the Stoic doctrine. He divides his discourse (§ 3), after the traditional custom of the Stoics, into four parts: 1. proof of the existence of the gods; 2. explanation of their nature and of their various sorts; 3. proof that the world is governed by them; 4. proof that in particular they have a care for mankind. The Stoics considered this fourth proposition necessary, because a divine government of the world is quite conceivable, which might order the whole according to general laws, bestowing at the same time no especial care on men; still less interfering in particular cases in their behalf, vouchsafing revelations, giving them support and aid, all of which the Stoics admitted in conformity with the popular belief. — The existence of the gods is proved from several points of view. The universality of the belief among all men is first mentioned, and the confirmation it receives, partly from individual apparitions of divine beings, partly from the revelations of the gods through divination and auspices (4–12). Next follows a statement of the reasons assigned by Cleanthes for this universal belief in the gods; first, the revelations of future events; second, the consideration of the many blessings which the order of the universe secures to man; third, the impression made by the grand, mighty and terrible phenomena of nature; fourth, the contemplation of the wonderful order and beauty of the heavenly bodies and their motions, which has led men to recognize the existence of ordering and governing beings (13–15). 1 Then follows Chrysippus’s

1 Aristotle had already explained in a similar manner the origin of the belief in the gods; first, ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς συμβαίνων, among which he reck-
justification of the belief in the gods, thus concisely stated: as it is certain that the universe and its everlasting order have not been produced by human power and human wisdom, so is it equally certain that the being which did produce them is higher than man. But beings higher than man must be gods; we can conceive nothing else higher than man, because man alone is endowed with reason, and reason is the highest possible endowment. If then there exists anything higher than men (and to deny it would be the most foolish presumption), it follows that there must be gods (16). This argument, which, as may be seen, takes for granted the idea of the gods as superhuman intelligent beings, and is only directed to show that such beings must of necessity exist, is then somewhat further developed. It would be foolish to think that the universe was intended to be an abode for men alone and not for higher beings as well. — Human reason itself, limited and incomplete as it is, presupposes the existence of a more complete and hence a divine reason from which it is derived. Just as everything which pertains to the bodily organization of man is derived from elements existing in the world, so must the best in man, the thinking spirit, be derived from a thinking being existing in the world; and it would be absurd were we to ascribe to the universe everything except the highest and best (17, 18). Finally, the wise order of the world, the connection and interpenetration of all its parts lead necessarily to the recognition of a divine spirit governing and holding together the whole (19). Some short propositions of Zeno follow summing up in syllogistic forms the essentials of the foregoing argument (20–22). Next comes a detailed deduction from the speculative physics of the Stoics, the preceding proofs having all been drawn from the point of view of the ordinary human reason. All vegetable and animal life in the universe depends upon heat; for individual motion and activity can only dwell in what is endowed with heat; life is only a definite, uniform mode of activity, which proceeds from the principle of heat existing in all living bodies, and this principle is thus seen to pervade the whole universe (23, 24). This general prevalence is further evident from the fact that we find heat in all

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four of the chief forms of matter, the so-called four elements, earth, water, air and fire. Hence heat is to be regarded as the living principle of the whole universe (25-28). But this principle must be conceived as possessing consciousness and reason. For since there exists in all not simple, but composite natural bodies a superior governing power (ἡγεμονικόν), to which all the rest are subordinate, so there must be a superior governing power in the universe; and since some subordinate parts of the universe are endowed with reason, the superior parts must also be so endowed; hence the universe and this all-pervading, all-animating principle must be endowed with reason, and the universe, since it is penetrated and animated by this principle, must be a being endowed with reason, divine and possessing in full divine power (29, 30). This principle is then, as has been said, heat, but a heat much purer, much more

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1 The principle of heat in general, totum hoc genus ignem as it is called in § 25, or calidum illud atque ignem (§ 28), although operating in all the three elements, earth, water and air, yet exists independently of them as quarta pars mundi or as a fourth element in the aether (§ 27). The common earthly fire, hic noster ignis, quem usus vitae requirit, confector consumptorque omnium (§ 41), appears on the contrary not as a separate element, but only as a variation or inferior form of the other. According to Cicero then three grades are to be distinguished of this genus ignem; first, the ardor caelestis, qui aether vel caelum nominatur (§ 41); second, the vital heat in animals and plants, ignis corporaeus (§ 41), or hic noster calor, quo haec quae nota nobis sunt retinuntur et vigint (§ 30); third, the common fire which only burns, destroys, dissolves, confector, et consumptor omnium (§ 41). In other authors, as Stobaeus, Ecl. I. 36, p. 538, only two sorts are distinguished, πῦρ τεχνικόν and πῦρ ἀτεχνικόν, the latter being common fire, the former the two other sorts which Cicero distinguishes, which in fact possess in common the animating and preserving power. The Peripatetics blamed the Stoics for using the one term πῦρ of the heavenly ether and of common fire, though others had done the same before them; they themselves rather regarded the ether as a separate existence, a fifth element in addition to the four common ones. See Cic. Acad. I. 11, 39; Ps. Arist. de mund. c. 2, 5, with the citations of Kapp, p. 28; and Ideler, note on Arist. Meteor. I, p. 335. When, moreover, the Stoics laid down the proposition that no fire can exist without replenishing as universally valid, so that it might be applied to the original fire from which all things have proceeded, they certainly laid themselves open to the attacks of their opponents: and we find that the Academic in Bk. III, 14, 37, makes use of this to prove that the original fire (or the primæval deity of the Stoics) cannot be eternal. We must suppose that the Stoics really limited the proposition only to the varieties of
powerful than that which exists in earthly things and which produces life and consciousness in men and animals, and so all the more sensitive, conscious and thinking. And since it derives its spring of action not from something external but from itself; and since whatever is the source of its own activity is, as Plato teaches, soul; the principle of heat is to be regarded as the soul of the universe, and the universe as a being possessing a soul (31, 32): it is at the same time a reasonable and wise being, because the universe must surely be better than the individual beings which it contains; while if it were not reasonable and wise, it would follow that man by the possession of reason would thereby have the preeminence over the universe (32). — A further proof of the existence of the deity is drawn from the observed gradation of beings, the higher succeeding the lower, the more perfect the more imperfect; the sensitive animal, moved by instincts and desires, standing above the plant which merely grows and nourishes itself, and man endowed with reason standing above the animal. In like manner there must be above man a higher grade of beings who are possessed of reason in the highest fullness, which in man is only incomplete. This grade is that of the deity, hence of the universe which is the deity and whose perfection cannot, like that of subordinate natures, be diminished by any limitations or defects whatever (33–36). To strengthen this argument the absurdity and impossibility of the contrary supposition is pointed out; as also the necessity that the universe, as the all-embracing all must be perfect in every respect, hence reasonable and wise, and hence God (37–39).

After the divinity of the universe has thus been shown, there follows the proof that the heavenly bodies are also gods. As these consist entirely of the finest ether i.e. the warm principle of fire, they must consequently be living, sensitive and thinking beings. This is true first of the sun, the ethery, fiery nature of which cannot be doubted (40, 41); the other heavenly bodies are also of the substance of ether, hence sensitive and thinking (42). This however follows also from the order and regularity of their motions,

fire derived from the original fire, as they exist in the heavenly bodies and in earthly things. Anything more definite than this we are unable to ascertain from our sources of information.
which are to be regarded as purely voluntary, depending on a systematic choice, and hence as a proof of their divinity (43, 44).

Thus far we have been concerned with the proof of the existence of the gods; next follows the second part, or the question as to their nature. This has already been partially answered in the first part; for having proved the existence of an animating and conserving principle of fire in the universe, and having attributed to it consciousness and reason and also divinity, we have substantially shown that the deity is such an all-pervading, animating, conserving, reasoning principle of fire; furthermore that the universe, as being filled and animated by this principle, is itself to be called God.\(^1\) In beginning, therefore, with the proposition that the universe is God, and in putting it upon the ground that according to universal natural consciousness the deity must be a living being, and the most perfect one, and that nothing answers to this idea better than the universe itself, Balbus only repeats what he had already said under the previous head. He adds to this a hit at the Epicureans who ridiculed this spherical deity (for the Stoics as well as the majority of people believed in the spherical form of the world, while the Epicureans doubted it) (46–48); hence the reasons for this shape of the universe and of the heavenly bodies as well are derived from the movements of the heavens and the stars (49–53); and the argument for the divinity of the heavenly bodies, drawn from the regularity of their movements, is incidentally repeated (54–56). Balbus now makes use of these propositions to establish the Stoic definition of nature given by Zeno, that it is a sort of heat possessing creative energy and working in an intelligent and methodical manner; or in other words the animating and thinking principle of heat before referred to. This nature, so far as it is operative in the universe, may be called the soul of the universe

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\(^1\) Diog. L. VII, 137: ἔγοντο δὲ κόσμων τρίχως· αὐτῶν τε τὸν θεόν τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσις οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιῶν, ὡς δὴ ἀφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος, δημοιριαὶ τῶν τῆς διακοσμήσεως κατὰ χρόνων ποιᾶς περιόδους ἀναλίπας εἰς ἑαυτῷ τὴν ἀπάσιαν οὐσίαν καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἑαυτῷ γεννών; (it is therefore the primeval creative being, which makes all other beings to proceed from its own fullness and again receives them back into itself). Καὶ αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διακοσμήσαν τῶν ἱστέρων κόσμων εἶναι ἔγονος, καὶ τρίτον τὸ συνεστικός ἐξ ἄμφων. Comp. Stobaeus, Ecl. I, pp. 324 and 444.
or providence, as being the intelligent force everywhere aiming at adaptation, permanence and beauty (57, 58).

Besides the gods whose existence has thus far been proved, namely the universe and the heavenly bodies, wise men, continues Balbus, have for good reasons accepted many others. Desirable and useful things have been regarded as gifts of divine persons and so have been named after the givers; as, for instance, wine and grain are called Liber and Ceres: so also virtues and relations of great importance, which were referred to especial divine influence, like Truth, Virtue, Honor, Unity, Freedom &c. (59–61). Famous men have been deified for their achievements (62). Finally the forces of nature have been personified and natural phenomena clothed in allegories; and this has given rise to a great number of gods and fables relating to them (62–70). It would be in the highest degree foolish to interpret these literally and to believe them; a sensible person will rather take them in their true sense, and regard those gods as nothing more than manifestations of the divine being working in different parts of the universe, to whom we should pay reverence with a true and honest heart.

Next follows the third part or the proof that the world is governed by the divine providence. It may be said that this also has been in some degree anticipated in the preceding portion; since the creative and sustaining power, omnipresent in the world, was there represented as the universal soul and providence, endowed with reason, ordering and governing everything with a definite purpose (57, 58); but the Stoics thought it necessary to prove this point independently of the others, though it obliged them to repeat much that had been said before. The proof is of three sorts. First, if we once concede the existence of gods, we must also conceive of them as rulers of the world; because, if they were not so, they would not deserve to be called gods at all. For it follows from the true general idea of gods that they are subject to no other being external to themselves; that they are wise, mutually bound to a common, intelligent, systematic activity, and that they must direct this activity to the highest and most important object, which is the government of the world (75–80).—The second argument is drawn from the order of the universe, and the correspondence of its parts. All single objects and parts of the world are subject to Nature, by which we are to understand no blind and unconscious force, but one
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possessing intelligence and working with the highest skill and wisdom. The sum total of the universe too is subject to such a force (81–86). But no one who contemplates the world with its arrangement can doubt that the nature which governs it all is really in the highest degree intelligent and wise; he will be compelled rather to recognize a being which manages and governs it wisely (87–90).—

The third argument is closely connected with the second, being based upon the contemplation of the heavens and the heavenly bodies in their wonderful order, harmony and beauty (91–129); of the different plants and beasts constituted and endowed with so wondrous adaptation (121); of the manifold productions of the earth conducing to the well-being of various creatures; and of many other things of the same sort which are given at great length (122–132). Cicero omits, however, at the end to draw the definite conclusion that there must be a divine providence which governs the world. He assumes rather as a matter of course that all this is the work of the gods; and draws simply the conclusion that the gods could only have created the world for the sake of thinking, reasoning beings, that is, for themselves and for mankind (122); this is directly followed by the proof of the especial care of the gods for men. The argument consists of a minute description of the wise arrangement and adaptation of the human body (134–149), and the facilities it gives men for procuring their pleasures and satisfying their wants (150–152); especial weight is laid upon reason, which distinguishes man from all other earthly beings, and which enables him to contemplate the heavens and attain to knowledge of the gods; from this come piety and all the other virtues which make man so like the gods that they excel him in hardly anything but immortality. All this cannot possibly be the result of chance.

Balbus here nominally begins the fourth part or the proof that men enjoy the particular care of the gods, although what has just preceded might with equal propriety have been arranged under this head. It was, however, so closely connected with the third part that it was drawn into that portion of the discussion. Balbus shows here, in addition, that the whole arrangement of the world, from the heavenly bodies and the succession of the seasons and weather resulting from their motion to the earth with its manifold products, is evidently intended for the advantage of man (154–162). Finally the revelation made to men by the various species of divina-
tion, which was used in the beginning of the argument to prove the
existence of the gods, is again introduced here to show the divine
care for men (162, 163)\(^1\); this care is shown to be bestowed not
only upon the human race in general but upon separate portions
and upon individuals who, when distinguished for excellence above
their fellows, have owed it chiefly to the help of the favoring gods
(164–167). In conclusion Balbus exhorts Cotta to devote his dia-
lectic skill and eloquence rather to the defence of these views than
to the destruction of the belief in the gods (168).

\(^1\) As this point is only briefly touched upon here, Cicero has treated it at
length in the book De Divinatione, where his brother Quintus gives the Stoic
view and he himself the Academic.

Q U A E cum Cotta dixisset, tum Velleius: Ne ego, inquit,
incautus, qui cum Academicio et eodem rhetore congregi
conatus sim! Nam neque indisertum Academicum pertimuis-
sem nec sine ista philosophia rhetorem quamvis eloquentem;
neque enim flumine conturbor inanium verborum nec subtilitate
sententiarum, si orationis est siccitas. Tu autem, Cotta, utraque
re valuisti; corona tibi et iudices defuerunt. Sed ad ista alias,
nunc Lucilius, si ipsi commodum est, audiamus. Tum Bal-
bus: Eundem equidem malim audire Cottam, dum, qua
eloquentia falsos deos sustulit, eadem veros inducat. Est enim
et philosophi et pontificis et Cottaë de dis immortalis habere
non errantem et vagam, ut Academicici, sed, ut nostri, stabilem
certamque sententiam. Nam contra Epicurum satis superque
dictum est. Sed aveo audire, tu ipse, Cotta, quid sentias. An,
inquit, obitus es, quid initio dixerim, facilius me, talibus
praescertim de rebus, quid non sentirem, quam quid sentirem,
posse dicere? Quodsi haberem aliud, quod liqueret, tamen
te vicissim audire vellem, cum ipse tam multa dixissem. Tum
LIB. II. CAP. I, II. §§ 1-5.

Balbus: Geram tibi morem et agam quam brevissum potero; etenim convictis Epicuri erroribus longa de mea disputatione detracta oratio est. Omnino dividunt nostri totam istam de dis inmortalibus quaestionem in partis quattuor. Primum docent esse deos, deinde quales sint, tum mundum ab iis administrari, postremo consulere eos rebus humanis. Nos autem hoc sermone, quae priora duo sunt, sumamus; tertium et quartum, quia maiora sunt, puto esse in aliud tempus differenda. Minime vero, inquit Cotta; nam et otiosi sumus et iis de rebus agimus, quae sunt etiam negotiis anteponendae.

Tum Lucilius: Ne egere quidem videtur, inquit, oratione prima pars. Quid enim potest esse tam apertum tamque perspicuum, cum caelum suspeximus caelestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse alicud numen praestantissimae mentis, quo haec regantur? Quod ni ita esset, qui potuisset adsensu omnium dicere Ennius:

Āspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant omnēs Iovem,

illum vero et Iovem et dominatorem rerum et omnia nutu regentem et, ut idem Ennius,

patrem divumque hominumque

et praesentem ac praepotentem deum? Quod qui dubitet, haud sane intellego, cur non idem, sol sit an nullus sit, dubitare possit. Qui enim est hoc illo evidentius? Quod nisi cognitum comprehensumque animis haberemus, non tam stabilis opinio permaneret nec confirmaretur diurnitate temporis nec una cum saeculis aetatibusque hominum inveterari potuisset. Etenim videmus ceteras opiniones factas atque vanas diurnitate extabuisse. Quis enim Hippocentaurum fuisse aut Chimaeram putat? quaeve anus tam excors inveniri potest, quae illa, quae quondam credebantur apud inferos portenta, extimescat? Opinionis enim commenta delet dies, naturae judicia confirmat. Itaque et in nostro populo et in ceteris deorum cultus
DE NATURA DEORUM.

religionumque sanctitates existunt in dies maiores atque meliores, idque evenit non temere nec casu, sed quod et praesentes saepe di vim suam declarant, ut et apud Regillum bello Latinorum, cum A. Postumius dictator cum Octavio Mamilio Tusculano proelio dimicaret, in nostra acie Castor et Pollux ex equis pugnare visi sunt, et recentiore memoria iadem Tyndaridae Persem victum nuntiaverunt. P. enim Vatinius, avus huius adulescentis, cum praefectura Reatina Romam venienti noctu duo iuvenes cum equis albis dixissent regem Persem illo die captum, senatui nuntiavit; et primo quasi temere de re publica locutus in carcerem coniectus est, post a Paulo litteris allatis cum idem dies constitisset, et agro a senatu et vacacione donatus est. Atque etiam cum ad fluvium Sagram Crotoniatis Locri maximo proelio devicissent, eo ipso die auditam esse eam pugnam ludis Olympiae memoriae proditum est. Saepe Faunorum voces exaudita, saepe visae formae deorum quemvis non aut hebetem aut impium deos praesentes esse confiteri coegerunt. Praedictiones vero et praesensiones rerum futurarum quid aliud declarant nisi hominibus ea ostendi, monstrari, portendi, praedici? ex quo illa ostenta, monstra, portenta, prodigia dicuntur. Quodsi ea finta credimus licentia fabularum, Mopsum, Tiresiam, Amphiaratum, Calchawatam, Helenum, quos tamen augures ne ipsae quidem fabulae adscivissent, si res omnino repudiaret, ne domesticis quidem exemplis docti numen deorum conprobabimus? Nihil nos P. Claudii bello Punico primo temperitas movebit? qui etiam per iocum deos inrident, cum cavea liberati pulli non pascerentur, mergi eos in aquam iussit, ut biberent, quoniam esse nollent. Qui risus classe devicta multas ipsi lacrimas, magnam populo Romano cladem attulit. Quid? collega eius Iunius eodem bello nonne tempestate classem amisset, cum auspiciis non paruisset? Itaque Claudius a populo condemnatus est, Iunius necem sibi ipse conscivit. C. Flaminium Coelius religione neglecta ceceidisse apud Trasumenum scribit cum magno rei publicae vulnere. Quorum exitio intellegi potest eorum.
imperis rem publicam amplificatam, qui religionibus paruissent. Et si conferre volumus nostra cum externis, ceteris rebus aut pares aut etiam inferiores reperiemur, religione, id est cultu deorum, multo superiores. An Attii Navii lituus ille, quo ad 9 investigandum suum regiones vineae terminavit, contemnendus est? Credemus, nisi eius augurio rex Hostilius maxima bella gessisset. Sed neglegentia nobilitatis augurii disciplina omissa veritas auspiciorum spreta est, species tantum retenta. Itaque maximae rei publicae partes, in his bella, quibus rei publicae salus continentur, nullis auspiciis administrantur, nulla peremnia servantur, nulla ex acuminibus, nulla, cum viri vocantur, ex quo in procinctu testamenta perierunt. Tum enim bella gerere nostri duces incipient, cum auspicia posuerunt. At vero apud 10 maiores tanta religionis vis fuit, ut quidam imperatores etiam se ipsos dis in mortalibus capite velato verbis certis pro re publica devoverent. Multa ex Sibyllinis vaticinationibus, multa ex haruspicorum responsibus commemorare possum, quibus ea con- firmentur, quae dubia nemini debent esse. Atqui et nostrorum augurum et Etruscorum haruspicum disciplinam P. Scipione C. Figulo consulibus res ipsa probavit; quos cum Ti. Gracchus consul iterum crearet, primus rogator, ut eos retulit, ibidem est repente mortuus. Gracchus cum comitia nihil minus peregisset remque illam in religionem populo venisse sentiret, ad senatum retulit. Senatus, quos ad soleret, referendum censuit.

Haruspices introducti responderunt non fusse iustum comitiorum rogatorem. Tum Gracchus, ut e patre audiebam, 11 incensus ira: 'Itane vero? ego non iustus, qui et consul rogavi et auspicato? an vos Tusci ac barbari auspiciorum populi Romani ius tenetis et interpretes esse comitiorum potestis?' Itaque tum illos exire iussit. Post autem et provincia litteras ad collegium misit se, cum legeret libros, recordatum esse vitio sibi tabernaculum captum fusse [hortos Scipionis], quod, cum pomerium postea intrasset habendi senatus causa, in redeundo, cum idem 15 pomerium transiret, auspicari esset oblitus; itaque vitio creatos
consules esse. Augures rem ad senatum; senatus, ut abdicarent consules; abdicaverunt. Quae quaerimus exempla maiora? Vir sapientissimus atque haud sciam an omnium praestantissimus peccatum suum, quod celari possit, confiteri maluit quam haerere in re publica religionem, consules summum imperium statim deponere quam id tenere punctum temporis contra religionem. Magna augurum auctoritas; quid? haruspicum ars nonne divina? Haec et innumerabilia ex eodem genere qui videat, nonne cogatur confiteri deos esse? Quorum enim interpretis sunt, eos ipso esse certe necesse est; deorum autem interpretis sunt; deos igitur esse fateamur. At fortasse non omnia eveniunt, quae praedicta sunt. Ne aegri quidem quia non omnes convalescunt, idcirco ars nulla medicina est. Signa ostenduntur a dis rerum futurarum. In his si qui erraverunt, non deorum natura, sed hominum coniectura peccavit. Itaque inter omnis omnium gentium summa constat; omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum esse deos. Quales sint, varium est, esse nemo negat. Cleanthes quidem noster quattuor de causis dixit in animis hominum informatas deorum esse notiones. Primam posuit eam, de qua modo dixi, quae orta esset ex praeesione rerum futurarum; alteram, quam ceperimus ex magnitudine commodorum, quae percipiantur caeli temperamentio, fecunditate terrarum aliarumque commoditatum conplurium copia; tertiam, quae terreret animos fulminibus, tempestatibus, nimbis, nivibus, grandinibus, vastitate, pestilentia, terrae motibus et saepe fremitibus lapideisque imbribus et guttis imbrium quasi cruentis, tum labibus aut repentinis terrarum hiatibus, tum praeter naturam hominum pecudumque portentis, tum facibus visis caelestibus, tum stellis iis, quas Graeci cometas, nostri cincinnatas vocant, quae nuper bello Octaviano magnarum fuerunt calamitatum praenuntiae, tum sole geminato, quod, ut e patre audivi, Tuditano et Aquilio consulibus evenerat, quo quidem anno P. Africanus sol alter extinctus est, quibus exterriti homines vim quandam esse caelestem et divinam suspicati sunt; quartam causam esse,
eamque vel maximam, aequabilitatem motus conversionumque caeli, solis, lunae siderumque omnium distinctionem, varietatem, pulchritudinem, ordinem, quorum rerum aspectus ipse satis indicaret non esse ea fortuita. Ut, si quis in domum aliquam aut in gymnasium aut in forum venerit, cum videat omnium rerum rationem, modum, disciplinam, non possit ea sine causa fieri iudicare, sed esse aliquem intellegat, qui praesit et cui pareatur, multo magis in tantis motionibus tantisque vicissitutibus, tam multarum rerum atque tantarum ordinibus, in quibus nihil umquam immensa et infinita vetustas mentita sit, statuat necesse est ab aliqua mente tantos naturae motus gubernari. Chrysippus quidem, quamquam est acerrimo ingenio, tamen ea dicit, ut ab ipsa natura didicisse, non ut ipse repperisse videatur. 'Si enim', inquit, 'est aliquid in rerum natura, quod hominis mens, quod ratio, quod vis, quod potestas humana efficere non possit, est certe id, quod illud efficit, homine melius; atqui res caelestes omnesque eae, quarum est ordo sempiternus, ab homine confici non possunt; est igitur id, a quo illa conficiuntur, homine melius. Id autem quid potius dixeris quam deum? Etenim si di non sunt, quid esse potest in rerum natura homine melius? in eo enim solo est ratio, qua nihil potest esse praestantius. Esse autem hominem, qui nihil in omni mundo melius esse quam se putet, desipientis adrogantiae est; ergo est aliquid melius; est igitur profecto deus.' An vero, si domum magnam pulchramque videris, non possis adduci, ut, etiamsi dominum non videas, muribus illam et mustelis aedificatam putes? tantum ergo ornatum mundi, tantam varietatem pulchritudinemque rerum caelestium, tantam vim et magnitudinem maris atque terrarum si tuum ac non deorum inmortalium domicilium putes, nonne plane desipere videare? An ne hoc quidem intellegimus, omnia supera esse meliora, terram autem esse infimam, quam crassis-
simus circumfundat aër? ut ob eam ipsam causam, quod etiam quibusdam regionibus atque urbibus contingere videmus, hebetiora ut sint hominum ingenia propter caeli pleniorem naturam, hoc idem generi humano evenerit, quod in terra, hoc est in crassissima regione mundi, conlocati sint. Et tamen ex ipsa hominum sollertia esse aliquam mentem, et eam quidem aciorem et divinam, existimare debemus. 'Unde enim hanc homo arripuit?' ut ait apud Xenophontem Socrates. Quin et umorem et calorem, qui est fusus in corpore, et terrenam ipsam viscerum soliditatem, animum denique illum spirabilem, si quis quaerat, unde habeamus, appareat, quod aliud a terra sumpsimus, aliud ab umore, aliud ab igni, aliud ab aëre eo, quem spiritu ducimus. Illud autem, quod vincit haec omnia, rationem dico et, si placet pluribus verbis, mentem, consilium, cogitationem, prudentiam, ubi invenimus? unde sustulimus? An cetera mundus habebit omnia, hoc unum, quod plurimi est, non habebit? Atqui certe nihil omnium rerum melius est mundo, nihil praestabilius, nihil pulchrius, nec solum nihil est, sed ne cogitari quidem quicquam melius potest. Et si ratione et sapientia nihil est melius, necesse est haec inesse in eo, quod optimum esse concedimus. Quid vero? tanta rerum consentiens, conspirans, continuata cognatio quem non coget ea, quae dicuntur a me, conprobare? Possetne uno tempore flore, dein vicissim horrere terra? aut tot rebus ipsis se inmutantibus solis accessus discensusque solstitiis brumisque cognosci? aut aestus maritimis fretorumque angustiae ortu aut obitu lunae commoveri? aut una totius caeli conversione cursus astrorum dispares conservari? Haec ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur. Atque haec cum uberi disputationur et fusius, ut mihi est in animo facere, facilius effugiat Academicorum calumniam; cum autem, ut Zeno solebat, brevius angustiusque concludentur, tum apertiora sunt ad reprendendum. Nam ut profluens amnis aut vix aut nullo modo, conclusa autem aqua facile conrumpitur, sic
orationis flumine reprensoris convicia diluuntur, angustia autem conclusae orationis non facile se ipsa tutatur. Haec enim, quae dilatantur a nobis, Zeno sic premebat: 'Quod ratione utitur, id melius est quam id, quod ratione non utitur; nihil autem mundo melius; ratione igitur mundus utitur.' Similiter effici potest sapientem esse mundum, simuliter beatum, simuliter aeternum; omnia enim haec meliora sunt quam ea, quae sunt iis carentia, nec mundo quicquam melius; ex quo efficietur esse mundum deum. Idemque hoc modo: 'Nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest esse sentiens; mundi autem partes sentientes sunt; non igitur caret sensu mundus.' Pergit idem et urget angustius: 'Nihil', inquit, 'quod animi quodque rationis est ex-pers, id generare ex se potest animantem conpotemque rationis; mundus autem gene-rat animantis compotesque rationis; animans est igitur mundus composque rationis.' Idemque similitudine, ut saepe solet, rationem conclusit hoc modo: 'Si ex oliva modulate canentes tibiae nascerentur, num dubitares, quin in-esset in oliva tibicinii quaedam scientia? Quid, si platani fidiculas ferrent numerose sonantes? idem scilicet censeres in plata-nis inesse musicam. Cur igitur mundus non animans sapiensque iudicetur, cum ex se procreet animantis atque sapientis?'

Sed quoniam coepi secus agere, atque initio dixeram (negaram enim hanc primam partem egere oratione, quod esset omnibus perspicuum deos esse), tamen id ipsum rationibus physicis confirmare volo. Sic enim res se habet, ut omnia, quae alantur et quae crescant, contineant in se vim caloris, sine qua neque ali possent nec crescere. Nam omne, quod est calidum et igneum, cietur et agitur motu suo; quod autem alitur et crescit, motu quodam utitur; certo et aequabili; qui
quam diu remanet in nobis, tam diu sensus et vita remanet; re-
frigerato autem et extincto calore occidimus ipsi et extinguimur.

24 Quod quidem Cleanthes his etiam argumentis docet, quanta vis
insit caloris in omni corpore: negat enim esse ullam cibum tam
gravem, quin is nocte et die concoquatur; cuius etiam in
reliquis inest calor ii, quas natura respuerit. Iam vero venae
et arteriae micare non desinunt quasi quodam igneo motu,
animadversumque saepe est, cum cor animantis alcuuis
evolsum ita mobiliter palpitaret, ut imitaretur igneam celeri-
tatem. Omne igitur, quod vivit, sive animal sive terra editum, 10
id vivit propter inclusum in eo calorem. Ex quo intellegi
debet eam caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem per omnem
mundum pertinentem. Atque id facile cernimus toto genere
hoc igneo, quod tranat omnia, subtilius explicato. Omnes
igitur partes mundi (tangam autem maximas) calore fultae 15
sustinentur. Quod primum in terrena natura perspici potest.
Nam et lapidum conflictu atque tritu elici ignem videmus et
recenti fossione terram fumare calentem, atque etiam ex puteis
iugibus aquam calidam trahi, et id maxime fieri temporibus
hibernis, quod magna vis terrae cavernis contineatur caloris 20
eaque hieme sit densior ob eamque causam calorem insitum in
terris contineat artius. Longa est oratio multaeque rationes,
quibus doceri possit omnia, quae terra concipiat semina, quae-
que ipsa ex se generata stirpibus infixa contineat, ea tempera-
tione caloris et oriri et augescere. Atque aquae etiam 25
admixtum esse calorem primum ipse liquor aquae declarat et
fusio, quae neque congliciaret frigoribus neque nive pruinaque
concrasceret, nisi cadem se admixto calore liquefacta et dilapsa
diffunderet. Itaque et aquilonibus reliquisque frigoribus ad-
strictus durescit umor, et idem vicissim mollitur tepfactus et 30
tabescit calore. Atque etiam maria agitata ventis ita tepescunt,
ut intellegi facile possit in tantis illis umoribus esse inclusum
calorem. Nec enim ille externus et adventicius habendus est
tepor, sed ex intimis maris partibus agitatione excitatus, quod
nostris quoque corporibus contingit, cum motu atque exercita-
tione recalescunt. Ipse vero aër, qui natura est maxime frigidus, minime est expers caloris; ille vero et multo quidem calore admixtus est; ipse enim oritur ex respiratione aquarum; earum enim quasi vapor quidam aër habendus est; is autem existit motu eius caloris, qui aquis continetur. Quam similitudinem cernere possumus in iis aquis, quae ecfervescent subditis ignibus. Iam vero reliqua quarta pars mundi, ea et ipsa tota natura fervida est et ceteris naturis omnibus salutarem inpertit et vitalem calorem. Ex quo concluditur, cum omnes mundi partes sustineantur calore, mundum etiam ipsum simili parique natura in tanta diurnitate servari, eoque magis, quod intellegi debet calidum illud atque ignem ita in omni fusum esse natura, ut in eo insit procreandi vis et causa gignendi, a quo et animantia omnia et ea, quorum stirpes terra continentur, et nasci sit necesse et augescere.

Natura est igitur, quae contineat mundum omnem eumque tueatur, et ea quidem non sine sensu atque ratione; omnem enim naturam necesse est, quae non solitaria sit neque simplex, sed cum alio iuncta atque conexa, habere aliquem in se principatum, ut in homine mentem, in belua quiddam sime mentis, unde orientur rerum adpetitus. In arborum autem et earum rerum, quae gignuntur et terra, radicibus inesse principatum putatur. Principatum autem id dico, quod Graeci ἥγεμονικὸν vocant, quo nihil in quoque generi nec potest nec debet esse praeistantius. Ita necesse est illud etiam, in quo sit totius naturae principatus, esse omnium optimum omni- que rerum potestate dominatuaque dignissimum. Videmus autem in partibus mundi (nihil est enim in omni mundo, quod non pars universi sit) inesse sensum atque rationem. In ea parte igitur, in qua mundi inest principatus, haec inesse necesse est, et acriora quidem atque maiora. Quocirca sapientem esse mundum necesse est, naturamque eam, quae res omnes complexa teneat, perfectione rationis excellere, eoque deum esse mundum, omnemque vim mundi natura divina contineri. Atque etiam mundi ille fervor purior, perlucidior mo-
biliorque *est* multo ob easque causas aptior ad sensus commovendos quam hic noster calor, quo haec, quae nota nobis sunt, retinentur et vigent. Absurdum igitur est dicere, cum homines bestiaeque hoc calore teneantur et propterea moveantur ac sentiant, mundum esse sine sensu, qui integro et libero et puro; eodemque acerrimo et mobilissimo ardore teneatur, prae-sertim cum is ardor, qui est mundi, non agitatus ab alio neque externo pulsu, sed per se ipse ac sua sponte moveatur. Nam quid potest esse mundo valentius, quod pellat atque moveat calorem eum, quo ille teneatur? Audiamus enim Platonem quasi quendam deum philosophorum; cui duo placet esse motus, unum suum, alterum externum, esse autem divinius, quod ipsum ex se sua sponte moveatur, quam quod pulsu agitetur alieno. Hunc autem motum in solis animis esse ponit, ab hisque principium motus esse ductum putat. Quapropter, quoniam ex mundi ardore motus omnis oritur, is autem ar dor non alieno inpulsu, sed sua sponte movetur, animus sit necesse est; ex quo efficitur animantem esse mundum. Atque ex hoc quoque intellegi poterit in eo inesse intellegantiam, quod certe est mundus melior quam ulla natura. Ut enim nulla pars est corporis nostri, quae non minoris sit, quam nosmet ipsi sumus, sic mundum universum pluris esse necesse est quam partem aliquam universi. Quod si ita est, sapiens sit mundus necesse est. Nam si ita esset, hominem, qui est mundi pars, quoniam rationis est particeps, pluris esse quam mundum omnem opor- teret. Atque etiam, si a primis inchoatisque naturis ad ultimas perfectasque volumus procedere, ad deorum naturam perveniamus necesse est. Primum enim animadvertimus a natura sustineri ea, quae gignantur e terra, quibus natura nihil tribuit amplius, quam ut ea alendo atque augendo tueretur. Bestiis autem sensum et motum dedit et cum quodam adpetitu accessum ad res salutares, a pestiferis recessum; hoc homini amplius, quod addidit rationem, qua regerentur animi adpetitus, qui tum remitterentur, tum continerentur. Quartus autem gradu est et altissimus eorum, qui natura boni sapientesque
gignuntur, quibus a principio innascitur ratio recta constansque, quae supra hominem putanda est deoque tribuenda, id est mundo, in quo ncessse est perfectam illam atque absolutam inesse rationem. Neque enim dici potest in ulla rerum insti-
tutione non esse aliquid extremum atque perfectum. Ut enim
in vite, ut in pecude, nisi quae vis obstitit, videmus naturam
suo quodam itinere ad ultimum pervenire, atque ut pictura et
fabrica ceteraeque artes habent quendam absulti operis effec-
tum, sic in omni natura, ac multo etiam magis, ncessse est
ab solvi aliquid ac perfici. Etenim ceteris naturis multa ex-
terna, quo minus perficientur, possunt obsistere, universam
autem naturam nulla res potest impedire, propterea quod omnis
naturas ipsa cohibet et continet. Quocirca ncessse est esse
quartum illum et altissimum gradum, quo nulla vis possit acce-
dere. Is autem est gradus, in quo rerum omnium natura pon-
tur; quae quoniam talis est, ut et prae sit omnibus et eam nulla
res possit impedire, ncessse est intelligentem esse mundum et
quidem etiam sapientem. Quid autem est inscitus quam eam
naturam, quae omnis res sit conplexa, non optumam dici, aut,
cum sit optuma, non primum animantem esse, deinde rationis
et consilii compotem, postremo sapientem? Qui enim potest
alter esse optuma? Neque enim, si stirpium similis sit aut
etiam bestiarum, optuma putanda sit potius quam determina,
nec vero, si rationis particeps sit nec sit tamen a principio
sapiens, non sit deterior mundi potius quam humana condicio;
homo enim sapiens fieri potest, mundus autem si in aeterno
praeteriti temporis spatio fuit insipiens, numquam profecto
sapientiam consequetur; ita erit homine deterior. Quod quo-
niam absurdum est, et sapiens a principio mundus et deus
habendus est. Neque enim est quicquam aliud praeter mun-
dum, cui nihil absit, quodque undique aptum atque perfectum
expletumque sit omnibus suis numeris et partibus. Scite enim
Chrysippus, ut clipei causa involucrum, vagina autem gladii,
sic praeter mundum cetera omnia aliorum causa esse generata,
ut eas fruges atque fructus, quos terra gignit, animantium causa,
animantes autem hominum, ut equum vehendī causa, arandi
bovem, venandi et custodiendi canem. Ipse autem homo ortus
est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum, nullo modo
perfectus, sed est quaedam particula perfecti. Sed mundus
quoniam omnia complexus est neque est quicquam, quod non
insit in eo, perfectus undique est. Qui igitur potest ei deesse
id, quod est optimum? nihil autem est mente et ratione melius;
ergo haec mundo deesse non possunt. Bene igitur idem Chry-
sippus, qui similitudines adiungens omnia in perfectis et ma-
turis docet esse meliora, ut in equo quam in eculeo, in cane
quam in catulo, in viro quam in puero, item, quod in omni
mundo optimum sit, id in perfecto alique atque absoluto esse
debere; est autem nihil mundo perfectius, nihil virtute melius;
igitur mundi est propria virtus. Nec vero hominis natura per-
fecta est, et efficitum tamen in homine virtus; quanto igitur in
mundo facilius! est ergo in eo virtus; sapiens est igitur et
propterea deus.

Atque hac mundi divinitate perspecta tribuenda est sideribus
eadem divinitas, quae ex mobilissima purissimaque aetheris
parte gignuntur, neque ulla praeterea sunt admixta natura
totaque sunt calida atque perlucida, ut ea quoque rectissime et
animantia esse et sentire atque intellegere dicantur. Atque ea
quidem tota esse ignea duorum sensuum testimonio confirmari
Cleanteus putat, tactus et oculorum. Nam solis et candor ins-
lustrior est quam ullius ignis, quippe qui in inmenso mundo
tam longe lateque conlueat, et is eius tactus est, non ut tape-
faciat solum, sed etiam saepe comburat, quorum neutrum face-
ret, nisi esset igneus. 'Ergo', inquit, 'cum sol igneus sit Oce-
ānique alatur umoribus, quia nullus ignis sine pastu aliquo posset
permanere, necesse est aut ei similis sit igni, quem adhibemus
ad usum atque victum, aut ei, qui corporibus animantium con-
tinetur. Atqui hic noster ignis, quem usus vitae requirit, con-
fector est et consumptor omnium, idemque, quocumque invasit,
cuncta disturbat ac dissipat; contra ille corporeus vitalis et
salutaris omnia conservat, alit, auget, sustinet sensuque adficit.'
Negat ergo esse dubium, horum ignium sol utri similis sit, cum is quoque efficiat, ut omnia floreant et in suo quaeque genere pubescant. Quare cum solis ignis similis eorum ignium sit, qui sunt in corporibus animantium; solem quoque animantem esse oportet, et quidem reliqua astra, quae orientur in ardore caelesti, qui aether vel caelum nominatur. Cum igitur aliorum animantium ortus in terra sit, aliorum in aqua, in aëre aliorum, absurdum esse Aristotelis videtur in ea parte, quae sit ad gignenda animantia aptissima, animal gigni nullum putare. Sidera autem aetherium locum obtinent; qui quoniam tenuissimus est et semper agitatur et viget, necesse est, quod animal in eo gignatur, id et sensu acerrimo et mobilitate celerrima esse. Quare cum in aethere astra gignantur, consentaneum est in ipsis sensum inesse et intelligentiam, ex quo efficitur in deorum numero astra esse ducenda. Etenim licet videre acutiora ingenia et ad intellegendum aptiora eorum, qui terras incolant eas, in quibus aer sit purus ac tenuis, quam illorum, qui utantur crasso caelo atque concreto. Quin etiam cibo quo utare, interesse aliquid ad mentis aciem putant. Probabile est igitur praestantem intelligentiam in sideribus esse, quae et aetheriam partem mundi incolant et marinis terrenisque umoribus longo intervallo extenuatis alantur. Sensus autem astrorum atque intelligentiam maxumam declarat ordo eorum atque constantia (nihil est enim, quod ratione et numero moveri possit sine consilio), in quo nihil est temerarium, nihil varium, nihil fortuitum. Ordo autem siderum et in omni aeternitate constantia neque naturam significat (est enim plena rationis) neque fortunam, quae amica varietati constantiam respetit. Sequitur ergo, ut ipsa sua sponte, suo sensu ac divinitate moveantur. Nec vero Aristoteles non laudandus est in eo, quod omnia, quae moventur, aut natura moveri censuit aut vi aut voluntate; moveri autem solem et lunam et sidera omnia; quae autem natura moverentur, haec aut pondere deorsum aut levitate [in] sublime ferri, quorum neutrum austrum contingere, propterea quod eorum motus in orbem circumque ferretur. Nec vero dici potest vi quadam
maiore fieri, ut contra naturam astra moveantur; quae enim
potest maior esse? Restat igitur, ut motus astrorum sit volun-
tarius. Quae qui videat, non indocte solum, verum etiam
impie faciat, si deos esse neget. Nec sane multum interest,
utrum id neget an eos omni procuratione atque actione privet;
mihi enim, qui nihil agit, esse omnino non videtur. Esse igitur
deos ita perspicuum est, ut, id qui neget, vix eum sanae mentis
existimem.

17 Restat, ut, qualsis eorum natura sit, consideremus; in quo
nihil est difficilis quam a consuetudine oculorum aciem mentis
abducere. Ea difficultas induxit et vulgo inperitos et similes
philosophos inperitorum, ut nisi figuris hominum constitutis
nihil possent de dis inmortalibus cogitare; cuius opinionis levi-
tas confutata a Cotta non desiderat orationem meam. Sed cum
talem esse deum certa notione animi praesentiamus, primum ut
sit animans, deinde ut in omni natura nihil eo sit praestantius,
ad hanc praevisionem notionemque nostram nihil video quod
potius accommodem, quam ut primum hunc ipsum mundum,
quo nihil excellentius fieri potest, animantem esse et deum
iudicem. Sic quam volet Epicurus iocetur, homo non aptis-
simus ad iocandum minimeque resipiens patriam, et dicat se
non posse intellegere, qualis sit volubilis et rotundus deus, ta-
men ex hoc, quod etiam ipse probat, numquam me movebit.
Placet enim illi esse deos, quia necesse sit praestantem esse
aliquam naturam, qua nihil sit melius. Mundo autem certe
nihil est melius. Nec dubium, quin, quod animans sit habeat-
que sensum et rationem et mentem, id sit melius quam id, quod
his careat. Ita efficitur animantem, sensus, mentis, rationis
mundum esse compotem; qua ratione deum esse mundum
concluditur. Sed haec paulo post facilius cognoscentur ex iis
rebus ipsis, quas mundus efficit.

18 Interea, Vellei, noli, quaesó, præ te ferre vos plane expertes
esse doctrinæ. Conum tibi ais et cylindrum et pyramidem
pulchriorem quam sphaeram videri. Novum etiam oculorum
iudicium habetis. Sed sint ista pulchriora dumtaxat aspectu,
quod mihi tamen ipsum non videtur; quid enim pulchrior ea figura, quae sola omnis alias figuram complexa continet, quaeque nihil asperitatis habere, nihil offensionis potest, nihil incisum angulis, nihil anfractibus, nihil eminens, nihil lacunosum? cumque duae formae praestantes sint, ex solidis globus (sic enim σφαιραν interpretari placet), ex planis autem circulis aut orbis, qui κύκλος Graece dicitur, his duabus formis contingit solis, ut omnes earum partes sint inter se simillimae a medioque tantundem absit extremum, quo nihil fieri potest aptius. Sed si haec non videtis, quia numquam eruditum illum pulvere attingis, ne hoc quidem physici intellegere potuistis, hanc aequabilitatem motus constantiaeque ordinum in alia figura non potuisse servari? Itaque nihil potest esse indoctius, quam quod a vobis adfirmari solet. Nec enim hunc ipsum mundum pro certo rotundum esse dicitis; nam posse fieri, ut sit alia figura, innumerablesque mundos alios aliarum esse formarum. Quae, si, bis bina quot essent, dixisset Epicurus, certe non diceret; sed dum palato, quid sit optimum, iudicat, 'cæli palatum', ut ait Ennius, non suspexit. Nam cum duo sint genera siderum, quorum alterum spatii inmutabilibus ab ortu ad occasum commeans nullum umquam cursus sui vestigium inflectat, alterum autem continuas conversiones duas isdem spatii cursibusque conficiat, ex utraque re et mundi volubilitas, quae nisi in globosa forma esse non posset, et stellarum rotundi ambitus cognoscantur. Primusque sol, qui astrorum tenet principatum, ita movetur, ut, cum terras larga luce compleverit, easdem modo his, modo illis ex partibus opacet; ipsa enim umbra terrae soli officiis noctem efficit; nocturnorum autem spatiorum eadem est aequabilitas, quae diurnorum; eiusdemque solis tum accessus modici, tum recessus et frigoris et caloris modum temperant; circumitus enim solis orbium v et LX et CCC quarta fere diei parte addita conversionem conficiunt annuum, inflectens autem sol cursum tum ad septentriones, tum ad meridiem aestates et hiemes efficit et ea duo temporae, quorum alterum hiemi senescenti adiunctum est, alterum aestati. Ita ex quattuor temporum mutationibus
omnium, quae terra marique gignuntur, initia causaeque ducentur. 

Iam solis annuos cursus spatiis menstruis luna consequitur, cuius tenuissimum lumen facit proximus accessus ad solem, digressus autem longissimum quique plenissimum. Neque solum eius species ac forma mutatur tum crescendo, tum defectibus in initia recurrendo, sed etiam regio, quae tum est aquilonia, tum australis. Inde in lunae quoque cursu est et brumae quaedam et solstitii similitudo, multaque ab ea manant et fluunt, quibus et animantes alantur augescantque et pubescant maturitatemque adsequantur, quae oriuntur e terra. Maxume vero sunt admirabile motus earum quinque stellarum, quae falso vocantur errantes. Nihil enim errat, quod in omni aeternitate conservat progressus et regressus reliquisque motus constantis et ratiros. Quod eo est admirabilia in his stellis, quas dicimus, quia tum occultantur, tum rursus aperientur, tum adeunt, tum recedunt, tum antcedunt, tum autem subsequuntur, tum celerius movetur, tum tardius, tum omnino ne moventur quidem, sed ad quoddam tempus insistunt. Quarum ex disparibus motionibus magnum annum mathematici nominaverunt, qui tum efficitur, cum solis et lunae et quinque errantium ad eandem inter se comparationem confectis omnium spatiis est facta conversio.

Quae quam longa sit, magna quaestio est, esse vero certam et definitam necesse est. Nam ea, quae Saturni stella dicitur Phaëthon, quae Graecis nominatur, quae a terra abest plurimum, fere annis cursum suum conficit, in quo cursu multa mirabiliter efficiens tum antecedendo, tum retardando, tum vespertinis temporibus delitiscendo, tum matutinis rursum se aperiendo, nihil inmutat sempiternis saeclorum aetatibus, quin eadem isdem temporibus efficiat. Infra autem hanc proprius a terra Iovis stella furtur, quae Phaëthon dicitur, eaque eundem xii signorum orbem annis xii conficit easdemque, quas Saturni stella, efficit in cursu varietates. Huic autem proximum inferiori orbem tenet Πυρόεις, quae stella Martis appellatur, eaque iii et xx mensibus vi, ut opinor, diebus minus eundem lustrat orbem, quem duae superiores. Infra hanc autem stella Mercurii est;
ea Σταβων appellatur a Graecis; quae anno fere vertente signiferum lustrat orbem neque a sole longius umquam unius signi intervallo discedit tum antevertens, tum subsequens. Infima est quinque errantium terraeque proxima stella Veneris, quae Ἀφρος Graece, Lucifer Latine dicitur, cum antegreditur solem, cum subsequitur autem, Ἐσπερος; ea cursum anno conficit et latitudinem lustrans signiferi orbis et longitudinem, quod idem faciunt stellae superiores, neque umquam ab sole duorum signorum intervallo longius discedit tum antecedens, tum subsequens. Hanc igitur in stellis constantiam, hanc tantam tam variis cursibus in omni aeternitate convenientiam temporum non possum intellegere sine mente, ratione, consilio. Quae cum in sideribus inesse videamus, non possumus ea ipsa non in deorum numero reponere. Nec vero eae stellae, quae inerrantes vocantur, non significant eandem mentem atque prudentiam, quarum est cotidiana conveniens constansque conversio, nec habent aetherios cursus neque caelo inhaerentes, ut plerique dicunt physicae rationis ignari. Non est enim aetheris ea natura, ut vi sua stellas complexa contorqueat; nam tenuis ac perlucens et æquabili calore suffusus aether non satis aptus ad stellas continendas videtur. Habent igitur suam sphaeram stellae inerrantes ab aetheria coniunctione secretam et liberam. Earum autem perennes cursus atque perpetui cum admirabili incredibilique constantia declarant in his vim et mentem esse divinam, ut, haec ipsa qui non sentiat deorum vim habere, is nihil omnino sensurus esse videatur. Nulla igitur in caelo nec fortuna nec tementitas nec erratio nec vanitas inest contraque omnis ordo, veritas, ratio, constantia; quaeque his vacant ementita et falsa plenaque erroris, ea circum terras infra lunam, quae omnium ultima est, in terrisque versantur. Caelestium ergo admirablem ordinem incredibilemque constantiam, ex qua conservatio et salus omnium omnis oritur, qui vacare mente putat, is ipse mentis express habendus est. Haud ergo, ut opinor, erravero, si a principe investigandae veritatis huius disputationis principium duxero.
22 Zeno igitur naturam ita definit, ut eam dicat ignem esse artif "ciosem, ad gignendum progredientem via. Censet enim artis maxume proprium esse creare et gignere; quodque in operibus nostrarum artium manus efficiat, id multo artificiosius naturam efficere, id est, ut dixi, ignem artificiosum, magistrum artium reliquarum. Atque hac quidem ratione omnis natura artificiosa est, quod habet quasi viam quandam et sectam, quam sequatur.

58 Ipsius vero mundi, qui omnia complextus suo coercet et continet, natura non artificiosa solum, sed plane artifex ab eodem Zenone dicitur, consultrix et provida utilitatum opportunitatumque omnium. Atque ut ceterae naturae suis seminibus quaeque gignuntur, augescunt, continentur, sic natura mundi omnis movet habet voluntarios conatusque et adpetitiones, quas ὕποδειχθηστί Graeci vocant, et his consentaneas actiones sic adhibet, ut nosmet ipsi, qui animis movemur et sensibus. Talis igitur mens mundi cum sit ob eamque causam vel prudentia vel providentia appellari recte possit (Graece enim τρόπον dicitur), haec potissimum providet et in his maxime est occupata, primum ut mundus quam aptissimus sit ad permanendum, deinde ut nulla re egeat, maxume autem ut in eo eximia pulchritudo sit atque omnis ornatus.

23 Dictum est de universo mundo, dictum etiam est de sideribus, ut iam prope modum appareat multitudo nec cessantium deorum nec ea, quae agant, molientium cum labore operoso ac molesto. Non enim venis et nervis et ossibus continentur nec iis escis aut potionibus vescentur, ut aut nimis acres aut nimis concretos umores conligant, nec iis corporibus sunt, ut casus aut ictus extimescant aut morbos metuant ex defetigatione membrorum; quae verens Epicurus monogrammos deos et nihil agentes commentus est. Ili autem pulcherrima forma praediti purissimaque in regione caeli collocale ita feruntur moderanturque cursus, ut ad omnia conservanda et tuenda consensisse videantur.

Multae autem aliae naturae deorum ex magnis beneficiis eorum non sine causa et a Graeciae sapientissimis et a maior...
bus nostris constitutaee nominataeque sunt. Quicquid enim mag-
nam utilitatem generi adferret humano, id non sine divina boni-
tate erga homines fieri arbitrabantur. Itaque tum illud, quod erat
a deo natum, nomine ipsius dei nuncupabant, ut cum fruges Ce-
5 rerem appellamus, vinum autem Liberum, ex quo illud Terentii :

Sine Cerere et Libero friget Venus,

tum autem res ipsa, in qua vis inest maior aliqua, sic appellatur, si
ut ea ipsa nominetur deus, ut Fides, ut Mens, quas in Capitolio
dedicatas videmus proxime a M. Aemilio Scauro; ante autem
10 ab A. Atilio Calatino erat Fides consecrata. Vides Virtutis
templum, vides Honoris a M. Marcello renovatum, quod multis
ante annis erat bello Ligustico a Q. Maximo dedicatum. Quid
Opis? quid Salutis? quid Concordiae, Libertatis, Victoriae?
quarum omnium rerum quia vis erat tanta, ut sine deo regi non
15 posset, ipsa res deorum nomen obtinuit. Quo ex genere Cu-
pidinis et Voluptatis et Lubentinae Veneris vocabula consecrata
sunt, vitiosarum rerum neque naturalium; quamquam Velleius
aliter existimat; sed tamen ea ipsa vitia naturam vehementius
saepe pulsant. Utilitatum igitur magnitudine constituunt eis
20 di, qui utilitates quasque gignebant. Atque his quidem nomini-
bus, quae paulo ante dicta sunt, quae vis sit in quoque decla-
ratur deo.

Suscepit autem vita hominum consuetudoque communis, ut
24 beneficiis excellentis viros in caelum fama ac voluntate tollerent.
25 Hinc Hercules, hinc Castor et Pollux, hinc Aesculapius, hinc
Liber etiam (hunc dico Liberum Semela natum, non eum, quem
nostri maiores auguste sancteque [Liberum] cum Cerere et Lib-
20era consecraverunt, quod quale sit, ex mysteriis intellegi potest.
Sed quod ex nobis natos 'liberos' appellamus, idcirco Cerere
nati nominati sunt Liber et Libera, quod in Libera servant, in
Libero non item), hinc etiam Romulus, quem quidem eundem
esse Quirinum putant; quorum cum remanerent animi atque
aeternitate fruerentur, rite di sunt habiti, cum et optimi essent
et aeterni.
63 Aliquaque ex ratione, et quidem physica, magna fluxit multitudo deorum, qui induti specie humana fabulas poëtis suppeditaverunt, hominum autem vitam superstitione omni referunt. Atque hic locus a Zenone tractatus post a Cleanthe et Chrysippo pluribus verbis explicatus est. Nam vetus haec opinio Graeciam opplevit exsectum Caelum a filio Saturno, vincum autem Saturnum ipsum a filio Iove. Physica ratio non inelegans inclusa est in impia fabulas; caelestem enim altissimum aetheriamque naturam, id est igneam, quae per sese omnia gigneret, vacare voluerunt ea parte corporis, quae con-

25 iunctione alterius egeret ad procreandum. Saturnum autem eum esse voluerunt, qui cursum et conversionem spatiorum ac temporum contineret, qui deus Graece id ipsum nomen habet; Κρόνος enim dicitur, qui est idem χρόνος, id est spatium temporis. Saturnus autem est appellatus, quod saturaretur annis; ex se enim natos comesse fingoitur solitus, quia consumit aetas temporum spatia annisque praeteritis insaturabiliter expletur, vinctus autem a Iove, ne inmoderatos cursus haberet, atque ut eum siderum vincis alligaret. Sed ipse Iuppiter, id est 'iuvars pater', quem conversis casibus appellamus a iuvando Iovem, a poëtis 'pater divomque hominumque' dicitur, a maioribus autem nostris 'optumus maximus', et quidem ante 'optumus', id est beneficentissimus, quam 'maximus', quia maius est certeque gratius prodesse omnibus quam opes magnas habere — hunc igitur Ennius, ut supra dixi, nuncupat ita dicens:

Áspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant
omnia Iovem,
planius quam alio loco idem:

Cui, quod in me est, exsecrabor hoc, quod
lucet, quicquid est;

hunc etiam augures nostri, cum dicit 'Iove fulgente, tonante';
dicunt enim 'caelo fulgente, tonante'. Euripides autem, ut multa praecclare, sic hoc breviter:
LIB. II. CAP. XXV–XXVII. §§ 63–68. 99

Vidēs sublime fūsum, inmoderatum aēthera,
Qui térram tenero circumiectu amplēcitur:
Hunc summum habeto dīvum, hunc perhi-
betō Iovem.

5 Aēr autem, ut Stoici disputant, interiectus inter mare et caelum Iunonis nomine consecratur, quae est soror et coniunx Iovis, quod ei similitudo est aetheris et cum eo summa coniunctio. Effeminarunt autem eum Iunonique tribuerunt, quod nihil est eo mollius. Sed Iunonem a iuvando credo nominatam. Aqua restabat et terra, ut essent ex fabulis tria regna divisa. Datum est igitur Neptuno, alteri Iovis, ut volunt, fratri, maritimum omne regnum, nomenque productum, ut Portunus a portu, sic Neptunus a nando paulum primum litteris immutatis. Terræ autem vis omnis atque natura Diti patri dedicata est, qui Dives, ut apud Graecos Πλοῦτων, quia et recidunt omnia in terras et oriuntur e terris. Cui nuptam dicunt Proserpinam, quod Graecorum nomen est; ea enim est, quae Περσεφόνη Graece nominatur, quam frugum semen esse voluit absconditamque quaerit a matre fingunt. Mater autem est a gerendis frugibus Ceres tamquam ‘Geres’, casuque prima littera itidem immutata, ut a Graecis; nam ab illis quoque Δημήτηρ quasi Γημήτηρ nominata est. Iam qui magna verteret, Mavors, Minerva autem, quae vel minueret vel minaretur. Cumque in omnibus rebus vīm habeant maxumam prima et extremam, principem in sacrificando Ianum esse voluerunt, quod ab eundo nomen est ductum, ex quo transitiones perviae ‘iani’ foresque in liminis profanarum aedium ‘ianuae’ nominatur. Nam Vestae nomen a Graecis; ea est enim, quae ab illis ‘Εστία dicitur. Vis autem eius ad aras et focus pertinet. Itaque in ea dea, quod est rerum custos intumarum, omnis et precatio et sacrificio extrema est. Nec longe absunt ab hac vi di Penates sive a penu ducto nomine (est enim omne, quo vescentur homines, penus) sive ab eo, quod penitus insident; ex quo etiam ‘penetales’ a poëtis vocantur. Iam Apollinis nomen est Graecum, quem Solem esse
volunt. Dianam autem et Lunam eandem esse putant, cum Sol dictus sit, vel quia solus ex omnibus sideribus est tantus vel quia, cum est exortus, obscuratus omnibus solus apparat, Luna a lucendo nominata sit; eadem est enim Lucina. Itaque, ut apud Graecos Dianam, eamque Luciferam, sic apud nostros Junonem Lucinam in pariendo invocant; quae eadem Diana 'omnivaga' dicitur, non a venando, sed quod in septem numerat tamquam vagantibus. Diana dicta, quia noctu quasi diem efficeret. Adhibetur autem ad partus, quod ii maturescunt aut septem non numquam aut, ut plerumque, novem lunae cursibus, qui quia mensa spatia conficiunt, 'menses' nominantur. Concinneque, ut multa, Timeaus, qui cum in historia dixisset, qua nocte natus Alexander esset, eadem Dianae Ephesiae templum deplagrvisse, adiunxit minime id esse mirandum, quod Diana, cum in partu Olympiadis adesse voluisset, afuisse domo. Quae autem dea ad res omnes veniret, Venerem nostri nominaverunt, atque ex ea potius 'venustas' quam 'Venus' ex venustate.

Videtisne igitur, ut a physicis rebus bene atque utiliter inventis tracta ratio sit ad commenticios et factos deos? quae res genuit falsas opiniones erroresque turbulentos et superstitiones paene aniles. Et formae enim nobis deorum et aetates et vestitus ornatusque noti sunt, genera praeterea, coniugia, cognitiones omniaque traducta ad similitudinem inbecillitatis humanae; nam et perturbatis animis inducuntur; acceperimus enim deorum cupiditates, aegritudines, iracundias; nec vero, ut fabulae ferunt, bellis proelisque caruerunt, nec solum, ut apud Homerus, cum duo exercitus contrarios alii dei ex alia parte defenderent, sed etiam, ut cum Titanis, ut cum Gigantibus, sua propria bella gesserunt. Haec et dicuntur et creduntur sultissime et plena sunt fututilitatis summaeque levitatis. Sed tamen his fabulis sprexit ac repudiatis deus pertinent per naturam cuiusque rei, per terras Ceres, per maria Neptunus, alii per alia, poterunt intellegi qui qualesque sint, quoque eos nomine consuetudo nuncupaverit, hoc eos et venerari et colere debemus. Cultus
autem deorum est optimus idemque castissimus atque sanctissimus plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper pura, integra, incorrupta et mente et voce veneremur. Non enim philosophi solum, verum etiam maiores nostri superstitionem a religione separaverunt. Nam qui totos dies precabantur et immolabant, ut sibi sui liberi superstites essent, superstitosi sunt appellati, quod nomen patuit postea latius; qui autem omnia, quae ad cultum deorum pertinent, diligenter retractarent et tamquam relegarent, sunt dicti religiosi ex relegendo, ut elegantes ex eligendo, ex diligendo diligentes, ex intellegendo intellegentes. His enim in verbis omnibus inest vis legendi eadem, quae in religioso. Ita factum est in superstitoso et religioso alterum vitii nomen, alterum laudis. Ac mihi videor satis et esse deos, et quales essent, ostendisse.

Proximum est, ut doceam deorum providentia mundum administrari. Magnus sane locus est et a vestrī, Cotta, vexatus, ac nimirus vobiscum omne certamen est. Nam vobis, Vellei, minus notum est, quem ad modum quidque dicatur; vestra enim solum legitis, vestra amatis, ceteros causa incognita con demnatis. Velut a te ipso hesterno die dictum est anum fatic dicam πρὸναυ πρὸναυ a Stoicis induci, id est providentiam. Quod eo errore dixisti, quia existumas ab iis providentiam fingi quasi quandam deam singularum, quae mundum omnem gubernet et regat; sed id praecise dicitur. Ut, si quis dicit Atheniensium rem publicam consilio regi, desit illud 'Areopagi', sic, cum dicimus providentia mundum administrari, deesse arbitrate 'deorum'; plene autem et perfecte sic dici existimato: provid entia deorum mundum administrari. Ita salem istum, quo caret vestra natio, in inridendis nobis nolitote consumere, et mehercle, si me audiat, ne experiamini quidem; non decet, non datum est, non potestis. Nec vero hoc in te convenit, unum moribus domesticis ac nostrorum hominum urbanitate limatum, sed cum in reliquis vestros, tum in eum maxime, qui ista peperit, hominem sine arte, sine litteris, insulantem in omnes, sine acumineullo, sine auctoritate, sine lepore. Dico.
igitur providentia deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes et initio constitutas esse et omni tempore administrari; eamque disputationem tris in partes nostri fere dividunt, quorum prima pars est, quae ducitur ab ea ratione, quae docet esse deos; quo concessio confitendum est eorum consilio mundum administrari. Secunda est autem, quae docet omnes res subiectas esse naturae sentienti, ab eaque omnia pulcherrume geri; quo constituto sequitur ab animantibus principiis ea esse generata. Tertius est locus, qui ducitur ex admiratione rerum caelestium atque terrae.

Primum igitur aut negandum est esse deos, quod et Democritus simulacra et Epicurus imagines inducens quodam pacto negat, aut, qui deos esse concedant, iis fatendum est eos aliquid agere, idque praecarium; nihil est autem praecarium mundi administratione; deorum igitur consilio administratur. Quod si aliter est, aliquid profecto sit necesse est melius et maiore vi praeditum quam deus, quale id cumque est, sive inanima natura sive necessitas vi magna incitata haec pulcherrima opera efficiens, quae videmus. Non est igitur natura deorum praepotens neque excellens, siquidem ea subiecta est ei vel necessitate vel naturae, qua caelum, maria, terrae regantur; nihil est autem praestantius deo; ab eo igitur mundum necesse est regi. Nulli igitur est naturae oboediens aut subiectus deus, omnem ergo regit ipse naturam. Etenim si concedimus intellegentes esse deos, concedimus etiam providentes, et rerum quidem maxumarum. Ergo utrum ignorant, quae res maxumae sint, quoque eae modo tractandae et tuendae, an vim non habent, qua tantas res sustineant et gerant? At et ignorant rerum aliena naturae deorum est, et sustinendi muneris propert inbecillitatem difficultas minime cadit in maiestatem deorum. Ex quo efficitur id, quod volumus, deorum providentia mundum administrari. Atqui necesse est, cum sint di, si modo sunt, ut profecto sunt, animantis esse, nec solum animantis, sed etiam rationis compotes inter seque quasi civili conciliatione et societate coniunctos, unum mundum ut commu-
nem rem publicam atque urbem aliquam regentis. Sequitur, ut eadem sit in iis, quae humano in genere, ratio, eadem veritas utroquoise sit eademque lex, quae est recti praeeptio pravique depulsio. Ex quo intellegitur prudentiam quoque et mentem a deis ad homines pervenisse, ob eamque causam maiorum institutis mens, fides, virtus, concordia consecratae et publice dedicate sunt. Quae qui convenit penes deos esse negare, cum eorum augusta et sancta simulacra veneremur? Quodsi inest in hominum genere mens, fides, virtus, concordia, unde haec in terram nisi ab superis defluere potuerunt? Cumque sint in nobis consilium, ratio, prudentia, necesse est deos haec ipsa habere maiora, nec habere solum, sed etiam iis uti in maxumis et optumis rebus; nihil autem nec maius nec melius mundo; necesse est ergo eum deorum consilio et providentia administrari. Postremo cum satis docuerimus hos esse deos, quorum insignem vim et inlustrem faciem videremus, solem dico et lunam et vagas stellas et inerrantes et caelum et mundum ipsum et earum rerum vim, quae inessent in omni mundo cum magno usu et commoditate generis humani, efficitor omnia regi divina mente atque prudentia. Ac de prima quidem parte satis dictum est.

Sequitur, ut doceam omnia subjecta esse naturae, eaque ab ea pulcherrime geri. Sed quid sit ipsa natura, explicandum est ante breviter, quo facilis id, quod docere volumus, intellegi possit. Namque alii naturam esse censent vim quandam sine ratione cientem motus in corporibus necessarios, alii autem vim participem rationis atque ordinis tamquam via progradentem declarantemque, quid cuiusque rei causa efficat, quid sequatur, cuius solertia nullas ars, nulla manus, nemo opifex consequi possit imitando; seminis enim vim esse tantam, ut id, quamquam sit perexiguum, tamen, si inciderit in concipientem precedentemque naturam nactumque sit materiam, qua alii augerique possit, ita fingat et efficat in suo quidque genere, partim ut tantum modo per stirpes alantur suas, partim ut moveri etiam et sentire et appetere possint et ex sese similia sui gignere. Sunt autem, qui omnia naturae nomine appellent,
ut Epicurus, qui ita dividit: omnium, quae sint, naturam esse corpora et inane, quaeque his accidant. Sed nos cum dicimus natura constare administrarique mundum, non ita dicimus, ut glaebam aut fragmentum lapidis aut aliquid eius modi nulla cohaerendi natura, sed ut arborem, ut animal, in quibus nulla temeritas, sed ordo appareat et artis quaedam similitudo.

Quodsi ea, quae a terra stirpibus continentur, arte naturae vivunt et vigent, profecto ipsa terra eadem vi continentur [arte naturae], quippe quae gravidata seminibus omnia pariat et fundat ex sese, stirpes amplexa alat et augeat ipsaque alatur vicissim a superis externisque naturis. Eiusdemque exspirationibus et aëris alitur et aether et omnia supera. Ita, si terra natura tenetur et viget, eadem ratio in reliquo mundo est; stirpes enim terrae inhaerent; animantes autem adspiratione aëris sustinentur, ipsaque aëris nobiscum videt, nobiscum audit, nobiscum sonat; nihil enim eorum sine eo fieri potest; quin etiam movetur nobiscum; quacumque enim imus, quamque movemur, videtur quasi locum dare et cedere. Quaeque in medio locum mundi, qui est infimus, et quae a medio in superum quacque conversione rotunda circum medium fertur, ea continentem mundi efficiunt unamque naturam. Et cum quattuor genera sint corporum, vicissitudine eorum mundi continuata natura est. Nam ex terra aqua, ex aqua oritur aëre, ex aëre aether, deinde retrorsum vicissim ex aether eëre, inde aqua, ex aqua terra infima. Sic naturis his, ex quibus omnia constant, sursus deorsus, ultimo citro commeantibus mundi partium conjunctio continetur. Quae aut sempiterna sit necesse est hoc eodem ornatu, quem videmus, aut certe perdiuturna, permanens ad longinquum et immensum paene tempus. Quorum utrumvis ut sit, sequitur natura mundum administrari. Quae enim classium navigatio aut quae instructio exercitus aut, rursus ut ea, quae natura efficit, conferamus, quae procreatio vitis aut arboris, quae porro animantis figura conformatioque membrorum tantam naturae sollertiam significat, quantum ipse mundus? Aut igitur nihil est, quod sentiente natura regatur,
aut mundum regi confitendum est. Etenim, qui reliquas naturas omnes earumque semina contineat, qui potest ipse non natura administrari? ut, si qui dentes et pubertatem natura dicit existere, ipsum autem hominem, cui ea existant, non constare natura, non intellegat ea, quae ecferant aliquid ex sese, perfectiores habere naturas quam ea, quae ex iis ecferantur.

Omnium autem rerum, quae natura administrantur, seminator et sator et parens, ut ita dicam, atque educator et altor est mundus omniaque sicut membra et partes suas nutricatur et continet. Quods mi mundi partes natura administrantur, necesse est mundum ipsum natura administrari, cuium quidem administration nihil habet in se, quod reprehendi possit; ex iis enim naturis, quae erant, quod effici optimum potuit, effectum est. Doceat ergo alius potuisse melius. Sed nemo umquam docet bit, et si quis corrigere aliquid volet, aut deterius faciet aut id, quod fieri non potuerit, desiderabit. Quods mi omnes mundi partes ita constitutae sunt, ut neque ad usum meliores potuerint esse neque ad speciem pulchriores, videamus, utrum ea fortuitane sint an eo statu, quo cohaerere nullo modo potuerint nisi sensu moderante divinaque providentia. Si igitur meliora sunt ea, quae natura, quam illa, quae arte perfecta sunt, nec ars efficit quicquam sine ratione, ne natura quidem rationis expers est habenda. Qui igitur convenit, signum aut tabulam pictam cum aspexeris, scire adhibitam esse artem, cumque procul cursor navigii videris, non dubitare, quin id ratione atque arte moveatur, aut, cum solarium vel discriptum vel ex aqua contemplere, intellegere declarari horas arte, non casu, mundum autem, qui et has ipsas artes et earum artifices et cuncta conlectatur, consilii et rationis esse expertem putare? Quods mi in Scythiam aut in Britanniam sphaeram alius tulerit hanc, quam nuper familiaris noster effect Posidonius, cuium singulae conversiones idem efficient in sole et in luna et in quinque stellis errantibus, quod efficitur in caelo singulis diebus et noctibus, quis in illa barbaria dubitet, quin ea sphaera sit perfecta ratione? Hi autem dubitant de mundo, ex quo et oriuntur et fiunt omnia,
casune ipse sit effectus aut necessitate aliqua an ratione ac mente divina, et Archimedei arbitrantur plus valuisse in imitant-dis sphaerarum conversionibus quam naturam in efficiendis, praesertim cum multis partibus sint illa perfecta quam haec simulata sollertius. Atqui ille apud Accium pastor, qui navem numquam s ante vidisset, ut procul divinum et novum vehiculum Argonautarum e monte conspexit, primo admirans et perterritus hoc modo loquitur:

Tánta moles lábitur
Fremíbúnda ex alto ingénti sonitu et spiritu. 10
Prae se úndas volvit, vértices vi súscitat,
Ruít prolapsa, pélagus respergít, reflat.
Ita dum interruptum crédas nimbum vôlvier,
Dum quód sublime véntis expulsúm rapi
Saxum aút procellis, vél globosos túrbines 15
Exístere ictos úndis concursántibus,
Nisi quás terrestris póntus strages cónciet,
Aut fórte Triton fúscina everténs specus
Subtér radices pénitus undanti ín freto
Molem ex profundo sáxéam ad cælum éruit. 20

Dubitat primo, quae sit ea natura, quam cernit ignotam, idem-que iuvenibus visis auditoque nautico cantu:

† Sicut incití atque álacres rostrís pérfremunt
Delphíni † item alia multa Silvaní melo
Consímilem ad aures cántum et auditúm refert. 25

Ergo ut hic primo aspectu inanimum quiddam sensuque vacuum se putat cernere, post autem signis certioribus, quale sit id, de quo dubitaverat, incipit suspicari, sic philosophi debuerunt, si forte eos primus aspectus mundi conturbaverat, postea, cum vidissent motus eius finitos et aequabiles omniaque ratis ordiní- bus moderata inmutabilique constantia, intellegere inesse ali- quem non solum habitatorem in hac caelesti ac divina domo, sed etiam rectorem et moderatorem et tamquam architectum
tanti operis tantique muneres. Nunc autem mihi videntur ne
suspicari quidem, quanta sit admirabilis caelestium rerum
atque terrestrium.

Principio enim terra sita in media parte mundi circumfusa
undique est hac animali spirabiliique natura, cui nomen est aër,
Graecum illud quidem, sed perceptum iam tamen usu a nostris;
tritum est enim pro Latino. Hunc rursus amplctitur inmensus
aether, qui constat ex altissimis ignibus. Mutemur hoc quo-
que verbum, dicaturque tam 'aether' Latine, quam dicitur aër,
etsi interpretatur Pacuvius:

Hóc, quod memoro, nostri caelum, Gráii perhi-
bent aéthera;

quasi vero non Graius hoc dicat. At Latine loquitur. Si qui-
dem nos non quasi Graece loquentem audiamus. Docet idem
alio loco:

Graiúgena de istoc áperit ipsa óratio.

Sed ad maiora redeamus. Ex aethere igitur innumerabiles
flammae siderum existunt, quorum est princeps sol omnia cla-
risima luce conlustrans, multis partibus maior atque amplior
quam terra universa, deinde reliqua sidera magnitudinis in-
mensis. Atque hi tanti ignes tamque multi non modo nihil
nocent terris rebusque terrestribus, sed ita prosunt, ut, si mota
loco sint, conflagrare terras necesse sit a tantis ardiribus mo-
deratione et temperacione sublata.

Hic ego non mirer esse quemquam, qui sibi persuadeat cor-
pora quaedam solida atque individua vi et gravitate ferri, mun-
dumque effic iornatissimum et pulcherrimum ex eorum corpo-
rum concursione fortuita? Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non
intellego, cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius et viginti
formae litterarum vel aureae vel qualeslibet aliquo coiciuntur,
posse ex iis in terram excussis annales Ennii, ut deinceps legi
possint, effici; quod nescio an ne in uno quidem versus possit
tantum valere fortuna. Istri autem quem ad modum adseverant
ex corpusculis non calore, non qualitate aliqua, quam ρωτήρα Graeci vocant, non sensu praeditis, sed concurrentibus temere atque casu mundum esse perfectum, vel innumerabiles potius in omni puncto temporis alios nasci, alios interire? Quodsi mundum efficere potest concursus atomorum, cur porticum, cur templum, cur domum, cur urbem non potest? quae sunt minus operosa et multo quidem faciliora. Certe ita temere de mundo effutient, ut mihi quidem numquam hunc admirabilem caeli ornatum, qui locus est proximus, suspexisses videantur.

Praeclare ergo Aristoteles: 'Si essent', inquit, 'qui sub terra semper habitavissent bonis et industribus domiciliiis, quae essent ornata signis atque picturis instructaque rebus iis omnibus, quibus abundant ii, qui beati putantur, nec tamen exissent unquam supra terram, accese pessent autem fama et auditione esse quod-dam numen et vim deorum, deinde aliquo tempore patefactis terrae faucibus ex illis abditis sedibus evadere in haec loca, quae nos incolimus, atque exire potuissent: cum repente terram et maria caelumque vidissent, nubium magnitudinem ventorumque vim cognovissent aspexissentque solem eiusque cum magnitudinem pulchritudinemque, tum etiam efficientiam cognovissent, quod is diem efficeret toto caelo luce diffusa; cum autem terras nox opacasset, tum caelum totum cernent astris distinctum et ornatum lunaeque luminum varietatem tum crescentis, tum senescentis eorumque omnium ortus et occasus atque in omni aeternitate ratos inmutabilesque cursus; quae cum viderent, profecto et esse deos et haec tanta opera deorum esse arbitrarentur.' Atque haec quidem ille. Nos autem tenebras cogitemus tantas, quantae quondam eruptione Aetnae-
orum ignium finitimas regiones obscuravisse dicuntur, ut per
biduum nemo hominem homo agnosceret, cum autem terto die
sol inluxisset, tum ut revixisse sibi viderentur. Quodsi hoc
idem ex aeternis tenebris continget, ut subito lucem aspicere-
5 mus, quaenam species caeli videretur? Scd adsiduitate coti-
diana et consuetudine oculorum adsequunt animi neque
admirantur neque requirunt rationes earum rerum, quas semper
vident, proinde quasi novitas nos magis quam magnitudo rerum
debeat ad exquirendas causas excitare. Quis enim hunc homi-
97 nem dixerit, qui cum tam certos caeli motus, tam ratos astrorum
ordines tamque inter se omnia conexa et apta viderit, neget in
his ullum inesse rationem eaque casu fieri dicat, quae quanto
consilio gerantur, nullo consilio adsequi possimus? An, cum
machinatione quadam moveri aliquid videmus, ut sphaeram, ut
10 horas, ut alia permulta, non dubitamus, quin illa opera sint ra-
tionis; cum autem impetum caeli cum admirabili celeritate
moveri vertique videamus constantissime conscientem vicissi-
tudines anniversarias cum summa salute et conservatione rerum
omnia, dubitamus, quin ea non solum ratione fiat, sed etiam
30 excellenti divinaque ratione? licet enim iam remota subtilitate
disputandi oculis quodam modo contemplari pulchritudinem
rerum earum, quas divina providentia dicimus constitutas.

Ac principio terra universa cernatur, locata in media sede
mundi, solida et globosa et undique ipsa in sese nutibus suis
25 conglobata, vestita floribus, herbis, arboribus, frugibus, quorum
omnia incredibilis multitudo insatiabili varietate distinguitur.
Adde huc fontium gelidas perennitates, liquores perlucidos am-
nium, riparum vestitos viridissimos, speluncarum concavas alti-
tudines, saxorum asperitates, inpendentium montium altitu-
dines insensitiasque camporum; adde etiam reconditas auri
20 argentique venas infinitamque vim marmoris. Quae vero et
quam varia genera bestiarum vel cicurum vel ferarum! qui
volucrum lapsus atque canthus! qui pecudum pastus! quae vita
silvestrium! Quid iam de hominum genere dicam? qui quasi
35 cultores terrae constituiri non patiuntur eam nec inmanitate
beluarum esserari nec stirpium asperitate vastari, quorumque
operibus agri, insulae litoraque collucent distincta tectis et urb-
ibus. Quae si, ut animis, sic oculis videre possemus, nemo
cunctam intuens terram de divina ratione dubitaret. At vero
quanta maris est pulchritudo! quae species universi! quae mul-
titudo et varietas insularum! quae amoenitates orarum ac
litorum! quot genera quamque disparia partim submersarum,
partim fluitantium et innantium beluarum, partim ad saxa nativis
testis inhaerentium! Ipsum autem mare sic terram appetens
litoribus alludit, ut una ex duabus naturis conflata videatur. 10

Exin mari finitumus aër die et nocte distinguitur, isque tum
fusus et extenuatus sublime fertur, tum autem concretus in
nubes cogitur umoremque colligens terram auget imbris, tum
effluens huc et illuc ventos efficit. Idem annuas frigorum et
calorum facit varietates, idemque et volatus altum sustinet et 15
spiritu ductus alit et sustentat animantes. Restat ultimus et a
domiciliis nostris altissimus omnia cingens et coërcens caeli
complexus, qui idem aether vocatur, extrema ora et determi-
natio mundi, in quo cum admirabilitate maxima ignae formae

cursus ordinatos definiunt. E quibus sol, cuius magnitudine
multis partibus terra superatur, circum eam ipsam volvitur, isque
orients et occidentem diem noctemque conficit et modo accedens,
tum autem recedens binas in singulis annis reversiones ab ex-
tremo contrarias facit, quarum in intervallo tum quasi tristitia
quadam contrahit terram, tum vicissim laetificat, ut cum caelo 25
hilarata videatur. Luna autem, quae est, ut ostendunt mathe-
matici, maior quam dimidia pars terrae, isdem spatiis vagatur,
qui sus sol, sed tum congradiens cum sole, tum digrediens et
eam lucem, quam a sole accepit, mittit in terras et varias ipsa
lucis mutationes habet, atque etiam tum subjicta atque opposita
solii radios eius et lumen obscurarit, tum ipsa incidens in umbram
terrae, cum est e regione solis, interpositu interiectuque terrae
repente deficit. Isdemque spatiis eae stellae, quas vagas dici-
mus, circum terram feruntur eodemque modo oriuntur et occi-
dunt, quarum motus tum incitantur, tum retardantur, saepe 35
etiam insistunt. Quo spectaculo nihil potest admirabilius, esse,\textsuperscript{104} nihil pulchrior. Sequitur stellarum inerrantium maxima multitudo, quarum ita discripta distinctio est, ut ex notarum figurarum similitudine nomina invenerint. Atque hoc loco me\textsuperscript{41} intuens: Utar, inquit, carminibus Aratiis, quae a te admodum adulescentulo conversa ita me delectant, quia Latina sunt, ut multa ex iis memoria teneam. Ergo, ut oculis adsidue videmus, sine ulla mutatione aut varietate

Cetera labuntur celeri caelestia motu

Cum caeloque simul noctesque diesque feruntur,

quorum contemplatione nullius expleri potest animus naturae\textsuperscript{105} constantiam videre cupientis.

Extremusque adeo duplici de cardine vertex

Dicitur esse polus.

Hunc circum Arctoe duae feruntur numquam occidentes.

Ex his altera apud Graios Cynosura vocatur,

Altera dicitur esse Helice,

cuius quidem clarissimas stellas totis noctibus cernimus,

Quas nostri Septem soliti vocitare Triones.

Paribusque stellis similiiter distinctis eundem caeli verticem\textsuperscript{106} lustrat parva Cynosura:

Hac fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto.

Sed prior illa magis stellis distincta refulget

Et late prima confestim a nocte videtur,

Haec vero parva est, sed nautis usus in hac est;

Nam cursu interior brevi convertitur orbe.

Et quo sit earum stellarum admirabilior aspectus,

Has inter, veluti rapido cum gurgite flumen,

Tovrus Draco serpit subter superaque revol

v
t

Sese conficiensque sinus e corpore flexos.
107 Eius cum totius est praecelara species, tum in primis aspicienda est figura capitis atque ardor oculorum:

Huic non una modo caput ornans stella re-
lucet,

Verum tempora sunt duplici fulgore notata,

E trucibusque oculis duo fervida lumina fla-
grant,

Atque uno mentum radianti sidere lucet;

Obstipum caput at tereti cervice reflexum

Obtutum in cauda maioris figere dicas.

108 Et reliquum quidem corpus Draconis totis noctibus cernimus:

Hoc caput hic paulum sese subito aequore

condit,

Ortus ubi atque obitus partem admiscetur in

unam.

Id autem caput

Attingens defessa velut maerentis imago

Vertitur,

quam quidem Graeci

Engonasin vocitant, genibus quia nixa feratur.

Hic illa eximio posita est fulgore Corona.

Atque haec quidem a tergo, propter caput autem Anguitenens,

109 Quem claro perhibent Ophiuchum nomine

Graii.

Hic pressu duplici palmarum continet An-
guem,

Atque eius ipse manet religatus corpore torto;

Namque virum medium serpens sub pectora

cingit.

Ille tamen nitens graviter vestigia ponit

Atque oculos urget pedibus pectusque Nepai.

Septentriones autem sequitur
Arctophylax, vulgo qui dicitur esse Bootes,
Quod quasi temoni adiunctam prae se quatit
Arctum.

Dein, quae sequuntur. Huic enim Booti

subter praecordia fixa videtur
Stella micans radiis, Arcturus nomine claro,
cuius pedibus subiecta fertur
Spicum inlustre tenens splendenti corpore
Virgo.

Atque ita dimetata signa sunt, ut in tantis discretionibus di-
vina sollertia appareat:

Et natos Geminos invisus sub caput Arcti.
Subiectus mediae est Cancer, pedibusque te-
etur

Magnus Leo tremulam quatiens e corpore
flammam.

Auriga

Sub laeva Geminorum obductus parte feretur.
Adversum caput huic Helicae truculenta tuo-
tur.

At Capra laevum umerum clara obtinet.

Tum, quae sequuntur:

Verum haec est magno atque inlustri praedita
signo,

Contra Haedi exiguum iaciunt mortalibus ig-
nem.

Cuius sub pedibus

Corniger est valido conixus corpore Taurus.

Eius caput stellis conspersum est frequentibus:

Has Graeci stellas Hyadas vocitare suērunt,
[a plundo; ëw enim est pluere] nostri imperite Suculas,
quasi a subus essent, non ab imbribus nominatae. Minorem
autem Septentrionem Cepheus passis palmis a tergo subsequeitur:

Namque ipsum ad tergum Cynosurae vertitur
   Arcti.

Hunc antecedit

Obsculta specie stellarum Cassiepia.
Hanc autem inlustri versatur corpore propter
Andromeda aufugiens aspectum maesta parentis.
Huic Equus ille iubam quatiens fulgore micanti.  
Summum contingit caput alvo, stellaque iungens
Una tenet duplices communi lumine formas
Aeternum ex astra cupiens conectere nodum.
Exin contortis Aries cum cornibus haeret;

quem propter

Pisces, quorum alter paulum praelabitur ante
Et magis horriferis aquilonis tangitur auris.

Ad pedes Andromedae Perseus describitur,

Quem summa ab regione aquilonis flamina pulsant.
Cuius propter laevum genus omni ex parte locatas
Parvas Vergilias tenui cum luce videbis.
Inde Fides posita et leviter convexa videtur.
Inde est ales Avis lato sub tegmine caeli.

Capiti autem Equi proxima est Aquarii dextra totusque deincept Aquarius.

Tum gelidum valido de pectore frigus anhelans
Corpore semifero magno Capricornus in orbe;
Quem cum perpetuo vestivit lumine Titan,
Brumali flectens contornquet tempore currum.
Hinc autem aspicitur,
Ut sese ostendens emergit Scorpios alte
Posteriore trahens plexum vi corporis arcum,
Quem propter nitens pinnis convolvitur Ales.

At propter se Aquila ardentī cum corpore portat.

Deinde Delphinus,
Exinde Orion obliquō corpore nitens.
Quem subsequens

Fervidus ille Canis stellārum luce refulget.

Post Lepus subsequitur
Curriculum numquam defesso corpore sedans.
At Canis ad caudam serpens prolabitur Argo....
Hanc Aries tegit et squamoso corpore Pisces
Fluminis instultīri tangentem corpore ripas.

Quem longe serpentem et manantem aspicies
proceraque Vincla videbis,
Quae retinent Pisces caudarum a parte locata....

Inde Nepae cernes propter fulgentis acumen
Aram, quam flatu permulcit spiritus austri.

Propterque Centaurus
Cedit Equi partis properans subiungere Chelis.
Hic dextram porgens, quadrupes qua vasta
tenetur,
Tendit et instultrem truculentus cedit ad Aram;
Hic sese infernis e partibus erigit Hydra,
cuius longe corpus est fusum,
In medioque sinu fulgens Cratera relucet.

Extremam nitens plumato corpore Corvus
Rostro tundit, et hic Geminis est ille sub ipsis
Ante Canem, Ἡρώων Graio qui nomine fertur.
Hacc omnis discriptio siderum atque hic tantus caeli ornatus ex corporibus huc et illuc casu et temere cursantibus potuisse effici cuiquam sano videri potest? aut vero alia quae natura mentis et rationis exprs haec efficere potuit? quae non modo ut fierent ratione eguerunt, sed intellegi qualia sint sine summa ratione non possunt.

Nec vero haec solum admirabilia, sed nihil maius, quam quod ita stabilis est mundus atque ita cohaeret ad permanendum, ut nihil ne excogitari quidem possit aptius. Omnes enim partes eius undique medium locum capessentes nituntur aequa- 10 liter. Maxime autem corpora inter se iuncta permanent, cum quasi quodam vinculo circumdando colligantur; quod facit ea natura, quae per omnem mundum omnia mente et ratione conficiens funditur et ad medium rapit et convertit extrema.

Quocirca, si mundus globosus est ob eamque causam omnes 25 eius partes undique aequabiles ipsae per se atque inter se continentur, contingere idem terrae necesse est, ut omnibus eius partibus in medium vergentibus (id autem medium infimum in sphaera est) nihil interrumpat, quo labefactari possit tanta contentio gravitatis et ponderum. Eademque ratione mare, cum 30 supra terram sit, medium tamen terrae locum expetens congrubatur undique aequabiliter neque redundat umquam neque effunditur. Huic autem continens aër fertur ille quidem levitate sublime, sed tamen in omnes partes se ipse fundit; itaque et mari continuatus et iunctus est et natura fertur ad caelum, 35 cuius tenuitate et calore temperatus vitalem et salutarem spiritum praebet animantibus. Quem complexa summa pars caeli, quae aetheria dicitur, et suum retinet ardorem tenuem et nulla admixtione concretum et cum aëris extremitate coniungitur.

In aethere autem astra volvuntur, quae se et nisu suo conglo- 30 bata continent et forma ipsa figuraque sua momenta sustentant; sunt enim rotunda, quibus formis, ut ante dixisse videor, minime noceri potest. Sunt autem stellae natura flammeae; quocirca terrae, maris, aquarum vaporibus aluntur ii, qui a sole ex agris tepifactis et ex aquis excitantur, quibus altae renovataeque 35
stellae atque omnis aether refundunt eadem et rursum trahunt indidem, nihil ut fere intereat aut admodum paululum, quod astrorum ignis et aetheris flamma consumit. Ex quo eventurum nostri putant id, de quo Panaetium addubitare dicebant, ut ad extremum omnis mundus ignesceret, cum umore consumpto neque terra ali posset nec remearet aër, cuius ortus aqua omni exhausta esse non posset; ita relinqui nihil praeter ignem, a quo rursum animante ac deo renovatio mundi fieret atque idem ornatus oreretur. Nolo in stellarum ratione multus volvis

videri, maximeque earum, quae errare dicuntur; quarum tantus est concentus ex dissimilimis motibus, ut, cum summa Saturni refrigeret, media Martis incendat, his interiecta Iovis inlustret et temperet infraque Martem duae Soli oboediant, ipse Sol mundum omnem sua luce compleat ab eoque Luna inluminata graviditates et partus adferat maturitassesque gignendi. Quae copulatio rerum et quasi consentiens ad mundi incoluitatem coagantatio naturae quem non movet, hunc horum nihil umquam reputavisse certo scio.

Age, ut a caelestibus rebus ad terrestres veniamus, quid est in his, in quo non naturae ratio intellegentis apparet? Principio eorum, quae gignuntur e terra, stirpes et stabilitatem dant iis, quae sustinent, et e terra sucum trahunt, quo alantur ea, quae radicibus continentur, obducanturque libro aut cortice trunci, quo sint a frigoribus et caloribus tutiores. Iam vero vites sic claviculis adminicula tamquam manibus adprehendunt atque ita se erigunt, ut animantes. Quin etiam a caulibus, si propter sati sint, ut a pestiferis et nocentibus refugere dicuntur nec eos ulla ex parte contingere. Animantium vero quanta varietas est, quanta ad eam rem vis, ut in suo quaeque gener
er permaneat! Quarum aliae coriis tectae sunt, aliae villis vestitae, aliae spinis hirsutae; pluma alia, alia squama videmus obductas, alias esse cornibus armatas, alias habere effugia pin- narum. Pastum autem animantibus large et copiose naturae eum, qui cuique aptus erat, comparavit. Enumerare possum, ad eum pastum capessendum conficiendumque quae sit in
figuris animantium et quam sollers subtilisque discriptio partium quamque admirabilis fabrica membrorum. Omnia enim, quae quidem intus inclusa sunt, ita nata atque ita locata sunt, ut nihil eorum supervacaneum sit, nihil ad vitam retinendum non 122 necessarium. Dedit autem eadem natura beluis et sensum et appetitum, ut altero conatum haberen ad naturales pastus capessendos, altero secernerent pestifera a salutaribus. Iam vero alia animalia gradiendo, alia serpendo ad pastum accedunt, alia volando, alia nando, cubumque partim oris hiatus et dentibus ipsis capessunt, partim unguium tenacitate arripiant, partim adunctate rostrorum, alia sugunt, alia carpunt, alia vorant, alia mandunt; atque etiam aliorum ea est humilitas, ut cibum 123 terrestrem rostras facile contingat; quae autem altiora sunt, ut anseres, ut cygni, ut grues, ut cameli, adiuvantur proceritate collorum; manus etiam data elephanto est, quia propter magni-
48 tudinem corporis difficiles aditus habebat ad pastum. At qui-
bus bestiis erat is cibus, ut alii [generis] bestiis vescerentur, aut vires natura dedit aut celeritatem. Data est quibusdam 124 etiam machinatio quaedam atque sollertia, ut in araneolis aliae quasi rete texunt, ut, si quid inhaeserit, conficiant, aliae autem ex inopinato observant et, si quid incidit, arripiant idque con-
sumunt. Pina vero (sic enim Graece dicitur) duabus grandibus patula conchis cum parva squilla quasi societatem coit comparandi cibi, itaque, cum pisciculi parvi in concham hian-
tem innataverunt, tum admonita squillae morsu pina comprimit 125 conchas. Sic dissimillimis bestiolis communiter cibus quae
eritur.

In quo admirandum est, congressune aliquo inter se an iam inde ab ortu natura ipsa congregatae sint. Est etiam admiratio non nulla in bestiis aquatilibus iis, quae gignuntur in terra; veluti crocodili fluvialesque testudines quaedamque serpentes ortae 39 extra aquam, simul ac primum niti possunt, aquam persequuntur. Quin etiam anitum ova gallinis saepe supponimus; e quibus pulli orti primo aluntur ab iis ut a matribus, a quibus exclusi faticque sunt, deinde eas relinquent et effugijunt se-
quentes, cum primum aquam quasi naturalem domum videre 35
potuerunt. Tantam ingenuit animantibus conservandi sui natura
custodiam. Legi etiam scriptum esse avem quandam, quae
platalea nominaretur; eam sibi cibum quaerere advolantem ad
eas avis, quae se in mari mergent; quae cum emersissent
piscemque cepissent, usque eo premere earum capita mordicus,
dum illae captum amitterent, in quod ipsa invaderet. Eadem-
que haec avis scribitur conchis se solere complere, easque cum
stomachi calore concoxerit, evomere atque ita eligere ex iis,
quae sunt esculenta. Ranae autem marinae dicuntur obruer e

sese harena solere et moveri prope aquam, ad quas quasi ad
escam pisces cum accesserint, confici a ranis atque consumi.
Miluo est quoddam bellum quasi naturale cum corvo; ergo
alter alterius ubicumque nancust est ova frangit. Illud vero ab
Aristotele animadversum, a quo pleraque, quis potest non mi-
rari? grues cum loca calidiora petentes maria transmittant,
trianguli efficere formam; eius autem summo angulo aër ab iis
adversus pellitur, deinde sensim ab utroque latere, tamquam
remis, ita pinnis cursus avium levatur. Basis autem trianguli,
quem efficiunt grues, ea tamquam a puppi ventis adivuvatur,
eaeque in tergo praevolantium colla et capita reponunt; quod
quia ipse dux facere non potest, quia non habet, ubi nitatur,
revolat, ut ipse quoque quiescat; in eius locum succednit ex iis,
quae adquierunt, eaque vicissitudo in omni cursu conservatur.
Multa eius modi proferre possunt, sed genus ipsum videtis.

Iam vero illa etiam notiora, quanto se opere custodiant bestiae,
ut in pastu circumspectent, ut in cubilibus delitiscant. Atque
illa mirabilia, quod (ea quae nuper, id est paucis ante saeclis,
medicorum ingenii reperta sunt) vomitione canes, purgantes
autem alvos ibes Aegyptiae curantur. Auditum est pantheras,
quae in barbaria venenata carne caperentur, remedium quod-
dam habere, quo cum essent usae, non morerentur; capras
autem in Creta feras, cum essent confixae venenatis sagittis,
herbam quaerere, quae dictaminus vocaretur, quam cum gusta-
vissent, sagittas excidere dicunt e corpore. Cervaeque paulo
ante partum perpurgant se quadam herbula, quae seselis dicitur.
DE NATURA DEORUM.

IAM illa cernimus, ut contra vim et metum suis se armis quaeque defendant, cornibus tauri, apri dentibus, morsu leones; aliae fuga se, aliae occultatione tutantur, atramenti effusione sepiae, torpore torpedoines, multae etiam insectantis odoris intolerabili foeditate depellunt.

51 Ut vero perpetuus mundi esset ornatus, magna adhibita cura est a providentia deorum, ut semper essent et bestiarum genera et arborum omniumque rerum, quae a terra stirpibus continentur. Quae quidem omnia eam vim seminis habent in se, ut ex uno plura generentur; idque semen inclusum est in intum parte earum bacarum, quae ex quaque stirpe funduntur, isdemque seminibus et homines adfatim vescentur et terrae eiusdem generis stirpium renovatione conplentur. Quid loquar, quanta ratio in bestiis ad perpetuam conservationem earum generis apparet? Nam primum aliae mares, aliae feminae sunt, quod perpetuitatis causa machinata natura est, deinde partes corporis et ad procreandum et ad concipiendum aptissimae, et in mare et in femina commiscendorum corporum mirae libidines. Cum autem in locis semen insedit, rapit omnem fere cibum ad sese eoque saeptum fingit animal; quod cum ex utero elapsum excitit, in iis animantibus, quae lacte aluntur, omnis fere cibus matrum lactescere incipit, eaque, quae paulo ante nata sunt, sine magistro duce natura mammas appetunt earumque ubertate saturantur. Atque ut intelligamus nihil horum esse fortuitum, et haec omnia esse opera providae sollertisque naturae, quae multiplices fetus procreant, ut sues, ut canes, iis mammaram data est multitudo; quas easdem paucas habent eae bestiae, quae pausa gignunt. Quid dicam, quantus amor bestiarum sit in educandis custodiendisque iis, quae procreaverunt, usque ad eum finem, dum possint se ipsa defendere? etsi pisces, ut aiunt, ova cum gennuerunt, relinquent; facile enim illa aqua et sustinentur et fetum fundunt. Testudines autem et crocodilos dicunt, cum in terra partum ediderint, obruere ova, deinde discedere; ita et nascentur et educatur ipsa per se. IAM gallinae avesque reliqua et quietum requirunt ad pariendum.
locum et cubilia sibi nidosque construunt eosque quam possunt mollissum e substernunt, ut quam facillum ova serventur; e quibus pullos cum excuderunt, ita tuentur, ut et pinnis foveant, ne frigore laedantur, et, si est calor a sole, se opponant. Cum autem pulli pinnulis uti possunt, tum volatus eorum matres prosequeuntur, reliqua cura liberantur. Accedit ad nonnullorum animantium et earum rerum, quas terra dignit, conservationem et salutem hominum etiam sollertia et diligentia. Nam multae et pecudes et stirpes sunt, quae sine procuratione hominum salvae esse non possunt. Magnae etiam oportenitates ad cultum hominum atque abundantiam aliae alii in locis reperiantur. Aegyptum Nilus inrigat et, cum tota aegesta obrutam oppletamque tenuit, tum recedit mollitosque et oblimatos agros ad seren- dum relinquit. Mesopotamiam fertilem efficit Euphrates, in quam quot annos quasi novos agros invehit. Indus vero, qui est omnium fluminum maximus, non aqua solum agros laetificat et mitigat, sed eos etiam consertit; magnum enim vim seminum secum frumenti similium dicitur deporare. Multaque alia in alis locis commemorabilia proferre possunt, multos fertiles agros alios aliorum fructum. Sed illa quanta benignitas naturae, quod tam multa ad vescendum, tam varia et tam iucunda gignit, neque ea uno tempore anni, ut semper et novitate delectemur et copia! Quam tempestivos autem dedit, quam salutares non modo hominum, sed etiam pecudum generi, iis denique omni- bus, quae oriuntur e terra, ventos Eetias! quorum flatu nimii temperantur calores; ab isdem etiam maritimis cursus celeres et certi deriguntur. Multa praetereunda sunt [et tamen multa dicuntur]. Enumerari enim non possunt fluminum oportuni- tates, aestus maritimi [multum] accedentes et recedentes, mon- tes vestiti atque silvestres, salinae ab ora maritima remotissimae, medicamentorum salutarium plenissimae terrae, utilitates deni- que innumerabiles ad victum et ad vitam necessariae. Tam diei noctisque vicissitudo conservat animantes tribuens alius agendi tempus, alius quiescendi. Sic undique omni ratione concludi- tur mente consilioque divino omnia in hoc mundo ad

Sed cum aspera arteria (sic enim a medicis appellatur) ostium habeat adiunctum linguae radicibus paulo supra, quam ad linguam stomachus adnexitur, eaque ad pulmones usque pertineat excipiatque animam, eam quae ducta est spiritu, eandemque a pulmonibus respiret et reddat, tegitur quodam quasi operculo, quod ob cam causam datum est, ne, si quid in eam cibi forte incidisset, spiritus impediretur. Sed cum alvi natura subiecta stomacho cibi et potionis sit receptaculum, pulmones autem et cor extrinsecus spiritum ducant, in alvo multa sunt.
mirabiliter effecta, quae constat fere e nervis. Est autem multiplex et tortuosa arcetque et continet, sive illud aridum est sive umidum, quod recept, ut id mutari et concoqui possit, eaque tum astringitur, tum relaxatur atque omne, quod accepit, cogit et confundit, ut facile et calore, quem multum habet, et terendo cibo et praeterea spiritu omnia cocta atque confecta in reliquum corpus dividantur. In pulmonibus autem inest raritas quaedam et adsimilis spongii mollitudo ad hauriendum spiritum aptissima, quia tum se contrahunt adspirantes, tum in respiratu dilatant, ut frequenter ducatur cibus animalis, quo maxime aluntur animantes. Ex intestinis autem secretus a reliquo cibo sucus is, quo alimur, permanat ad iecur per quasdam a medio intestino usque ad portas iecoris (sic enim appellantur) ductas et directas vias, quae pertinent ad iecur eique adhaerent. Atque inde aliae alicui pertinentes sunt, per quas cadit cibus a iecore dilapsus. Ab eo cibo cum est secreta bilis eique umores, qui erenibus profunduntur, reliqua se in sanguinem vertunt ad easdemque portas iecoris confluunt, ad quas omnes eius viae pertinent; per quas lapsus cibus in hoc ipso loco in eam venam, quae cava appellatur, confunditur perque eam ad cor confectus iam coctusque perlabitur, a corde autem in totum corpus distribuitur per venas admodum multas in omnes partes corporis pertinentes. Quem ad modum autem reliquiae cibi depellantur tum astringentibus se intestinis, tum relaxantibus, haud sane difficile dictu est, sed tamen praetereundum est, ne quid habeat iniucunditatis oratio. Illa potius explicetur incredibilis fabrica naturae: Nam quae spiritu in pulmones anima ducitur, eae lescit primum ipso ab spiritu, deinde contagione pulmonum, ex eaque pars redditur respirando, pars concipitur cordis parte quadam, quem ventriculum cordis appellant, cui similis alter adiunctus est, in quem sanguis a iecore per venam illam cavam influit. Eoque modo ex his partibus et sanguis per venas in omne corpus diffunditur et spiritus per arterias. Utraque autem crebrae multaetque toto corpore intextae vim quandam incredibilem artificiosi operis divinique testantur. Quid dicam de
ossibus? quae subiecta corpori mirabiles commissuras habent et ad stabilitatem aptas et ad artus finiendo adcommodatas et ad motum et ad omnem corporis actionem. Huc adde nervos, a quibus artus continentur, eorumque implicationem corpore toto pertinentem, qui sicut venae et arteriae a corde tracti et pro- feecti in corpus omne ducuntur. Ad hanc providentiam naturae tam diligentem tamque sollemnem adiungi multa possunt, e quibus intellegatur, quantae res hominibus [a dis] quamque eximiae tributa sint. Quae primum eos humo excitatos celsos et erectos constituit, ut deorum cognitionem caelum intuentes capere possent. Sunt enim ex terra homines non ut incolae atque habitatores, sed quasi spectatores superarum rerum atque caelestium, quorum spectaculum ad nullum aliud genus animantium pertinet. Sensus autem interpretes ac nuntii rerum in capite tamquam in arce mirifice ad usus necessarios et facti et conlocati sunt. Nam oculi tamquam speculares altissimum locum obtinent, ex quo plurima conspicientes fungantur suo munere; et aures, cum sonum percipere debeant, qui natura [in] sublime fertur, recte in altis corporum partibus collocatae sunt; itemque nares et, quod omnis odor ad supera fertur, recte sursum sunt et, quod cibi et potionis iudicium magnum earum est, non sine causa vicinitatem oris secutae sunt. Iam gustatus, qui sentire eorum, quibus vesceimur, genera debet, habitat in ea parte oris, qua esculentis et potulentis iter natura patefecit. Tactus autem toto corpore aequabiliter fusus est, ut omnes ictus omnesque minimos et frigoris et caloris adpulsus sentire possimi- mus. Atque ut in aedificiis architecti avertunt ab oculis nari-ibusque dominorum ea, quae profluentia necessario taetri essent aliquid habitura, sic natura res similis procul amandavit a sensi- bus. Quis vero opifex praeter naturam, qua nihil potest esse callidius, tantam sollertiae persequi potuisset in sensibus? quae primum oculos membranis tenuissimis vestivit et saepsit; quas primum perlocidas fecit, ut per eas cerni posset, firmas autem, ut continerentur; sed lubricos oculos fecit et mobiles, ut et de- clinarent, si quid noceret, et aspectum, quo vellent, facile con-
verterent; aciesque ipsa, qua cernimus, quae pupula vocatur, ita parva est, ut ea, quae nocere possint, facile vitet, palpebraeque, quae sunt tegmenta oculorum, mollissimae tactu, ne laedere rent aciem, aptissime factae et ad claudendas pupulas, ne quid incideret, et ad aperiendas, idque providit ut identidem fieri posset cum maxima celeritate. Munitaeque sunt palpebrae tamquam vallo pilorum, quibus et apertis oculis, si quid incideret, repelletur, et somno convinentibus, cum oculis ad cer nendum non egeremus, ut ii tamquam involuti quiescerent. Latent praeterea utiliter et excelsis undique partibus saepiuntur. Primum enim superiora superciliis obducta sudorem a capite et fronte defluentem repellunt; genae deinde ab inferiore parte tuantur subiectae leniterque eminentes; nasusque ita locatus est, ut quasi murus oculis interiectus esse videatur. Auditus autem semper patet; eius enim sensu etiam dormientes egemus; a quo cum sonus est acceptus, etiam e somno excitamur. Flexuosum iter habet, ne quid intrare possit, si simplex et de rectum pateret; provisum etiam, ut, si qua minima bestiola conaretur inrumpere, in sordibus aurium tamquam in visco in haeresceret. Extra autem eminent quae appellantur aures et te gendi causa factae tutandique sensus, et ne adiectae voces laberentur atque errarent, prius quam sensus ab iis pulsus esset. Sed duro et quasi corneolos habent introitus multisque cum flexibus, quod his naturis relatus amplificatur sonus; quocirca et in fidibus testudine resonatur aut cornu, et ex tortuosis locis et inclusis soni referuntur ampliores. Similiter nares, quae sem per propter necessarias utilitates patent, contractiores habent introitus, ne quid in eas, quod noceat, possit pervadere, um om remque semper habent ad pulverem multaque alia depellenda non inutilem. Gustatus praecclare saeptus est; ore enim continetur et ad usum apte et ad incolumitatis custodiam. Omnis que sensus hominum multo antecellit sensibus bestiarum. Primum enim oculi in iis artibus, quorum iudicium est oculo rum, in pictis, fictis caelatisque formis, in corporum etiam mo tione atque gestu multa cernunt subtilius; colorum etiam et
figurarum . . . , tum venustatem atque ordinem et, ut ita dicam, decentiam oculi iudicant, atque etiam alia maiora. Nam et virtutes et vitia cognoscent; iratum propitium, laetae et dolentem, fortium ignavum, audaces timideumque cognoscent.

Auriumque item est admirabile quoddam artificiosumque iudicium, quo iudicatur et in vocis et in tibiarum nervorumque cantibus varietas sonorum, intervalla, distinctio et vocis genera permulta, canorum fuscum, leve asperum, grave acutum, flexibile durum, quae hominum solum auribus iudicantur. Nariumque item et gustandi pariter et tangendi magna iudicia sunt. Ad quos sensus capiendos et perfunundos plures etiam, quam vellem, artes repertae sunt. Perspicuum est enim, quo compositiones ungumentorum, quo ciborum conditiones, quo corporum lenocinia processerint.

Iam vero animum ipsum mentemque hominis, rationem, consilium, prudentiam qui non divina cura perfecta esse perspicit, is his ipsi rebus mihi videtur carere. De quo dum disputarem, tuam mihi dari vellem, Cotta, eloquentiam. Quo enim tu illa modo diceris! quanta primum intellegentia, deinde consequentium rerum cum primis coniunctio et comprehensio esset in nobis; ex quo videlicet, quid ex quibusque rebus efficiatur, idque ratione concludimus singularaque res definimus circumspectaeque complectimur; ex quo scientia intellegitur quam vim habeat qualisque sit, qua ne in deo quidem est res ulla praestantior. Quanta vero illa sunt, quae vos Academici infirmatis et tollitis, quod et sensibus et animo ea, quae extra sunt, percipimus atque comprehendimus! ex quibus conlatis inter se et comparatis artes quoque efficimus partim ad usum vitae, partim ad oblectionem necessarias. Iam vero domina rerum, ut vos solcitis dicere, eloquendi vis, quam est praeclara quamque divina! quae primum efficit, ut et ea, quae ignorantem, discere et ea, quae scimus, alios docere possimus; deinde hac cohortamur, hac persuademus, hac consolamur affictos, hac deducimus perterritos a timore, hoc gestientes conprimimus, hac cupiditates iracundiasque restinguimus, haec nos iuris, legum,
urbium societate devinxit, haec a vita inmani et fera segregavit. Ad usum autem orationis incredibile est, si diligenter attenderis, quanta opera machinata natura sit. Primum enim a pulmonibus arteria usque ad os intimum pertinet, per quam vox principium a mente ducens percipitur et funditur; deinde in ore sita lingua est finita dentibus; ea vocem inmoderate profusam fingit et terminat atque sonos vocis distinctos et pressos efficit, cum et ad dentes et ad alias partes pellit oris. Itaque plectri similem linguam nostris solent dicere, chordarum dentes, nares cornibus iis, qui ad nervos resonant in cantibus.

Quam vero aptas quamque multarum artium minstras manus natura homini dedit! Digestorum enim contractio facilis facilisque porrectio propter molles commissuras et artus nullo in motu laborat. Itaque ad pingendum, ad fingendum, ad scalpendum, ad nervorum eliciendos sonos ac tibiarum apta manus est admodionem digitorum. Atque haec oblectationis; illa necessitas, cultus dico agrorum extructionesque tectorum, tegumenta corporum vel texta vel sutu omnemque fabricam aeris et ferri; ex quo intellegitur ad inventa animo, percepta sensibus adhibitis opificum manibus omnia nos consecutos, ut tecti, ut vestiti, ut salvi esse possemus, urbes, muros, domicilia, delubra habemus. Iam vero operibus hominum, id est manibus, cibi etiam varietas inventur et copia. Nam et agri multa efferunt manu quaesita, quae vel statim consumantur vel mandentur condita vetustati, et praeterea vescimir bestiis et terrenis et aquatilibus et volantibus partim capiendo, partim alendo. Efficimus etiam domitu nostro quadripedum vectiones, quorum celeritas atque vis nobis ipsis adfert vim et celeritatem. Nos onera quibusdam bestiis, nos iuga inponimus, nos elephantorum acutissimis sensibus, nos sagacitate canum ad utilitatem nostram abutimur, nos e terrae cavernis ferrum eligimus, rem ad colendos agros necessariam, nos aeris, argenti, auri venas penitus abditas invenimus et ad usum aptas et ad ornatum decoras, arborum autem sectione omnique materia et culta et silvestri partim ad calcifi endum corpus igni adhibito et ad mitigandum cibum utimur,
partim ad aedificandum, ut tectis saepti frigora caloresque pella-

mus. Magnos vero usus adfert ad navigia facienda, quorum
cursibus subpeditantur omnes undique ad vitam copiae; quas-
que res violentissimas natura genuit, earum moderationem nos
soli habemus, maris atque ventorum, propter nauticarum rerum
scientiam plurimisque maritimis rebus fruimus atque utimur.
Terrenorum item commodorum omnis est in homine dominatus.
Nos campis, nos montibus fruimus, nostri sunt amnes, nostri
lacus, nos fruges serimus, nos arbores, nos aquarum inductioni-
bus terris secunditatem damus, nos flumina arcemus, derigimus, avertimus, nostris denique manibus in rerum natura quasi alte-
ram naturam efficere conamur.

Quid vero? hominum ratio non in caelum usque penetravit?
Soli enim ex animantibus nos astrorum ortus, obitus cursusque
cognovimus, ab hominum genere finitus est dies, mensis, annus,
defectiones solis et lunae cognitae praedictaeque in omne pos-
terum tempus, quae, quantae, quando futurae sint. Quae con-
tuens animus accedit ad cognitionem deorum, e qua oritur
pietas, cui coniuncta iustitia est reliquaeque virtutes, e quibus
vita beata existit par et similis deorum, nulla alia re nisi inmor-
talitate, quae nihil ad bene vivendum pertinet, cedens caelesti-
bus. Quibus rebus expositis satis docuisset videor, hominis
natura quantum omnis anteiret animantes. Ex quo debet intel-
legi nec figuram situmque membrorum nec ingenii mentisque
vim talem effici potuisse fortuna. Restat, ut doceam atque aliando
perorem omnia, quae sint in hoc mundo, quibus utantur homines, hominum causa facta esse et parata.

Principio ipse mundus deorum hominumque causa factus est,
quaeque in eo sunt, ea parata ad fructum hominum et inventa
sunt. Est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque homi-
numin domus aut urbs utrorumque. Soli enim ratione utentes
iure ac lege vivunt. Ut igitur Athenas et Lacedaemonem Atheni-
ensium Lacedaemoniorumque causa putandum est conditas esse,
omniaque, quae sint in his urribus, eorum populum recte esse
dicuntur, sic, quaecumque sunt in omni mundo, deorum atque
hominum putanda sunt. Iam vero circumitus solis et lunae reliquorumque siderum, quamquam etiam ad mundi cohaerentiam pertinent, tamen et spectaculum hominibus praebent; nulla est enim insatiabilior species, nulla pulchrior et ad rationem sollertiamque praestantior; eorum enim cursus dimetati maturitates temporum et varietates mutationesque cognovimus; quae si hominibus solis nota sunt, hominum facta esse causa iudicandum est. Terra vero feta frugibus et vario leguminum genere, quae cum maxima laritate fundit, ea ferarumne an hominum causa gignere videtur? Quid de vitibus olivetisque dicam? quarum uberrumi laetissumique fructus nihil omnino ad bestias pertinent. Neque enim serendi neque colendi nec tempestive demetendi percipiendique fructus neque condendi ac reponendi ulla pecudum scientia est, earumque omnium rerum hominum est et usus et cura. Ut fides igitur et tibias eorum causa factas dicendum est, qui illis uti possent, sic ea, quae dixi, iis solis confitendum est esse parata, qui utuntur, nec, si quae bestiae furantur aliquid ex iis aut rapiunt, illarum quoque causa ea nata esse dicemus. Neque enim homines murum aut formicarum causa frumentum condunt, sed coniugum et liberorum et familiarum suarum. Itaque bestiae furtim, ut dixi, fruuntur, domini palam et libere. Hominum igitur causa eas rerum copias comparatas fatendum est, nisi forte tanta ubertas et varietas pomorum eorumque iucundus non gustatus solum, sed odoratus etiam et aspectus dubitationem adsert, quin hominibus solis ea natura donaverit. Tantumque abest, ut haec bestiarum etiam causa parata sint, ut ipsas bestias hominum gratia generatas esse videamus. Quid enim oves aliud adferunt, nisi ut eorum villis confectis atque contextis homines vestiantur? quae quidem neque ali neque sustentari neque ullum fructum edere ex se sine cultu hominum et curatione potuissent. Canum vero tam fida custodia tamque amans dominorum adulatio tantumque odium in externos et tam incredibilis ad investigandum sagacitas narium, tanta alacritas in venando quid significat aliud nisi se ad hominum commoditates esse generatos? Quid de
bubus loquer? quorum ipsa terga declarant non esse se ad onus accipiendum figurata; cervices autem natae ad iugum, tum vires umerorum et latitudines ad aratra [ex]trahenda. Quibus, cum terrae subigerentur fissione glebarum, ab illo aureo genere, ut poëtae loquuntur, vis nulla umquam adferebatur. 5

Ferrea tum vero proles exorta repente est
Ausaque funestum prima est fabricieri ensem
Et gustare manu vinctum domitumque iuven-
cum.

Tanta putabatur utilitas percipi e bubus, ut eorum visceribus 10
vesci sceledus haberetur. Longum est mulorum persecu-
utilitates et asinorum, quae certe ad hominum usum paratae
sunt. Sus vero quid habet praeter escam? cui quidem, ne putesceret, animam ipsam pro sale datam dicit esse Chrysippus;
qua pecude, quod erat ad vescendum hominibus apta, nihil 15
gennit natura fecundius. Quid multitudinem suavitatemque
piscium dicam? quid avium? ex quibus tanta percipitur voluptas, ut interdum Pronoea nostra Epicurea fuisset videatur. Atque
eae ne caperentur quidem nisi hominum ratione atque sollertia;
quamquam avis quasdam, et alites et oscines, ut nostri augures 20
appellant, rerum augurandarum causa esse natus putamus. Iam
vero immanes et feras belugas nanciscimur venando, ut et vescamur iis et exerciamur in venando ad similitudinem bellicae
disciplinae et utamur domitis et cœndocefactis, ut elephantis,
multaque ex carum corporibus remedia morbis et vulneribus 25
eligamus, sicut ex quibusdam stirpibus et herbis, quorum utili-
tates longinquus temporis usu et periclitatione percepimus. To-
tam licet animis tamquam oculis lustrare terram mariaque
omnia; cernes iam spatia frugifera atque inmensa camporum
vestitusque densissimos montium, pecudum pastus, tum incredi-
biili cursus maritimos celeritate. Nec vero supra terram, sed etiam in intumis eius tenebris plurimarum rerum latet utilitas,
quea ad usum hominum orta ab hominibus solis inventur. 30

Illud vero, quod uterque vestrum arripiet fortasse ad repren-
dendum, Cotta, quia Carneades lubenter in Stoicos invehebatur, Velleius, quia nihil tam inrident Epicurus quam praedictionem rerum futurarum, mihi videtur vel maxume confirmare deorum providentia consuli rebus humanis. Est enim profecto divinatio, quae multis locis, rebus, temporibus apparat cum [in] privatis tum maxume publicis. Multa cernunt haruspices, multa 168 augures provident, multa oraclis declarantur, multa vaticinationibus, multa somniis, multa portentis, quibus cognitis multae saepe res ex hominum sententia atque utilitate partae, multa etiam pericula depulsa sunt. Haec igitur sive vis sive sive natura ad scientiam rerum futurarum homini profecto est nec alii cuiquam a dis inmortalibus data. Quae si singula vos forte non movent, universa certe tamen inter se conexa atque coniuncta movere debebunt.

Nec vero universo generi hominum solum, sed etiam singulis 164 a dis inmortalibus consuli et provideri solet. Licet enim contrahere universitatem generis humani eamque gradatim ad pauciores, postremo deducere ad singulos. Nam si omnibus 66 hominibus, qui ubique sunt quacumque in ora ac parte terrarum ab huiusce terrae, quam nos incolumus, continuatione distantium, deos consulere censemus ob eas causas, quas ante diximus, his quoque hominibus consulunt, qui has nobiscum terras ab oriente ad occidentem colunt. Sin autem his consu-lunt, qui quasi magnam quandam insulam incolum, quam nos orbem terrae vocamus, etiam illis consulunt, qui partes eius insulae tenent, Europam, Asiam, Africam. Ergo et earum partes diligunt, ut Romam, Athenas, Spartam, Rhodum, et earum urbium separatim ab universis singulos diligunt, ut Pyrrhi bello Curium, Fabricium, Coruncanium, primo Punico Calatium, Duellium, Metellum, Lutatium, secundo Maxumum, Marcellium, Africanum, post hos Paulum, Gracchum, Catonem patrumve memoria Scipionem, Laelium; multosque praeterea et nostra civitas et Graecia tuliit singulares viros, quorum neminem nisi iuvante deo talem fuisse credendum est. Quae ratio 165 poëtas maxumeque Homerum inpulit, ut principibus heroum,

Haec mihi fere in mentem veniebant, quae dicenda putarem de natura deorum. Tu autem, Cotta, si me audias, eandem causam agas teque et principem civem et pontificem esse cogites et, quoniam in utramque partem vobis licet disputare, hanc potius sumas eamque facultatem disserendi, quam tibi a rhetorici excitationibus acceptam amplificavit Academia, potius huc conferas. Mala enim et impia consuetudo est contra deos disputandi, sive ex animo id fit sive simulate.
BOOK THIRD.

SUMMARY.

BEFORE giving his objections to the doctrines of the Stoics as expounded by Balbus Cotta expressly defends himself against the suspicion of not believing the religious faith handed down from former times. He believes it, he says, thoroughly; but to him religion is only a matter of faith, not of knowledge, and his objections are directed solely against the attempt of the Stoic to change this faith into knowledge by means of rational proof. He cannot allow any conclusive force to the arguments adduced by Balbus (§§ 1–5). He then commences the discussion in detail, and first takes up the proofs for the existence of the gods. Balbus had said that, properly speaking, no proofs of it were necessary, and yet had attempted to give them; in reality however he had only made the matter more doubtful. He had appealed to the popular belief, without really agreeing with that belief himself; moreover such an appeal cannot pass, says Cotta, for a scientific argument (6–10). The pretended instances of apparitions of the gods, and all that Balbus had said about revelation by the auspices, can make no claim to certainty or to be received as valid proof (11–15). This is sufficient to refute the first part of Cleanthes’s argument which is also based on revelation. The second part, which appealed to the impression made by the gigantic phenomena of nature, is met by the remark that, although the common people regard these as the operations of divine beings, it by no means follows that they really are such (16, 17). The two remaining parts are reserved for the portion of the argument on the divine providence; this however is no longer extant. For this portion is also reserved the discussion of the arguments of Chrysippus, of the syllogisms of Zeno and the
propositions of physics in regard to the creative principle of heat, 
the soul of the universe, the divinity of the world and the heavenly 
bodies (18).

All that Balbus had said about the nature of the gods is consid-
ered by Cotta as rather adapted to make even their existence doubt-
ful. Balbus had argued that the universe must be God because 
there exists nothing more perfect than the universe. But even if 
this were true, it does not necessarily follow from its perfection that 
the universe is endowed with a soul, with reason, with wisdom, nor 
that it is God (21–23). Nor can the regularity of the motions of 
the heavenly bodies be cited as proof that they are divine; if so, we 
should have to consider the ebb and flow of the tide and even 
intermittent fever as gods by reason of their regular recurrence. The 
further deduction of Balbus, that, since the universe is not the work 
of human power or human wisdom, there must exist beings of a 
higher sort than men, and hence gods, rests on an arbitrary and erro-
neous view of what is higher, and upon a confusion of reason and 
natural force (25, 26). That too is a prejudice, that the human 
reasonable soul must derive from a reasonable soul already existing 
in the world. It is, says Cotta, a result of the force of nature, just 
as the harmonious complex of the universe is, and no gods are 
necessary to explain this (27, 28).—Next follows the argument of 
Carneades, that no bodily, no living and sensitive being can be 
eternal and immortal (29–35), and the proof that the principle of fire 
or heat, which the Stoics regard as living and as the source of all 
life, cannot be immortal, inasmuch as according to their notion it 
needs replenishing (35–37).—Cotta omits the further deduction 
from this, which follows of itself: for if there is nothing which is 
immortal, and if immortality is an essential predicate of the deity, 
there can be no gods. Finally he says that the idea of deity ex-
cludes the idea of virtue, which only comports with human relations; 
while again on the other hand a god is inconceivable without virtue 
(38, 39).

But granting too that the universe is God, how can we justify the 
assumption of several gods? And suppose we let pass also the 
divinity of the heavenly bodies; to consider eatable things as gods 
is an evident absurdity; and how gods can be made out of men is 
quite inconceivable (40–42). If we are to learn from popular belief 
and tradition whom to recognise as God, we shall have all sorts,
even the most monstrous and most ridiculous gods (43–50). If the heavenly bodies are gods, there is no reason for not considering the rainbows, clouds and winds as gods; if earth and sea pass for gods, so must rivers and springs; in short there is no limit (51, 52). The learned inquirers think they have found out that all the chief gods of the popular belief were only men of olden time who have not actually become gods but are only imagined to be so by the deluded people. Such a view, Cotta thinks, must necessarily be rejected in the interest of religion itself; but the Stoics, by their allegorical explanation of these pretended gods and the stories about them, have, instead of rejecting them, rather given them a sort of respectability (53–60). Still all their views are easily refuted. Some of the beings explained to be gods are evidently impersonal things, qualities and relations; and all the rest after the Stoic explanations, instead of gods, become mere forces of nature.

Next came in the original the third part or the refutation of the proposition that the world is governed by the divine providence; but the whole of this part is lost. A large portion of the fourth part is also no longer extant, which was devoted to showing that the gods had no especial care for men. The remaining portion (§ 66) relates to Balbus’s eulogy of reason as the most excellent gift of the gods to men (Bk. II, c. 61). Cotta

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1 For this rejection of Euhemerism see note on 23, 60. Cotta is here evidently guilty of an inconsistency. For if in the interest of religion, in order not to take from the common people the gods in whom they believed, he rejected the Euhemeristic humanizing of them, the same interest would necessarily have deterred him also from interfering with any one of the deities worshipped by the people which he has really done in many instances in what has preceded. It would seem that this inconsistency is due to Cicero alone, and that the real Academic philosophers by no means disdained to make use of Euhemerism as a weapon against the popular religion; just as at a subsequent period the Christian opponents of polytheism were fond of doing. And that Cicero himself did not refuse to acknowledge a justification for Euhemerism is seen from Tusc. I, 13, 28, and V, 3, 8.

2 We say nothing on the question whether this part was designedly destroyed, because it might endanger faith and piety. Arnobius (III, 7) testifies that in reality many even among the heathen were scandalized at this book of Cicero’s, and thought it ought to be destroyed; and according to Lactantius (D. I. II, 3, 2) Cotta said in the third book: non esse illa vulgo disputanda, ne suspectas publice religiones disputatio talis exstingueret.
attempts to show on the contrary that reason, since it is so often turned to evil purposes and brings so much harm, cannot by any possibility be regarded as a divine gift; for we cannot suppose either that the gods would have given to men a hurtful gift or that they could not have prevented or foreseen the evil use which mankind would make of it (66–78). Gods who really wished well to mankind ought rather to have made them good and wise; or if not this, they ought at least to have had a care for those who are good and wise (79, 80). But this is no more the case than the other; the best men often fare the worst, and the worst the best; experience gives no proof whatever of a divine justice, which rewards virtue and punishes vice; and this would afford encouragement to crime, were it not for conscience, which, regardless of the deity, furnishes to mankind a support and guide (81–85). But no evidence of divine government is discernible here; and the pretext that the gods concern themselves with human affairs only in general, not with trifles, is inadmissible, because the cases in which the absence of divine justice is felt are by no means all trifles of no importance (86). The general belief regards precisely the external gifts of fortune, not the internal ones such as virtue and wisdom, as coming from the gods; and thus the good fortune, which bad men enjoy, is a proof against the divine government of the world (87, 88). Isolated instances, in which the good meet with success, are of no weight against the majority of cases where the contrary happens; and it is no excuse to say either that the gods do not concern themselves with every individual case or that they are ignorant (89, 90). And to say that the gods visit the punishment of evil deeds, if not on the evil-doers themselves, at least upon their children and descendants is to attribute to them the greatest injustice. But suffering and misfortune come not from any god, but from men themselves. The deity does not protect us against it, even where it should justly do so, if, as the Stoics say, it has the power to do what it wills. So then the deity is ignorant of what it can do, or it has no concern for mankind, or it is incapable of judging what is good (91, 92). The Stoics contradict themselves, says Cotta, when they say that the gods do not concern themselves with details, and at the same time maintain that dreams come from the gods, and urge everybody to pray to the deity, for in that case the deity must hear the prayers of individuals.
Cotta closes with the assurance that the aim of his whole discourse is not to deny the existence of the gods, but only to show how difficult it is to arrive at any distinct knowledge about them. Cicero adds however that, although Velleius pronounces the exposition of Cotta true and convincing, he himself is inclined to consider the views of Balbus as more probable.

QUAE cum Balbus dixisset, tum adridens Cotta: Sero, inquit, mihi, Balbe, praecipis, quid defendam. Ego enim te disputante, quid contra dicerem, mecum ipse meditabar, neque tam refellendi tui causa quam ea, quae minus intellegebam, requirendi. Cum autem suo cuique iudicio sit utendum, difficile factu est me id sentire, quod tu velis. Hic Velleius: Nescis, inquit, quanta cum exspectatione, Cotta, sim te auditurus. Iucundus enim Balbo nostro sermo tuus contra Epicurum fuit; praebebo igitur ego me tibi vicissim attentum contra Stoicos auditorem. Spero enim te, ut soles, bene paratum venire. Tum Cotta: Sic mehercule, inquit, Vellei; neque enim mihi par ratio cum Lucilio est ac tecum fuit. Qui tandem? inquit ille. Quia mihi videtur Epicurus vester de dis inmortalibus non magnopere pugnare; tantum modo negare deos esse non audet, ne quid invidiae subeat aut criminis. Cum vero deos nihil agere, nihil curare confirmat membrisque humanis esse praeditos, sed eorum membrorum sum nullum habere, ludere videtur satisque putare, si dixerit esse quandam beatam naturam et aeternam. A Balbo autem animadvertisti, credo, quam multa dicta sint quamque, etiamsi minus vera, tamen apta inter se et cohaerentia. Itaque cogito, ut dixi, non tam refellere eius orationem quam ea, quae minus intellexi, requirere. Quare, Balbe, tibi permitto, responderene mihi malis de singulis rebus quaeverti ex te ea, quae parum accepi, an universam audire orationem meam. Tum Balbus: Ego vero,
si quid explanari tibi voles, respondere malo; sin me interro-
gare non tam intellegendi causa quam refellendi, utrum voles,  
faciam, vel ad singula, quae requires, statim respondebo vel,  
cum peroraris, ad omnia. Tum Cotta: Optime, inquit. Quam  
ob rem sic agamus, ut nos ipsa ducet oratio. Sed ante quam  
de re, pauc a de me. Non enim mediocriter moveor auctoritate  
tua, Balbe, orationeque ea, me in perorando cohortabatur,  
ut meminissem me et Cottam esse et pontificem; quod eo,  
credo, valebat, ut opiniones, quas a maioribus accepmus de dis  
immortalibus, sacra, caeremonias religionesque defenderem. Ego  
vero eas defendam semper semperque defendi, nec me ex ea  
opinione, quam a maioribus accepi de cultu deorum immortalium,  
ullius umquam oratio aut docti aut indocti movebit. Sed  
cum de religione agitur, Ti. Coruncanium, P. Scipionem,  
P. Scaevolam, pontifices maximos, non Zenonem aut Cleanthen  
aut Chrysippum sequor habeoque C. Laelium augurem eun-
demque sapientem, quem potius audiam dicerem de religione  
in illa oratione nobili quam quemquam principem Stoicorum.  
Cumque omnis populi Romani religio in sacra et in auspicio  
divisa sit, tertium adiunctum sit, si quid praedictionis causa ex  
portentis et monstris Sibyllae interpretes haruspicesve monu-
runt, harum ego religionem nullam umquam contemnendum  
putavi mihiique ita persuasi, Romulum auspiciis, Numam sacris  
constituitis fundamenta iewisse nostrae civitatis, quae numquam  
profecto sine summa placatione deorum immortalium tanta esse  
potuisset. Habes, Balbe, quid Cotta, quid pontifex sentiat;  
fac nunc ego intellegam, tu quid sentias. A te enim philosopho  
rationem accipere debeo religionis, maioribus autem nostris  
etiam nulla ratione reddit a credere. Tum Balbus: Quam  
igitur a me rationem, inquit, Cotta, desideras? Et ille: Quadriper-
tita, inquit, fuit divisio tua, primum ut velles docere deos esse,  
deinde quales essent, tum ab iis mundum regi, postremo con-
sulere eos rebus humanis. Haec, si recte memini, partitio fuit.  
Rectissume, inquit Balbus; sed expecto, quid requiras.

Tum Cotta: Primum quidque videamus, inquit; et, si id est
primum, quod inter omnis nisi admodum impios convenit, mihi quidem ex animo excuti non potest, esse deos, id tamen ipsum, quod mihi persuasum est auctoritate maiorum, cur ita sit, nihil tu me doces. Quid est, inquit Balbus, si tibi persuasum est, 5 cur a me velis discere? Tum Cotta: Quia sic adgrepior, inquit, ad hanc disputationem, quasi nihil umquam audierim de dis inmortalibus, nihil cogitaverim; rudem me et integrum discipulum accipe et ea, quae requiro, doce. Dic igitur, inquit, quid 8 requiras. Egone? primum illud, cur, quod in ista partizione ne 10 egere quidem oratione dixisses, quod esset perspicuum et inter omnis constaret, de eo ipso tam multa dixeris. Quia te quoque, inquit, animadverti, Cotta, saepe, cum in foro diceres, quam plurimis posses argumentis onerare iudicem, si modo eam facultatem tibi daret causa. Atque hoc idem et philosophi faciunt 15 et ego, ut potui, feci. Tu autem, qui id quaeris, similiter facis, ac si me roges, cur te duobus contuear oculis et non altero coniveam, cum idem uno adsequi possim. Tum Cotta: Quam 4 9 simile istud sit, inquit, tu videris. Nam ego neque in causis, si quid est evidens, de quo inter omnis conveniat, argumentari soleo; perspicuitas enim argumentatione elevatur; nec, si id facerem in causis forensibus, idem facerem in hac subtilitate sermonis. Cur coniveres autem altero oculo, causa non esset, cum idem obtutus esset amborum, et cum rerum natura, quam tu sapientem esse vis, duo lumina ab animo ad oculos perforata nos habere voluisset. Sed quia non confidebas tam esse id perspicuum, quam tu velles, propterea multis argumentis deos esse docere voluisti. Mihi enim unum sat erat, ita nobis maiores nostros tradidisse. Sed tu auctoritates contentemis, ratione pugnas. Patere igitur rationem meam cum tua ratione 10 30 contendere. Advers haec omnia argumenta, cur di sint, remque mea sententia minime dubiam argumentando dubiam facis. Mandavi enim memoriae non numerum solum, sed etiam ordinem argumentorum tuorum. Primum fuit, cum caelum suspexisset, statim nos intellegere esse aliquod numen, quo 35 haec regantur. Ex hoc illud etiam:
Aspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant omnes Iovem.

Quasi vero quisquam nostrum istum potius quam Capitolinum Iovem appellant aut hoc perspicuum sit constetque inter omnis, eos esse deos, quos tibi Velleius multique praeterea ne animantis quidem esse concedant. Grave etiam argumentum tibi videbatur, quod opinio de dis immortaliibus et omnium esset et cotidie cresceret. Placet igitur tantas res opinione stultorum iudicari, vobis praeertim, qui illos insanos esse dicatis? At enim praeentes videmus eos, ut apud Regillum Postumius, in Salaria Vatinius; nescio quid etiam de Locorum apud Sagram proelio. Quos igitur tu Tyndaridas appellabas, id est homines homine natos, et quos Homerus, qui recens ab illorum aetate fuit, seputtos esse dicit Lacedaemon, eos tu cantheriis albis nullis calonibus ob iiam Vatinio venisse existimas et victoriam populi Romani Vatinio potius, homini rustico, quem M. Catoni, qui tum erat princeps, nuntiavisse? Ergo et illud in silice, quod hodie appareat apud Regillum tamquam vestigium ungulae, Castoris equi credis esse? Nonne mavis illud credere, quod probari potest, animos praeclatorum hominum, quales isti Tyndaridae fuerunt, divinos esse et aeternos, quam eos, qui semel cremati essent, equitare et in acie pugnare putuisse aut, si hoc fieri putuisse dicis, doceas oportet, quo modo, nec fabellas aniles proferas. Tum Lucilius: An tibi, inquit, fabellae videntur? Nonne ab A. Postumio aedem Castori et Polluci in foro dedicatam, nonne senatus consultum de Vatinio vides? Nam de Sagra Graecorum etiam est volgare proverbum, qui, quae adfirmant, certiora esse dicunt quam illa, quae apud Sagram. His igitur auctoribus nonne debes moveri? Tum Cotta: Rumoribus, inquit, mecum pugnas, Balbe, ego autem a te rationes requiro ...

Sequuntur, quae futura sunt. Effugere enim nemo id potest, quod futurum est. Saepe autem ne utile quidem est scire, quid futurum sit; miserum est enim nihil proficicentem angie nec habere ne spei quidem extremum et tamen commune solacium, praeertim cum vos idem fato fieri dicatis omnia, quod autem
semper ex omni aeternitate verum fuerit, id esse fatum. Quid igitur iuvat aut quid adfert ad cavendum scire aliquid futurum, cum id certe futurum sit? Unde porro ista divinatio? Quis inventit fissum iecoris? quis cornicis cantum notavit, quis sortis? quibus ego credo, nec possum Atti Navii, quem commemorabas, lituum contemnere. Sed qui ista intellecta sint, a philosophis debo discere, praeertim cum plurimis de rebus divini isti mentiantur. At medici quoque (ita enim dicebas) saepe falluntur. Quid simile medicina, cuius ego rationem video, et divinatio, quae unde oriatur, non intellego? Tu autem etiam Deciorum devotionibus placatos deos esse censes. Quae fuit eorum tanta iniquitas, ut placari populo Romano non possent, nisi viri tales occidissent? Consilium illud imperatorium fuit, quod Graeci στρατήγημα appellant, sed eorum imperatorum, qui patriae consulerent, vitae non parcerent; rebantur enim fore ut exercitus imperatorem equo incitato se in hostem inmittentem persequeretur, id quod evenit. Nam Fauni vocem equidem numquam audivi; tibi, si audivisse te dicis, credam, etsi Faunus omnino quid sit nescio. Non igitur adhuc, quantum quidem in te est, Balbe, intellego deos esse, quos equidem credo esse; sed nihil docent Stoici. Nam Cleanthes, ut dicebas, quattuor modis formatas in animis hominum putat deorum esse notiones. Unus is modus est, de quo satis dixi, qui est susceptus ex praesensione rerum futuram, alter ex perturbationibus tempestatum et reliquis motibus, tertius ex commoditate rerum, quas percipimus, et copia, quartus ex astrorum ordine caelique constantia.

De praesensione diximus. De perturbationibus caelestibus et maritimis et terrenis non possumus dicere, cum ea fiant, non esse multos, qui illa metuant et a dis inmortalibus fieri existernent; sed non id quaeritur, sintne aliqui, qui deos esse putent; di utrum sint necne sint, quaeritur. Nam reliquae causae, quas Cleanthes adfert, quorum una est de commodorum, quae capimus, copia, altera de tempore ordine caelique constantia, tum tractabuntur a nobis, cum disputabimus de providentia deorum, de qua plurima a te, Balbe, dicta sunt; eodemque illa etiam
differemus, quod Chrysippum dicere aiebas, quoniam esset ali-
quid in rerum natura, quod ab homine effici non posset, esse
aliquid homine melius, quaeque in domo pulchra cum pulchri-
tudine mundi comparabas, et cum totius mundi convenientiam
consensumque adserebas, Zenonisque brevis et acutulas conclu-
siones in eam partem sermonis, quam modo dixi, differemus;
eodemque tempore illa omnia, quae a te, physice, dicta sunt
de vi ignea dece eo calore, ex quo omnia generari dicebas,
loco suo quaerentur, omniaque, quae a te nudius tertius dicta
sunt, cum docere velles deos esse, quare et mundus universus
et sol et luna et stellae sensum ac mentem habenent, in idem
tempus reservabo. A te autem idem illud etiam atque etiam
quaeram, quibus rationibus tibi persuadeas deos esse. Tum
Balbus: Equidem attulisse rationes mihi videor, sed eas tu ita
refellis, ut, cum me interrogaturus esse videare et ego me ad
respondendum compararim, repente avertas orationem nec des
respondendi locum. Itaque maximae res tacitae praetererunt,
de divinatione, de fato, quibus de quaestionibus tu quidem stric-
tim, nostri autem multa solent dicere, sed ab hac ea quaestione,
quae nunc in manibus est, separantur. Quare, si videtur, noli
agere confuse, ut hoc explicemus hac disputatione, quod qua-
eritur.

Optime, inquit Cotta. Itaque quoniam quattuor in partes
totam quaestionem disvisisti de primaque diximus, consideremus
secundam; quae mihi talis videtur fuisse, ut, cum ostendere vel-
les, quales di essent, ostenderes nullos esse. A consuetudine
enim oculorum animum abducere difficillimum dicebas, sed,
cum deo nihil praestantis esset, non dubitabas, quin mundus
esset deus, quo nihil in rerum natura melius esset. Modo posse-
mus eum animantem cogitare vel potius, ut cetera oculis, sic
animo hoc cernere! Sed cum mundo negas quicquam esse
melius, quid dicis melius? Si pulchrius, adsentior; si aptius ad
utilitates nostras, id quoque adsentior; sin autem id dicis, nihil
esse mundo sapientius, nullo modo prorsus adsentior, non quod
difficile sit mentem ab oculis sevocare, sed quo magis sevoco,
eo minus id, quod tu vis, possum mente comprehendere. Nihil est mundo melius in rerum natura. Ne in terris quidem urbe nostra; num igitur idcirco in urbe esse rationem, cogitationem, mentem putas? aut, quoniam non sit, num idcirco existimas formicam anteponendam esse huic pulcherrunae urbi, quod in urbe sensus sit nullus, in formica non modo sensus, sed etiam mens, ratio, memoria? Vide oportet, Balbe, quid tibi concedatur, non te ipsum, quod velis, sumere. Iustum enim locum totum illa vetus Zenonis brevis et, ut tibi videbatur, acuta conclusio dilatavit. Zeno enim ita concludit: 'Quod ratione utitur, id melius est quam id, quod ratione non utitur; nihil autem mundo melius; ratione igitur mundus utitur.' Hoc si placet, iam efficies, ut mundus optime librum legere videatur. Zenonis enim vestigios hoc modo rationem poteris concludere: 'Quod litteratum est, id est melius, quam quod non est litteratum; nihil autem mundo melius; litteratus igitur est mundus.' Isto modo etiam disertus et quidem mathematicus, musicus, omni denique doctrina eruditus, postremo philosophus [erit mundus]. Saepe dixti nihil fieri nisi ex eo, nec illam vim esse naturae, ut sui dissimilia posset effingere; concedam non modo animantem et sapientem esse mundum, sed fidecinem etiam et tubicinem, quoniam earum quoque artium homines ex eo procreantur? Nihil igitur adfert pater iste Stoicorum, quare mundum ratione uti putemus, ne cur animantem quidem esse. Non est igitur mundus deus, et tamen nihil est eo melius; nihil est enim eo pulchrius, nihil salutarius nobis, nihil ornatus aspectu motuque constantius. Quodsi mundus universus non est deus, ne stellae quidem, quas tu innumerabilis in deorum numero reponebas, quorum te cursus aequabiles aeternique delectabant, nec mehercule iniuria; sunt enim admirabili incredbiliique constantia. Sed non omnia, Balbe, quae cursus certos et constantis habent, ea deo potius tribuenda sunt quam naturae. Quid Chalcidico Euripo in motu identidem reciprocando putas fieri posse constantius? quid freto Siciliensi? quid Oceani fervore illis in locis, Europam Libyamque rapax ubi dividit unda?
Quid? aestus maritimi vel Hispanienses vel Britannici eorum-que certis temporibus vel accessus vel recessus sine deo fieri non possunt? Vide, quaeso, si omnis motus omniaque, quae certis temporibus ordinem suum conservant, divina dicitur, ne tertianas quoque febres et quartanas divinas esse dicendum sit, quarum reversione et motu quid potest esse constantius? Sed omnium talium rerum ratio reddenda est. Quod vos cum facere non potestis, tamquam in aram confugitis ad deum.

Et Chrysippus tibi acute dicere videbatur, homo sine dubio versutus et callidus (versutos eos appello, quorum celeriter mens versatur, callidos autem, quorum, tamquam manus opere, sic animus usu concalluit); is igitur: 'Si aliquid est', inquit, 'quod homo efficere non possit, qui id efficit, melior est homine; homo autem haec, quae in mundo sunt, efficere non potest; qui potuit igitur, is praestat homini; homini autem praeclare quis possit nisi deus? est igitur deus.' Haec omnia in eodem, quo illa Zenonis, errore versantur. Quid enim sit melius, quid praestabilius, quid inter naturam et rationem inter-sit, non distinguitur. Idemque, si deo non sint, negat esse in omni natura quicquam homine melius; id autem putare quemquam hominem, nihil homine esse melius, summae adrogantiae censest esse. Sit sane adrogantis pluris se putare quam mundum; at illud non modo non adrogantis, sed potius prudentis, intellegere se habere sensum et rationem, haec eadem Orionem et Caniculam non habere. Et: 'Si domus pulchra sit, intelle-gamus eam dominis', inquit, 'aedificatum esse, non muribus; sic igitur mundum deorum domum existimare debemus.' Ita prorsus existimarem, si illum aedificatum esse, non (quem ad modum docebo) a natura conformatum putarem.

At enim quaeit apud Xenophontem Socrates, unde animum arripuerimus, si nullus fuerit in mundo. Et ego quaero, unde orationem, unde numeros, unde cantus; nisi vero loqui solem cum luna putamus, cum propius accesserit, aut ad harmoniam canere mundum, ut Pythagoras existimat. Naturae ista sunt, Balbe, naturae non artificiosae ambulantis, ut ait Zeno, (quod...
quidem quale sit, iam videbimus) sed omnia censitis et agitantis motibus et mutationibus suis. Itaque illa mihi placebat oratio de convenientia consensuque naturae, quam quasi cognatione continuata conspirare dicellas. Illud non probabam, quod negabas id accidere potuisse, nisi ea uno divino spiritu contineretur. Illa vero cohaerent et permanent naturae viribus, non deorum, estque in ea iste quasi consensus, quam συμπιθευω Graeci vocant; sed ea, quo sua sponte maior est, eo minus divina ratione fieri existimanda est.

Illa autem, quae Carneades adferebat, quem ad modum dissolvitis? si nullum corpus inmortale sit, nullum esse corpus sempiternum; corpus autem inmortale nullum esse, ne individuum quidem, nec quod dirimi distrahive non possit. Cumque omne animal patibilem naturam habeat, nullum est eorum, quod effugiat accipiendi aliquid extrinsecus, id est quasi ferendi et patiendi, necessitatem, et, si omne animal tale est, inmortale nullum est. Ergo itidem, si omne animal securi ac dividi potest, nullum est eorum individuum, nullum aeternum; atque omne animal ad accipiendam vim externam et ferundam paratum est; mortale igitur omne animal et dissolubile et dividuum sit necesse est. Ut enim, si omnis cera commutabilis esset, nihil esset cereum, quod communicari non posset, item nihil argentium, nihil aeneum, si commutabilis esset natura argenti et aeris: similiter igitur, si omnia [quae sunt], e quibus cuncta constant, mutabilia sunt, nullum corpus esse potest non mutabile; mutabilia autem sunt illa, ex quibus omnia constant, ut vobis videtur; omne igitur corpus mutabile est. At si esset corpus aliquod inmortale, non esset omne mutabile; ita efferitur, ut omne corpus mortale sit. Etenim omne corpus aut aqua aut aër aut ignis aut terra est aut id, quod est concretum ex his aut ex aliqua parte eorum; horum autem nihil est, quin intreat. Nam et terrenum omne dividitur, et umor ita mollis est, ut facile premi conlidge possit; ignis vero et aër omni pulsu facillime pellitur naturaque cedens est maxume et dissupabilis. Praetereaque omnia haec tum intereunt, cum in naturam aliam
convertuntur, quod fit, cum terra in aquam se vertit, et cum ex aqua oritur aëris, ex aëre aether, cumque eadem vicissim retro commeat. Quodsi ea intereunt, e quibus constat omne animal, nullum est animal sempiternum. Et ut haec omissus, tamen animal nullum inveniri potest, quod neque natum umquam sit et semper sit futurum. Omne enim animal sensus habet; sentit igitur et calida et frigida et dulcia et amara nec potest ullo sensu iucunda accipere, non accipere contraria; si igitur voluptatis sensum capiat, doloris etiam capiat; quod autem dolorem accipit, id accipiat etiam interitum necesse est; omne igitur animal confitendum est esse mortale. Praeterea, si quid est, quod nec voluptatem sentiat nec dolorem, id animal esse non potest; sin autem quid animal est, id illa necesse est sentiat; et, quod ea sentit, non potest esse aeternum, et omne animal sentit; nullum igitur animal aeternum est. Praeterea nullum potest esse animal, in quo non et adpetitio sit et declinatio naturalis; appetuntur autem, quae secundum naturam sunt, declinantur contraria; et omne animal adpetit quaedam et fugit a quibusdam; quod autem refugit, id contra naturam est; et, quod est contra naturam, id habet vim interimendi; omne ergo animal intereat necesse est. Innumerabilia sunt, ex quibus effici cogique possit nihil esse, quod sensum habeat, quin id intereat; etenim ea ipsa, quae sentientur, ut figus, ut calor, ut voluptas, ut dolor, ut cetera, cum amplificata sunt, interimunt; nec ullum animal est sine sensu; nullum igitur animal aeternum est. Etenim aut simplex est natura animantis, ut vel terrena sit vel ignea vel animalis vel umida (quod quale sit, ne intellegi quidem potest), aut concreta ex pluribus naturis, quorum suum quaeque locum habeat, quo naturae vi feratur, alia insimum, alia summum, alia medium. Haec ad quoddam tempus cohaerere possunt, semper autem nullo modo possunt; necesse est enim in suum quaeque locum natura rapiatur. Nullum igitur animal est sempiternum.

Sed omnia vestri, Balbe, solent ad igneam vim referre Heraclitum, ut opinor, sequentes, quem ipsum non omnes interpre-
tantur uno modo; qui quoniam quid diceret intellegi noluit, 
omittamus; vos autem ita dicitis, omnem vim esse ignem, 
itaque et animantis, cum calor defecerit, tum interire, et in 
omni natura rerum id vivere, id vigere, quod caleat. Ego 
autem non intellego, quo modo calore extincto corpora intere-
unt, non intereat umore aut spiritu amisso, præsertim cum 
intereat etiam nimio calore. Quam ob rem id quidem com-
mune est de calido; verum tamen videamus exitum. Ita voltis, 
opinor, nihil esse animal intrinsecus in natura atque mundo 
praeter ignem. Qui magis quam praeter animam, unde ani-
mantium quoque constet animus, ex quo animal dicitur? Quo 
omodo autem hoc, quasi concedatur, sumitis, nihil esse animum 
nisi ignem? probabilius enim videtur tale quiddam esse ani-
um, ut sit ex igni atque anima temperatum. Quodsi ignis ex 
15 sese ipse animal est nulla se alia admiscente natura, quoniam is, 
cum inest in corporibus nostris, efficit, ut sentiamus, non potest 
ipse esse sine sensu. Rursus eadem dici possunt: Quidquid 
est enim, quod sensum habeat, id necesse est sentiat et volup-
tatem et dolorem; ad quem autem dolor veniat, ad eundem 
etiam interitum venire. Ita fit, ut ne ignem quidem efficere 
possitis aeternum. Quid enim? non eisdem vobis placet om-

nem ignem pastus indigere nec permanere ullo modo posse, 
nisi alatur? ali autem solem, lunam, reliqua astra aquis, alia 
dulcibus, alia marinis? Eamque causam Cleanthes adfert, cur 
se sol referat nec longius progrediatur solstitiali orbi itemque 
brumali, ne longius discedat a cibo. Hoc totum quale sit, 
mox; nunc autem conclusatur illud: quod interire possit, id 
aeternum non esse nature; ignem autem interitum esse, nisi 
alatur; non esse igitur natura ignem sempiternum.

30 Qualem autem deum intelligere nos possumus nulla virtute 
praeditum? Quid enim? prudentiamne deo tribuemus, quae 
constat ex scientia rerum bonarum et malarum et nec bonarum 
nec malarum? Cui mali nihil est nec esse potest, quid huic 
opus est dilectu bonorum et malorum? quid autem ratione? 
35 quid intellegentia? quibus utimur ad eam rem, ut apertis ob-

sublime candens, quem invocant omnès Iovem.

Quare igitur pluris adiungimus deos? quanta autem est eorum multitudo! Mihi quidem sane multi videntur. Singulas enim stellas numeras deos eoque aut beluarum nomine appelias, ut Capram, ut Nepam, ut Taurum, ut Leonem, aut rerum inanem, ut Argo, ut Aram, ut Coronam. Sed ut haec concendantur, reliqua qui tandem non modo concedi, sed omnino intelligi possunt? Cum fruges Cererem, vinum Liberum dici-mus, genere nos quidem sermonis utimur usitato, sed ec quem tam amentem esse putas, qui illud, quo vescatur, deum credat esse? Nam quos ab hominibus pervenisse dicis ad deos, tu reddes rationem, quem ad modum id fieri potuerit aut cur fieri desierit, et ego discam libenter. Quo modo nunc quidem est, non video, quo, pacto ille, cui 'in monte Oetae' illatae
lampades fuerint', ut ait Accius, 'in domum aeternam patris' ex illo ardore pervenerit; quem tamen Homerus apud inferos conveniri facit ab Ulix. sicut ceteros. qui exesserant vita. Quamquam, quem potissimum Herculem colamus. scire sane velim; pluriis enim tradunt nobis ii, qui interiores scrutinatur et reconditas litteras, antiquissimum Iove natum, sed item Iove antiquissimo; nam Ioves quoque pluriis in priscis Graecorum litteris invenimus. Ex eo igitur et Lysithoë est is Hercules, quem concertavisse cum Appolline de tripode accepimus. Alter traditur Nilo natus Aegyptius, quem aiunt Phrygias litteras conscriptisse. Tertius est ex Idaeis Digitis, cui inferas adferunt. Quartus Iovis est et Asteriae, Latonae sororis, qui Tyri maxime colitur, cuius Karthaginem filiam ferunt. Quintus in India, qui Belus dicitur. Sextus hic ex Alcmena, quem Iuppiter genuit, sed tertia Iuppiter, quoniam, ut iam docebo, pluris Ioves etiam accepimus.

Quando enim me in hunc locum deduxit oratio, docebo meliora me didicisse de colendis dis immortalibus iure pontificio et more maiorum capedunculis iis, quas Numa nobis reliquit, de quibus in illa aureola oratiuncula dicit Laelius, quam rationibus Stoicorum. Si enim vos sequar, dic, quid ei respondeam, qui me sic roget: Si di sunt, suntne etiam Nymphae deae? si Nymphae, Panisci ctiam et Satyri? Hi autem non sunt; ne Nymphae [deae] quidem igitur? At earum templo sunt publice vota et dedicata. Ne ceteri quidem ergo di, quorum templo sunt dedicata? Age porro, Iovem et Neptunum deum numeras; ergo etiam Orcus, frater eorum, deus, et illi, qui fluere apud inferos dicuntur, Acheron, Cocytus, Phrygilegethon, tum Charon, tum Cerberus di putandi. At id quidem repudiandum. Ne Orcus quidem igitur. Quid dicitis ergo de fratribus? Haec Carneades aiebat, non ut deos tolleret (quid enim philosophoph minus conveniens?), sed ut Stoicos nihil de dis explicare convinceret; itaque insequabatur. Quid enim? aiebat, si hi fratres sunt in numero deorum, num de patre eorum Saturi negari potest, quem volgo maxime colunt ad occidentem?

Dicamus igitur, Balbe, oportet contra illos etiam, qui hos deos ex hominum genere in caelum translatos non re, sed opinione esse dicunt, quos auguste omnes sancteque veneramur. Principio Iove tres numerant ii, qui theologi nominantur, ex quibus primum et secundum natos in Arcadia, alterum patre Aethec, ex quo etiam Proserpinam natam ferunt et Liberum, alterum patre Caelo, qui genuisse Minervam dicitur, quam principem et inventricem belli ferunt, tertium Cre-tensem, Saturni filium, cujus in illa insula sepulcrum ostenditur. Διόκτονως etiam apud Graios multis modis nominantur. Primi tres, qui appellantur Anaces Athenis, ex rege Iove anti-
quissimo et Proserpina nati, Tritopatreus, Eubuleus, Dionysus, secundii Iove tertio nati et Leda, Castor et Pollux, tertii dicuntur a non nullis Alco et Melampus et Tmolus, Atrei filii, qui Pelope natus fuit. Iam Musae primae quattuor Iove altero natae, Thel-54
xoë, Aoede, Arche, Melete, secundae Iove tertio et Mnemosyne procreatae novem, tertiae Piero natae et Antiopa, quas Pieridas et Pierias solent poëtae appellare, isdem nominibus et eodem numero, quo proximae superiores. Cumque tu Sol-
lem, quia solus esset, appellatum esse dicas, Solis ipsi quam
multi a theologis proferuntur! Unus eorum Iove natus, nepos Aetheris, alter Hyperione, tertius Volcano, Nili filio, cuius urbem Aegyptii volunt esse eam, quae Heliopolis appellatur, quartus is, quem heroicis temporibus Acantho Rhodi peperisse dicitur, . . . Ialysi, Camiri, Lindi, Rhodi, quinques, qui Colchis fertur Aeetam
et Circam procreavisse. Volcani item complures, primus Caelo natus, ex quo et Minerva Apollinem eum, cuius in tutela Athenas antiqui historici esse voluerunt, secundus Nilo natus, Phthas, ut Aegyptii appellant, quem custodem esse Aegypti volunt, tertius ex tertio Iove et Iunone, qui Lemni fabricae traditur
praefuisse, quartus Memalio natus, qui tenuit insulas propter Sicilian, quae Volcaniae nominabantur. Mercurius unus Caelo patre, Die matre natus, cuius obscenus excitata natura traditur, quod aspectu Proserpinae commotus sit, alter Valentis et Coroisidis filius, is qui sub terris habetur idem Trophonius, tertius Iove tertio natus et Maia, ex quo et Penelope Pana natum ferunt, quartus Nilo patre, quem Aegyptii nefas habent nominare, quintus, quem colunt Pheneatae, qui Argum dicitur interemisse ob eamque causam Aegyptum profugisse atque Aegyptii leges et litteras tradidisse. Hunc Aegyptii Theuth appellant, eodemque nominee anni primus mensis apud eos vocatur. Aesculapiorum primus Apollinis, quem Arcades colunt, qui specillum invenisse primusque volnus dicitur obligavisse, secundus secundi Mercurii frater; is fulmine percussus dicitur humatus esse Cynosuris; tertius Arsippi et Arsinoae, qui primus
purgationem alvi dentisque evolusionem, ut ferunt, invenit, cuius
in Arcadia non longe a Lusio flumine sepulcrum et lucus ostenditur. Apollinum antiquissimus is, quem paulo antea et Vulcano natum esse dixi, custodem Athenarum, alter Corybantis filius, natus in Cretae, cuius de illa insula cum Iove ipso certamen fuisset traditur, tertius Iove tertio natus et Latona, quem ex Hyperboreis Delphos ferunt advenisse, quartus in Arcadia, quem Arcades Νύμων appellant, quod ab eo se leges ferunt accepisse.

Dianae item plures, prima Iovis et Proserpinae, quae pinnatum Cupidinem genuisse dicitur, secunda notior, quam Iove tertio et Latona natam accepius, tertiae pater Upis traditur, Glaucè mater; eam saepe Graeci Upim paterno nomine appellant. Dionysos multos habemus, primum Iove et Proserpina natum, secundum Nilo, qui Nysam dicitur interemisse, tertium Cabrio patre, eumque regem Asiae praefuisse dicunt, cui Sabazia sunt instituta, quartum Iove et Luna, cui sacra Orphica putatur confici, quintum Niso natum et Thyone, a quo Trieterides constitutae putatur. Venus prima Caelo et Die nata, cuius Elide delubrum vidimus, altera spuma procreata, ex qua et Mercurio Cupidinem secundum natum accepius, tertia Iove nata et Diona, quae nupsit Volcano, sed ex ea et Marte natus Anteros dicitur, quarta Syria Cynroque concepta, quae Astarte vocatur, quam Adonidi nupsisse proditum est. Minerva prima, quam Apollinis matrem supra diximus, secunda orta Nilo, quam Aegyptii Saitae colunt, tertia illa, quam a Iove generatum supra diximus, quarta Iove nata et Coryphe, Oceani filia, quam Arcades Kopíaw nominant et quadrigrarum inventricem ferunt, quinta Pallantis, quae patrem dicitur interemisse virginitatem suam violare conantem, cui pinnarum talaria adfigunt. Cupido primus Mercurio et Diana prima natus dicitur, secundus Mercurio et Venere secunda, tertius, qui idem est Anteros, Marte et Venere tertia. Atque haec quidam alioque eius modi ex vetere Graeciae fama collecta sunt, quibus intelligis resistendum esse, ne perturbentur religiones. Vestri autem non modo haec non refellunt, verum etiam confirmant interpretando, quorum quidque pertineat. Sed eo iam, unde huc digressi sumus, revertamur.
Num censes igitur subtiliore ratione opus esse ad haec refel-
\[\text{\footnotesize 24}\] lenda? Nam mentem, fidem, spem, virtutem, honorem, victo-
\[\text{\footnotesize 61}\] riam, salutem, concordiam ceteraque eius modi rerum vim
habere videmus, non deorum. Aut enim in nobis met insunt
\[\text{\footnotesize 5}\] ipsis, ut mens, ut spes, ut fides, ut virtus, ut concordia, aut
optandae nobis sunt, ut honos, ut salus, ut victoria; quare
rerum utilitatem video, video etiam consecrata simulacra; quare
autem in iis vis deorum insit, tum intellegam, cum cognovero.
Quo in genere vel maxime est Fortuna numeranda, quam nemo
ab inconstantia et temeritate seiuget, quae digna certe non
\[\text{\footnotesize 10}\] sunt deo. Iam vero quid vos illa delectat explicatio fabularum
et enodatio nominum? Exsectum a filio Caelum, vinctum
itidem a filio Saturnum, haec et alia generis eiusdem ita defen-
ditis, ut ii, qui ista finxerunt, non modo non insani, sed etiam
\[\text{\footnotesize 15}\] fuisse sapientes videantur. In enodandis autem nominibus,
\[\text{\footnotesize 16}\] quod miserandum sit, laboratis. Saturnus, quia se saturat annis,
Mavors, quia magna vertit, Minerva, quia minuit aut quia mina-
tur, Venus, quia venit ad omnia, Ceres a gerendo. Quam
\[\text{\footnotesize 20}\] periculosa consuetudo! In multis enim nominibus haereditis.
Quid Veiovi facies, quid Volcano? quamquam, quoniam Nep-
\[\text{\footnotesize 25}\] tunum a nando appellatum putas, nullum erit nomen, quod non
possis una littera explicare unde ductum sit; in quo quidem
\[\text{\footnotesize 26}\] magis tu mihi nature visus es quam ipse Neptunus. Magnam
molestiam suscepit et minime necessariam primus Zeno, post
\[\text{\footnotesize 30}\] Cleanthes, deinde Chrysippus, commenticiarum fabularum red-
dere rationem, vocabularum, cur quidque ita appellatum sit,
\[\text{\footnotesize 31}\] causas explicare. Quod cum facitis, illud profecto confitemini,
\[\text{\footnotesize 32}\] longe aliter se rem habere, atque hominum opinio sit; eos
\[\text{\footnotesize 33}\] enim, qui di appellantur, rerum naturas esse, non figuras deo-
\[\text{\footnotesize 34}\] rum. Qui tantus error fuit, ut perniciosis etiam rebus non
\[\text{\footnotesize 35}\] nomen deorum tribueretur, sed etiam sacra constituerentur.
Febris enim fanum in Palatio et Orbonae ad aedem Larum et
\[\text{\footnotesize 36}\] aram Malae Fortunae Esquiliis consecratam videmus. Omnis
igitur talis a philosophia pellatur error, ut, cum de dis immortalis-
\[\text{\footnotesize 37}\] bus disputemus, dicamus indigna iis; de quibus habeo ipse
quod sentiam, non habeo autem quod tibi adsentiar. Nep-
tunum esse dicas animum cum intellegantia per mare pertinen-
tem, idem de Cerere. Istam autem intellegantiam aut maris
aut terrae non modo comprehendere animo, sed ne suspicione
quidem possum attingere. Itaque aliunde mihi quaedam
est, ut et esse deos, et quales sint di, discere possum; qualis tu
eos esse vis . . .

Videamus ea, quae sequuntur, primum deorum providentia
mundus regatur, deinde consulantne di rebus humanis. Haec
enim mihi ex tua partitione restant duo; de quibus, si vobis
videtur, accuratius disserendum puto. Mihi vero, inquit Vel-
leius, valde videtur; nam et maiora expecto et ii, quae dicta
sunt, vehementer adsentior. Tum Balbus: Interpellare te, in-
quit, Cotta, nolo, sed sumemus tempus aliud; efficiam profecto,
Ut fateare. Sed . . .

Néquaquam istuc istac ibi; mágna inest cert-
tático.
Nás ut ego illi suplicarem tanta blandilo-
quência?

Parumne ratiocinari videtur et sibi ipsa nefariam pestem ma-
chinari? Illud vero quam callida ratione!

Qui vult esse, quod vult, ita dat se res, ut ope-
rám dabit.

Qui est versus omnium seminari malorum.

Ílle traversa mente mi hodie tradidit repá-
gula,
Quibus ego iram omném recludam atque illi
perniciém dabo,
Míhi maëiores, illi lucrum, exitium illi, ex-
liúm mihi.

Hanc videlicet rationem, quam vos divino beneficio homini
solum tributam dicitis, bestiae non habent. Videsne igitur,
quanto munere deorum simus affecti? Atque eadem Medea patrem patriamque fugiens:

postquam pater
ádpropinquat iámque paene ut cóprehendens tūr parat,
Púerum interea obtúncat membraque árticulatim dívidit
Pérque agros passíms dispergit córpus; id ea grátia,
Út, dum nati dissipatos ártus captarét parens,
Ípsa interea effúgeret, illum ut maéror tardaret sequi,
Síbi salutem ut fámiari páreret parrícidió.

Huic ut scelus, sic ne ratio quidem defuit. Quid? ille funestas epulas fratri conparans nonne versat huc et illuc cogitatione rationem?

Maiór mihi moles, máius miscendúmst malum,
Qui illius acerbum cór contundam et cónprimam.

Nec tamen ille ipse est praetereundus,
Qui nón sat habuit cóniugem inlexe in stúprum,
de quo recte et verissume loquitur Atreus:

...quod re in summá summum esse árbitror
Períclum, matres cóinquinari régias,
Contáminari stírpmem ac miseri genus.

At id ipsum quam callide, qui regnum adulterio quaereret:

Adde, inquit, húc, quod mihi porténto caelestum pater

Prodígium misit, régni stabilimént méi,
Agnum inter pecudes aúrea clarúm coma
Quondám Thyestem clépere ausum esse é régia,

Qua in re ádiutricem cóniugem cepít sibi.
Videturne summa inprobitate usus non sine summa esse ratione? Nec vero scaena solum referta est his sceleribus, sed multo vita communis paene maioribus. Sentit domus unius cuiusque, sentit forum, sentit curia, campus, socii, provinciae, ut, quem ad modum ratione recte fiat, sic ratione peccetur, alterumque et a paucis et raro, alterum et saepe et a plurimis, ut satius fuerit nullam omnino nobis a dis immortalibus datam esse rationem quam tanta cum pernicie datam. Ut vinum aegrotis, quia prodest raro, nocet saepissime, melius est non adhibere omnino quam spe dubiae salutis in apertam pernicem incurrere, sic haud scio an melius fuerit humano generi motum istum celerem cogitationis, acumen, sollertiam, quam rationem vocamus, quoniam pestifera est multis, admodum paucis salutaris, non dari omnino quam tam munifice et tam large dari.

Quam ob rem si mens voluntasque divina idcirco consultum hominibus, quod iis est largita rationem, iis solis consultum, quos bona ratione donavit, quos videmus, si modo ulli sunt, esse perpaucos. Non placet autem paucis a dis immortalibus esse consultum; sequitur ergo, ut nemini consultum sit.

Huic loco sic solcis occurrere: non idcirco non optume nobis a dis esse provisum, quod multi eorum beneficio perverse uterentur; etiam patrimonii multos male uti, nec ob eam causam eos beneficium a patribus nullum habere. Quisquamne istuc negat? aut quae est in collatione ista similittudo? Nec enim Herculi nocere Deianira voluit, cum ei tunicam sanguine Centauri tinctam dedit, nec prodesse Phraeo Iasoni is, qui gladio vomicam eius aperuit, quam sanare medici non potuerant. Multi enim et, cum obesse vellent, profuerunt et, cum prodesse, obsuerunt. Ita non fit ex eo, quod datur, ut voluntas eius, qui dederit, appareat, nec, si is, qui accept, bene utitur. idcirco is, qui dedit, amice dedit. Quae enim libido, quae avaritia, quod facinus aut suscipitur nisi consilio capto aut sine animi motu et cogitatione, id est ratione, perficitur? Nam omnis opinio ratio est, et quidem bona ratio, si vera, mala autem, si falsa est opinio. Sed a deo tantum rationem habe-
mus, si modo habemus, bonam autem rationem aut non bonam a nobis. Non enim, ut patrimonium relinquitur, sic ratio est homini beneficio deorum data. Quid enim potius hominibus dedissent, si iis nocere voluissent? Injustitiae autem, intemperantiae, timiditatis quae semina essent, si his vitii ratio non subesset? Medea modo et Atreus commemorabantur a nobis, [heroicae personae, inita subductaque ratione nefaria scelera meditantes. Quid? levitates comicæ parumne semper in ratione versantur? parumne subtiliter disputat ille in Eunucho?

Quid igitur faciam? . . . . . . .
Exclusit, revocat; regeam? non, si me obscret.

Ille vero in Synepebis Academicorum more contra communem opinionem non dubitat pugnare ratione, qui 'in amore summo summaque inopia suave esse' dicit

Parément habere avárum, inlepidum, in liberos
Difficilem, qui te néc amet nec studeát tui.

Atque huic incredibili sententiae ratiunculas suggerit:

Aut tu illum fructu fállas aut per líteras
Avértas aliquid nómen aut per sérvolum
Percútias pavidum, póstremo a parcó patre
Quod súmas, quanto dissipes libentius!

Idemque facilem et liberalem patrem incommodum esse amanti filio disputat,

Quem néque quo pacto fállam nec quid inde aúferam
Nec quém dolum ad eum aut máchinam commóliar,
Scio quícquam; ita omnes méos dolos, fallácias,
Praeútrigias praestínxit commodítas patris.
Quid ergo? isti doli, quid? machinae, quid? fallaciae prae-strigiaeque num sine ratione esse potuerunt? O praeclarum munus deorum! ut Phormio possit dicere:

Cedo senem; iam instructa sunt mi in corde consilia omnia.

Sed exeamus e theatro, veniamus in forum. Sessum it praetor. Quid ut iudicetur? Qui tabularium incenderit. Quod facinus occultius? Id se Q. Sosius, splendidus eques Romanus ex agro Piceno, fecisse confessus est. Qui transscripserit tabulas publicas. Id quoque L. Alenus fecit, cum chirographum sex primum imitatus est. Quid hoc homine sollertius? Cognosce alias quaestiones, auri Tolossani, conjurationis Iugurthinae; repete superiora, Tubuli de pecunia capta ob rem iudicandam, posteriora, de incessu rogatione Peducae, tum haec cotidiana, sicae, veneni, peculatus, testamentorum etiam lege nova quaestiones. Inde illa actio: OPE CONSILIOQUE TUA FURTUM AIO FACTUM ESSE, inde tot iudicia de fide mala, tutelae, mandati, pro socio, fiduciae, reliqua, quae ex empto aut vendito aut conducto aut locato contra fidem sunt, inde iudicium publicum rei privatae lege Plaetoria, inde eversiculum malitiarum omnium, iudicium de dolo malo, quod C. Aquilius, familiaris noster, protulit; quem dolum idem Aquilius tum teneri putat, cum aliud sit simulatum, aliud actum. Hanc igitur tantam a dis immortalibus arbitramur malorum sementim esse factam? Si enim rationem hominibus di dederunt, malitiam dederunt; est enim malitia versuta et fallax ratio nocendi; iidem etiam di fraudem dederunt, facinus ceteraque, quorum nihil nec suscipi sine ratione nec effici potest. 'Utinam' igitur, ut illa anus optat,

ne in nemore Pello securus
Caesae accidissent abiegnae ad terram trabes,
sic istam calliditatem hominibus di ne dedissent! qua perpauci bene utuntur, qui tamen ipsi saepe a male utentibus opprimuntur, innumerables autem improbe utuntur, ut dominum hoc divi-
num rationis et consilii ad fraudem hominibus, non ad bonitatem
impertitum esse videatur.

Sed urgetis identidem hominem esse istam culpam, non deo-
rum; ut si medicus gravitatem morbi, gubernator vim tempes-
tatis accuset; etsi hi quidem homunculi, sed tamen ridiculi.
Quis enim te adhibuisset, dixerit quispiam, si ista non essent?
Contra deum licet disputare liberius. In hominum vitii ais esse
culpam. Eam dedisses hominibus rationem, quae vitia culpam-
que excluderet. Ubi igitur locus fuit errori deorum? Nam
patrimonia spe bene tradendi relinquimus, qua possumus falli;
deus falli qui potuit? An ut Sol, in currum cum Phaethontem
filium sustulit, aut Neptunus, cum Theseus Hippolytum perdidit,
cum ter optandi a Neptuno patre habuisset potestatem? Poëta-
rum ista sunt, nos autem philosophi esse volumus, rerum
auctores, non fabularum. Atque hi tamen ipsi di poëtici si
scissent perniciosae fore illa filii, peccasse in beneficio putat-
rentur. Et, si verum est, quod Aristo Chius dicere solebat,
nocere audientibus philosophos iis, qui bene dicta male inter-
pretarentur (posse enim asotos ex Aristippi, acerbos e Zenonis
schola exire), prorsus, si, qui audierunt, vitiosi essent dicessuri,
quod perverse philosophorum dispositionem interpretarentur,
tacere praestaret philosophis quam iis, qui se audissent, nocere.
Sic, si homines rationem bono consilio a dis inmortalibus datam
in fraudem malitiamque convertunt, non dari illam quam dari
humano generi melius fuit. Ut, si medicus sciat eum aegrotum,
qui iussus sit vinum sumere, meraciis sumpturum statimque
periturum, magna sit in culpa, sic vestra ista providentia repre-
hendenda, quae rationem dederit iis, quos scierit ea perverse et
inprove usuros. Nisi forte dicitis eam nescisse. Utinam qui-
dem! Sed non audebitis. Non enim ignoro, quanti eius nomen
putetis.

Sed hic quidem locus concludi iam potest. Nam si stultitia
consensu omnium philosophorum maius est malum, quam si
omnia mala et fortunae et corporis ex altera parte ponantur,
sapientiam autem nemo adsequitur, in summis malis omnes
sumus, quibus vos optume consultum a dis inmortalibus dici-
tis. Nam ut nihil interest, utrum nemo valeat, an nemo possit
valere, sic non intellego, quid intersit, utrum nemo sit sapiens,
an nemo esse possit. Ac nos quidem nimis multa de re aper-
tissuma. Telamo autem uno versus locum totum conficit, cur;
di homines neglegant:

Nām si curent, bène bonis sit, mále malis;
quod nunc abest.

Debebant illi quidem omnis bonos efficere, siquidem homi-
nom generi consulebant. Sin id minus, bonis quidem certe con-
consulere debebant. Cur igitur duo Scipiones, fortissimos et
optimos viros, in Hispania Poenus oppressit? cur Maximus
extulit filium consularem? cur Marcellum Hannibal interemit?
cur Paulum Cannae sustulerunt? cur Poenorum crudelitati
Reguli corpus est praebitum? cur Africanum domestici paretet
non texerunt? Sed haec vetera et alia permulta; propri
videamus. Cur avunculus meus, vir innocentissimus idemque
doctissimus, P. Rutilius, in exilio est? cur sodalis meus inter-
factus domi suae, Drusus? cur temperantiae prudentiaeque
specimen ante simulacrum Vestae pontifex maximus est Q.
Scaevola trucidatus? cur ante etiam tot civilis principes a
Cinna interemti? cur omnium perfidiosissimus, C. Marius, Q.
Catulum, praestantissuma dignitare virum, mori potuit iubere?

Dies deficiat, si velim numerare, quibus bonis male evenerit,
nec minus, si commemorem, quibus improbis optime. Cur
enim Marius tam feliciter septimum consul domi suae senex est
mortuus? cur omnium crudelissimus tam diu Cinna regnavit?

At dedit poenas. Prohiberi melius fuit impedirique, ne tot
summos viros interficeret, quam ipsum aliquando poenas dare.
Summo cruciato supplicioque Q. Varius, homo importunissu-
mus, perit; si, quia Drusum ferro, Metellum veneno sustulerat,
illos conservari melius fuit quam poenas sceleris Varium pen-
dere. Duodequadraginta annos Dionysius tyrannus fuit opu-
salentissumae et beatissumae civitatis; quam multos ante hunc
in ipso Graeciae flore Pisistratus! At Phalaris, at Apollodorus poenas sustulit. Multis quidem ante cruciatis et necatis. Et praedones multi saepe poenas dant, nec tamen possumus dicere non pluriis captivos acerbe quam praedones necatos. Ana-
xarchum Democriteum a Cyprio tyranno excarnificatum accipi-
mus, Zenonem Eleae in tormentis necatum. Quid dicam de 
Socrate, cuius morti inlacrimari soleo Platonem legens? Vi-
desne igitur deorum iudicio, si vident res humanas, discrimen 
esse sublatum? Diogenes quidem Cynicus dicere solebat Har-
palum, qui temporibus illis praedo felix habebatur, contra deos 
testimonium dicere, quod in illa fortuna tam diu viveret. Dio-
nysius, de quo ante dixi, cum fanum Proserpinae Locris 
expilavisset, navigat Syracusas; isque cum secundissimo 
vento cursum teneret, ridens 'Videtisne', inquit, 'amici, 
quam bona a dis inmortalibus navigatio sacrilegis 
detur?' Idque homo acutus cum bene planeque percepisset, 
in eadem sententia perseveratabat. Qui cum ad Peloponnesum 
classem appulisset et in fanum venisset Iovis Olympii, aureum 
ei detraxit amicum grandi pondere, quo Iovem ornarat e 
manubiis Karthaginiensem tyrannus Gelo, atque in eo etiam 
cavillatus est aestate grave esse aureum amicum, hieme frigi-
dum, eique laneum pallium iniecit, cum id esse aptum ad omne 
anni tempus diceret. Idemque Aesculapii Epidauri barbam 
auream demi iussit; neque enim convenire barbatum esse 
filium, cum in omnibus fanis pater inberbis esset. Etiam men-
sas argentiae de omnibus delubris iussit auferri, in quibus cum 
more veteris Graeciae inscriptum esset BONORUM DEORUM, uti 
se eorum bonitate velle dicebat. Idem Victoriolas aureas et 
pateras coronasque, quae simulacrorum porrectis manibus susti-
nebantur, sine dubitatione tollebat eaque se accipere, non 
auferre dicebat; esse enim stultitiam, a quibus bona precare-
mur, ab ipsis porrigentibus et dantibus nolle sumere. Eundemque 
ferunt haec, quae dixi, sublata de fanis in forum protulisse et 
per praecenem vendidisse exactaque pecunia edixisse, ut, quod 
quisque a sacris haberet, id ante diem certam in suum quidque
fanum referret. Ita ad impietatem in deos in homines adiun-
xit iniuriam. Hunc igitur nec Olympius Iuppiter fulmine per-
cussit nec Aesculapius misero diuturnoque morbo tabescentem
interemit, atque in suo lectulo mortuus in [tyrannidis] rogum
inlatus est eamque potestatem, quam ipse per scelus erat nanc-
tus, quasi iustum et legitimam hereditatis loco filio tradidit.
Invita in hoc loco versatur oratio; videtur enim auctoritatem
adferre peccandi; recte videretur, nisi et virtutis et vitiorum
sine ulla divina ratione grave ipsius conscientiae pondus esset,
qua sublata iacent omnia. Ut enim nec domus nec res publica
ratione quadam et disciplina dissipata videatur, si in ea nec
recte factis praemia extant ulla nec suppricia peccatis, sic
mundi divina [in homines] moderatio profecto nulla est, si in
eae discrimen nullum est bonorum et malorum.
At enim minora di neglegunt neque agellos singulorum nec
viticulas persequuntur nec, si uredo aut grando quippiam nocuit,
id Iovi animadvertendum fuit; ne in regnis quidem reges omnia
minima curant; sic enim dicitis. Quasi ego paulo ante de
fundo Formiano P. Rutilii sim questus, non de amissa salute.
Atque hoc quidem omnes mortales sic habent, externas com-
moditates, vineta, segetes, oliveta, ubertatem frugum et fruc-
tuum, omnem denique commoditatem prosperitatemque vitae a
dis se habere; virtutem autem nemo umquam acceptam deo
rettulit. Nimirum recte; propter virtutem enim iure laudamur
et in virtute recte gloriamur; quod non contingert, si id donum
a deo, non a nobis haberemus. At vero aut honoribus aucti
aut re familiari, aut si aliud quippiam nacti sumus fortuiti boni
aut depulimus mali, tum dis gratias agimus, tum nihil nostrae
laudi adsumptum arbitramur. Num quis, quod bonus vir esset,
gratias dis egit umquam? at quod dives, quod honoratus, quod
incomn. Iovemque optumum et maxumum ob eas res appel-
lant, non quod nos iustos, temperatos, sapientes efficiat, sed
quod salvos, incomn, opulentos, copiosos. Neque Herculi
quisquam decumam vovit umquam, si sapiens factus esset.
Quamquam Pythagoras cum in geometria quiddam novi inve-
nisset, Musis bovem immolasse dicitur; sed id quidem non credo, quoniam ille ne Apollini quidem Delio hostiam immolare voluit, ne aram sanguine aspergeret. Ad rem autem ut redeam, iudicium hoc omnium mortalium est, fortunam a deo petendam, a se ipso sumendam esse sapientiam. Quamvis licet Menti delubra et Virtuti et Fidei consecremus, tamen haec in nobis ipsis sita videmus; Spei, Salutis, Opis, Victoriae facultas a dis expetenda est. Inproborum igitur prosperitates secundaeque res redarguunt, ut Diogenes dicebat, vim omnem deorum ac potestatem. At non numquam bonos exitus habent boni. Eos quidem arripimus attribuimusque sine ulla ratione dis immortalibus. At Diagoras cum Samothracam venisset, átheos ille qui dicitur, atque ei quidam amicus 'Tu, qui deos putas humana neglegere, nonne animadvertis ex tot tabulis pictis, quam multi votis vim tempestatis effugierint in portumque salvi pervenerint?', 'Ita fit', inquit; 'illi enim nusquam picti sunt, qui nautfragia fecerunt in marique perierunt.' Idemque, cum ei naviganti vectores adversa tempestate timidi et perterriti dicerent non injuria sibi illud accidere, qui illum in eandem navem recepissent, ostendit eis in eodem cursu multas alias laborantis quaesivitque, num etiam in iis navibus Diagoram vehi crederent. Sic enim res se habet, ut ad prosperam adversamve fortunam, qualis sis aut quem ad modum vixeris, nihil intersit. Non animadvertunt, inquit, omnia di, ne reges quidem. Quid est simile? Reges enim si scientes praetermittunt, magna culpa est; at deo ne excusatio quidem est inscientiae. Quem vos praeclare defenditis, cum dicitis eam vim deorum esse, ut, etiamsi quis morte poenas sceleris effugerit, expetantur eae poenae a liberis, a nepotibus, a posteris. O miram aequitatem deorum! Ferretne civitas ulla latorem istius modi legis, ut condemnaretur filius aut nepos, si pater aut avus deliquisset?

Quinam Tantalidarum interbecionem modus Paretur? aut quaecumque uniform ob mortem Myrtilli
Poenis luendis dabitur satias supplici?

Utrum poëtae Stoicos depravarent, an Stoici poëtis dederint auctoritatem, non facile dixerim; portenta enim ab utrisque et flagitia dicuntur. Neque enim, quem Hipponactis iambus laesus, aut qui erat Archilochi versus vulneratus, a deo inmissum dolorem, non conceptum a se ipso continebat, nec, cum Aegisthi libidinem aut cum Paridis videmus, a deo causam requirimus, cum culpae paene vocem audiamus, nec ego multorum aegrotum salutem non ab Hippocrate potius quam ab Aesculapio datum iudico, nec Lacedaemoniorum disciplinam dicam umquam ab Apolline potius Spartae quam a Lycurgo datam. Crito, inquam, evertit Corinthum, Karthagenem Hasdrubal. Hi duo illos oculos orae maritimae effoderunt, non iratus aliqui, quem omnino irasci posse negatis, deus. At subvenire certe potuit et conservare urbis tantas atque talis; vos enim ipsi dicere soletis nihil esse, quod deus efficere non possit, et quidem sine labore ullo; ut enim hominum membra nulla contentionem mente ipsa ac voluntate moveantur, sic numine deorum omnia fingi, moveri mutarique posse. Neque id dicitis superstitione atque aniliter, sed physica constantique ratione; materialiam enim rerum, ex qua et in qua omnia sint, totam esse flexibilem et commutabilem, ut nihil sit, quod non ex ea quamvis subito fingi convertique possit; eius autem universae fictricem et moderatricem divinam esse providentiam; hanc igitur, quocumque se moveat, efficere posse, quicquid velit. Itaque aut nescit, quid possit, aut neglegit res humanas aut, quid sit optimum, non potest iudicare. Non curat singulos homines. Non mirum; ne civitates quidem. Non eas? ne nationes quidem et gentes. Quodsi has etiam contemnet, quid mirum est omne ab ea genus humanum esse contemptum? Sed quo modo iidem dicitis non omnia deos persequi, iidem voltis a dis inmortalibus hominibus dispertiri ac divid i somnia? Idcirco haec tecum, quia vestra est de omniorum veritate sententia. Atque iidem etiam vota suscipi dicitis oportere. Nempe singuli
vovent, audit igitur mens divina etiam de singulis. Videtis ergo
non esse eam tam occupatam, quam pufabatis? Fac esse dis-
tentam, caelum versantem, terram tuentem, maria moderantem;
cur tam multos deos nihil agere et cessare patitur? cur non
5 rebus humanis aliquos otiosos deos praeficit, qui a te, Balbe,
innumerales explicati sunt? Haec fere dicere habui de natura
deorum, non ut eam tollerem, sed ut intellexeretis, quam esset
obscura et quam difficilis explicatus haberet.

Quae cum dixisset, Cotta finem. Lucilius autem : Vehemen-
tius, inquit, Cotta, tu quidem investus es in eam Stoicorum
rationem, quae de providentia deorum ab illis sanctissime et
providentissime constituta est. Sed quoniam adversascit,
dabis nobis diem aliquem, ut contra ista dicamus. Est enim
mihi tecum pro aris et focis certamen et pro deorum templis
15 atque delubris proque urbis muris, quos vos, pontifices, sanctos
esse dicitis diligentiusque urbem religionem quam ipsis moenibus
cingitis; quae deseri a me, dum quidem spirare potero, nefas
iudico. Tum Cotta : Ego vero et opto redargui me, Balbe, et

ea, quae disputavi, disserere malui quam iudicare et facile me
20 a te vincite posses certa scio. Quippe, inquit Velleius, qui etiam
somnia putet ad nos mitti ab Iove, quae ipsa tamen tam levia
non sunt, quam est Stoicorum de natura deorum oratio. Haec
cum essent dicta, ita discessimus, ut Velleio Cottaee disputatione
verior, mihi Balbi ad veritatis similitudinem videretur esse pro-
25 pensior.
FRAGMENTA

EX LIBRO DE NATURA DEORUM TERTIO.

1. Lactant. inst. div. II, 3, 2: Intellegebat Cicero falsa esse, quae homines adorarent. Nam cum multa dixisset, quae ad eversionem religionum valerent, ait tamen non esse illa vulgo disputanda, ne susceptas publice religiones disputatio talis extinguat.

2. Lactant. inst. div. II, 8, 10: Cicero de natura deorum disputans sic ait: Primum igitur non est probabile eam materiam rerum, unde orta sunt omnia, esse divina providentia effectam, sed habere et habuisse vim et naturam suam. Ut igitur faber, cum quid aedificaturus est, non ipse facit materiam, sed ea utitur, quae sit parata, factaque item cera, sic isti providentiae divinae materiam praesto esse oportuit, non quam ipse faceret, sed quam haberet paratam. Quodsi non est a deo materia facta, ne terra quidem et aqua et aër et ignis a deo factus est.


EX LIBRIS INCERTIS.


[7. Serv. ad Verg. Aen. VI, 894: Per portam corneam oculi significantur, qui et cornei sunt et duriores ceteris membris; nam frigus non sentiunt, sicut etiam Cicero dixit in libris de natura deorum. (Vid. N. D. II, 57, 144.)]
NOTES.

BOOK FIRST.

32. 4. ad agnitionem animi. Through knowledge of God the mind gains more knowledge of itself, inasmuch as it participates in the divine essence; knowledge of God and knowledge of one's self are correlative. Comp. Tusc. V, 25, 70: Ut ipsa se mens agnoscat coniunctamque cum divina mente se sentiat.—De Legg. I, 8, 25: ut is agnoscat deum, qui unde ortus sit quasi recordetur ac noscat. Hence too the study of this subject is ad agnitionem animi pulcherrima, because it leads to a worthy and admirable result in a knowledge of one's self.

ad moderandum religione, because only a right understanding of the divine nature can give the proper balance and direction to our worship. Compare below II, 61, 153.

32. 5. De qua. The relative refers not to religione, but to the more remote quaestio.

32. 8. inscientiam. The variety and contradictions in the opinions about the divine nature, a consequence of the ignorance which has incited men to philosophize and to form so various opinions on the subject, might serve as a weighty proof, magnum argumentum, for the general proposition, that all philosophical investigation, that is, the striving after knowledge, has its foundation and starting point in ignorance. Arist. Met. I, 2: διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν ἄγνωσθαι ἐπιστολάν. In the same vein Plato, Theaet., p. 155 D, says that ἑαυτομέγεις, that is the wonder at what is unexplained and the resulting desire to understand it, is ἀρχηγία φιλοσοφίας. [Justin Martyr, Cohort. ad Graecos, c. 5: Ei δὲ καὶ τοῦτον (Platonem et Aristotelem) μὴ συμφωνούντας ἀλλήλως εὑροιμεν, ἤδοιον οἴμαι καὶ τὴν τοῦτον ἄγνωσθαι γνώσειν σαφὸς.]—Instead of debeat debeant would be better; or else id should be inserted after ut.—In some Mss. the copula before principium is wanting, others have id est instead, and many critics have considered principium itself as a spurious addition. [The text here is hopelessly corrupt, and none of the proposed emendations give a satisfactory sense. It is true that men set out from ignorance to think or philosophize on any subject whatever, but, as Aristotle and Plato say, it is the desire to escape from that ignorance and to attain knowledge that
induces them to think: moreover their reaching contradictory conclusions on a given point does not prove that they started from such ignorance, any more than their reaching identical conclusions would prove that they started from knowledge. Cicero might properly have said that the difference of opinions on the subject in question would go far to show that the result (not the beginning) of all philosophy was ignorance; and hence that the attitude of the Academics was a wise one. Or, if we strike out causam... inscientiam with the que after prudenter (and this is the reading of one Ms. according to Ursinus ed. Moser, p. 6), the sense is: that the difference of opinions on the subject in question goes far to show that the Academics were wise in withholding assent from things that were really not to be understood.]

32. 8. [prudenter...cohlibuisse. The verb in phrases like this is really contained in the adverb; "the Academics were prudent in withholding their assent" &c. De Fin. IV, 23, 63: Illi igitur antiqui non tam acute optabiliorum illum vitam putant.] — Academicos. See Introduction, p. 13.

32. 9. [temeritate here indicates haphazard action, based upon no rational grounds, in rebus incertis; so temerarium in the next sentence. Cf. N. D. II, 32, 82: nulla temeritas, sed ordo; Div. II, 41, 85: temeritas et casus, non ratio nec consilium. Cicero calls it temerarium aut falsum sentire, aut...defendere.]

32. 13. [Velut, "as for example," introduces an instance of the tam variae tamque discrepantes sententiae.—quod and quo refer to the proposition deos esse which follows.]

32. 15. Protagoras, Diagoras, Theodorus: See below notes to 12, 29 and 23, 63.

33. 1. rem causamque. The more general is defined by the more special term; for causa est res quae habet in se controversiam (De Invent. I, 6, 8).

33. 5. in summo errore. Error is not always synonymous with the English "error"; it often means simply the wavering and uncertainty which comes from ignorance of what is right. Thus errare is often used as equivalent to ambigere, incertum esse, as Plaut. Mil. Glor. III, 1, 197: erro, quam insistas viam. Senec. Agam. 144: ubi animus errat, optimum est casum sequi. Compare De Offic. II, 2, 7: non sumus ii, quorum vagetur animus errore, nec habeat umquam quid sequatur. And below II, 1, 2: non errantem et vagam, sed stabilem certamque sententiam.

33. 8. Quorum si vera. If the gods have no care for human affairs, then men cannot cherish towards them feelings expressed by pietas,
sanctitas, religio. Pietas is pure, dutiful feeling towards those with whom we stand in intimate connection, our relatives, colleagues in office, our superiors; especially then towards the gods as our governors and benefactors. In 41, 116, it is described as iustitia adversum deos; and in the same place sanctitas is called scientia colendorum deorum; (see also the note). Sanctitas is properly irreproachable behavior towards the gods; religio the recognition of the duty by which we feel ourselves bound (De Invent. II, 53, 161: quae superioris cuiusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam caerimoniamque adserit); and to this idea the derivation from relegare given by Lactantius IV, 28 appears to correspond better than that of Cicero, from relegere, given below II, 28, 72.

33. 10. [tribuenda . . . ita sunt, si—"are to be given on the assumption that —"]

33. 16. fictae simulationis. Of course any simulatio is ficta; which does not however prevent Cicero from emphasizing the idea by the added epithet. — Moreover the remark has particular reference to the Epicureans, who, although disbelieving in a divine power that governs the world, yet endeavored to keep up an appearance of divine reverence. See below, ch. 17, 45; 21, 56; and on the other side, 41, 115.

33. 20. fides . . . iustitia tollatur. Cicero also points out the connection between the duties towards men and the duties towards God in II, 61, 153; but a passage cited by Lactantius V, 8 from the De Legibus refers to the ground of this connection, namely, that the consciousness that all men are of the same (divine) race and are in the same way the object of the divine love and care must produce among them too a mutual regard and love. So in De Offic. III, 6, 28 disregard of one's duties to his fellow-men is brought forward as a proof of impiety towards the gods. Compare also below II, 61, 153 and Gataker on Antonin. II, 1, p. 43. Wytenbach has observed not without reason that the clause beginning atque haud scio would be in a more proper place before the preceding quibus sublatis. In its present position it seems only an after-thought, to make an application of the preceding general observation to the living together of men in society. A radical criticism might be disposed to throw aside the whole clause as an interpolation; one less severe to substitute namque for atque. [But is not the clause haud scio an a reinforcement of the preceding? Cicero has just said that, if sanctitas and religio are taken away, great trouble ensues in common life; but if you take away pietas adversus deos, loyalty towards the gods, it would be almost impossible for men to live together in society.]

33. 22. alii philosophi, especially the Stoics.

33. 25. [reliqua, quae terra parlat—omnia, quae terra dignat—]
The Latin seems to have had no single word to express the vegetable kingdom. Cicero uses several circumlocutions; II, 33, 83: ea quae a terra stirpibus continentur; II, 10, 28: ea quorum stirpes terra continentur; De Fin. IV, 5, 13: res eas quae gignuntur e terra; N. D. II, 13, 36: stirpes alone; Sallust Jug. 70, 6: gignentia. See Nägelsbach, Latinische Stilistik, § 36, 1, 2.

33. 29. quae dicentur in his libris. See II, 62, 156 seqq.—ea ipsa, these things exactly as they are.

33. 30. fabricati paene, i.e. paene fabrili opera effecisse, with artistic plan and care.

33. 31. Carneades of Cyrene, head of the Academy at Athens about the middle of the second century B.C. His negative criticism, on which it may suffice for the moment to refer to c. 5, 11, was directed especially against the Stoics and their leader Chrysippus. Compare also II, 65, 162 and III, 17, 44. He wrote nothing except some letters to the Cappadocian king Ariarthes, but his lectures were reported by listeners and published.

33. 31. ita goes with dixerit, not with multa; it points to the character of his arguments, which were such ut excitaret (sc. Carneades) homines &c. For the arrangement of the words compare Verr. II, 3, 8: magistratum nostrorum injurias ita multorum tulerunt, ut numquam ante hoc tempus ad aram legum... confugerint.

34. 1. Qua quidem in causa. The idea may be better defined by mentally supplying tractanda. Cicero says: While undertaking this discussion I am quite in a position to defend myself from any one who blames me for it.—It is entirely erroneous to refer this expression, as many have done, to the Stoics and Epicureans.

34. 2. [benivolos. So Müller writes here, and in I, 21, 58; 44, 122 from the Mss. Both bene- and beni- are correct, but the former became the recognized form from the first century of the empire. Brambach.]

34. 6. [brevi tempore edidimus. See Introduction, p. 19.]

34. 10. eam...philosophiam, i.e. Academicam. In Acad. II, 19, 61 Cicero represents Lucullus as saying to him: Tune eam philosophiam sequere, quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos iudicio, privat approbatione, omnibus orbatis sensibus?—The dative rebus is not to be taken with lucem eriperet on account of the order of the words; we might rather supply a dative like nobis or hominibus. Compare Acad. II, 10, 30: quid eum facturum putem de abditis rebus et obscuris, qui lucem eriperet conetur? ibid. 32, 105: non enim lucem eripimus: sed ea, quae vos percipi, eadem nos videri dicimus; and 103: ab Academia sensus eripi. Compare Liv. X, 32: nebulas erat—densa adeo, ut lucis usum eriperet.
34. 12. desertaeque disciplinæ. See below c. 5, 11. Antiochus, mentioned just below, is to be regarded as a desertor of the Academy.

34. 19. Diodotus, a Stoic, lived for several years in Cicero's house and left him a considerable property at his death.

34. 19. Philo of Larissa, an Academic, fled during the Mithridatic war in 666 from Athens to Rome, where Cicero, as he himself says Brut. 89, 306, totum se ei tradidit. He was the last representative of any note of the Academic philosophy. Philone vivo patrocinium Academiae non defuit says Cic. Acad. II, 6, 17.

34. 19. Antiochus of Ascalon, a disciple of Philo, but not his successor. He abandoned the Academic scepticism and devised for himself an eclectic, dogmatic system composed of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic tenets taken together. Comp. Acad. II, 22, 69; and especially Madvig, Preface to Cic. De Fin., p. 61, ff.

34. 20. Posidonius of Apamea in Syria, disciple of the Rhodian Panaetius, the most distinguished of the Stoics at that time. He lived and taught mostly at Rhodes and is hence called Rhodian, but also passed some time at Rome. All that remains of his numerous writings in fragments and citations may be found in Posidonii reliquiae doctrinae. Coll. atque illustr. J. Bake. Lugd. B. 1810. 8.


34. 29. ad decus et ad laudem civitatis. Comp. De Div. II, 2, 5: magnificum illud etiam Romanisque hominibus gloriosum, ut Graecis de philosophia litteris non egeant.

34. 31. multorum — scribendi studia. Comp. De Offic. II, 1, 2. 8

No notice has come down to us of the many whom Cicero here speaks of. We know indeed that several of his contemporaries wrote in Latin on philosophical topics, for example P. Nigidius Figulus and M. Terentius Varro, not to speak of the poet Lucretius; but they were not induced to do so by Cicero's example any more than the Epicureans Amasinius, Rabirius and Catius, whom he mentions disparagingly. Acad. I, 1, 5; Tusc. IV, 3, 6; Ad Famil. XV, 16, 1; 19, 1. Perhaps however Brutus and Plancus mentioned by Quintilian X, 1, 123 and C. Asinius Pollio were among those whom he has in mind.

35. 2. vincereumur, not vincanmnr. The imperfect limits the remark to Cicero's previous writings, and the sense is simply that he succeeded in not falling behind his Graecian models in adequate expression of philosophic ideas. In another place with patriotic enthusiasm he maintains broadly Latinam linguam non modo non inopem, ut vulgo putant, sed locupletiorem etiam esse quam Graecam, De Fin. I, 3, 10; comp. III,
2, 5. On the other hand in Tusc. II, 15, 35 he acknowledges the greater richness of the Greek.

35. 3. fortunae inuria, alluding to the death of his daughter. Comp. Introduction, p. 19.

35. 9. totae quæstiones, investigations of philosophic questions in all their bearings, their general scope, as opposed to isolated, aphoristic meditations.

35. 11. alla ex alla; not simply distributive as it generally is, but also reciprocal, εὖ ἀλλῆλον as below c. 43. Comp. De Fin. IV, 17, 47: nihil differre aliud ab alio; De Legg. 1, 19, 52: videtisne quanta series rerum sententiarumque sit, atque ut ex alio alia nectantur; and further Drakenborch on Liv. IV, 22, 5; and Schneid. on Caes. Bell. Gall. VI, 37, 6. — In Greek too ἀλλὸς ἀλλὸν for ἀλλῆλος. See Bekk. Anecd., p. 81, 88 and 379, 9.

5 35. 15. [Quin etiam obest &c. The reason may be found in Acad. II, 3, 9: nam quod dicunt omnia se credere ei, quem iudicent fuisse sapientem, probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti iudicare potuissent &c.]


11 35. 24. quattuor Academicis libris. Cicero wrote at first two books of Academic investigations, one entitled Catulus, the other Lucullus after the two chief personages who carry on the discussion. He afterwards abandoned these and wrote four other books instead, dedicated to Varro. The beginning of the first book of the second series and the second book of the first (Lucullus) are still extant. [For ɪs the Mss. and edd. generally have his.]

35. 27. lucem auctoris. Auctor, from the same stem with aio and autumno (see Schoemann Opusc. Ac. III, p. 407), is originally he who asserts something effectually (der etwas wirksam ausdrückt), with confidence, energy, vouching for what he says to other persons. From this original meaning all the various usages of the word are easily explained. An auctor of a doctrine is then not only its originator but its representative at any particular time, (for example Chrysippus is called divinationis auctor, De Divin. II, 28, 610) and lux auctoris is the light that comes from a valiant champion, by which a doctrine is made evident to others and gains prominence. The Academic school no longer had any such representative since the death of Philo, and so Cicero complains that it was propemodum orba.

35. 29. protecta a Socrate. Socrates was thought to be the prede-
cessor of the Academic scepticism and the opposition to the dogmatism of the other schools because of his assertion: That he knew only one thing, namely, that he knew nothing; and because of the reasoning he used to convict of ignorance those who boasted of knowing something.

—Arcesillas of Pitane in Æolis B.C. 316–241 went further than Socrates; for as Cicero says, Acad. I, 12, 45, negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset; sic omnia latere in occulto. —On Carneades see c. 2, 4.

35. 35. veri reperiendi causa. The question with them was certainly one of truth, although in the end they only arrived at the result that in the absence of a sure criterion a certain and definite knowledge of the truth was unattainable and that one must rest satisfied with probability.

De Fin. II, 14, 43: Quasi desperata cognitione certa id sequi volunt, quod veri simile videtur. Acad. II, 3, 7: nihil aliud agunt, nisi ut in utramque partem disputando eliciant aliquid, quod aut verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat. Comp. ibid. 24, 76.

36. 5. allo loco, namely, in the Academica. For what follows compare De Off. II, 2, 7.

36. 9. judicandi et adsentendi nota: a criterion for judging and deciding. [Cicero uses several expressions for this, there being no single Latin word corresponding to the Greek κριθήνων: regula et iudicium, below 1, 16, 43; distinctio in agnoscendo Acad. II, 86; cognitionis nota, ibid. 110 &c. See Nagelsbach, Lat. Stil. § 1, end.]

36. 10. exstitit. "The result for us Academics is,—or, we have drawn the conclusion" &c. In the following clause the words multa esse probabilia evidently mean that there are many things probable and yet not certain, which still may furnish to a reasonable man sufficient guides for his practical actions. —Visum, accus. from the verbal subst. visus, synonymous with visio, properly signifies the mental act of the person beholding; it may however be applied to the object which gives rise to the perception; as here visum insigne et illustrem habere, "to cause a definite and clear perception" (eine bestimmte und klare Aeusserung bewirken). [Professor Schoemann here seems to take visum as the act of perception, and habere in the sense of "to cause." But it would seem better to take visum = speciem, the sense of the passage being that some things have an appearance sufficiently clear for practical purposes, though they may have no perfectly sure criterion. Comp. Acad. II, 31, 101: ... ut ei multa vera videantur, neque tamen habere insigne illam et propriam percipiendi notam; 99: Itaque et sensibus probanda multa sunt, teneatur modo illud, non inesse in iis quicquam tale, quale non etiam falsum nihil ab eo differens esse possit. Cicero generally uses the neuter
NOTES.

visum for the Greek φαντασία, as in Acad. I, II, 40 and II, 6, 18, and this is one reason why Heindorf brackets this whole sentence; Baiter does the same.—The construction at the end of the sentence is not quite regular. It would be more correct were it either quae . . . sapientis vitam regerent or quibus . . . sapientis vila regeretur. As it is, quae quamquam can only be equivalent to et quamquam haec, and one would rather expect iis sapientis vitam regi, so that both clauses, multa esse probabilia and iis . . . regi connected by quae (for et haec), would depend on existit. But such irregularity is easily explained and excused.

36. II. percipierentur. This expression, like comprehenderes, with which it is often coupled, especially in the Lucullus, denotes a perfectly certain and undoubted knowledge and comprehension of an object, the ἀφασιᾶ καὶ βεβαια καὶ ἀμετάθετος κατάληψις of the Stoics.

36. 15. omnes, qui . . . iudicent, i.e. all those who pronounce a distinct judgment; the Dogmatics in contradistinction to the Academics who refrained from any such judgment: nullam rem aperte iudicant, § 11; comp. III, 40, 95: ea quae disputari disserere malui quam iudicaret. [But why are the Dogmatics summoned rather than any other? and in point of fact the Academic bears a most important part in the dialogue. The natural meaning of qui . . . iudicent would seem to be “to consider the sententias philosophorum in medio positas and judge which of them are true”; iudicaret quae sit earum vera can hardly mean “to hold a clear opinion on the question in general”; earum must refer to sentimentias preceding. The sentence seems to be rather an awkward appeal to all the world, in the same vein as the quotation from Caecilius just below.]

36. 18. (est) in Synephebis. The verb is wanting in the Mss. Synephebi was the title of a fabula palliata of Caecilius Statius, a younger contemporary of Plautus. The Greek original was by Menander.—The first two of the verses cited are regular trochaic tetrameters; the other two were doubtless of the same metre, but, whether by the fault of Cicero or that of the copyists, have gotten into confusion. [non vult; nevoll Schoemann, Baiter I and II.]

36. 29. ausplicis, quibus nos praesumus. Cicero had been a member of the college of Augurs since the year 700 of the city, the 54th of his age. He also wrote a book De Auguriiis, probably after the De Nat. Deor. and De Divin. See the fragments in Orelli IV, 2, p. 478.

37. 3. C. Cottam; see Introduction, p. 17.

37. 4. ferilis Latinus. The ancient feast of the Latin Confederation was annually celebrated on the Alban Mount, the Roman consuls presiding, even long after the confederation had ceased to exist. It did not take
place on a fixed day, but was always announced by the consuls (seriae concepтивae). In Cicero's time it lasted four days, during which public business ceased and public men had leisure to visit their country seats.

37. 6. exedra or eхedra was a large room with a high ceiling, two ends of which formed semicircles with benches running quite around the wall, where people gathered for social intercourse. See Mazois, "Der Palast des Scaurus," übers. von Wüstemann, pp. 119, 126. — The interspiration, which the Mss. have here, was employed by the Graecian grammarians only in such compounds as εξεαν, διερε and the like, when the object was to indicate a doubtful etymology. Comp. Lehrn, De Aristarchi stud. Hom., p. 316. The Latin spelling of such words varies. Comp. Schneider, Elementarlehre I, p. 192. According to Bücheler in the N. Rhein. Mus. XIV, 3, p. 429 the interspiration was not indicated in Cicero's time.

37. 10. [Our text has Pеropоrtunе here and oрurtunе three lines below; it is the usual spelling in the Mss. So I, 33, 92; II, 22, 58; 52, 130; see Halm, Laelius, p. 618, 32, edit. Orell. II.]

37. 11. alerсatim always denotes a lively and somewhat passionate interchange of words.

37. 14. M. Piso. He refers to M. Pupius Piso Calpurnianus, adopted son of a M. Pupius, consul in 693, whom Cicero several times mentions as an incompetent and vain man; in another place however he compliments him for integrity, eloquence and learning. He was a follower of the Peripatetic school, and in the fifth book of the De Fin. Cicero makes him the expounder of their doctrine about the highest good, as understood by Antiochus.

37. 15. earum quidem, quae in honore sunt. The only ones of which this could be said at that time were the Epicurean, Stoic and the Peripatetic; the Pythagorean had an enthusiastic and learned champion in P. Nigidius Figulus, but beyond this was little known. On the Academic see above c. 5, 11.

37. 17. Antiochi. See note to c. 3, 6.

37. 17. ad hunc Balbum missus, i.e. dedicated to him. Comp. De Senect. I, 3: hunc librum ad te de senectute misimus.

37. 19. re conсlinere, verbis discrepare. Comp. De Legg. I, 21, 55: (Zeno) cum decus, quod antiqui summum bonum esse dixerant, solum bonum dicat, itemque dedecus illi summum malum, hic solum; divitiias, valetudinem, pulchritudinem commodas res appellet, non bonas; paupertatem, debilitatem, dolorem incommodas, non malas; sentit idem quod
NOTES.

Xenocrates, quod Aristoteles, loquitur alio modo. Ex hac autem non rerum sed verborum discordia controversia nata est de finibus &c.


37. 26. non verborum parva, sed rerum permagna dissenso.
On this question consult the third and fourth books De Fin.; especially IV, 22 ff. and III, 15 with Madvig's note.

17 37. 29. me intuens. "Παρενθήκη est; with a glance at me." Wolf. So II, 41, 104 and Brut. c. 72, 253. In like manner Acad. I, 1, 2: iam pridem ad hunc ipsum (me autem dicebat) quaedam institui. De Fin. V, 3, 7: hoc, inquit, non poterit sic abire, cum hic adsit; me autem dicebat. Isoc. Panath. c. 85: οὐ μὲν πεποίησαι τοὺς λόγους (ἐμὲ λέγων) ὥς ἄν ἄπαντ' ἀποδεχόμενον μοι τάκεινον. Before the following de natura agebamus deorum supply something like dicam ei. Comp. Heindorf on Hor. Sat. II, 1, 80; Ochsner, Cicer. Eclog., p. 339. This omission is common in Greek. See Heindorf on Plat. Gorg. § 21.

37. 29. ab eodem Philone; because both had had him for teacher, eodem uteaque magistro usi. On Philo see note to 3, 6.

37. 35. nihil scire didicistis. The Academicians had taught them that there was no such thing as certain knowledge. Seneca, doubtless thinking of this passage, Epist. 88 says: Academicici novam induxerunt sententiam, nihil scire; and Lactantius III, 14: Haec (Academia) nihil docet, nisi ut scias te nihil scire.


8 38. 7. et ex Epicuri intermundis. The copula adds a more special designation to the preceding general expression ex deorum concilio. According to Epicurus the gods dwelt in the intermundis. In this passage, in De Fin. II, 23, 75 and De Divin. II, 17, 40 Cicero uses this word to translate the Greek μετακόσμημα, i.e. τὰ μεταξῷ κόσμων διαστήματα (Diog. L. X, 89), the intervals between the worlds considered by him as infinite in number. See below note to 20, 53.

38. 9. Platonis de Timaeo deum; Timaeus of Locri in lower Italy, a Pythagorean, whose instruction Plato is said to have enjoyed according to Cic. De Republic. I, 10, 16. Plato represents him in the dia-
logue bearing his name as giving his views about God and the creation of the world; and it is undeniable that much of the Pythagorean doctrine, which may really have been taught by Timaeus, is contained in that dialogue. Hence *Platonis de Timaeo deum* here is equivalent to *de Timaeo acceptum,* "the god of Plato, that Timaeus taught him." It is generally considered that the extant treatise π. ἴημι κόσμου καὶ φύσις bearing the name of Timaeus is a comparatively recent forgery.

38. 10. *anum fatidicam.* Cicero doubtless found this sarcastic expression in some of his Greek predecessors. Plutarch repeats the same, De Nobil. c. 13: ἐκεῖνη ἢ ἵμετέρα πρόνοια, χρησμολόγοι γραψ. Velleius moreover misrepresents the Stoic view in speaking of the Pronoia as an individual person, and he is therefore corrected by Balbus below II, 29, 73.

38. 11. *mundum ipsum.* The Stoics considered the universe as God, in so far that they held it to be endowed with a soul, and to be permeated if not by an immaterial, yet by a thinking and willing principle, namely the fiery ether, just as the human body is by the soul; the doctrine is developed in detail in the second book c. 8 ff. Compare note to c. 14, 37.

38. 12. *ardentem,* because of the fiery ether just mentioned, *ardor caelestis*; comp. c. 14, 37; II, 11, 30, 31; 12, 32; 15, 41.

38. 14. *quibus enim occults [animi].* Velleius foresees and meets the objection that it might be seen if not with the bodily, at least with the mind's eye. "With what sort of mind's eye?" he asks, not being willing to concede anything of the sort. Comp. *mentis occulti,* De Orat. III, 41, 163 and Orat. c. 29, 101, *pectoris occulti.* Ovid. Met. XV, 64. φρενίς ὤμω. Aristoph. Av. V, 1376. τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὤμω, Plato Rep. VII, p. 533 D, and Stallbaum's note.—In the present passage *animi* is wanting in several Mss. and is also considered as suspicious by critics.

38. 17. *tanti munus,* i.e. *tanti operis.* The two expressions are united in Cicero Tusc. I, 28, 70: *moderator tanti operis et munus,* and below II, 35, 90: *architectum tanti operis tantique munus.* Munus is especially used of public buildings, as temples or theatres, constructed at private expense.

38. 19. *illae quinque formae.* Plato in the Timaeus, p. 53 C, § 107 ff. in conformity with the Pythagoreans (comp. Plutarch Plac. Phil. II, 6) derives the so-called four elements from the geometrical shaping of the formless matter, which he calls, not ἴλη, but only χώρα; namely, the earth from the cube, water from the icosahedron, air from the octahedron, fire from the pyramid, to which is added a fifth from the dodecahedron, the nature of which he does not clearly explain. Later writers
consider as the πέμπτη σώσια, quinta natura or quinta essentia (Macrobi. in Somn. Scip. I, 14, 20) the aether, i.e. the fine etheric substance of which according to Aristotle the heavenly bodies consisted, which surrounded and penetrated the universe and formed according to many the substance of the soul. According to Plato however, who takes the αἰθήρ only for the higher, finer air (p. 58 D), the soul comes neither from this nor from any mixture or combination of the five forms of matter (comp. Trendelenburg's note to Arist. De Anim. I, 2, 7, p. 228); and all that the earlier commentators have advanced to explain the traditional reading in the text, ad animum efficiendum, is quite untenable. The correct reading is afficiendum. For Plato explains in detail, p. 64 A to 68 C, how the different modifications and mixtures of the elements are adapted to affect the organs of sense and by means of these the soul (τὸ φρόνιμον, p. 64 B) and to produce sensus, i.e. perceptions.—Sensus, not senses but perceptions, as often elsewhere; comp. Acad. I, 11, 40: Zeno sensus esse censuit a quadam impulsione obiata extrinsecus.—pariendos sensus, like dolorum parere, De Fin. I, 15 end; somnum parere, Plin. Hist. Nat. XIX, 8, 38.

38. 21. Longum est ad omnia; dicere is omitted as in Tusc. III, 18, 40: sed non necesse est nunc omnia; ibid. IV, 20, 46: expecto quid ad ista sc. dicturus sis; and often elsewhere.—ad aliquid dicere, to speak against something. De Div. II, 3, 8: dicendum est mihi ad ea, quae a te dicta sunt. Comp. below II, 1, 1.

20 38. 22. Sed illa palmaris [Schoemann's reading for palmaria], "worthy of the palm," i.e. the prize of victory; ironically of coarse. But it is very doubtful whether Cicero really wrote thus, supplying mentally sententia from § 18, or res (as Zumpt thinks, ad Verrin, p. 297 and p. 700). Perhaps he wrote: sed illud palmare est, or illa palmaria as Baiter and Madvig prefer; for although Plato's assertion is a single one, yet it might have been made several times and in several sentences (p. 32 C, 33 A, 41 A) and so be indicated by a plural.

38. 26. physiologam, not what is called so now-a-days, but natural science. Comp. De Div. I, 41, 90: naturae rationem, quam physiologam Graeci appellant. —Moreover Plato (Timaeus, p. 41, A) expressly recognizes the law which Velleius reproaches him with being ignorant of; but he still ascribes to the highest God, the creator of the world, the power of endowing what he has created with eternal existence.

38. 28. quid est ... nihil sit extremum? The question, equivalent to a negation, relates properly only to the second number of the sentence, cuius nihil sit extremum: the first, cuius principium aliquod sit, gives the circumstances under which that question is asked. Cicero might
have written: quid est, cuius, cum principium aliquod sit, nihil sit extremum? On this form of sentence in general see below note to c. 9, 23.

38. 29. si est [eadem] scil. ac Platonicus deus. The traditional reading, Pronoea vero si vestra est, eadem requiro gives no adequate sense, but has found some defenders.

38. 30. mortalem mundum. Comp. note to II, 46, 118.

38. 32. Ab utroque, i.e. a te, Lucili, et a Platone.— For the matter itself see Lucret. V, 169 ff.

38. 34. extenterint: i.e. prodierint ad aedificandum.

39. 2. nam fateor etc. Comp. Plat. Timae., p. 39 E: ήμέρας γάρ καὶ νόκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἐκαστοῦς ωκ νύκτας πρὶν οὐρανοὶ γενέσθαι, τότε ἀμά ἐκεῖνω ξυσταμένω τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μεγαλάζει (ὁ θεομορφός) ταύτα δὲ πάντα μέρα χρόνον. Saeculum, according to Censorin. d. die nat. c. 17, spatium vitae humanæ longissimum, partu et morte definitum. Originally therefore the span of life; later a definite period of a hundred or a hundred and ten years; sometimes too a longer period in general of no precise limits.

39. 3. sed fuit . . . Intellegit (non) potest. The connection of thought, misunderstood by many, is as follows: Before the creation of the world and the heavenly bodies there was an eternity without beginning or division into periods; but of its duration (lit. of what sort it was in respect to duration, spatio) we can have no conception. We can conceive only measurable and limited time; but this was a thing impossible before the heavenly bodies existed, by whose movements time is measured and divided.— The negation before potest is indispensable. Comp. Arist. Phys. IV, 11; Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. hypot. III, 140 f. Victorin. ad Cic. De Invent. I, p. 79, Orelli.

39. 6. ut fuerit. We should expect ut fuisse intellegamus; the abbreviated form of expression is not unfrequent. Comp. De Fin. I, 5, 14: adduci vix possum, ut ea tibi non vera videantur, fors ut ea tibi vera esse non credam. De Legg. III, 15, 33: ego in ista sum sententia, nihil ut fuerit in suffragiis voce melius, fors ut fuisse putem; more examples of the sort where a consequence only conceived is expressed precisely as an actual one may be seen in Madvig’s note to the above passage De Fin., and Haase notes to Reisig’s Vorlesungen, p. 557. Comp. also below c. 27, 75 and 34, 95. [The two examples cited by Prof. Schoemann are quite dissimilar. After adduci there is plainly an ellipsis as it is commonly explained. But with in ista sententia sum the explanation does not hold. I am not of the opinion that I think a thing is so, I am of the opinion that it is so. So in Tusc. V, 41, 119: quorum ea sententia est ut virtus per se
ipsum nihil valeat, the clause with ut is the plain statement of the opinion. Take the example in Fam. XV, 15, 2: equidem fater meam coniecturam hanc fuisse ut—communi salutis consulta vellent; was his conjecture that he conjectured so and so? De Fin. II, 3, 6: Hoc vero optimum, ut is . . . nesciat. De Div. II 2, 5: Magnificum illud . . . ut . . . non gregant. Tusc. IV, 47: ita enim definit, ut perturbatio sit &c., not a result, but the substance of the definition, censet . . . esse. Fam. XV, 2, 8: hae opinione ut . . . liberavit. In all these cases the ut clause does not express a result, but merely the idea in a simple form as a conception, without regard to the actual reality. In the text the sense is: The idea is inconceivable that there was ever any such thing as time when there was no means of measuring it. The usage is doubtless an extension of the consecutive ut, but is sufficiently common to be noticed apart.]

22 39. 11. signis et luminibus. The second word is in a measure explanatory of the first; for signa are here the heavenly bodies, as it were lights of heaven, as below c. 13, 35. Lucr. I, 1088: atque ideo totum circumiremere aethera signis. Signa is especially used of the constellations of the zodiac, as in II, 20, 52.

39. 12. tamquam aedilis, because the aediles had the care of decorating the public places on festive occasions. That illuminations were included is not especially stated, but may be reasonably inferred.


39. 19. An stultorum. They are immediately after called improbi, because improbitas springs from stultitia or insipientia, i.e. the want of that proper insight and of moral consistency in action, which belongs only to the sapiens. According to the Stoics there is no middle term between sapientia and stultitia (comp. De Fin. IV, 19); and as wisdom is attained only by a very few, the great mass of men are stulti or improbi. — For cum omnes stulti sint miserrimi comp. III, 32, 79.

39. 20. [deinde quid est adsecutus?] The deinde occurring three lines below is at first a little confusing. Velleius says that these things were not created for the sake stultorum for two reasons: first (at primum), because there was no occasion for the Deity to show any favor to the wicked (improbis or stulti); second, (deinde quid est adsecutus?) because it has been of no avail if he did. The answer nihil is to be understood after adsecutus. This answer is now justified on two grounds: first, (cum omnes &c.) because the stulti are already as wretched as they can be from their own stultitia; second, (deinde quod ita multa sunt &c.) because of the many ills of life &c.]

39. 23. ut ea sapientes &c. The consequence of the clause ita multa sunt incommoda is really contained in the second of the two clauses
connected by ut, stultus nec vitare venientia possint &c., and not in the first sapientes ea commodorum compensatione leniunt; this last contains rather a concession, inserted only for the purpose of bringing out into a stronger light from the contrast the following clause, the real consequence of ita multa sunt &c. Hence Cicero might have written: ita multa sunt incommoda in vita, ut, etsi (or cum) ea sapientes ... leniunt, stultus nec vitare venientia possint nec ferre praesentia.—This peculiarity of inserting concessions or assumptions without the corresponding conjunctions before the clause which really contains the essential fact is very frequent in both of the ancient languages; and examples may be found in this treatise, besides those mentioned above, in c. 8, 20; I, 26, 74; 31, 86; II, 34, 87; III, 13, 32. Comp. Hand's Tursell. I, p. 349: Matthiae, Vern. Schr., p. 52. For Greek examples where the two clauses are distinguished by μὲν and ὁδε see note to Iseaus, p. 195.

39. 27. [animi natura intellegentis. Schoemann reads:] animi 10 natura et intelligentia, according to the most probable emendation of the passage which is corrupted in the Mss. The special designation is added to the more general by the copula. —We shall see below c. 18, 48 that the Epicureans held that intelligence could only exist in connection with the human form.

39. 28. nunc autem hactenus. The adverb can hardly be taken 24 with admirator, which would give no proper sense; but must be explained elliptically, supplying some verb like dicam. “So much for the present on this point.” Comp. De Div. II, 36, 76.


39. 30. rotundum. This alone is the predicate. The three preceding adjectives are only qualifications of mundum supplied from the foregoing sentence. It seems particularly absurd to the Epicurean that the animated, immortal and moreover happy universe should be round. The reason for emphasizing hactenus more than the other attributes by prefixing et hactenus will be seen from what follows; for this revolution of a round god is in complete contradiction with his pretended happiness.

39. 31. Plato, in the Timaeus, p. 33 B. Pythagoras held the same opinion according to Diog. Laert. VIII, 105.

39. 33. ea celeritate contorquatur. We must bear in mind the old idea that the earth remains fixed and all the rest of the universe revolves around it daily.

39. 35. Quodque. The conjunction que often makes the transition
to something new, quite different from what precedes, when forro, deinde, iam vero or the like might have been used instead. Examples in abundance may be found in Goerenz De Legg., p. 47 and Madvig De Fin., p. 476.—In what went before Velleius was speaking of the revolution of the universe; he now passes on to the earth, which does not revolve, but suffers cold and heat. The reasoning is briefly this: The earth, as part of the universe, is also a part of God; but the earth is subject to cold and heat; therefore God is so subject. But as cold and heat are very unpleasant to men, so we cannot doubt that they are unpleasant to God; but this is inconsistent with his happiness. Comp. Matthiae, Verm. Schr., p. 54.

40. 1. sic affiliatur [an emendation of Schoemann] for signatusetur in the Mss., which nobody has been able to explain, referring to the heat and cold mentioned immediately after. [Lachmann, Lucret. p. 351, proposes sic incitetur, understanding the passage to refer to what precedes; but the enim of the next sentence seems to forbid that. Müller gives the Mss. reading without emendation.]

40. 6. quae, si mundus est deus. A more correct arrangement would be quae, quoniam partes mundi sunt, si mundus est deus &c.

40. 9. [Lucili, i.e. Balbus, the representative of the Stoics in the discussion.—Qualla vero (vetera) sint. The passage in the Mss. is hopelessly corrupt, the best having: Qualla vero est; Müller leaves it without any attempt at restoration, and Schoemann reads: Qualla vero (cetera) sint. The reading given in the text is an emendation proposed by A. Weidner in the Philologus, Vol. 38, 1879. Comp. Tusc. I, 13, 29: Si vero scrutari vetera et ex iis ea, quae scriptores Graccae prodiderunt, eruere coner &c.—ab ultimo . . . superiorum. From the most remote, i.e. the earliest in point of time.]

40. 10. [Thales of Miletus, founder of the Ionic school, born about B.C. 640, left no writings, but his doctrine, handed down by tradition, was later committed to writing, for example, by Aristotle.]

40. 12. deum autem eam mentem &c. This sounds as if Thales as well as Anaxagoras (c. 11, 26) recognized a spiritual, creative, original being along with and distinct from matter, which is doubtless an error. Thales held that the primal existence was a fluid which he called ἴδωρ; but a living, not a lifeless fluid, and one endowed with a δύναμις κυνηγή; force and matter united in one. Μίαν καὶ κατοικημένην ἀρχήν says Simplic. ad Ar. Phys. f. 6, 18. Stobaeus, Ecl. Phys. I, p. 56, calls this δύναμις κυνηγή divine: it is doubtful whether Thales called it so or not; but he certainly never regarded it as conscious, thinking mind. Nihil huic operi ex divina mente praeposuit. Augustine D. Civ. Dei VIII, 2.—Si di possunt esse &c. The objections of the speaker really apply not to the view which
he has just ascribed to Thales, but only to the intimate union of mind and matter in the same elementary substance; so that in the statement of that view we must suppose an incorrectness of expression, perhaps through the fault of Cicero, which has obscured its real purport. — [The reading of this passage here given has become a sort of *textus receptus*, and we have not ventured to give any other; but it is far from satisfactory. We have to deal of course not with what Thales really taught, but with what Cicero thought he taught; and the answer is such as Cicero supposed an Epicurean would have made. In line 11 Cicero says that Thales taught that *aquam esse initium rerum*, and that *deum eam mentem esse*, which created all things out of water. He must have thought then that *deum* and *mentem* were identical, denoting the creating power as distinguished from *aqua*, the matter. Now the Epicurean's objections to almost all the views commented upon in the following summary is simply that we cannot conceive of God or mind without sensation, or without a body for this purpose: cf. l. 20, *quasi aut aer sine uta forma deus esse possit &c.; l. 31, aperta simplexque mens, nulla re adiuncta, qua senire possit, fugere intellegetiae nostrae vim et notionem videtur; 41, 33, aer . . . quem sensum habere potest aut quam formam dei?* So in 42, 2, in the criticism on Plato; in 42, 29, on Aristotle; in 43, 14; in 43, 20. In the passage in question the objection is made that God or mind must have a body and hence sensation; and if it could be otherwise, Thales had no need of associating god or mind with water, he might have left it a separate existence. We understand then the two suppositions *Si di possunt esse sine sensu, and si ipsa mens constare potest vacans corpore* as the same in substance; and the conclusion to be drawn in the form of the question, — *mentem cur aquae adiunxit?* Heindorf proposed *si dii possunt esse sine sensu cur aquae mentem adiunxit, si ipsa mens &c.* Prof. Schoemann (Opusc. Ac. III, p. 285) says of this “*Hoc refutari nihil opus est,*” and emends the passage as it stands in our text. But assuming as he does that the two suppositions are different in substance, there should be two conclusions also differing in substance. What difference is there between associating mind with water, or water with mind? The logical train of thought under Schoemann's supposition would be: *Si di possunt &c., deum (not mentem) cur aquae adiunxit; si mens constare &c., mentem cur aquae adiunxit.* It is of course not possible to say what Cicero really wrote; but we should prefer to read: *Si di possunt esse sine sensu, mentem cur aquae adiunxit, si ipsa mens &c.* The edd. and Ms. O have *sensu et mente cur aquae adiunxit;* and B¹ (Orelli) has *mentem for mente.* A. Weidner (Philologus, Vol. 38, 1879) emends thus: *Sed nec di possunt esse sine sensu, et mentem cur aquae adiunxit &c.*]
40. 15. [Anaximandri, also of Miletus, an Ionic philosopher, born about B.C. 611. He held the existence of a primeval substance, ἀρχή, which he called ἀπειρον. It was undefined in quality and unlimited in extent. There is a difference of opinion whether he considered the ἀπειρον to be a mixture of all the elementary substances which in time separated and assumed distinct existence, or an indefinite substance which potentially contained all the others. Aristotle, Phys. III, 4, says that he taught that the ἀπειρον was itself divine, contained and governed everything. It is probable however that Anaximander did not express himself very clearly on these points. He is said to have taught that the soul was of the nature of air. See Ueberweg, Gesch. der Phil. I, p. 36.] — nativos esse deos, i.e. that the gods had not always existed, but had come into existence in the course of the development of the universe. Comp. Schwegler on Arist. Metaph. XII, 2, 5, p. 239.

40. 16. innumerabilsmundos. Apparently not only the heavenly bodies are here meant, which, as we know, Anaxagoras held to be gods, but other worlds like our own. Comp. Stobaeus, Eclog. I, p. 496; August. De Civit. Dei VIII, 2.

40. 17. intellegere. See c. 14, 36.

40. 18. Anaximenes, likewise of Miletus and of the Ionic school like Thales and Anaximander, whose disciple he is said to have been. — aëra. He held the doctrine of an elementary substance like the air, which he considered, as Thales did water and Anaximander the ἀπειρον, not as mere lifeless matter, but as endowed with living force. Stobaeus, I, p. 56 says also that he called it god. — eumqueigni. The statement that Anaximenes held the airy elementary substance to have been created, not to have existed from eternity, is doubtless an error, difficult to understand or excuse. ex egoqueomniaigni would be a more correct statement (Stobaeus, p. 296); but that is not to be thought of here.

11 40. 22. Anaxagoras of Klazomenae, also of the Ionic school (B.C. 500), lived and taught a long time at Athens. It is very doubtful whether Cicero and others are right in calling him a disciple of the preceding.

40. 23. primus... voluit. Anaxagoras passes for the first philosopher who rose to the idea of a pure, immaterial spirit. It is certain that he held the existence of a νοῦς, which as a thinking, moving and regulating principle he opposed to the original matter that contained in itself all the constituents of the physical world, the so-called ὄμοιομερή, and believed the two to be essentially different. He called the νοῦς λεπτότατον πάντων χρωμάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον; expressions which may be due to the want of a more appropriate designation for what is purely immaterial (ὡσάματον, see
note to c. 12, 30); but only in so far as we consider it certain that Anaxagoras really understood the νοῖς to consist not only of finer and purer matter than everything else, but as actually immaterial. But is this really so sure?

40. 24. [discriptionem et modum. For modum Schoemann has motum and compares Arist. Phys. Ausc. VIII, 1: φησὶ γὰρ (ὁ Ἀν.) ὄμοι πάντων ὑπὸν καὶ ἠρεμοῖντων τὸν ἀπειρον χρόνου, κίνησιν ἐμποίησαι τὸν νοῖν καὶ διακρίναι.]

40. 25. motum sensui functum et continentem, "activity producing motion (bewegende Thätigkeit) bound up and going together with sensation and consciousness" (for sensus includes both these ideas). That the activity of mind is attended with sensation and consciousness follows, without being especially stated, from the fact that ratio, reason, is ascribed to it. But according to Epicurus not only is an activity of anything infinite and incorporeal which works upon matter and sets it in motion impossible, because only matter can work upon matter, but any sensation is impossible, because this too can only result from the action of matter upon matter. — In the following words: neque sensum omnino, quo non ipsa natura pulsá sentiret, it is hardly correct to take ipsa natura as nominative and only another expression for infinitum. It is rather an ablative absolute. Cicero says that sensation would be inconceivable such as we should have to assume under the supposition of an infinite incorporeal spirit, namely that it would perceive without its nature receiving an impression from without (naturá non pulsá). Ipsius would be a better reading than ipsa. — [This passage is very obscure, and the explanation turns upon Cicero’s understanding of Anaxagoras’s doctrine. He seems to have thought that Anaxagoras held that the νοῖς was immanent in and coextensive with the universe; and then makes the Epicurean object that there can be no motion and sensation combined in what is infinite, nor any sensation at all unless nature itself experiences such sensation. There can be no motion and sensation in the infinite because, as the Epicurean thought, motion and sensation cannot exist sine corpore, the Deity must according to them be endowed with a corpus or a quasi corpus; and there can be no sensation at all of the mens infinita, if that be immanent in and coextensive with the universe, because sensation must result from some external cause, and there can be no such cause external to the whole universe. Comp. p. 41, 11 and Schoemann’s note.]

40. 28. si mentem istam quasi animal. Epicurus considered two things essential to the animal: an inward portion, the anima, from which comes the name, and an outward portion, the body. Now if the νοῖς of Anaxagoras is an animal, it must be likewise so constituted; and
hence, inasmuch as the spirit, properly so called, can only be the inward portion, we must conceive the νοῦς as provided with an external body.

40. 30. Quod quoniam non placet, scil. Anaxagorae. [There is here an ellipsis somewhat of this sort: Since Anaxagoras rejects this idea, he must hold that the mind is aperta simplexque; and aperta simplexque mens &c. is beyond our power of conception.]

40. 31. aperta, i.e. nullo corpore cincta. The same idea is contained in nulla re adiuncta qua sentire possit, because according to Epicurus sensation is only possible by means of a material body.

40. 32. Intellegentiae nostrae vim et notionem: “this exceeds the power and faculty of comprehension of our reason.” The general intellegentiae vim is further defined by notionem, our comprehension.

40. 33. Alcmæo of Crotona, a younger contemporary of Pythagoras, by some considered to be of his school. Little is known of his opinions; whether he really held only the heavenly bodies to be gods, or accepted other divine existences besides them, is not to be ascertained. [Arist. De Anima, I, 2, 17: ὑπ’ ἄροι αὐτὴν (τὴν ψυχὴν) ἀθανάτων εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ οὐκέτι τοὺς ἀθανάτους, τὸν ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ ὡς ἄει καὶ κακομενην καὶ κατά τὰ θεῖα πάντα συνεχόν ἄει, σεισμόν, ἥλιον, τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν ὄμολον ὄλον.]

40. 35. Pythagoras of Samos lived and taught in lower Italy and died at Croto at a very old age B.C. 497. — Nam is here not causal, but only a particle of transition, as it often is in passing to something which is to be stated with vivacity and confidence. It is originally a particle of asseveration; the causal signification is only a secondary one.

41. 1. animum ... commeantem, i.e. a soul of the universe permeating and animating everything: πνεύμα τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου δύναμιν ψυχῆς τρόπον, Sext. Empir. adv. Math. IX, 127, not immaterial, but a very fine, fiery ether. Cicero does not expressly say that Pythagoras called this soul of the universe God; but in this connection it followed as a matter of course, and hence it is unnecessary to insert deum, before animum for instance.


41. 6. [autem here introduces another objection, like our “moreover”; it merely continues the argument.]

41. 7. nihil nisi animus, i.e. entirely incorporeal and immaterial. But if the soul of the universe was a fiery ether, it was not immaterial, and the difficulty which Velleius here suggests was unreal.
41. 8. Xenophanes, born at Colophon, was banished from there, and emigrated to the Phocaean colony of Elea in lower Italy; he was contemporary with the Persian wars and founder of the Eleatic school.

41. 8. mente adiuncta omne praeterea, quod esset infinitum &c. Construed thus the sense must almost necessarily be, that Xenophanes understood the mens and besides (praeterea) the infinite All as two different things, but still as subsisting in union, and that he called them both together God. If Velleius really meant this, it was certainly an error and in contradiction with what we know of Xenophanes from other sources. I have therefore taken the liberty to change the traditional punctuation, writing omne, praeterea quod instead of omne praeterea, quod &c. It is certain that praeterea quod might have been said as equivalent to praeter quam quod, though there may be no other example of it. The sense of the passage would then be: that Xenophanes taught that the Omne, endowed with intelligence, was not only infinite, but was also God. [We have retained the usual punctuation in the text.]

41. 10. item, ut ceteri, like Thales for example (c. 10, 25) and Anaxagoras (c. 11, 26).

41. 11. neque sentiens neque coniunctum. Whatever is infinite cannot be touched by anything outside of itself, and hence cannot experience sensation (see note to § 26) nor stand in connection with anything, because outside of itself there is nothing.

41. 12. Parmenides of Elea, disciple of Xenophanes, set forth doctrines such as are here cited in the second part of his didactic poem, in which he treated, not as in the first part peri tov duntos, i.e. of that which really exists, but peri tov aisthontos, of phenomena; and set up a sort of scientific dogmatism (ta prods dopeis).

41. 13. coronae simile. In the world sprung from the elementary substance Parmenides assumed the existence of a number of concentric spheres, which he called stefhous: tivn de mesantyn anipastos koll khrdoichon epoemerizei, dikein te kai anagkhe, Stobae. Ecl. I, p. 482. Comp. the verse of Parmenides preserved by Simplicius, Phys. f. 9 a: ev de meos tov taxon daivos, h panta kuberev. In taking the exterior sphere of all for the abode of the daivos instead of the middle one Velleius confounds the views of Parmenides with those of the Stoics. On this see c. 14, 37; and comp. Somn. Scip. c. 4.


41. 16. monstra, also used of fantastic views, absurdities in III, 17, 44; like portenta, I, 8, 18; 16, 43; and III, 38, 91.
NOTES.

41. 17. *ad deum revocet*, "refers to the divine being," *i.e.* represents them as his manifestations or actions. Parmenides treats of the attracting and repelling forces in his poetic language under the terms πόλεμος, νείκος, στάσις, ἔρως &c., of which there are traces in the fragments.

41. 19. *in allo*, namely *in Alcmene*, § 27.

41. 20. Empedocles of Agrigentum, about the middle of the fifth century, set forth his views on natural philosophy, as Xenophanes and Parmenides did, in a didactic poem, of which several important fragments are still preserved.


41. 21. *Quattuor enim naturas*, *i.e.* the so-called four elements, called στοιχεία since Aristotle, but designated by Empedocles in his poem περὶ φύσεως as τέσσαρα τῶν πάντων μορίων; they are also personified as divine beings and called by mythological names of gods, which however may be considered as a poetic license, such as we often find in Lucretius. Velleius evidently makes more of it than Empedocles intended.

41. 24. *Protagoras* of Abdera, contemporary of Socrates, was one of the most distinguished among the so-called sophists, men who at that time travelled about as teachers of knowledge and taught for money. He maintained that there was no such thing as certain, objective knowledge, no universally valid truth, but only subjective ideas and opinions; and he used the same language in regard to the belief in the gods. Comp. c. 23, 63.

41. 26. *Democritus*, also of Abdera, a somewhat younger contemporary of the preceding. On his doctrines referred to here see more in the note to c. 43, 120.

41. 27. *Imagines earumque circumitus* for *imagines circumventes*, a strange hendiadys, but doubtless chosen designedly to bring out more pointedly the strangeness of the thing by the strangeness of the expression. So further on *scientiam intellegentiamque nostram*, the abstract for the concrete, *animum nostrum scientem et intellegentem*. On the *natura quae imagines fundat* see note to c. 24, 66 and 43, 120.

41. 33. *Diogenes Apolloniates* of Apollonia in Crete, contemporary of Anaxagoras. The air-like elementary substance, which he held with Anaximenes (c. 10, 26), he considered not only as endowed with living
force, but as also *compos divinae rationis* (Augustine, De Civ. Dei VIII, 2); *πολλα ειδικ* (Simplic. in Arist. Phys. f. 33 a).

41. 34. **Platonis inconstantia.** This inconsistency evidently cannot not be held to exist between the two assertions contained in the following relative clause, which are not at all contradictory; but in the positive views afterwards cited which Plato sets forth in other places. Consequently Cicero should have made the clauses, in which these views are stated, also dependent on the relative *qui*, opposing them to what precedes by *tamen*: for example, *qui in Timaeo (or qui, cum in Timaeo) ... censeat, alibi tamen sine corp.* &c. [The opposition seems to be rather between *qui in Timaeo ... censeat* and the sentence beginning *Idem et in Timaeo*. Cicero says that in these two dialogues Plato holds that nothing can be known of the Deity, and yet in the very same dialogues he says that various things, *mundum, caelum, astra* &c. are God. Compare what is said of Xenophon in the next passage: *facit Socrates disputan-
tem formam dei quaerit non oportere, eundemque et solum et animum deum
dicere &c.* The clause *Quod vero* &c. merely mentions in passing another notion of Plato on the same subject.]

41. 35. **In Timaeo nominari negat posse.** Plat. Tim., p. 28 C, and Cicero’s translation of the Tim. c. 2.

42. 1. **In legum libris.** Namely, VII, c. 22, p. 821 A. But Velleius either from design or carelessness has ignored Plato’s true meaning.

42. 3. *δυσμαροι.* - Plato does not himself use this expression in the Ti-
maeus, although he does so in other dialogues. I should hesitate to take this as an interpolation as Baiter and Heindorf do. The corresponding Latin word *incorporeus* is not found as early as Cicero. Comp. Gell. V, 15, 1.

42. 5. **caret etiam prudentia;** inasmuch as this is only a result of experience, and experience only a result of sense-perceptions, which are impossible for an incorporeal being.

42. 7. **mundum deum esse.** Tim., p. 34 B; 68 E; 92 C. The God in the universe, which is hence called God itself, is the soul bestowed upon it by the highest God, the *δημιουργός*. Comp. note to c. 14, 37.

42. 7. *caelum, astra, terram.* Legg. VII, 22, p. 821, and X, 8, p. 896 f. These too are divine only because the divine soul of the universe dwells in them.

42. 8. **animos.** Plato calls the soul not God, but only godlike, inasmuch as it also partakes of the soul of the universe. Tim., p. 41 C.

42. 8. **quos maiorum institutis accepimus.** Tim., p. 40 D ff. Plato allowed the gods of the popular belief, as he had no reason to deny their existence, to pass for creatures and servants of the supreme God.
["The distorted conceptions of the Platonic doctrines, which we find here, are not to be laid to the charge of Cicero, but to that of some Greek authority of the Epicurean school, who, it would seem, designedly for his own purpose expounded the Platonic teachings and in part misrepresented them." R. Küliner, Wesen der Götter, übers. u. erkl., p. 64.]

42. 10. [Atque etiam here and below § 32 serves only to make the transition. It is worth while to notice the different particles used for this purpose throughout the whole passage from § 25. Compare a similar one, II, 47, 122.]

42. 12. formam dei quaeril non oportere. Xenophon, Memor. IV, 3, 13.

42. 13. solemn et animum deum. In the Memorabilia the sun is nowhere called God; and of the soul it is only said τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχει.

42. 13. modo unum, tum autem plures deos. It is true that Xenophon sometimes uses the plural ὁ θεός, sometimes the singular ὁ θεός; τὸ θεῖον, also τὸ δυσμάνων; but he uses the singular, as all other writers do, only to designate the divine power in general, not this or that particular god. An especial designation of a supreme God governing and maintaining the world, as opposed to the other gods, is found only in IV, 3, 13, a passage which is considered without reason by some critics as an interpolation, though an old one.

42. 14. [sunt ilsdem in erratis. We say in English that a person is in error; but here we must translate by the adjective. So below § 37: magnus in errore sententia est; De Fin. II, 14, 47: Atque his tribus generibus honestorum notatis quartum sequitur et in eadem pulcritudine et apium ex illis tribus; a similar use in Tusc. III, 18, 42: Quae sequuntur in eadem sententia sunt &c.]

42. 15. Antisthenes of Athens, disciple of Socrates, founder of the Cynic school. In the Herculane. Fr. of Philodemus, p. 21 (72 Gomp.) we find: παρ' Ἀντισθένην δ' ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ λέγεται τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι πολλοῖς θεοῖς, κατὰ δὲ φίλοι κακὰ. His speculations in natural philosophy led him to the idea of one God, at the same time that he allowed the traditional gods of the popular belief to pass for creatures and subordinate servants of the supreme God, just as other philosophers did. The judgment therefore that follows, tolibit vīm et naturam deorum, is to be regarded as unfounded.

42. 18. Spoussippus, likewise of Athens, and successor of his uncle Plato in the Academy.

42. 18. vim quandam... eamque animalem. An animal, i.e. a living force, a soul of the universe. From Stob. Ecl. I, p. 58 taken with Arist. Metaph. XII, 7, § 19, p. 1072 we learn that he called this
νοῦς; ascribing however the highest intellectual and moral perfection not to this νοῦς, but to a later stage of development. Nothing more is known of his views, and we cannot be certain whether qua omnia regantur is really said here in the same sense as he intended it.

42. 20. in tertio de philosophia libro. This work is no longer extant. It was one of the popular works written in the form of a dialogue. See Bernays, Die Dialoge des Arist., pp. 95 and 99.

42. 22. menti, i.e. the highest intelligence, the pure, incorporeal spirit, νοῦς. Metaph. XII, 6. 7. 9.

42. 23. mundum ipsum deum esse. Aristotle nowhere asserts that the universe is God: but he calls the heavens ἀθανάτων τι καὶ θείων. De Caelo II, 1, 3.

42. 23. alium quendam. He means probably what Aristotle in Meteor. I, 3 and De Caelo II, 4 calls πρῶτον στοιχεῖον, πρῶτον τῶν οὐσιῶν, an οὐσία σώματος ἀλλή παρά τὰς ἐνταθὰ (i.e. ἐν τῇ γῆ) συστάσεις θεοτέρα καὶ πρώτη (De Caelo I, 2), the quinta natura mentioned above (note to c. 8, 19), which occupies the space above the moon, and from which are formed the heavenly bodies and their spheres. This nobler, godlike element is endowed with a circular motion, which explains the revolution of the heavens and the heavenly bodies; and it is this motion which is here designated by replicatio, a motion returning upon itself. Comp. Stob. Ecl. Phys. I, p. 64 and especially Plut. Plac. Phil. I, 7.

42. 25. caell ardorem. Only another name for the substance just spoken of, which Aristotle himself (De Caelo I, 3) explains to be what others call aether. On this expression see note to c. 8, 18.

42. 28. illi tot d1. By this expression it is impossible to understand the three just mentioned, the mundus, the governor of the mundus, and the caeli ardor. Therefore some passage must have been lost in which heavenly bodies were probably spoken of; and those, being formed of a divine matter, might themselves be called divine (θεία, δαίμονα). Comp. Stob. Ecl. Phys. I, p. 486, where they are also called theoi.

42. 32. semper se movens. According to Aristotle the supreme God is himself without motion, but is himself the cause of the motion of the universe. The Epicurean could not quite understand anything that caused motion, being itself immovable; hence he says se movens.

42. 33. Xenocrates of Chalcedon, disciple of Plato (hence condiscipulus of Aristotle), and successor of Speusippus as teacher in the Academy after B.C. 339.

42. 35. deos enim octo esse dicit. The account of the theology of Xenocrates is very incomplete; it is more fully given in Stob. Ecl. I, p. 62. At the head he placed the μονάς and the διάς, the unity and the
duality; the former he also called Zeus and mind, νοῦς; the latter he
categorized as a female principle, and called it mother of the gods,
ruler of the sublunary world, soul of the universe. The heavens and the
heavenly bodies were gods that had come into being (not existing from
eternity); as were also the elementary spirits which had rule in the air,
the water and the earth, and to which he gave the names of the popular
deities, Here, Poseidon, Demeter.

43. 1. [stellis vagis, below errantibus stellis, i.e. the planets. Repub. I, 14, 22: quae (stellae) errantes et quasi vagae nominarentur.]

43. 5. Ponticus Heraclides, from Heraclea in Pontus, disciple of
Plato and Speusippus and later of Aristotle. Other authorities also rep-
resent him as a versatile writer who did not disdain to bring in much
that was strange and fabulous.

43. 7. sensuque deum privat; evidently from the Epicurean’s point
of view, who with his opinions could not allow any sensation or conscious-
ness to gods of this sort.

35 43. 9. Theophrasti of Eresus in Lesbos, disciple and successor of
Aristotle.

43. 12. Strato of Lampsacus, ἀνὴρ ἐλλογμολογητὸς καὶ φύσικς ἐπιλυ-
θεῖς, Diog. L. V, 2. The little that is found about him has been
gathered by Nauwerck, De Stratone Lampaceno. Berol. 1836.

43. 13. in natura sitam. Comp. Cic. Acad. II, 38, 121: negat opera
deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum; quaecumque sint, omnia effecta
esse natura. On natura as a blind, unconscious natural force (natura
nesciens quid faciat in Seneca, Quaest. Nat. 1 princi.) see II, 32, 81.

14 36 43. 15. Zeno of Citium in Cyprus, who studied partly with the Cynic
Crates, partly with Xenocrates the Academic, was founder of the Stoic
school, and died at a very old age at Athens about b.c. 260.

43. 15. naturalem legem. Diog. L. VII, 88: κοινὸς νόμος, δισερ
κατιν ὃ ἐρθος λύος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὃ αὐτὸς δὲν τῷ διὶ.

43. 17. quo modo efficient animantem &c. A wilful misunder-
standing of the opinion of Zeno similar to one noticed above on the
πρώτω, c. 8, 18.

43. 19. aethera. See below B. II, 9, 23 ff.

43. 20. nihil sentiens. So the Epicurean says, because he cannot
conceive of an ether with sensation and reason, as Zeno understood it. On

43. 22. rationem quandam; λόγον, the same as the lex above men-
tioned. — affectam, which is rather incongruous here and certainly un-
necessary, was hardly written by Cicero. Comp. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 313.
Or shall we assume that Cicero thought to put a somewhat inappropriate expression in the mouth of the Epicurean?

43. 23. astris. See II, 15.

43. 24. annis, mensibus &c. Evidently a perversion, to which Zeno's allegorical explanations of the mythological gods perhaps gave occasion.

43. 25. Hesiodi theogoniam interpretatur. Zeno certainly wrote no particular commentary on the Theogony, but only referred to it in his writings on natural philosophy, such as peri kósmou, and explained the theogonic fables allegorically, per quandam significationem as is stated below, in harmony with his system.

43. 26. usitatæs perceptasque. See note to II, 39, 91. — Cognitiones = notiones, as below c. 17, 44.

43. 30. Aristonís of Chios, not be confounded with the Peripatetic 87 of the same name from Ceos. We have no other information regarding his doctrines, and hence can form no judgment of the correctness of the statement here made.

43. 33. Cleanthes of Assus in Lycia, Zeno's successor as head of the Stoic school.

43. 34. ipsum mundum. Zeno had done the same before. See II, 8, 21.

43. 35. totius naturae menti atque animo, i.e. to the soul of the universe. This is a repetition of the idea of the preceding phrase; for the universe is only called God, because it is filled with and animated by the universal soul. Comp. Varro in August. De Civit. Dei VII, 6: Hunc ipsum mundum esse deum; sed sicut hominem sapientem, cum sìt ex corpore et animo, tamen ab animo dici sapientem, ita mundum deum dici ab animo, quum sìt ex animo et corpore.

44. 1. ultimum . . . ardores. Also the same thing in another form; for it is the fiery ether that partly encompasses the universe, partly penetrates it as its soul.

44. 7. in animi notione . . . reponere. Epicurus assumed the existence of an innate idea, the so-called πρόληψις, of God (see c. 16, 43); a god, to be entitled to our belief, must correspond to this innate idea, must fit into this mould, so to speak; and this is itself the proof whether he is really a god; just as, if we wished to ascertain whether a foot were the one it purported to be, we were to place it in one of its foot-prints, and judge from the result. Comp. Plato Republ., p. 462 A: ἄρα ἃ νῦν ὃθελόμεν εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἵνα ἡμῖν ἀριστέωτε; so also Cicero Orat. c. 38, 133: ea oratio (Demosthenes de Corona) in eam formam, quae est insita in mentibus nostris, includi sic potest, ut maior eloquentia non requiratur; where the idea is also the frame into which the work of art must fit. So ibid. c. 5, 15.
44. 9. Persaeus was not only a disciple but fellow-countryman of Zeno.

44. 10. a quibus ... esset inventa. Of course Persaeus did not explain the existence of all the gods in this way, but only of some of them, as Bacchus, Ceres, Aesculapius. See II, 24, 62.

44. 11. ipsaeque res utiles. See II, 23, 60, 62; and 31, 80.

44. 13. Quo ... quam ... A sort of ἐπεξῆγαγος where the idea, which is referred to by the relative as contained in the foregoing, is afterwards reasserted in a different and more definite form. Comp. De Fin. I, 6: ait enim declinare atomos sine causa; quo nihil turpius physico, quam fieri sine causa quidquam dicere; where Madvig gives further examples. Verr. IV, 35, 77; Orat. I, 37, 169. The Greeks often use the same form of sentence. See Matthiae, Gr. Gr. § 450, 2 and Rem. 2.

44. 16. Chrysippus of Soli in Cilicia (B.C. 280–206), disciple and successor of Cleanthes, very active as a teacher and author, and regarded as the one who really completed the Stoic system; see the verse in Dierg. L. VII, 183: ei μη γαρ ἐν Χρυσίππος, οὐκ ἂν ἐν Σωκ. Hence the transition to him is especially marked by iam vero.

44. 19. [cogitatione posse depingere. Cicero often uses cogitatio for our "fancy," "imagination," the genus for the species, there being no exactly corresponding word in Latin. Mil. 29, 79: fingite animis ... liberae sunt enim nostrae cogitationes et quae volunt sic intuentur, ut ea cernimus, quae videmus ... fingite cogitatione imaginem huius conditionis meae. Nägelsb. § 8, 1.]

44. 20. In ratione ... et ... mente. The copula adds a more special to a general expression. The soul of the universe is referred to. Τὴν φρένα πάνων καὶ ... λόγον καὶ τὴν τοῦ δόλου ψυχήν is the expression in the passage relating to Chrysippus of the Herculanean fragment, referred to in Introduction, p. 15.

44. 22. elius animi fusionem universam, for elius animum ubique fusum; the abstract for the concrete. This is clearly only another expression for the soul of the universe.

44. 22. elius ipsius principatum. Again the same thing differently expressed. For the subject-matter comp. II, 11, 29.

44. 24. fatalem ... necessitatem &c. The εἰμαρμένη (c. 20, 55), the eternal law, by the force of which events succeed one another in a continuous chain of cause and effect.

44. 25. ignem ... et ... aethera. The special expression added to the general one, which might, if used alone, suggest only the common earthly fire. Comp. note to II, 15, 41; and for et Hand Tursell. II, p. 477.

44. 26. quae natura fluenter atque manarent. fluant, manent
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would have been more correct. See however note to c. 22, 61. For the subject-matter comp. II, 33, 84 and Ps. Plutarch De Plac. Phil. I, 9: οἱ Σταυροὶ τρεπῆναι καὶ ἀλλωστὶν καὶ μεταβλητὴν καὶ ἁμετανόητον ὥλν ὑπὸ ἁμοῦ τῆς ὅλης. Bouhier has proposed manerent instead of manarent on account of terram; which is of course inadmissible. Heindorf’s suggestion is better; ut aquam et aëra: tum solem, lunnam, sidera, terram &c. The words qua omnia continentur are superfluous, probably an old addition suggested by omnia continentem above.

44. 29. etiam homines eos ... The souls of ordinary men at death are lost in the universal nature; those of the better sort maintain a personal existence and lead a godlike life until the general conflagration of all things; a few of especial excellence are taken into the number of the gods. See II, 24, 62 and Ps. Plutarch De Plac. Phil. IV, 7; Diog. L. VII, 157 and other passages.

44. 30. aethera ... Io vem. See II, 2, 4 and 25, 65.

44. 31. Neptunum. See II, 26, 66 and 28, 71. Perhaps aether would have been more correct than aër, but the Epicurean is not quite so exact. The author of the Herculaneum fragment col. 3, 2 (p. 80 Comp.) uses áēra even of Zeus; and 8, 3 (p. 85) he calls the Stoic gods áēras καὶ πνεύματα καὶ αἰθήρας. Moreover Empedocles did not strictly distinguish the two expressions. See Karsten, Emped., p. 217; and further in Schneider, Callimach. I, p. 293; and Munro’s note on Lucretius II, 1115.

44. 32. terramque ... quae Ceres. See II, 26, 67 and 28, 71.

45. 1. sempiternam ... veritatem. Eusebius Pr. Evang. XV, 14: ἀλλήλων καὶ νόμον τῶν ὑμων καὶ ἀληθοῦσαν καὶ ἀφθηκτον.

45. 3. Orpheu. The so-called Orphic theogony.

45. 4. Musael. He is spoken of as a friend and disciple of Orpheus, and was also said to have written a poem on the theogony. All the citations from it are gathered in Schoemann Opusc. Ac. II, p. 6.

45. 7. Diogenes Babylonius. He was a disciple of Chrysippus, from Seleucia in Syria, καλοῖσιν δὲ Βαβυλόνιος διὰ τῆς γείτων/ας, as Diog. L. says VII, 81. His book περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς is also referred to Hercul. Fr. 5, 15 (82 Comp.).

45. 12. fus; the proper expression not only for the outflow of poetic or prophetic inspiration but for the utterances of delirium or thoughtlessness. Comp. c. 24, 66; De Fin. IV, 4, 10: poetarum more verba fundere; De Div. II, 11, 27: concitazione mentis ed et quasi fundi.

45. 18. portenta magorum, i.e. the fantastic doctrines of the Persian and Median religion; their priests and sages were called magi. (Comp. c. 8, 18; II, 28.) All that was known of their religion by the
Greeks and Romans is collected by Thomas Hyde, Hist. relig. vett. Persar. eorumque magorum. Oxon. 1700. Further information may be found in Duncker, Gesch. des Alterth. II, p. 369 ff.

45. 19. *Aegyptiorumque...dementiam.* Velleius refers to the worship of the sacred animals and of the gods appearing under the form of animals. See c. 29, 81; 36, 101; III, 19, 47.

45. 22. *venerari Epicurum.* This is characteristic. The followers of Epicurus frequently used such exaggerated expressions of reverence towards their master and were ridiculed for it by their antagonists. Comp. Plut. contra Colot. c. 17.

45. 26. *anticipationem...προλήψιν.* Epicurus designated by this term the universal ideas acquired from recollection of repeated perceptions and comparison of the impressions made thereby, inasmuch as they precede and form the basis of every judgment of true and false and of all further operations of the mind; this is indicated by the following words *sine qua...potest.* Comp. Sext. Empir. adv. Math. I, 57: οὔτε ἐπειδή οὔτε ἀποφεύγει ἐκατ' ἄνων 'Επίκουροι άκες προλήψεις. [Diog. L. X, 33: τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἶονει κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὅρθων ἢ ἐννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόημαν ἐναποκείμενην, τούτῳ μήνη τοῦ πολλάκις ἐξωθεν φανέντος.]

45. 30. *de regula et ludiclo,* according to Diog. L. X, 27 περὶ κριτηρίων, ἡ κανῶν, *i.e.* on the test of truth or the rule *i.e.* of judgment. In this book Epicurus set forth his system of Logic. [See note on I, 5, 12.]

45. 32. [*Cum enim non...* The negative belongs to the first clause, of which *sit constituta* is the verb, and for *que after maneat* we should use in English an adversative conjunction, *but.* *ad unum,* "without exception."
]

45. 35. *Innatas cognitiones.* Cicero must have known that Epicurus did not hold the πρόληψις to be innate, but to arise after the manner mentioned above; hence Diog. L. X, 33 calls it μνήμη τοῦ πολλάκις φανέντος. In using the word *innatas* therefore he merely indicates the natural origin in the mind, the *in animo natum,* which was not clearly expressed by *insitas.* Comp. note to II, 4, 12; 17, 45. [De Fin. I, 9, 31: *Jaque si sunt hanc quasi naturalem atque insitam in animis nostris inesse notionem &c.*]

46. 1. *Id verum necesse est.* Comp. II, 2, 5; and 4, 12; *per contra* I, 23, 62.

46. 4. *[hanc nos habere anticipationem,* namely *ut deos beatos &c.* which comes after the following parenthesis.]

46. 7. *quam antea nemo.* The Stoics, the first of whom Zeno was contemporary of Epicurus, used the word in a similar significiation; it
would seem from this passage that they took it from Epicurus. See Diog. L. VII, 54.

46. 8. The sentence, broken by the parenthesis, is taken up again by igitur; and we should expect, in harmony with what precedes, habere, parallel with hanc nos habere.

46. 9. [ipsorum deorum; so also Baiter, i.e. “the existence of the gods.” Schoemann has deorum ipsorum.]

46. 12. ab Epicuro. In the so-called κυρίας δόξας (see c. 30, 85) i.e. the principal points of his doctrine, preserved by Diog. L. X, 139 ff. The first of these is: τὸ μακάριον και ἀρχατον ὅτε αὐτό πράγματα ἔχει ὅτε ἄλλω παρέχει, ὅτε ὅτε δραγίς ὅτε χίαρις σινέχεια ἐν ἀσθενεί γὰρ πάν τὸ τουτόν.

46. 16. [satis erat dictum. For the indicative in the apodosis see Madvig Gr. 348, Obs.; Roby, 1535.]

46. 18. habet venerationem. So luctum habere (De Leg. II, 26, 65), delectationem, admirationem, expectationem, laetitiam, spem, timorem habere (Ad Famil. V, 12, 18) and the like are said of things which give rise to those feelings. Comp. Beier on De Offic. II, 6, 9.—a vi atque ira goes with metus; as metuer e ab aliquo, “to be afraid of a person.”

46. 23. vitae actionem, as in I, 1, 2 and 37, 103, “manner of life.”

46. 26. occurrit. In § 46 we shall see how this is to be understood.

46. 27. ne omnia revocetur ad primas notiones, “not to explain everything by reference to primary ideas.” The primary ideas are the προλήψεις explained above. The object of Velleius is now to arrive at the same data by a process of reasoning §§ 47, 48, in order to gain from the πρόληψεις by νόσος α κατάληψις (Theodoret. Therap., p. 42 Gaisf.). Cotta exposes the weakness of the argument c. 32, 89, 90.

46. 30. eandem equivalent to item, as Brut. 84, 290: Non omnes qui Attic, idem bene dicit. See Reisig, § 210; Mad. Gr. 488.

46. 33. Vos quidem, Lucili, soletis &c.; Balbus too does so in II, 54 ff.


47. 7. quasi corpus ... quasi sanguinem. According to Epicurus the mind too is material as well as the body, and consists like all other things of atoms, but of atoms of an especial fineness. (Diog. L. X, 63, 66, 67; Lucret. III, 178 ff.) But as only the material can affect what is
material, therefore the impressions in virtue of which the mind conceives the ideas of the gods must proceed from something material; i.e. the gods must be material. But their matter must be of another and finer sort than that of the objects which affect our bodily organs of sense; otherwise we should perceive them with these organs, which is not the case. Comp. Lucr. V, 149. It is this other, finer matter of the gods, which affects the mind directly without the interposition of the bodily sense-organs, that is here called quasi corpus, quasi sanguis.

47. 9. [acutius et ... subtilius ... quam ut quivis ea possit agnoscere, with such acuteness and subtlety that not every one (quivis) can take in the truth of them.]

47. 13. [docet eam &c. As this passage has been very much discussed, we give here the text of Schoemann, followed by his notes, adding afterwards comments upon the text in the present edition. Sch.: Epicurus ... docet eam esse vim et naturam deorum, ut primum non sensu, sed mente cernantur, nec sollicitate quidam nec ad numerum, ut ea quae ille propter firmitatem speciem appellat, sed imaginibus, similitudine et transitione perceptis; quum[que] infinita simillimarum imaginum species ex innumerabilibus individuis existat et ad nos affluat, cum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagine mentem intentam infixamque nostram intelligentiam capere, quae sit et beatae naturae et aeternae. It is to be noticed that S. reads cernantur, divides the passage at perceptis, reads quum[que], species, ad nos, beatae naturae et aeternae.] — primum. The corresponding deinde is omitted; it might stand before cum in the next sentence where que is wanting in the Mss.— non sensu sed mente. See above note on quasi corpus.— In this same sense occurrit § 46 is to be taken, of ideas which occur to the mind when awake or in a dream; comp. Sext. Empir. IX, 25. — nec soliditate quidam &c. Epicurus called the solid bodies perceived by the senses speciem, as distinguished from the idola, i.e. more attenuated atomic forms, which, similar in form to the solid bodies, stream forth from them: ἀπὸ ἑρῆμου τὴν ἐξής βίου καὶ τὰς ἔφεσιν διαπρόναι, ἣν περ καὶ ἐν τοῖς στερέμιοις εἶχον, Diog. L. X, 46. — The bodies of the gods are not speciem, and the atomic forms which flow from them are, as Lucretius IV, 732 teaches, multa magis tenuia textu, quam quae percipient oculos visuque laccusant. These last have a coarser constitution, which Cicero denotes by soliditas; the divine atoms have not this soliditas, cannot therefore soliditate quidam cerni like the speciem. — ad numerum. Below c. 39, 109 it is said of the divine images which come into the mind: Fluentium frequentior transitio fit visionum, ut et multis una videatur, from which may be inferred that Epicurus taught...
that these images produce in the mind only a general conception without distinction of single individuals: and with this agrees the allusion in c. 29, 80 to the undistinguishable similarity of the gods. ad numerum cerni then is equivalent to ita cerni ut numerari singillatin possint; for the possibility of counting presupposes a power of distinguishing individuals. — imaginibus, similitudine et transitione perceptis, i.e. imaginibus propter similitudinem et transitionem perceptis. The transitio is plainly the passing over of the images from the gods to the minds of men. But similitudo reminds one of the phrase similia similibus percipiuntur. The divine images are of similar constitution with the part of the mind affected by them, the mens animi (Lucret. V, 149). Hence they are perceived by the mind directly without the intervention of the bodily eye.— Quumque. Having first shown how the mind arrives at the general idea of God, he shows secondly, how it acquires the conception of a happy and immortal being.— On que which, though wanting in the Mss., is indispensable see note to c. 10, 24. — Infinita species. The reason for the singular may be seen from c. 36, 109: fluentium frequenter transitio est visionum, ut e multis una videatur. — ex innumerabilibus individuis, i.e. atomis. Comp. c. 39, 109: innumerabilitas suppediatur atomorum.— Intellegentiam, i.e. rational knowledge acquired by reflection. The praenotio or πρόληψις gained from the imagines excites the mind to reflect on the nature of the gods (Gr. ἐπιβάλλειν, ἐπιβολή), and it thus arrives at the idea of God as a happy and immortal being; and this as a consequence of the law of isonomy. Comp. Introd., p. 24; also Appendix.

[Baiter II varies from our reading thus: perceptis; cum[que] in l. 16 (dividing the passage at perceptis); species for series; a deo adfusat, cum max. vol. &c. for ad nos adfusat; tum max. vol. l. 18. Müller makes no pause after cernatur l. 14, divides the passage at appellat l. 16; has cum max. vol. l. 18. The changes proposed in our text are to divide the passage at adfusat l. 18, and to read tum max. vol. instead of cum max. vol.— tum is in fact the reading of Ms. B of Orelli. series l. 17 is an emendation of A. Briegeir. There are two points upon which Epicurus’s doctrine is here given; primum, the mode of our perception of the gods (the particle deinde is left out); tum, the way in which we arrive at the idea of their happiness and immortality. They are perceived, according to him, non sensu, sed mente, the first distinction; secondly, not by reason of their soliditate (quodam, “so to speak”), nor ad numerum, καὶ ἀριθμόν, so that we distinguish their individual identity, sed imaginibus, but by impressions or pictures perceived through their likeness one to another, and transitionem their continually coming in upon the mind,—and this last because there is an infinite series of identical
pictures constantly coming to us from innumerable individual natures:—
in the next place, _cum_, our minds upon reflection arrive at the conception of
a nature that is happy and immortal, _i.e._ the nature of the gods. The
clause _cum infinita . . . adsolvat_ seems to be better taken with what pre-
cedes than with what follows; comp. § 108 fin. _Fluentium frequenter
transitio sit visionum, ut e multis una videatur_; also Diog. L. X, 139:
τοῖς θεοῖς λόγῳ θεωρητοίς εἶναι . . . οίς δὲ κατὰ ὀμοιόμοιαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῖς
ἐπιρρήσεως τῶν ὀμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτελεσμένους ἀνθρωποεῖδες.

47. 25. _si mortallum . . . et si, quae interimant_. See Introd.,
p. 25 for the misconception occasioned by the order of these two phrases.

47. 28. _Balbo, soletis_, that is, you and your school; as in De Orat. 
I, 35, 160: _Quid est? Cotta, quid tacetis?_ Virg. _Æn._ IX, 525: _Vos,
O Calliope, precor, aspirate camenti._ Tibull. I, 3, 1: _Ibitis Aegaeas sine
me, Messalla, per undas._

47. 30. _Nihil enim agit_. We should expect _agent_; but such trans-
scriptions from plural to singular, when classes of things are in question, are
frequent, as also from singular to plural. See below c. 36, 101; 38, 106;
41, 113, 114.

48. 4. _vicissitudines ordinasesque_, equivalent to _earumque ordines,
or vicissitudines ordinatas_, as a hendiadys.

48. 8. _natura_, blind, unconscious force of nature, as c. 13, 35. Comp.
also note to c. 24, 67.

48. 11. _Innumerabils mundos_. The reasons of Epicurus for as-
suming a large number of worlds may be seen in Lucretius II, 1052 ff.
But they only amount to this, that the contrary cannot be proved. More-
over Epicurus was not the first to assume the existence of several worlds.
Comp. above c. 10, 25, and Stobaeus Ecl. 1, p. 496.

48. 12. _Quod quia_. _Quod_ thus used is much less frequently found
with _quia_ than with _si, nisi_; it connects the foregoing with what follows,
introduces a step in the argument. Comp. De Fin. I, 20, 67. Madvig
Gram. § 449; Roby Gram. § 2214.]

48. 12. _sine aliqua mente_, "without some mind or other." So in
II, 66, 167: _Nemo igitur vir Magnus sine aliquo afflatu divino umquam
fuit_. And so generally with _sine_ when the sentence is negative in form
_alquis_ is used; De Fin. III, 9, 30, negative from the force of _mancam;
ibid. III, 11, 37_. On the other hand when the sentence is affirmative _ullus_
is used. Cic. De Rep. I, 43, 67; II, 11, 22; II, 39, 66; _sine ulla dubita-
tione_. Tusc. III, 3, 5; Balb. 13, 31; Catil. IV, 3, 5; Verr. II, 4, 18, § 39
&c.—In De Offic. II, 11, 40 we find _ullus_ where we should expect _alquis:
Ne illi quidem, qui maleficio et scelere pascuntur, possunt sine ulla parti-
cula iustitiae vivere; i.e. they cannot get on without some measure of just dealing, namely, the laws of honor that prevail among thieves. In the first class of cases the sentence is really affirmative from the two negatives non and sine; so that the rule of the use of aliquis is still observed.]


48. 13. explicare argumenti exitum. The unravelling of a plot is the business of the poets; and hence we should expect non possunt. But here, as often happens, Cicero has briefly taken together the thing compared and the object with which the comparison is made, instead of saying, as strict precision would have required, something like this: cum explicare argumenti exitum non possunt, sic vos, cum disputando efficiere quod vultis non potestis. Comp. Horace Ep. I, 10, 42: cui non conveniet sua res, ut calcus olim si pede maior erit subverteret, si minor uret.

48. 17. ita is not to be taken with late but with peregrinatur. The connection of the two phrases of which peregrinatur and videat are the verbs is a concessive one, as the tamen shows; "though the mind roams about far and wide, yet it never sees" &c. The assertion in peregrinatur holds ita, "with this limitation." Comp. Or. pro Sest. c. 5, 13: verum hoc ita prætereaamus, ut tamen intuentes et respectantes relinquamus; De Prov. Cons. c. 17: ita dissensi ab eo, ut consimpi tamen amicitia maneret; Suet. Oct. 56: amicos ita magnos et potentem in civitate esse voluit, ut tamen pari iure esset. Also without tamen, Ad Attic. XIII, 27, 1: ita multa mutari voluit, ut mihi de integro scribendo causa non sit.

48. 17. nullam oram ultimi. The genitive defines the idea: "no boundary formed by the extreme limit"; like the expressions fines montium et fluviorum, boundaries formed by mountains and rivers; exitus mortis, like Homer's τῆλος βανάτου (Ruhnken on Velleci. II, 7, 1); urbes municipiorum et coloniarum, arbor abietis &c. See Reisig's Vorles., Haase's note 523; and Madvig Epist. ad Orell., p. 79.

48. 20. cohaerescent tamen inter se. On this see below c. 25, 69.

48. 28. fatalis necessitas. Comp. c. 15, 40; III, 6, 14; De Div. I. 55 55, 125: Fatum id appell, quod Graeci eiμαρθύν, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causa causae nexa rem ex se sicut. Ea est ex omnibus aeternitate flues veritas sempiterna.

48. 34. haruspices, interpreters of signs, who employed their art especially in the inspection of the entrails of the victims at sacrifices and in the explanation of many sorts of prodigies, prodigia, portenta, ostenta, monstra (II, 3, 7). augures were the observers and interpreters of the
signs which the gods gave chiefly through the flight of birds, but also by means of various animals, of celestial phenomena, especially lightning &c. hariolii were soothsayers, who made a business of foretelling the future from all sorts of signs for pay; they are always mentioned with contempt, while the augurs at Rome were a corporation composed of distinguished citizens, and the haruspices, though Etruscans, and hence foreigners (II, 4, 11), formed a college and were often consulted on affairs of state. vates were inspired seers, prophets; coniectores were interpreters of dreams.

48. 35. *His terroribus.* This idea, like that noticed above c. 16, 43, is characteristic of the school. The Epicureans considered it as one of the greatest merits of their master that he had freed them not only from superstition, but from every sort of fear of the gods. Comp. Lucret. Book V at the beginning, and Plutarch, *Non posse suaviter vivi* &c. c. 8.

49. 6. *non tam...audiendi,* *i.e.* the important point for me was, not so much to make a discourse myself, as to draw you out, and to hear what you could say in answer.

49. 14. *[disputata, "advanced in argument."]*

49. 15. *de familiaris illo tuo.* The allusion is of course to some person very well known to those present, whom for this reason it was unnecessary to name; and as in De Or. III, 21, 78 the orator L. Crassus is called a *familiaris* of Velleius, this seems to have induced some old critic to insert his name here, where it is found in several Mss. The calling the Romans *togatis* after their national costume would be rather expected from a foreigner, and may be defended by similar passages as De Orat. I, 24, 111; III, 11, 43; but it is not known that L. Crassus was particularly well versed in philosophy, especially that of Epicurus, or that he was the champion of it at that time; but this he must have been to make it possible for Cotta to appeal to his judgment as he does here. For these reasons we are inclined with Madvig, note to Cic. De Fin. I, 5, 16, to refer the passage to the Epicurean Phaedrus, who perhaps stood in a similar intimate relation to Velleius as Diodotus did to Cicero. See c. 3, 6.

49. 16. *videor audisse.* The full expression is *mihi videor*; but the pronoun being easily understood is often omitted. Comp. II, 46, 117; 61, 153. For further examples see Beier’s note to De Offic. I, 1, 1.

49. 22. *quam solent vestri.* It is often stated that the Epicureans laid very little weight on the form of discourse, and the extant fragments of Philodemus and Epicurus too confirm it. *Minime optum ad dicendum genus* they are called in Cic. Brut. c. 35, 131.

49. 23. Philo noster. See c. 3, 6. Although it cannot be stated with certainty, yet it is very probable that Cicero here attributes to Cotta what was really true of himself. Also c. 28, 79; 33, 93.

49. 30. [bona venia me audles, excuse me for saying so, i.e. for the use of the epithets tam levis, tam ineptas.]

49. 33. [In physcis. Under this head the ancients brought the question of the existence of the gods.]

50. 5. Simonide, the famous lyric poet from Ceos, who, like his somewhat younger contemporaries, Pindar, Ἀeschylus and his nephew Bacchylides, lived often and for a long time at Syracuse at the court of the elder Hiero. With what is said of him here comp. what Tertullian Ad Nat. II, 2, p. 183 Oehl. says of Thales: Thales Milesius Croeso sciscianti, quid de deis arbitraretur, post aliquot deliberandi commetatus nihil renuntiavit.

50. 10. quid dixit, quod . . . esset. Sit would have been more correct; but as the preceding dixit is used irregularly (though the assertions of Epicurus may be considered as present and still subsisting in his writings or in tradition), Cicero might properly use esset in the relative clause, just as if dixit had preceded in the principal one. Similar examples may be found above c. 15, 39 (fuerent atque manarent), ibid. 40 (appellarent), III, 28, 70 (utterentur); others may be found in Reisig, Haase’s note No. 500; and Madvig, Cic. De Fin., p. 464.

50. 13. [difficile est negare. A proposition to be answered in the next sentence.—in contione, i.e. before a public assembly, on grounds of public policy; but there is no difficulty in denying the proposition in huiusmodi sermone, in a familiar conversation among ourselves.]

50. 14. consessu. [Schoeemann reads in consessu and says]: if the preposition is allowed to stand here, we must assume that some word like hoc or tali has fallen out before consessu.

50. 15. ego ipse . . . is. The repeated reference by the demonstrative pronoun serves to bring out the contrast more plainly. Comp. note to III, 39, 93. [The pronoun is here repeats the subject ego, of the first person; it refers in sense to pontifex and qui . . . arbitror; “as pontifex, and as holding the opinion &c. (qui . . . arbitror), under these circumstances (is) I should desire.” &c. It is used with reference to the first or second person only where it has the force of tali. Cic. Phil. II, 30, 76: qui magister equitum fuisse tibi viderere . . . is per municipia coloniasque Galliae . . . cum Gallicis et lacernas cucurrísti. The usage is to be distinguished from that referred to by Prof. Schoeemann in III, 39, 93. Where idem is used there are two predicates, expressed or implied, belonging to
the same subject, one of which is sometimes opposed to the other; “the same person not only does this, but he also does that”; or “although he does this, he still does that.”]

50. 18. **ad veritatem plane**, “entirely according to truth,” *i.e.* as absolute truth would require; so that I should be convinced of it by positive proof, *non opinione*, not by an opinion I had been persuaded to adopt.


50. 29. **Diagoras** of Melos, one of the Cyclades, contemporary of Democritus, Protagoras and Socrates. He was also a lyric poet, and some verses of his poems which still remain breathe a thoroughly religious feeling. His atheism, which is repeatedly alluded to, is perhaps to be attributed to error in scientific speculations, due to the influence of Democritus, whose disciple he is said to have been, and of Protagoras; although other reasons are alleged for it. See Meier in the Encyclopaedia of Ersch and Gruber.

50. 30. **Theodorus** of Cyrene, under Ptolemaeus Lagi, denied not only the existence of the gods but also the truth of our moral perceptions, which he considered as only devised to keep the multitude in check. See Diog. L. II, 99.

50. 31. **Protagoras**. See note to c. 12, 29.

50. 33. **neque ut sint neque ut non sint**. The exact words of Protagoras are preserved in Diog. L. IX, 51: περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι οὐδ’ ὡς εἰσίν οὐδ’ ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν. Sometimes they are given in a somewhat different shape. See Frey, Quaest. Protag., p. 98. Cicero’s translation word for word violates the Latin usage. Moreover according to Diog. 54 the accuser of Protagoras was Pythodorus, one of the four hundred (in the year 411); and if the accusation was brought at that time, it may be assumed that the men, who were then in power, being opposed to the unbridled democracy, felt that they ought not to tolerate such free-thinking doctrines as Protagoras preached. In other cases the Athenians were as a rule very tolerant in regard to theoretical views, and interfered to punish only in those cases, where the existence of the gods was expressly denied, or when the existing institutions and customs were attacked and violated. Comp. Schoemann, Griech. Alterth. II, pp. 161 and 587; and Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. des Griech. Volksglaubens, p. 435.

51. 5. **Tubulus** (*L. Hostilius*): “cum praetor quaestionem inter sica- rios exercisset, ita aperte cepit pecunias ob rem iudicandam, ut anno proximo P. Scaevola trib. pt. ferret ad plebem, velletne de ea re quaeri.”
Quo plebiscito decreta a senatu est consuli quaestio Cn. Caepioni (ann. 613); profectus in exile Tubulus statim, nec respondere ausus; erat enim res aperta." Cic. De Fin. II, 16, 54.

51. 6. Lupus. Perhaps L. Cornelius Lentulus Lupus, who was consul in the year 579. That he was severely handled by the satirist Lucilius is shown by Horace Sat. II, 1, 68; and Pers. I, 114; of the reason nothing is known.

51. 6. Carbo (C. Papirius), the famous demagogue, and doubtless the object of attack on the part of the satirist for his demagogical doings.

51. 6. Neptuni fillus is equivalent to homo saevus et immannis according to Gellius, N. A. XV, 21, in allusion to Polyphemus, Cercyo, Sciron, the Laistrygones and similar monsters which the myth spoke of as sprung from Neptune. The aut of the MSS. is probably not genuine and the expression denotes no other than Carbo; for the idea, that the reference is to some mythical hero, perhaps Cercyo, only deserves to be mentioned as a curiosity.

51. 14. atomorum ... licentia, on account of the arbitrary declina- tio atomorum, as Epicurus held it. See c. 25, 69.


51. 15. Quae primum nullae sunt, i.e. the atoms. The primum leads one to expect a second proposition in regard to the atoms, which however is wanting; it is clear too that the next sentence does not, as the enim suggests, give a reason for the non-existence of the atoms. The passage is incomplete; and the thought may be conjecturally supplemented partly from Cicero himself (Acad. I, 7, 27), as follows: quae primum nullae sunt; nihil est enim [in rerum natura minimum, quod dividi nequeat; deinde, ut sint, moveri per inane non possunt, siquidem id dici inane] quod vacet corpore; corporibus autem omnibus obsidetur locus. Comp. Schoemann Opusc. Ac. III, p. 287. — Epicurus assumed as the beginning of all things an empty space and atoms moving therein. Diog. L. X, 40; and especially Lucret. I, 500 ff. Other philosophers denied entirely the existence of an empty space. Stobaeus Ecl. I, 19; Plut. Plac. Phil. I, 18.

51. 18. oracula fundo. See note to c. 16, 42.

51. 20. flagitía for opiniones flagitiosas, contemptu et vituperatione dignas. So also III, 38, 91. After the statement of these opinions the thread of the discourse is resumed by hanc tu opinionem.

51. 20. [Democriti. See c. 43, 120 and note.]
51. 20. *Leucippi.* "plenum et inane dixit esse, unde omnia gignentur." Cic. Acad. II, 37, 118. The *plenum,* παντόθες, was an infinity of infinitely small invisible and indivisible particles, στερέα, ἀδιαίρετα, ἀπερα τὸ πλήθος και ύφασμα διὰ ὀμφότητα τῶν ὁγκῶν. Arist. De Gen. et Corr. I, 8. — Leucippus was however but very little older than Democritus.

51. 29. *Quid enim mereas?* "What could induce you (what would you take) to give up being an Epicurean?" Comp. De Fin. II, 22, 74: *Quid enim mereri velis . . . quid merearis igitur, ut dicas te omnia voluptatis causa facturum?* Verr. IV, 60, 135: *quid arbitrarnini Rhegios merere velle ut ab iis marmorea illa Venus asferatur?*

52. 2. *nulla moderante natura.* This contradicts what Velleius said above, c. 20, 53. But in a certain degree both are true. The atoms in moving perpendicularly downward plainly obey a law of nature; but they vary from this direction without a specific law, and it is only by virtue of this variation that the origin of the world is possible. See note to c. 25, 69.

52. 8. *ut tu paulo ante;* above c. 8, 20.

52. 11. *In dumeta conripitis.* The simile is taken from game hard pursued and flying into the thick wood where the hunter cannot easily follow; so the Epicureans recur to propositions that are unintelligible and hence hard to controvert. This is shown in the following chapter by two examples, which are foreign to the main subject; that is taken up again in c. 26, 73.

52. 19. *nihil fore in nostrae potestate.* Inasmuch as the soul also consists of atoms, if the atoms had no power of varying from the course prescribed by the law of nature, all the activities of the mind must follow the law of nature, and free will would be excluded. For this reason Epicurus conceded to the atoms a certain power of voluntary motion, which enabled him, he thought, to explain by the concurrence of the atoms thus varying from the perpendicular line both the origin of the universe and the freedom of the human will. Comp. Cic. De Fato, c. 10, 22; and especially Lucret. II, 217 ff. and 251 ff.

52. 21. *quod Democritum fugerat,* because Democritus had assumed not a perpendicular motion with a voluntary deviation, but a swirling motion inherent in the nature of the atoms and taking place of necessity. Diog. L. IX, 45: πάντα τε κατ’ ἀνάγκην γενέσθαι τῆς δύνας αἰτίας ὀφει τῆς γενέσθαι πάντων, ἣν ἀνάγκην λέγει. See De Fin. I, 6, 18.

52. 25. *aut etiam aut non,* "either Yes or No." Compare De Fato, c. 10, 21; and Acad. II, 30, 97 where the same thing is said of Epicurus; and for *etiam* for affirmation see Heindorf's note to Hor. Sat. II, 3, 97.
Probably Epicurus did not say exactly what Cicero here states, but only that the so-called principle excludens tertii does not hold unconditionally, inasmuch as in alternative propositions referring to the future it is quite possible that neither of the alternatives may be true. Comp. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik I, p. 403; and Zeller III, I, p. 391.

[Zeller III, p. 233 thinks that Epicurus did not mean to impeach the formal correctness of the disjunction, but only the material truth of the two propositions. He did not deny then that of two contradictory cases one or the other must occur, that the statement was true that ‘Epicurus will be either alive or dead to-morrow’; but he denied only the truth of the two propositions each taken by itself, i.e. he denied the truth of the propositions ‘Epicurus will live,’ and ‘Epicurus will not live,’ because either one becomes true only when the actual occurrence takes place.]

52. 33. omnis sensus veri nuntios. Lucretius IV, 480 ff. gives Epicurus’s reasons; namely that what is called illusion of the senses is not the fault of the senses themselves, but of a wrong interpretation of the sensuous impression; see ibid. 464 ff.

52. 34. Nihil ... nimirum collude for admodum or valde callide. So non nimis for “not extremely.” Cic. Div. in Caecil. c. 22, 71: Hoc statuere, iudices, debetis, Caecilium non nimis hanc causam severe, non nimis accurate, non nimis diligenter acturum. Tusc. V, 33, 93: non nimis fortasse subtiliter, utiliter lamen; Acad. II, 47, 146: nec lamen nimis eleganter.

53. 1. dum individuorum corporum concretionem fugit. Epicurus did not deny that the bodies of the gods consisted of atoms; he denied only the concretio, i.e. the thicker, more compact constitution of their bodies. Comp. 27, 75. So for example in II, 39, 101 he opposes concretus aer to fusus et extenuatus; crassum caelum atque concretum II, 16 in.; pingue et concretum caelum, De Divin. I, 57, 130; nimirum concreti humores, below II, 23, 59; terrena concretaque corpora, Tusc. I, 18, 42. But it is certainly untrue that Epicurus attributed to the gods this finer, more subtle constitution of body simply for the reason here assigned by Cotta. See Summary, p. 26, n. 1; and for the true reason see note to c. 18, 49.

53. 3. sed tamquam corpus, sc. esse ait, supplied from the preceding negat; as De Fin. V, 29, 88: Ille Metelli vitam negat beatiorem quam Reguli, praeponendum lamen; a frequent ellipsis. So nolo ... sed, c. 7, 17.

53. 4. Mirabile videtur &c. Comp. De Div. II, 24, 51 where this sentiment is assigned to the elder Cato.
53. 7. si in ceris fingereetur; "if a person had such an idea in regard to figures of wax or clay."

53. 10. dictata, passages, chiefly from poets, which were dictated to scholars to be learned by heart. Comp. Hor. Ep. I, 18, 13: puerum saevo credas dictata magistro reddere.

53. 12. in scriptis. Diog. L. X, 13 mentions a saying of Epicurus of this sort in a letter. He also cites from another letter (§ 6) the words: παιδείαν δὲ πᾶσαν, μακάριε, φεύγε.

53. 14. nihil enim olet = nullum odorem olet; i.e. he shows no familiarity with the schools of Plato or Aristotle, the former of whom taught in the Academy, the latter in the Lyceum, both names of gymnasium at Athens. Ad Attic. II, 1, 1: ideo bene oler, quia nihil oletant, videbantur.

53. 15. e puerilibus disciplinis. He means the so-called ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία, that is, the usual course of instruction, consisting chiefly of grammar and rhetoric.

53. 16. Xenocraten. See note to 13, 34.

53. 18. Pamphilum. He is also mentioned in Diog. L. X, 14, but is otherwise unknown. Whether he is the same with the author of a τέχνη ἰησοῦ. mentioned by Arist. Rhet. II, 23, we cannot tell. Comp. Spalding's note to Quintil. III, 6, 34.

53. 20. agripeta, i.e. as colonist, Gr. κληρούχος, because in the year B.C. 351 the Athenians gave to the poorer citizens the confiscated land in Samos, divided into 2000 sections (κλήροι).

53. 23. In Nausiphan . . . tenetur. The sense is: In regard to Nausiphanes he cannot avoid it; he is proved to have learned something from him, which he would not allow in regard to Pamphilus, though he confessed to having heard him. Comp. Orat. pro Caec. c. 2: facile honestissimis testibus in perspicua teneretur, i.e. convinceretur; and further Ernesti Clav. Cic. sub tit. — Nausiphanes of Teos according to Sext. Emp. Math. I, 2, p. 599, Bekk. and Diog. L. IX, 69 was a disciple of the sceptic Pyrrhon, but is spoken of by Diog. Praef. 15 as a follower of Democritus. Cotta also says below c. 33, 93 that Epicurus learned something from him. It was maintained that he was indebted to him for his logic (see note to c. 16, 43). For remarks of Epicurus about him see Diog. L. X, 14, and 7, 8.

53. 26. quid audierat? The sense is: Epicurus spoke insultingly of Nausiphanes as if he owed nothing to him. And yet if he had not learned something from him what could he have learned at all? He would have been utterly ignorant, and would not have known even these doctrines of Democritus, on which his whole system of physics rests.

53. 30. naturae ratio. Comp. c. 8, 20: physiologiam, id est naturae rationem, and note.
53. 31. *istud quasi corpus . . . quid inteligis?* The argument is here resumed after the digression, “now what do you understand by this *quasi corpus?*” Comp. De Fin. II, 15, 50: *Quid ergo hoc loco intellegit honestum?* Paradox VI, I: *quem enim intellegimus divitem, aut hoc verbum in quo homine ponimus?*

53. 32. [Ego enim te scire &c. The sense is: I am quite willing to acknowledge that you know more about these things than I do; but once state them in the form of propositions, and there is no reason why I should not comprehend them as well as you.]

54. 3. *tamquam Heraclitus.* Cicero also hints farther on in III, 14, 25 that the obscurity of Heraclitus, for which he was called ὁ σκοτεινός, was intentional; [De Fin. II, 5, 15]. This strange idea is found also in other authors, as in Diog. L. IX, 6. — *Quod inter nos liceat.* The fuller expression Ad Attic. II, 4, 1: *quod inter nos liceat dicere;* [comp. § 59, bona venia me audies].

54. 4. *species ut sit for ut esse statuatur.* Comp. note to 9, 21.

54. 5. *nihil concreti &c., nothing solid (in contrast to liquid, see crescere II, 10, 26); nihil solidi, nothing solid, massive (in contrast to soft, pliable): nihil expressi, nothing stamped in tangible, perceptible form; nihil eminentis, nothing distinctive. For the genitive see Zumpt Gr. § 433.*

54. 7. *in Venere Coa, i.e. in the famous picture of Apelles, which represented the goddess as ἀνάδυσθη.*

54. 10. *similitudines rerum esse for sunt; transition from orat. rect. to orat. obliqu. In the next section for nec esse humana &c. he might have said nec sit, continuing the dependence on quod.*

54. 10. [Fac id . . . nihil esse persuasum; “Suppose me to be persuaded of that which cannot even be comprehended.” *id* is to be taken with persuasum.]

54. 19. *Primum quidque,* “each one in its order”; that is, always 77 taking the object which for the moment stands at the head of the others. The proper explanation of this often misunderstood expression is given by Giese, note to Cic. De Div. I, 57, 127; and Madvig De Fin. note, p. 321.


54. 31. *physicke*, ironically, as II, 18, 48. Comp. c. 30, 83.
54. 31. *quasi sui . . . lena*. Nature, or the peculiar natural constitution of any being, presents itself to such being as the most beautiful; as a *lena* recommends to her customers the attractions she offers them.
55. 3. *eam esse causam &c.* This part of the sentence can only depend on *quid mirum*, and would force the reader to take the preceding *si . . . putaret* as an inserted conditional clause, and not, as would be most natural, with *quid mirum* directly. Besides, as it here stands, it presents a violation of the consecutio temporum not easy to explain. Finally, it is evidently quite superfluous; and would have been better left out, if indeed Cicero really wrote it. Comp. Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, 317. 18.

55. 11. *Triton*, a sea gond, son of Poseidon and Amphitrite, was represented with two bodies of fishes instead of feet; therefore *natantibus invehens beluis.*
55. 15. *[quotus . . . quis-que, "the whatth one," as we say "every tenth one, hundredth one"; i.e. "what proportion of men is handsome?"]*
55. 16. *gregibus epheborum.* He refers to the youths gathered in companies in the gymnasium for exercise in common.
55. 19. *vitia saepe lucunda.* See the same topic treated in Lucretius IV, 1154 ff. Comp. also Hor. Sat. I, 3, 40.
55. 20. *Alcaeus*, the Lesbian lyric poet, of whose erotic poetry occasional mention is made, as for instance Cic. Tusc. IV, 33, 71, and some fragments remain.
55. 22. *huius collegae et familiaris nostris*; the one now living and well known to us. Comp. II, 2, 6; De Offic. III, 16, 26: *Cato, huius nostris Catonis pater.* The allusion is to Q. Lutatius Q. F. Q. N. Catulus, consul in A. v. 676, and colleague of Cotta in the Pontificate. His father of the same name was consul in 652, and one of his epigrams on the same subject may be seen in Gellius N. A. XIX, 9.
55. 22. *municipem tuum Rosciium*, the famous comic actor Q. Roscius, who was defended by Cicero in an oration still extant, and was, like Velleius, a native of the municipium Lanuvium.
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55. 32. strabones . . . paetulos. Schol. Cruq. note to Hor. Sat. I, 3, 44: strabo dicitur qui est detortis oculis, paetus autem, qui est oculis leniter declinatis, cuique hue et illuc celeriter volvuntur. —By the following quae sunt in nobis the defects (vitia) indicated by the preceding words are intended. Comp. II, 8, 21.

56. 3. florere . . . Academiam. [That is the gods would find in each other tantam similitudinem, ut in iis nulla inesset certa iudicandi nota, as Cicero puts it in § 5 of this book; they would perforce be New Academicians.] The joke of course must not be taken too seriously; for although the gods might not be able to distinguish between themselves, they might distinguish other objects.

56. 8. sic . . . ut dicis; above c. 18, 46.

56. 17. crocodillum &c. The same beasts were not accounted holy in all parts of Egypt; those which were worshipped in one part might be killed with impunity in another, as Herodotus II, 69 expressly says in regard to the crocodiles; and according to Plutarch De Is. et Osir. c. 72 there was an idea that this difference had been designedly arranged by the old rulers to aid in dividing the people for the purpose of governing them more easily. Ibises and cats were equally sacred throughout the whole land, and a few other animals besides, which are enumerated in Strabo XVII, p. 812.

56. 20. illam vestram Sospitam, i.e. Juno with the epithet Sospita, whose worship, originally peculiar to Lanuvium (hence vestram), had become Roman since the year 416; see Livy VIII, 14, 2. She is represented with a goatskin, pointed shoes, spear and shield by a statue in the Vatican (Müller Archæol. § 353, 3) and on coins, best on those of the gens Proculia in Patin, Famil. Rom., p. 234. The form of construction, instead of quam tibi illa vestra Sospita videtur, is a common attraction in such comparisons. Similar instances in c. 31, 86 and II, 11, 29. Further examples in Wunder's note to Cic. pro Planc., p. 103; and Madvig's note to Cic. De Fin., pp. 150 and 294. For quam tibi see the remark at the end of the Summary, p. 32.


56. 33. Age et . . . facimus. Age is used in a transition to something new, often with porro (Verr. II, 5, 22), nunc (Pro Rosc. Amer. 27, 108) and similar words. Comp. below II, 47, 120; III, 17, 43; Hand Tursell. I, p. 208. Et in this connection is evidently not simply copulative,
but corresponds to etiam, as Cicero sometimes uses it, at least in the philosophical writings and in the letters. Comp. Hand II, 513, 517; and Kühner’s note to Tusc. III, 13, 28. After speaking previously of the form under which the gods are conceived he passes on to their various apppellations. For the indicative in this form of question compare above c. 29, 80 (arbitramur); below, c. 32, 90 (putamus) and further Madvig on Cic. De Fin. II, 23, 76; and Opusc. Acad. alt., p. 41.

57. 2. in pontificis sc. libris. These are the so-called Indigita-menta, quae et nomina deorum et rationes ipsorum nominum continent. Serv. ad Virg. Georg. I, 21; comp. Preller, Röm. Mythol., p. 119.

57. 3. 1stud ... ita. Comp. De Divin. II, 8, 21: quod certe vobis ita dicendum est; and more in Hand Tursell. III, p. 485. [De Fin. I, 7, 26: quod tibi ita videri necesse est; II, 9, 28: cur id non ita fit? V, 26, 77: quod nisi ita efficitur.]

57. 7. Ipsum sibi dispiaceere. tibi would have been more exact; but what precedes really applies not so much to Velleius, as to the Epicureans in general.

[Haec vestra sunt. There seems to be something wrong here. Cotta has just finished his refutation of the Epicurean doctrine that the gods have human forms; he asks, l. 7, An tu mei similem putas esse aut tu deum? and answers himself, Profecto non putas. He then asks, Quid  ergo? — do you think the sun and moon are gods? and shows this to be absurd. Then according to the common reading he says, Haec vestra sunt. But these doctrines last mentioned are not Epicurean doctrines, vestra, i.e. of Velleius and his sect. Then in the next sentence he goes on: If they have not human forms, as I have shown, nor any such forms (tali aliquo), which you are quite certain of &c. The words nec tali aliquo refer to solem aut lunam aut caelum; but they must refer to some view which Velleius did not accept as true; and the words Haec vestra sunt state the contrary of what would be expected. Possibly they should be a question; or is the reading of the Ms. I (ed. Moser) the true one, Haec vera sunt?]

57. 12. humano (visu) = humana specie. As the Mss. here have a break, the word to be inserted is by no means sure; it might be corpore. But the emendation venerantes for numerantes is certain.

57. 17. Itaque &c. It is clear that the simple quotation in this sentence is not properly that which is to serve as proof of the view just mentioned in the preceding, but that such proof consists in the supposed intentional ambiguity of Epicurus, which is afterwards spoken of. This connection of thought would have been more properly expressed as follows: Itaque cum in illis selectis eius brevibusque sententiis ... prima sententia sit ... in hac ita exposita sententia &c.—On the κυρ. δοξ. see

note to c. 17, 45. [Or is itaque at the beginning of this sentence equivalent to “and so,” “accordingly,” introducing an illustration or confirmation of the opinion before referred to? See Reisig, Vorles. § 272.]

57. 24. an, si quid sit. Cicero could very well leave out the apodosis, which is easily supplied from the foregoing, namely id nec habere nec exhibere cuiquam negotium. Some unintelligent readers have supplied id esse immortale, which is now found in nearly all the Mss. — [The ambiguity of course consists in this: Epicurus says “Whatever is happy and immortal”; he does not say whether or not there be any such.]

57. 25. Non animadvertunt &c. On the connection of the members of this sentence see above note to c. 9, 23. — quam . . . te. See note to 29, 82 illum vestram Sospitam.

57. 26. Metrodorus. He was the nearest friend and disciple of Epicurus, paene alter Epicurus (De Fin. II, 28, 92); and author of numerous works.

58. 1. in deorum numero ponere. [Schoemann has natura for numero and says]: It is hardly an allowable expression, and probably only an error in copying for in deorum numero ponere.

58. 5. duabus unius orbis ultimis partibus. The unus orbis is the ecliptic; and the two ultimae partes are the points of contact with the Tropic of Cancer in the north, and the Tropic of Capricorn in the south.

58. 7. lustrationem for circumitum, because in religious purifications, which the word properly indicates, the purificatory offerings were carried around. Lustrare is so used below, II, 20, 53; and 41, 106.

58. 9. ab isdem principiis, i.e. if their courses are reckoned from the same starting point, they consume different periods of time to accomplish the same distance.

58. 15. Ita fit, “the result is then,” instead of ita fiet, which would be strictly more correct. See Kühner’s note to Tuscul. II, 7, 16; and below c. 43, 121.

58. 16. Seriphi, now Servino, one of the Cyclades, small and barren, often served as a proverbial designation for anything petty and narrow. It was a place of banishment under the emperors. — Ut at the beginning of the sentence = velut, “as for example”; comp. II, 33, 86; other examples in Giese’s note to Cic. De Div. I, 39, 86; and Madvig De Fin. IV, 12, 30.

58. 21. quae, by a σύνεσις or σύνταξις πρὸς τὸ νοθμενὸν refers to the idea of praecepta dialectica involved in the preceding dialecticorum. Comp. Tusc. I, 2, 4: erga in Græcia musici floruerunt discebatique id omnes.
58. 21. argumenta sententiae conclusit [Müller reads argu-
mento sententiam], "you have drawn up the arguments for your opinion in
regular, syllogistic forms." Comp. De Fin. III, 8, 27 : concluduntur igitur
eorum argumenta sic; Acad. II, 9, 27 : quae esset conclusi argumenti
fides. For the conclusion of Velleius see above c. 18, 48.—The reading
of this passage is uncertain. The Mss. have argumenti sententiam, which
is possibly an error for argumenti summarum. summarum orationis is used
in the same significan in De Or. II, 38, 158 and summar is confounded
with sententiae by the copyists in other passages. See Madvig De Fin. II,
31, 100.

58. 28. sumpsisses, "you might have assumed it," = sumere poteras
or debes, as below III, 31, 76 dedisses. See Zumpt Gr. § 529 Rem.;
Madvig De Fin. II, 12, 35; Naeke's note on Valer. Cato, p. 161; Wagner
Virg. Æn. IV, 678.—Quid autem est &c. [Schoemann reads quid on
the ground that the question really is, not what the gradatim means, but with
what propriety it can be applied to the form of argument of Velleius.]
On the frequent confusion see Schoemann Opusc. Ac. III, pp. 305, 325.

58. 35. formae figuram, "the structure of the form" (die Bildung
der Gestalt), as Lucretius says, IV, 67: veterem formae servare figuram.
Forma denotes the form as shown in the general impression which it
makes, figura the structure and relation of the parts; the forma stands out
visibly; the inner construction enters into the figura. Hence Cicero says
in De Offic. I, 35, 126: formam nostram ceteramque figuram; and the
colour may also enter into the forma, ibid. 36, 130: formae dignitas coloris
bonitate tuenda. — On the following di semper fuerunt see the Sum-
mary, p. 27.

59. 3. ea, qua erant forma dii. The forma of the preceding clause
is repeated, as often happens, in the relative clause for the sake of greater
precision; and the use of the demonstrative ea in the foregoing need not
prevent such repetition, as has been supposed. Comp. Caes. Bell. Gall. I,
49, 1: ultra eum locum, quo in loco Germani consederant; Cic. in Catil.
III, 10, 25: in hoc autem uno bello, quale bellum; Pro Cluent. c. 54 init.:
lex ea, qua lege; and ibid. 57, 166; De Repub. 1, 26: ad eam cauam
referendum est, quae causa genuit civitatem.

59. 9. putamus? "Shall we then believe?" For the indicative in
such questions see note to § 84.

59. 15. memoriter, not as often explained "from memory," but "with
good memory, correct memory" ["mindfully" from memor.], forgetting
nothing; see Madvig De Fin., p. 74.
59. 30. [quando quidem introduces the reason for asking the question quae... venustatis just preceding. The sense is: I ask this because you claim that the gods have these organs propter pulchritudinem. Velleius had said this in § 47.]

59. 32. Hermarchus of Mitylene, disciple and successor of Epicurus. Among his writings mentioned by Diog. L. X, 25 were ἐπιστολικὰ περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους εἰκος καὶ δίο and a book πρὸς Πλάτωνα; and Porphy. De Abstin. I, 26 mentions his book against Pythagoras, chiefly upon abstinence from animal food.

59. 34. Leontium is called Ἀττικὴ ἑταῖρα in Diog. L. X, 23, and παλλακῆ of Epicurus. A few words from one of his letters to her are found in the same passage, § 5; and a picture of Leontium in an attitude of deep thought, by the painter Theodorus is spoken of by Pliny, Hist. Nat. XXXV, 11. More about her may be found in Menage, Historia mulierum philosopharum, at the end of the edition of Diog. L. II, p. 618, Hüb.; and on her identity with the Leontium of Hermesianax see Schulze, Quaest. Hermes. (Lips. 1856), p. 22.

59. 35. sed tamen, sc. meretricula. The sense is: but still a person of such sort, that in spite of her talent and elegant style she ought not to have undertaken things of that sort.

59. 35. Epicuri hortus, because Epicurus lived and taught in his garden in the neighborhood of Athens. He left it in his will to Hermarchus and his successors in the office of teaching. Diog. L. X, 17.

60. 1. Zeno. The Epicurean mentioned above, c. 21, 59.

60. 2. T. Albeclus is called by Cic. Brut. c. 35, 131 perfectus Epicureus. He lived a long time in Athens and was ridiculed by Lucilius for his Graecomania. See De Fin. I, 3, 9. As propraetor of Sardinia in the year 650 he was guilty of extortion, and was afterwards prosecuted and condemned for it.

60. 2. Phaedro, the Epicurean mentioned in the Introduction, whose lectures Cicero mentions hearing, De Fin. I, 5, 16; Ad Famil. XIII, 1, 2.

60. 5. Phaedoni of Elis, who was brought to Athens as a slave, taken prisoner in war, made the acquaintance of Socrates and at his instigation was ransomed. Plato named his dialogue on immortality after him. He also wrote several dialogues himself. Diog. L. II, 105.

60. 6. Timocrates. Whatever Epicurus may have written, he could hardly have cherished enmity against him; at least in his will still extant, he made Timocrates and a certain Amynomachus heirs of his fortune. Diog. L. X, 16.

60. 7. in Democritum... ingratus. Comp. De Fin. I, 6, 21: Democritum, laudatum a ceteris, ab hoc, qui eum unum secutus est, nollem

60. 8. Nausiphanean. See c. 26, 73 from which passage the insertion of non before nihil, wanting in most Mss., is justified.

60. 10. Apollodorus, Sillus, two philosophers not otherwise known; for the Epicurean Apollodorus, who according to Diog. L. X, 2 and 25 was Zeno's teacher, is out of the question. It might sooner be the Stoic mentioned in Diog. L. VII, 39, where the other name Syllus has been restored upon conjecture. Other suppositions are not worth mentioning.

60. 12. Latino verbo utens. This is not incredible, inasmuch as we may assume some knowledge of Latin in the case of philosophers whose lectures were attended in great measure by Romans. Zeno might have used the Latin word for the reason that it indicated better than any Greek word what he wished to express, that sort of idle lounging about and that untiring loquacity which characterized the scurrina, and which might have been criticised even in Socrates by his enemies. The comic poet Eupolis also called him πεχυθός ἀδολέχης. Meineke Fragm. com. V, 1, p. LXXXVIII.

60. 13. Chrysippam. He probably meant to ridicule a wordy loquacity like that of a talkative old woman; Chrysippus was in fact a very voluminous and wordy writer, and γραφογος was the expression for loquacity. Sext. Emp. Adv. Gram. § 141.

60. 14. senatum ... rectitres, like a censor; comp. Liv. XXIII, 23, 5; and XXIX, 37, 1; Cic. Orat. pro Dom. c. 32, 84.

60. 18. lucubrationes anciularum. Not only study but the labour of women by lamplight were designated by lucubrations; in Liv. I, 57 S. Tarquinius finds Lucretia sitting inter lucubrantes ancillas. - Cotta says therefore that Epicurus' notions about the gods are hardly fit for old women's spinning-rooms.

60. 23. nam quod ... dicitis. How this is to be taken is stated at the end of the Summary.

60. 27. deus ut ... sit = ut esse statuatur. See note to c. 9, 21; 27, 25.

60. 30. durum, only because not yet in use; comp. Quintil. VIII, 3, 32. But the formation of both words is quite correct, like necessitas and necessitudo, claritas and claritudo, and the forms cited by Gellius XIII, 3: suavitudo, sanctitudo, acerbitudo, acritudo, with suavitatis &c. Also duritudo, planitudo, saevitudo, tarditudo, vastitudo. See Ritschl. De Fictil. Litter. (Berolin, 1853), p. 20.

61. 1. innumerabilia. See above c. 20, 53.
61. 3. quae sola divina natura est: "which (namely, happy and immortal) the divine nature, and no other, is." The neuter quae refers to both predicates beata and aeterna in the preceding clause. If there were only one of them, for instance aeterna, the phrase would run: quod sola divina natura est; as in De Fin. IV, 24, 66: ut iam omnes insipientes sint miseris, quod profecto sunt; and in the same way the demonstrative hoc, ibid. § 65: non tamen erat ille sapientis: quis enim hoc? Comp. Livy XXX, 30: Quod enim ego sum ad Trasimenum, id tu hoc es. —The traditional reading of this passage, sunt for est, is not susceptible of any rational explanation, that is, any that suits the context.

61. 7. accedebat. The imperfect in relation to the time when the opinion was formed (ratio docuit); reason ought to have recognized this truth, which is such not only now, but was so at that time. Compare below c. 35, 98 videbas, and 36, 100 habebam. —[deorum. Schoemann reads dei, and says:] the Mss. have deo for dei. On this see Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 321. Possibly the reading should be deorum.

61. 10. in rubro mari. Ἐνβρά θάλασσα, the sea to the south of Asia and Libya, with the Persian and Arabian gulfs. See Ps. Arist. De Mund. c. 3 and Kapp’s note and the commentators on Herod, I, 1.

61. 27. quid est ... conturbet? "How can the form alone throw you into such confusion?" That is, how can the prejudice or the assumed πρόληψις in regard to the form of the gods so disturb your judgment that you cling to the belief in it, while you set yourself against other assumptions no more arbitrary than that? On conturbare comp. Beier on De Offic. III, 10, 40.

61. 28. hls ... adiunctis ... rationem is equivalent to haec una cum ratione: all these endowments belong to man, as well as reason.

61. 34. uno digito plus: "a finger too many," lit. more by one finger than one ought to have; the ablative of measure, as sol multis partibus maior quam terra (II, 36, 92); Verr. II, 52, 129: Siculi nonnumquam uno die longiorem mensem faciunt aut biduo; Orat. 51, 173: versus una syllaba brevior aut longior.


menter errat Timarchides, sed errat domestica conjectura; Ad Attic. XIV, 22, 1: vereor ne nihil conjectura aberrem. With aberrare of course a vero, a proposito is to be supplied. A complete misunderstanding of the expression has occasioned the placing of the preposition a before conjectura; and one must then imagine that conjectura can mean the very truth that is sought after; as the latest defender of this opinion says, "conjectura cum effectu" or "finis quo tendimus."

62. 18. Et barbari quidem &c., "And of a bearded Jupiter forsooth" &c. This is represented to be quite as certain as what precedes, and with a view of weakening or destroying its force as an argument. See Schwarz on Hor. Tursell., p. 284; Jahn on Cicero Or. c. 50, 168; and especially Madvig Emden. in Cic. Libr. Phil., p. 91.

62. 24. ob allquam utilitatem. An assertion often made, but hardly correct, at least in this general form. The worship of animals is a sort of fetishism, resting upon a vague feeling of a superhuman power of nature as displayed in them, which man in an uncultivated state wonders at and reveres. In Plut. De Is. et Osir. c. 74 the συμβολὼν is placed along side of the χρειῶθες; and in c. 77 animals are called αἰνίγματα τοῦ θεοῦ. Comp. the learned remarks of J. A. Kanne in the Introduction to his Mythologie der Griechen, and Duncker, Geschichte des Alterthums I, p. 53, 2d edition.

62. 28. volucris angulis. Other authors make the same statement, but derive the winged serpents in part not from Lybia but from Arabia, as Herod. II, 75; III, 107; Ammian. Marcell. XXII, 15, 26. Schneider on Αelian. II. An. II, 38 is of the opinion that the creatures in question are flying lizards (the draco volans of Linnæus). The whole matter is doubtless exaggerated and fabulous.

62. 28. vento Africo. For the Italians the Africus is the West South-West wind, ab occidente hiberno, qui apud Graecos λέψ dicitur (Seneca Quaest. Nat. V, 16), because it came to them from the province Africa. Here it must be a West wind, as Lybia lay in this direction from the Egyptians.

62. 32. tamen beluas &c. The connection of the sentences shows that this is the true construction, not conclusum tamen, because ita conclusam &c. is not opposed to, but rather follows from what goes before; Cotta concludes thus, not although, but because he wishes to be brief. The tamen points to a thought not expressly stated because easily supplied from the connection, as often occurs in conversational style: Although people laugh at the Egyptians for their worship of animals, yet the animals (and this by way of excuse) are not considered sacred without some reason. — For tamen = saltem, certe comp. Giese on Cic. De Div. II, 38, 80. In the
same order and meaning it is also found in Verres I, 1, 21: *si relicet et absit, tamen impudenter sua pudentem exitum quaesisse videatur*; Ad Famili. XV, 17, 2: *Nos hic... tamen ad te scribam aliquid... Sullam patrem mortuum habeamus.*

62. 35. *habet* for *habent*, see note to c. 19, 51.

63. 4. *Haec oratio... spollat*, *i.e.* what you say takes away from 87 the gods motion &c. In the same way De Leg. I, 3, 10: *Legationem aliquam nimirum ista oratio postulat*; what you say indicates a wish for a *legatio*. Comp. II, 1, 3 and 10, init.

63. 10. *actio vitae*. See note to c. 17, 45.

63. 16. *quaes igne nasci putentur*, *i.e.* by a so-called *generatio originaria*, which the old natural philosophers held to be unquestionable. Seneca Quaest. Nat. V, 6 says of the animals mentioned here: *ignis, qui omnia consumit, quaedam etiam creat, et quod videri potest non simile veri, tamen verum est, animalia igne generari*. And Pliny H. N. XI, 36: *In Cypri aerariis fornicibus ex medio igni maioris muscae magnitudinis volat pennatum quadrupes; appellatur pyralis, a quibusdam pyrausta. Quandiu est in igni vivit... cum evasit longiore paulo volatu, emortitur.* In other connections *pyraustae* denote what we call millers.

63. 23. *Quiquid... attigeris, ulcus est.* *ulcus* is a weak point, 104 an insurmountable difficulty. So De Orat. 2, 72, 292: *malum vitiumque causae.*

63. 25. *Sic enim dicebas*, *i.e.* above c. 19, 49: but there Velleius 105 says not *speciem dei*, but *vim et naturam deorum*, which is quite a different thing. The *species* are taken cognizance of by the mind through the *imagines* which affect it, although afterward further reasons are found; but the nature of the gods cannot, like their form, be known from *imagines*, but only be deduced by the reason, *mente* or *cognitione cerni*; they are according to Epicurus only λόγω θεωρητι.

63. 26. *neque eadem ad numerum permanere*. This could only mean that the divine forms do not remain the same but are variable in respect to number; that they therefore appear now in greater now in lesser number. But according to Epicurus there can be no question of number in regard to the gods. Cicero perhaps wrote *neque eam ad numerum permanere*, so that *ad numerum* would be taken in the sense given in the note to § 49, *i.e.* *sic ut numerari possit, and permanere* in that of *flowing*, the *transitio* of the images. So far as concerns the language there would be no objection to this; and in fact one Ms. has *permanere*, which would of course however have very little weight if the sense were not in its favor. Lachmann also writes *eam for eadem* in note on Lucret., p. 24, but retains *permanere.*
NOTES.

63. 28. *similitudine et transitione.* To understand this rightly see note on § 49.


88 63. 32. *tantum modo ad cogitationem valent,* because they make no impression on the senses, but only on the mind, and so they simply give rise to ideas.

63. 34. *talem conformationem animi,* that is, an idea not resulting from any sensuous perception, but only from a mental act. *animi* is genitive subjective, not objective.

106 64. 2. *Ti. Gracchum &c.* A reference to the well-known story that Ti. Gracchus when tribune of the people proposed the deposition of his colleague M. Octavius who had opposed him, and called on the people to vote on the question.—On *ut* = "for example" see note to c. 31, 88.

64. 4. *Imagines remanere.* According to Epicurus there flow from objects not only images of coarser consistency which are perceived by the eye, but also those of more subtle nature which are directly perceived by the mind. Lucret. IV, 726 ff. Such images continue to exist, even when the objects from which they proceed have passed away; which accounts for the presence in the mind of the forms of those long dead, as for example in dreams. Lucret. V, 63. *Remanere* is to be understood of continuance in time, not in place; for, as Lucret. IV, 728 says, *simulacra vagantur... in cunctas undique partis.* Comp. Cic. De Div. II, 67, 137. For this reason the reading of the majority of Mss., *pervenerint,* would seem preferable to *pervenerim,* which has been adopted by recent editors from four Mss. Comp. Jahrh. für Phil. 1875, p. 691.

107 64. 10. *A Democrito haec licentia.* "This arbitrary assumption is borrowed from Democritus."

64. 13. *omnia in me incidere imagines &c.* Images or representations of all of them, just as it happens or as I fancy. Comp. De Div. II, 67, 139 where it is said of this Epicurean theory: *omnia igitur quae volumus nota nobis esse possint; nihil est enim de quo cogitare necuemus.* Cicero also ridicules it Ad Fam. XV, 16, 1. An attentive reader of Lucretius IV, 726 ff. will find with a little thought what an Epicurean might answer to this and the following objections.

64. 15. *nec ea forma = non tamen ea forma.* — In the following sentence *illae* would be more correct than *illi ergo;* but the masculine is excusable because the images represent the persons. Further on we find *Orpheus, id est imago eius.*

64. 16. *Orpheum poëtam &c.* The language here, misunderstood by some, evidently means that Aristotle entirely denied the existence of
Orpheus. For the allusion to him enters into the connection of the argument only on the assumption that he is adduced as an example of a non-sens. Comp. Lobeck Agl., p. 349 f. The fact that Orphic doctrines are several times mentioned in the extant writings of Aristotle proves nothing against the present passage; the name served as a convenient traditional designation for certain theological views. The opinion here mentioned by Cicero was probably to be found in the Dial. πέρι φιλοσοφίας. See Bernays, Dialoge des Arist., p. 96.

64. 17. hoc Orphicum carmen ... Cercopis. The Pythagorean Cercops, of whom we have no further information, was thought by some (for example by Epigenes in πέρι τῆς eis Ὀρφέα ποιήσεως in Clem. Alex. Strom. I, p. 397 Pott.) to be the author of two Orphic poems, the (Θησέως) κατά θεους eis θείου, and the ιερὸς λόγος. The latter, often called in the plural ιεροὶ λόγοι, consisted of twenty-four rhapsodies and contained a very extended theogony; another, likewise called ιερὸς λόγος, was of ethic and ascetic character. There was also a Cercops from Miletus, to whom a Hesiodic poem, Aigimius, was attributed; whether he was the same with the Pythagorean cannot be determined with certainty.

64. 22. Scyllae, Chimerae. This objection is answered by Lucret. IV, 736 ff. The next one it were better not to have made, it is so very easy to meet from Epicurus's standpoint; the third is answered by Lucret. IV, 780 ff.; the fourth IV, 761 ff.

64. 33. Num eadem ... omnia sempiterna? Epicurus assumed the existence of the infinite quantity of atoms only for the purpose of explaining the assumed everlasting efflux of the impressions from the gods. But Cotta speaks in this passage as if Epicurus intended to prove the immortality of the gods from the inexhaustible mass of the atoms; and in §§105-107 as if he used the ceaseless efflux of the divine images for the same purpose. That is certainly an error or an intentional misrepresentation. Epicurus first assumed the immortality of the gods on account of the πρόληψις, and then tried to strengthen the belief by appealing to the law of isonomy. According to this law, in contrast with mortal beings, there must necessarily be immortal ones; and since all other beings of whom we have knowledge are mortal and transitory, the gods are the only ones remaining to whom we either can or must ascribe immortality. The argument may be a weak one; but it is better at any rate than that which Cotta ascribed to him. For the following objections of Cotta see the note, Summary, p. 26 ff.

65. 1. sint aliqui immortales. The subjunctive as modus potentialis = elev av.
65. 3. *sint quae ... conservent*; [Schoemann reads *sunt* &c.]. The opponent is speaking.

65. 4. *ea conservent, quae sunt*. The sense is: there may certainly be certain preserving forces; but they can only preserve what really exists. But I do not believe that your gods really exist.

65. 10. *et deus vester*. As this is opposed to the foregoing, *sed* might have been used; but all languages sometimes use the simple copula when the opposition is not to be made especially prominent. Cic. De Leg. II, 21, 53: *hoc vero nihil ad pontificium ius, et e medio est iure civili*. Other examples in Hand Tursel. II, p. 495.

65. 11. *ne beatus quidem*; "and moreover not happy": simply continuous, not cumulative, as in cases where *ne ... quidem* = not even. Comp. III, 17, 43; 26, 68; and more in Madvig Cic. De Fin. note, p. 816.

65. 17. *quos non pudeat*. The Mss. omit the negative, so that the sense would be: The other Epicureans are ashamed of their master; you alone do not share in this. It is unnecessary to note the improbability of such a compliment to Velleius in the mouth of Cotta.

65. 20. *persequitur omnis nominatim*, for example in the *peri τέλον*; of which a passage, quoted by Athenaeus VII, p. 280 A, is translated by Cicero, Tusc. III, 18, 41: *Nec equidem habeo quod intellegam bonum illud, detrahens eas voluptates, quae sapore perciipientur, detrahens eas, quae auditu et cantibus, detrahens eas etiam, quae ex formis perciipientur oculis, suavis motiones, sive quae aliae voluptates in toto homine gignuntur quolibet sensu*. But Cicero has omitted in the translation the portion to which the censure contained in *obscoenis* especially applies, τὰς δὲ ἀφορμαίοις ἡδονάς; *quae si appelles honos praefandus sit* he says De Fin. II, 10, 29.

65. 28. *At has leviores ducis*; an objection which Cotta himself makes in behalf of Epicurus in order to controvert it directly; just as in c. 41 init.: *At dolore vacant*. — Epicurus was often reproached with inconsistency in his teachings in regard to pleasure; in many passages he represented the pleasures of the senses as the highest good, at other times he disparaged these and exalted the pleasures of the mind. Comp. Tusc. III, 20, 46. The following *quonesque ludis*? hints that he could not have been really in earnest.

65. 29. *titillatio*. Epicurus said *γαργαλιασμός* and *γαργαλίζειν*. Athen. XII, 546 E; Plutarch, Non posse suav. vivi, c. 3 and others. Cicero, translating the words in other passages by *titillare* and *titillatio* (De Fin. I, 11, 39; Tusc. III, 20, 47; De Offic. II, 18, 63; Cat. Mai. 14, 4), always adds a *quasi* to qualify the inappropriate expression.
65. 33. Metrodorl. He appears also in Plutarch in the passage cited above as a very strong defender of sensuous pleasure: οἷον τα ὂπι γα- στέρα τάγαθν εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πόρους τῆς σαρκὸς ἀπαντάς, δὴ ὃν ἥδονη ἐπεισέχρεται, καὶ πάντα καλὰ καὶ σοφὰ ἐξευθηματα τῆς περί γαστέρα ἥδους ἕνεκα γεγονέναι καὶ τῆς ὑπέρ ταύτης ἐλπίδος ἀγαθῆς, ὡς ὁ σοφὸς εἰρηκε Μητρόδωρος.

66. 7. Cogitat. For the number see note to c. 19, 51.

66. 12. ne interesse. These words are wanting in the Mss., but are preserved in the citation of the passage in Augustin. Epist. 56 tom. II, p. 267, ed. Basil. 1569. It is not advisable to strike them out and to read non pereat or non conteratur for non vereatur. The idea is that the continual fear of annihilation must interfere with the happiness of the gods.

66. 14. afluent, sc. ad nos, which, being so easily understood, could very well be omitted. Comp. c. 19, 49.

66. 16. de sanctitate. Comp. c. 44, 122. Among the works of Epri- 115 curus cited by Diog. L. X, 27 is one περὶ δαιμονίων. Whether there was a special one περὶ εὐσεβείας is not known.

66. 17. Ti. Coruncanium, the first plebeian Pontifex Maximus. Ci- cero also speaks of him (II, 66, 165) as a man beloved of the gods for his goodness; in III, 2, 5 as an authority in matters of religion; he says the same also of P. Scaevola.

66. 18. Scaevolam, i.e. P. Mucium P. F. Q. N. who was Pontifex Maximus in 631.

66. 20. ut Xerxes. Herod. VIII, 109 and many others state that Xerxes destroyed the temples and sanctuaries during his expedition to Greece.


66. 23. At est eorum &c. With reference to what Velleius said in 116 c. 17, 45.

66. 29. pletas, iustitia adversum deos. Inasmuch as justice yields to every one that which is due, it includes what is due to the gods. Cic. Partit. Or. c. 22, 78: In communione autem quae posita pars est (virtuus) iustitia dicitur, eaque erga deos religio, erga parentes pietas, vulgo autem bonitas; Macrobr. In Somn. Scip. I, 8, 7: De iustitia veniunt innocentia, amicitia, concordia, pietas, religio; Lact. Div. Inst. VI, 10: Primum iustitiae officium est consiungi cum deo, secundum cum homine.
66. 31. Sanctitas . . . scientia colendorum deorum. This corresponds to the Stoic definition of εἰσέβεβαια in Diog. L. VII, 119: εἶνα δὲ τὴν εἰσέβεβαιαν ἐπιστήμην θεῶν θεραπείας. Comp. Xen. Mem. IV, 6, 4; and Sext. Emp. IX, 123. — It is not strange that expressions of this sort have no precisely defined meaning, and hence are not always used and explained in the same way.

67. 2. Diagoram aut Theodorum. See note to c. 23, 63.—Protagoram; note to c. 12, 29.

67. 8. totam de dis immortalibus opinionem fictam. This opinion was avowed by many in the time of the Sophists, and the oldest evidence for it are some verses which Plutarch (De Plac. Phil. I, 7) cites from the Sisyphus of Euripides, but which others ascribe to Critias. Comp. Introd., pp. 6, 7.

67. 11. Prodicus Clus, a Sophist of the Socratic age, and in many respects worthy of great consideration. The opinion here quoted is also ascribed to him by Sext. Emp. adv. Phys. c. 2, p. 522: Πρόδικος ὁ Κέιος ἐλεύθερος καὶ αξιόνων καὶ υψιστῶν καὶ κρήνας καὶ καθόλου πάντα τὰ ωφελούντα τῶν βίων ἡμῶν οἱ παλαιοὶ θεοὶ ἐνόμισαν διὰ τὴν ἀτι αὐτῶν ωφέλειαν, καθάπερ Αἰγύπτιοι τὸν Νείλον καὶ διὰ τὸ τούτο τὸν μὲν ἄρτον Δήμητραν κληθήναι, τὸν δὲ οἴνον Διόνυσον, τὸ δὲ πῦρ Ἡφαιστοῦ, καὶ ἴδη τῶν εὐχρηστώτων ἐκαστῶν.

67. 17. Euhemer, from Messina in Sicily, at the end of the fourth century B.C., a friend of the Macedonian Cassander; he wrote a ἱερὰ ἁναγεγράφη, professedly based on documents which he claimed to have found in the temple of Zeus Triphyllos on an island of the Southern Ocean called Panchaia; according to these documents all the gods of the popular belief, from Uranus down, were nothing more than deified kings and heroes of early times. Extracts from his book are given especially in Diodor. V, 42 ff.; and Euseb. Praep. Evang. II, 4. Ennius translated it into Latin, and a number of passages of the translation are found in Lactant. Inst. Div. I, 11; but their genuineness is doubtful. — Hoeck, Kretalia III, 326 ff., and Gerlach in his Histor. Studien, p. 137 ff., treat of Euhemerus at length.

67. 22. Ubi initiavitur &c. The verses are from a tragedy otherwise unknown. — Instead of orarium we must either (with Bentley on Horace Od. I, 35, 29) read orai, or take orarium as partitive genitive, depending on ultimae. Ultima orarium, "the extreme of the boundaries." [But this would require the genitive ultimae to depend on gentes, which seems rather forced. Why not gentes ultimae orarium, as in Hor. Od. I, 35 ultimos orbis Britannos, or Tac. Agr. c. 30 Nos terrarum ac libertatis extremos? "the most remote people of the countries," instead of "the people
of the most remote countries."—The following anapestic verses are perhaps taken from the Philoctetus of Attius, and refer to the mysteries of the Cabiri at Lemnos. Probably the verses cited by Varro L. L. VII, 11 went before:

Lemnia praesto  
littora rara et celsa Cabirum  
delubra tenes, mysteria queis  
pristina castis concepta sacris.

See Hermann Opusc. III, p. 120.

67. 26. Quibus explicatis &c. That is, the deeds and experiences of the gods, set forth in the mysteries, have an allegorical signification; if you bring them down to their true meaning (ad rationem revocatis), you recognize in the gods the powers of nature personified, and in their actions and experiences natural events. This was the view of thinking minds; but we cannot believe that the priests themselves gave explanations of that sort to those initiated in the mysteries. — Comp. besides the similar expressions in regard to the allegorical interpretations of the Stoics III, 24, 63.

67. 29. hortulos suos inrigavit, alluding to the garden in which Epicurus lived. See note on 33, 93.

67. 29. nutare, to waver, have no settled, tenable opinion. Comp. De Fin. II, 2, 6: Nunc autem dico ipsum Epicurum nescire (quid sit voluptas) in eoque nutare.

67. 30. Tum enim censet ... So far as we can ascertain the theological views of Democritus, he held first the existence of a divine substance pervading the whole universe, consisting of special atoms of the most subtle constitution. This is the theia ousia in Clem. Alex. Strom. V, § 88, p. 698 Pott., and the kósmos ψυχή in Plutarch Plac. Phil. I, 7. From this substance proceed not only the individual gods but also the souls of living beings, which by breathing constantly receive as nourishment particles of this same substance which pervades the air. Arist. De Resp. c. 4. It is this substance doubtless which Cicero here means by principia mentis, and which above also c. 12, 29 he intends by natura quae imagines fundat.

For from this proceed the divine forms called cíðola on account of their subtle, ethereal constitution quite different from the coarser corporeal form: δύσφαστα μέν, οίκ δύσφαστα δέ. καὶ τότων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοτοία, τὰ δέ κακοτοία. Sext. Emp. IX, 19, p. 553. These are Cicero’s animantes imagines, quae vel prodesse nobis solemant vel nocere; and likewise without doubt the imagines divinitate praeditae mentioned in the beginning of the passage. But the last-mentioned ingentes imagines, which embrace the whole universe from without, are not alluded to in this shape by any other author, and probably are the result of a misunderstanding.

68. 7. negat idem esse in deo gratiam. See the κυρία δόξα cited above c. 17, 45. On idem comp. note to III, 39, 93.

68. 11. amari...dilig. These expressions are often used together; the former indicates an affection coming from the heart and to some extent involuntary, the latter a well-grounded esteem. Amant di homines, because it is of the divine nature to love men: diligunt di homines in that they bestow their special favor on the pious and virtuous.

68. 14. For Consent autem we should probably read Consent enim; it is certain that both particles are often confounded by the copyists. See Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 355.

68. 15. Nihil est enim virtute amabilissimus. Comp. De Amic. c. 8, 28: nihil est enim amabilissimus virtute, nihil quod magis adlicat ad diligen-dum, quippe cum propter virtutem et probitatem eos etiam quos numquam vidimus quodam modo diligamus.

68. 17. quid maius datis? In the language of common life dare in many phrases is equivalent to "cause, bring about"; e.g. malum dare, frequent in the comic writers.

68. 17. in inbecillitate. Comp. De Amic. c. 9, 29: guam (benivolentiam) si qui putant ab inbecillitate profisci, ut sit, per quem adequadur quod quisque desideret, huncilem sane relinquunt et minime generosum, ut ita dicem, ortum amicitiae.

68. 24. utilisatem suarum; nostrarum would be more correct; but since in what precedes the first person only represents the indefinite subject aliquis, the transition to the possessive of the third is easily explained.

68. 31. Ludimur; because he is not really in earnest. Comp. c. 40, 113; and III, 1, 3.

68. 35. Posidonius. See c. 3, 6.

69. 11. valeat, like the Greek χαρέω, χαίρεω εἰσαμεν αὐτόν, an expression of common life, to indicate that one cares for nothing more to do with a person. Donatus on Terent. Andr. IV, 2, 13 calls it renuntiationis verbum.

BOOK SECOND.

78. 2. rhetore for orator, to indicate a regularly trained speaker, which is not implied in orator. The word is used in the same sense of L. Torquatus in Brut. c. 76, 265. Generally rhetor means a teacher of rhetoric. Comp. Plin. Ep. IV, 11: eo decidit, ut rhetor de oratore fieret. In later times however the rhetores were also generally called oratores. See Ruhnken Praef. Ad Rutil. Lup., p. XXVI and Cramer ad Schol. Juven., p. 550.

78. 3. [indisertum contains the protasis of pertinuiisem; as sine ista philosophia does that of rhetorem quamvis eloquentem, sc. pertinuisem.]

78. 7. corona is used to denote the circle of listeners at judicial trials. Comp. De Fin. II, 22, 74: at tu eadem die in iudicio, aut, si coronam times, die in senatu. Brut. 51, 192: in iis etiam causis, in quibus omnis res nobis cum iudicibus est, non cum populo, tamen, si a corona relictus sim, non queam dicere.

78. 7. ad ista alias, sc. dicam. Comp. note on I, 8, 19.

78. 9. [malim is Müller's reading, mallem that of all the edd. and Mss. except A, which has malen. Müller feels justified in reading malim on account of the confusion in the Mss. In D. N. III, 9, 21, A V have velis for velis; in II, 59, 147 they all have velim for vellem; in III, 4, 9 all have velis for velles &c. Schoemann here has vellem with the following note:] mallem, not malim, because the speaker renounces the fulfilment of the wish, knowing, as he does, that Cotta would hardly treat of the gods in the same way that he would do himself. That he afterwards says aveo audire does not conflict with this; it is a sort of revocation of the preceding renunciation. Nor does the use of dum . . . inducat, instead of dum . . . induceret after mallem contradict it; such slight inconsistencies are permissible in familiar conversation. Comp. De Fin. I, 7, 25: si concederetur, etiamsi ad corpus nihil referatur, ista per se esse incunda. De Div. II, 59, 122: ne si navigare quidem velim, ita gubernarem, ut somniaverim. Plin. Ep. X, 115: lege Pompeia permissum Bythiniciis civitatibus adscribere quos vellent cives, dum civitatis non sint alienae; dum here = dummodo, as in the passage of the text.

[The imperf. subj. of these words mallem &c. is generally used when the fulfilment of the preference &c. is no longer possible. In this case it
is not so because Cotta had finished his discourse and because, as Balbus knew, the Academic had nothing positive to say on the subject; Balbus calls attention to it this way. The tense of *inducat* may be more than an oversight. "I should have preferred to hear Cotta continue his speech rather than leave off where he did, and see how he gets on when he comes to propound a system of positive theology; he ought to have one and I am curious to know what it is."

79. 3. *istam quaestionem.* This pronoun is used because the person addressed is the one who proposes the discussion, and who also last spoke. On *iste* referring to the person addressed see Reisig, Vorl. § 209.

79. 7. *suumus,* of subjects which one takes up for discussion. De Orat. II, 90, 366: *quis Antonio permisit, ut et partis faceret et ultram vellet prior ipse suumeret?*

79. 16. *Ennius,* who more than any one else made the Romans acquainted with the works and various forms of Greek poetry, modelled his tragedies chiefly upon the plays of Euripides. The verse here quoted is from the Thyestes. For others of similar import see below c. 25, 65. [Schoemann reads *sublumen* and remarks:] Festus (p. 306 M) apparently vouches for the form *sublumen* (subst.) as having been used by Ennius; but this is not quite certain. [Baiter also has *sublumen* in both editions.]

79. 18. *Iovem.* The ancients recognized the fact that the name *Iovis* (properly *Diovis*) signified "the heavenly" (see Varro L. L., V, 66), and modern comparative philology has confirmed it. *dium* too means the heavens, the bright sky, which spreads the light of day (*dies*) over the earth. *Zeus,* *Dios,* *deus,* *θὸς* are of the same root; and the supreme being bears the distinctive name of "heavenly father," *Dios pater, Diospiter,* *Diospiter,* *Iuppiter.* The Stoic however completely identifies God with the heavens, indeed he makes the heavenly ether God, as older philosophers had already done before him, whose views Euripides assigns to his heroes in some of his tragedies.—In the following *illum vero et Iovem* Balbus has in mind the supposed derivation of the name from *iuvare,* c. 25, 64.

79. 21. *patrem divumque &c.,* equivalent to the Homeric *πατὴρ ἄνδρων* *τε θεῶν τε.* The Stoic however understands thereby the creator, while in Homer and the other poets the name *Zeus* does not designate the creator, but only a paternal ruler; this is noted by Arist. Polit. I, 12. Cf. Div. Chrys. Or. XII, 75: *πατὴρ δὲ (*Zeus*) καλεῖται διά τε τὴν θεσμο-νίαν καὶ τὸ πρωτον.

79. 24. *cognitum comprehensumque.* The second word defines the first more precisely, and in the Stoic sense is to be understood of a
sure knowledge accompanied with a firm conviction. Comp. note on I, 5, 12 and Acad. I, 11, 41.


79. 28. *ceteras opiniones ... extabuisses*. We should expect directly the antithesis *naturae autem judicia ... confirmari*, or the like. But the speaker first adds something more for the confirmation of the first assertion, and, repeating it in other words: *opinionis commenta delet dies*, adds the antithesis *naturae judicia confirmat*.

79. 31. *apud inferos portenta*. A hyphen, as in c. 3, 7: *P. Claudii bello Punico primo temberitas*; and 5, 14: *praeter naturam portentis*.

80. 1. *religionum sanctitates = religiones sancte habitae et observatiae*. But the assertion that there was a constant improvement in the matter of religious observances must not be taken too strictly; it is contradicted by the numerous complaints of Cicero and others about the increasing decline of religious feeling. Cicero too contradicts himself very soon by what he makes Balbus say (c. 3, 9) on the neglect of the auspices.

80. 2. *quod et praesentes ... declarant*. The *et* here is not 6 equivalent to *etiam*, but corresponds to another that should have followed, for example *et praedictionibus ac praesensionibus futurae significant* (c. 3 in.), which Cicero had in mind but forgot while citing the examples of divine manifestations. It is a case of anacoluthia. For examples see Matthiä De Anacoluthis ap. Ciceronem in Wolf’s Litt. Analect. III, p. 5; or A. M. Vermischte Schriften, p. 56; and Madvig Cic. De Fin., p. 804; Madv. Gram. 480 and obs. 1.

80. 3. *apud Regillum*. When the Latins under Octavius Mamilius took up arms against Rome in favor of the exiled Tarquins, they were beaten by the dictator A. Postumius Albus at Lake Regillus in the Tusculan district a.u.c. 258. Dionysius A. R. VI, 13 and others mention the appearance of Castor and Pollux; Livy says nothing about it.

80. 6. [*ex equis*. For the preposition here and below *cum equis* see Roby 1174. 1937; 1235; Madvig 258, obs. 3.]

80. 7. *Persem victum nuntiaverunt, i.e. they gave news of the victory which L. Emilius Paulus gained over Perseus (or Perses) of Macedonia at Pydna in the year 586.*

80. 8. *hulus adolescentis*. On the pronoun see note I, 28, 79. The person referred to is P. Vatinius, against whom there is an oration of Cicero still extant.

80. 8. *praefectura; a municipium, to which a praefectus iuri dicundo was sent from Rome as chief magistrate.*

80. 13. *ad fluvium Sagram*. This small stream separated Croto
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from Locri. The battle, which ended in the total defeat of the people of Crotô, took place about B.C. 580. See Heyne, Opusc. Ac. II, p. 185; and on the participation of the Dioskûri see Klausen, Æneas u. d. Penaten, p. 666; and Preller, Röm. Myth., p. 659.

80. 16. Faunorum, field and wood gods of a lower order, to whom were ascribed all sorts of spectral apparitions and cries. Originally the popular belief knew only one Faunus, who was said to have been king in old times in Latium; at a later period there were many. Comp. De Div. I, 45, 101; and below III, 6, 15.

80. 19. ea ostendi, for eas. Comp. note on c. 5, 15. The Mss. add quae sint or quae sunt or quae futura sunt; evidently additions of persons who were disturbed by the neuter of the pronoun. For hominibus, which is plainly unnecessary, perhaps divinitus would be better.—The following series of synonymous expressions is also found De Div. I, 42, 93. It is difficult to distinguish the ideas clearly; but it may be said with Doederlein (Synon. Part 5, p. 174), that prodigium expresses more particularly what is significant and leads to important consequences; ostentum what is wonderful and extraordinary; portentum what is terrible and threatening; and monstrum what is unnatural and ugly.—The pronoun illa has no grammatical relation to the preceding ea; it is rather to be explained illa quae nobis res futuras ostendunt &c.

80. 20. [This phrase illa ostenta &c. is cited by Nägelsbach, Latein. Stilistik, § 3, 2, b, as a case where the want of an article in Latin is supplied by the demonstrative pronoun, equivalent here to Greek τα. ostenta &c. are then subjects of dicuntur. Comp. Tusc. V, 27, 78: Mulieres ... in certamen ... veniunt ...; quae est victa, ea laeta prosequentibus suis una cum iuvene in rogum imponitur, illa victa maesta discedit. But it seems preferable to take illa as referring to praedictiones et praesensiones with a change of gender like that of ea.]

80. 21. quodsi ea ficta credimus. We should expect quae de Mopso &c. traduntur to follow; instead of that Cicero with a freer turn of expression uses only the names.—They are all names of famous seers of the heroic age.


80. 25. P. Claudii (Pulchri) temeritas. The occurrence took place a.u.c. 505; the battle was near Drepanum against the Punic general Adherbal.

80. 30. Junius (L. Pullus). The disaster happened near the promontory Pachymenum: his mistake was quod vitio navigasset (Cic. De Div. I, 16, 29), i.e. contra auspicia, or avisbus non addicentibus.

81. 4. Atti Navil. Comp. Livy I, 36, where he is called inclitus ea tempestate augur, i.e. in the time of Tarquinius Priscus. It is an error of memory that Cicero mentions Hostilius here; in other passages, De Repub. II, 20, 36 and De Div. I, 17, 31 where the same story is told in more detail, he gives it correctly.

81. 10. peremnia, auspices taken at the crossing of a river.

81. 11. ex acuminibus, "auspicium totum militare" says Cicero De Div. II, 36, 77. But it is impossible to ascertain with certainty what is to be understood by acumina, whether the points of lances on which electric flames were sometimes seen, or the tongued flames of the sacrificial fire, or the points of the beaks of the birds, or what not. See the citations in Giese and Moser, Cic. De Div., p. 293.

81. 11. nulla, cum viri vocantur. The nulli viri vocantur of the Mss., which no one has ever been able to explain (comp. Schoen. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 275), must necessarily be thus amended. Gellius XV, 27, 3 expresses the idea more fully: cum viri ad praecilium faciendum in aiciem vocabantur. While the army was forming in line of battle the general took the auspices: is apud quem in exercitu auspicium imperiumque erat, in tabernaculo in sella sedens auspicabatur. Sabidius in Schol. Veron. on Virg. Aen. X, 241. When the soldiers were arranged in battle array, in procinctu, they occupied the time while the general was taking the auspices in making their wills before three or four of their companions: interim ea mora utebantur qui testamenta in procinctu facere volebant, says Sabidius in loco. A will made under such circumstances without further formalities (sine libra atque tabulis, De Orat. I, 53, 228) was legally valid. When the taking of the auspices fell into disuse the testamenta in procinctu also ceased, as there was no time for making them. This incidental remark may be here superfluous; but it need not for that reason have been regarded by the critics as suspicious. It is to be considered in the same way as the similar remarks II, 36, 91; 43, 111; III, 10, 25. The opinion of some that the testamenta in procinctu had not fallen into disuse in Cicero’s time is without foundation.
81. 13. *cum auspiciis posuerunt*, *i.e.* as proconsuls or praetors, when their *auspicia* or the right *rei publicae causa auspiciandi* had already passed over to their successors in the consulship or praetorship. Comp. De Div. II, 36, 76.

81. 14. **Imperatores**, the two P. Decii Mures, father and son, the former in the Latin, A.U.C. 415, the latter in the Gallic war, 457. See Livy VIII, 8 and X, 28.


81. 20. **T. (Sempronius) Gracchus**, the father of the two celebrated tribunes. — He was consul for the first time in A.U.C. 576 with C. Claudius Pulcher, the second time in 590 with M. Iuventius Thalna.

81. 21. **crearet.** This expression is quite frequently used of the magistrate who conducted an election, *qui comitia consulibus (praetoribus, aedilibus &c.) rogandis habet.*

81. 21. **primus rogator**, *i.e.* *rogator primae centuriae or praerogativa,* he who collected the votes of the first century and informed the presiding magistrate of the result. This is called *referre praerogativam* in Cic. De Div. II, 35, 75 where the same story is told, or *nomina referre; here ut eos, i.e. eorum nomina retulit.* On the other hand *rogator comitiorum* was the person who presided over the assembly, because his duty was to ask the people for whom they would vote, or in case of proposed laws whether they would accept or reject them: *populum rogare magistratus or leges.* This *rogator* must then be distinguished from the official mentioned in the text.

81. 24. **quos ad soleret;** a not uncommon anastrophe of the preposition with relative pronouns, as *quem per, quem contra, quos adversus* and the like. Examples from Cicero may be found in Beier, Ad Fr. Or. pro Tull., p. 57; Madvig De Fin., p. 549; Roby, 1038.

11 81. 31. **e provincia,** from Sardinia, whither he was sent as proconsul.

81. 31. **ad collegium sc. augurum,** to which he himself belonged; De Div. I, 17, 33; Ep. ad Quin. Frat. II, 2. — **libros sc. augurales,** which probably contained a collection of the old rules and formulas with explanations of various learned members. They are called *Commentarii* in De Div. II, 18, 42.

81. 32. **vitio sibi tabernaculum captum.** To take the auspices for a proposed electoral meeting the presiding magistrate went soon after midnight to an appropriate open place outside of the city where a tent was erected for the purpose: *tabernaculum capere.* But on his way thither, as he passed the *pomerium* or the region of the city walls, he was obliged to observe the omens as a warrant for proceeding further; otherwise the
tabernaculum was not rite captum; see Lange, Röm. Alterth. I, p. 413. Now Gracchus, after the first pitching of the tabernaculum, had occasion to return to the city; but on repassing the pomerium he forgot to observe the omens again as required by law; hence the tabernaculum was vitio captum. Comp. De Div. II, 17, 33. — [Schoemann reads [ad] hortos Scipionis.] The preposition before hortos is wanting in the Mss.; some have in hortos, which should then be horto or horitis; (in villa Scipionis is found in Granius Licin., p. 10, ed. Bonn.). Hortos cannot be taken as apposition to tabernaculum as has been proposed; it would be better to strike out the words. [Baiter brackets them.]

82. 1. [Senatus ut abdicaret; for the ellipsis see Roby I44I and Madv. Gram. 479.]

82. 13. [Baiter and Schoem. read ars nulla medicinae est for the reason given by Madvig that “it is good Latin to say medicina ars non est, but not ars nulla, no science.” Müller answers that ars medicina is perfectly good (Varro L. L, V, 93; Quint. XII, 11, 24, rei militaris et rusticae et medicinae), i.e. he takes medicina as an adjective.]

82. 15. non deorum natura. Numen, and not natura, would be better in opposition to coniectura. Comp. Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 327. It is not meant that Cicero really wrote numen; natura is rather to be taken in the same sense as in De Div. I, 49, 110.

82. 16. omnis omnium gentium without any substantive for omnis, is also found I, 18, 46. — Summa is the sum and substance of the matter. Cic. Acad. II, 9, 29: Non debere eos in suo decreto fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteter; De Fin. V, 5, 12: nec in summa tamen ipsa aut varietas est ulla aut dissensio; Ad Fam. XIII, 75, 2: Summa est, in quo mihi gratificari possis, si curaris, ut Avianus me a te amari sciat.

82. 17. Innatum, “arisen in the course of natural development,” not “innate”; for the Stoics did not, any more than the Epicureans, admit the existence of innate ideas. See above note I, 17, 44 and Plut. De Plac. Phil. IV, 11.

82. 18. Cleanthes. See I, 14, 37. With the four following reasons Cleanthes does not mean to give a proper speculative proof of the existence of the gods; but only to show the innasce, the natural origin of the belief in their existence. He therefore says, not argumentis or rationibus, but causis, i.e. occasions, for this is the proper idea of the word; hence the phrase causam capere; and so in § 14 when he says tertiam causam, quae terreret animos fulminibus &c., the expression is strange, but not exactly to be condemned. The occasion terrifies a man, in so far as it arises from the terrifying phenomena of nature.
82. 20. [Primam posuit eam &c. One is almost tempted to refer eam and alteram to notiones, considering the expressions eam, quae erat esset, and alteram, quam ceterimus; but farther on we find tertiam, quae terre-ret, and Quartam causam esse &c., which show that the antecedent is causis. The passage is carelessly written.]

82. 28. praeter naturam ... portentis; a hyphen, as above c. 2, 5.

82. 30. nuper bello Octaviano. A.U.C. 667. The consul Cn. Octavius, a partisan of Sulla, was besieged and slain by his colleague L. Cornelius Cinna and Marius who had just returned from Africa, while Sulla was fighting against Mithridates. Bellum Octavianum also in De Div. I, 2, 4; Philipp. XIV, 8, 23; Florus III, 21, 9. The adverb nuper might seem to indicate that we must imagine the present conversation to have taken place but a short time after that war. But the meaning of nuper is very relative, and it is hence used of somewhat remote periods of time, as in De Div. I, 39, 85: ante philosophiam patefactam quae nuper inventa est; and c. 50, 126 we even find: quae nuper, id est paucis ante saeculis, reperta sunt; where the period of modern culture is opposed to the early dark and uncultivated ages.

82. 32. Tuditano (C. Sempronio) et (M') Aquillo coss. A.U.C. 625. On the death of Scipio Africanus see III, 32, 80 and note. The double sun in that year is also referred to in De Repub. I, 10, 15.

83. 4. non esse ea fortuita for eas fortuitas. Comp. above c. 3, 7; and below 7, 18 extr.; also 34, 87; and 35, 88; De Leg. II, 11, 28: Bene vero quod mens, pietas, virtus, fides consecratur ... ut, illa qui habeant ... deos ipsos in animis suis collocatos putent. The use of the neuter here is not strange because to the objects which the pronoun refers have only a grammatical, not a natural, gender.

83. 4. [Ut, si quils &c. Ut here means "as for example"; and corresponds to multo magis ... statuat necesse est below. The apodosis of Si quis ... venerit is non possit &c.]

83. 10. nihil ... vetustas mentita sit, i.e. the endless lapse of time has never deceived men's expectations; the phenomena have always happened just as they ought and were expected to do according to the laws observed by men. Comp. c. 21, 56. ὁς γένοις ὁ ἀγήσιοι τοῦ ἀνδρε; is the question asked in a similar connection in the treatise De Mundo, c. 5, falsely ascribed to Aristotle, but the work of some later Peripatetic.

83. 12. Chrysippus quidem. See note I, 15, 39.—quamquam est acerrimo ingenio, tamen ... If Cicero meant to say that, clever as Chrysippus may have been, the following argumentation was cleverer than one would have expected of him, he has not expressed himself very
clearly. It is not in spite of his real ability, that he has made such an argument, but because his ability, however great people thought it, was even still greater than the common opinion. The excellence of his argumentation therefore was to be opposed not to his ability itself, but to the common opinion of his ability, somewhat thus: quamquam accerrimo esse ingenio credatur, tamen, quae dicit, eiusmodi sunt &c. Whether the argumentation really required so much keenness is another question; however that may be, it had already been made before Chrysippus by Cleanthes as may be seen from Sext. Emp. IX, 83.

[According to the preceding note the drift of the sentence would be that Chrysippus in the argument that follows showed himself to be cleverer than he was generally thought to be. But taking the language as it stands the opposition would rather seem to be between acerrimo ingenio and ab ipsa natura; “although he is a man of very keen mind and so quite able to construct a perfectly sound and convincing argument, yet the argument which he actually makes on this point is so sublime that you would think he had ‘borrowed a leaf from the book of nature,’ and not have found it out himself.” The point of the remark is then not the greater or less keenness of Chrysippus, but the soundness and beauty of the argument; and in the mouth of a Stoic this seems more natural than a very dubious compliment to Chrysippus.]

83. 20. (a) quo illa conficiuntur. The preposition, wanting in almost all Mss., is as indispensable here as before homine in the preceding sentence. Comp. Hand Tursell. I, p. 31 f., and below III, 10, 25 where the same argument is made in somewhat different language.

83. 26. desiplentis adrogantiae. Comp. De Leg. II, 7, 16: quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte adrogantem, ut in se rationem et mentem putet inesse, in caelo mundoque non putet?

83. 29. [A. du Mesnil in Fleckeisen’s Jahrb. 1877, p. 760 proposes to strike out the non; Müller (Adnotat. Crit.) approves, adding: The sentence is negligently written; it should run either thus: An . . . possis adduci, ut putas; tantum ergo ornatum . . . nonne desipere videare? or thus: An . . . non possis adduci, ut putas; tantum ornatum . . . ut tuum ac non deorum . . . putas, possis?]

83. 30. et mustells. The ancients kept weasels as well as cats in 17 their houses for the destruction of mice. Comp. Phaedr. Fab. I, 22; Perig. on Aelian. V. H. XIV, 4.

83. 34. omnia supera esse mellora. This sentence leads us to expect a line of argument similar to that in Sextus Emp. IX, 86 ff.: namely that the beings who live in the higher regions of the universe must be of a higher, superhuman nature, and therefore gods. Instead of this however
there follows something which has no necessary connection with what precedes, namely that the reason which dwells in man forces us to acknowledge also a reasonable principle in the universe from which the human reason is derived. One would think that Cicero had quoted from his original authority rather carelessly.

84. 2. quibusdam regionibus atque urbibus. See below c. 16, 42.

84. 5. Et tamen, i.e. in spite of all its imperfection the human reason is of such sort that we can only explain it as an outflow from a higher divine reason. Comp. c. 31, 79. aliam quam would perhaps be a better reading than aliquam; for the circumstances are different in passages where aliquis seems to be equivalent to alius quis; see Haase's note to Reisig, p. 338.

84. 8. apud Xenophonem. Memor. I, 4, 8: νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἄρα οὐδ' αὐτὸ δεύτερον ψύχος πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι; comp. below III, 11, 27; Tusc. V, 13, 38: humanus autem animus, decerptus ex mente divina, cum alio nullo nisi cum ipso deo, si hoc fas est dictu, comparari potest.

84. 10. terrenam . . . viscerum soliditatem = viscera solida et terrenae. Viscera includes not only the intestines but everything except skin, bones and blood. Comp. below c. 63 extr.; Tusc. II, 14, 34: Spartae pueri ad aram sic verberibus accipiantur, ut multus e visceribus sanguis exeat; Lactant. De Opif. Dei, c. 7: deus ossa visceribus operuit. Hence visceratio, κρεανομία. — Ochsner, Ecl. Cic., p. 22 has correctly remarked that animal illum would be more correct than the animum illum of the Mss.

84. 24. tot rebus ipsis se inmutantibus, “by the transformation of so many things within themselves”; i.e. their being subject to a transformation which takes place in themselves by a process having its moving spring within themselves. Evidently the changes in plants are meant, where the plant is developed from the seed, the fruit from the flower; and these changes stand in so close connection with the nearness or remoteness of the sun, that one can infer its position from them. Comp. Plin. H. N. XVIII, 27. The ancients however speak also of many other changes that go on in plants and beasts coinciding exactly with specified seasons of the year; examples may be found in Cic. De Div. I, 9, 16; II, 14, 33; Theophrast. Hist. Plant. I, 16; Gellius N. A. IX, 7, 1 and others. The ablatives solstitiiis brumisque are not to be taken with cognosci, but serve as a more precise definition to accessus discessusque. — Solstitium, although properly it denotes the winter as well as the summer solstice, is regularly used to mean the latter and opposed to bruma or hiems. Iuven. IV, 92: sic multas hiemem atque octogesima vidit solstitia. Comp. Gesn. on Varro R. R. I, 46.
84. 26. aestus maritimae, the ebb and flow of the ocean. See III, 10, 24. Similar movements of the sea occur in some narrow passages in the Mediterranean, as in the Euripus and the Fretum Siculum; also in the Adriatic sea according to Strabo V, 1, 5, p. 212. Hence the expression fretorum angustiae. The old naturalists generally held that these movements were caused by the influence of the moon: τῶν περὶ τῶν ὑκεανῶν πλημμυρίδων καὶ ἀμπώτεων αὐτῆ (ἡ σελήνη) αἰτία ἐστί, says Cleomedes in the treatise on the phenomena of the heavens, II, 1, p. 105; and Bake, p. 416 cites several others. [Comp. De Div. II, 14, 34: Quid de fretis aut de marinis aestibus plura dicam? quorum accessus et recessus lunae motu gubervantur.]

84. 27. una totius caeli conversione cursus astrorum disparis. The stars have an apparent motion with the whole heavens around the earth, but not all at the same rate. The greater part of them move so that they always keep the same place in the heavens, thus moving only along with the heavens, and these are called stellae fixae; others move in such manner that while moving along with the heavens around the earth they have an independent motion of their own, and are seen now here and now there; they are therefore called planetae. But these cursus disparis also follow an established law; hence the expression conservari. Comp. c. 20, 51.

84. 30. et continuato. The adjective is thus placed in order to bring out more pointedly the idea that the soul of the universe is to be conceived as a continuous, undivided whole.

84. 31. fusius is sometimes wrongly translated “at greater length”; it means “in loose discourse, not confined to a strict order and division.” Cic. De Leg. I, 13, 36: quae fuse olim disputabantur ac libere, ea nunc articulatim dissecta dicuntur. See Bake’s remark. [But ubierius and fusius seem to be opposed here to brevius and angustius in the next sentence. So Orat. II, 38, 159: et genus sermonis affert Stoicus non liquidum, non fusum ac profuens, sed exile, aridum, concicum ac minutum; Quint. II, 4, 7: materia abundantior atque ultra quum oporteat fusus. See the examples in Harper’s Latin Dictionary s. v.—Academicorum calumniam. So Acad. II, 5, 14: Arcesilaei calumnia.]

84. 34. ut profuens amnis. A similar comparison occurs in Quint. XII, 2, 11.

85. 3. Zeno. His own words are cited in Sext. Emp. IX, 104. Diog. L. VII, 143, ascribes the same argumentation to Chrysippus, Apollodorus and Posidonius.

85. 8. quae sunt his carentia. A structura ad sensum; for the
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demonstrative refers to the ideas of sapientia, beatitudo, aeternitas contained in the preceding adjectives. See above I, 29, 80.

22 85. 13. urguet angustius, "passes on with a closer, more concise reasoning toward his result." Urguere denotes the emphatic persistence in an assertion or an argument by which the assent of others is compelled. So De Fin. IV, 48, 77: urguent tamen et nihil remittunt, where Cicero is speaking of the argumentation of the Stoics by which they tried to compel assent to their proposition: omnia peccata paria.—The following argument of Zeno is also found in his own words in Sext. Emp. IX, 101.

85. 20. modulate, "melodiously," with melody; numerose, "rhythmically."

85. 24. [Idem, Baiter II, item.]

9 85. 28. dixeram. For the pluperfect see Haase's note to Reisig, p. 504; Jahn on Orat. 29, 101.—motu suo, i.e. motu proprio; it is autokinesis, not set in motion or activity by anything external to itself.

86. 2. [extincto calore occidimus ipsi; ipsi, "we ourselves," as distinguished from calor, the vital principle. So farther on he says eam caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem.]

24 86. 3. Quod quidem Cælanthes ... docet, quanta vis insit. A sort of epexegesis similar to that noticed in I, 15, 38; for here also the relative refers to what precedes as object of docet, the same idea being afterwards repeated in another form, quanta vis insit. Comp. De Fin. II, 4, 12: Quod vestri quidem vel optime disputant, nihil opus esse eum, qui futurus sit philosophus, scire litteras; Corn. Nep. Attic. c. 18: magistratus eorum non amplius quinis versibus descripsit, quod vix credendum sit, tantas res tam breviter potuisse declarari; comp below c. 37, 93, and further Jahn on Orat. c. 16, 52. The frequent combinations quod si (above c. 1, 3, below II, 38, 96), quod cum, quod quoniam and the like have sprung from this form of expression, although a freer use often obscures the origin.

86. 5. quin is. Comp. note III, 13, 34.

86. 6. venae et arteriae. The second expression serves to specify the first, for it is only the arteries, not the veins, that beat; but venae is very often used in a generic sense including also the arteries; and hence one may say venae micant, venas tangere and the like, though Gellius XVIII, 10 censures this as a loquendi imperitia. Comp. note 55, 138.—[quum cor ... palpitaret is a curious form of expression; we should expect ita mobiliter palpitare with quum ... evulsum in the form of an adverbial sentence of time.]

86. 12. eam caloris naturam, "this heat substance." For heat is
regarded as a substance in the physics of the Stoics; and *natura* in its concrete signification comprises every natural substance; further on the earth is called *terrena natura*.

86. 18. *terram fumare calentem*. These words form the last half of a hexameter. It is hardly to be supposed that Cicero would quote a line of poetry for so unimportant an observation; it occurred to him by chance. In Orat. c. 56, 189 he remarks how easily this may happen, and many collections have been made of examples from the best writers. Comp. note c. 60, 151 and Wolf on Tacit. Ann. I, 1.


86. 24. *ex se generata*, *i.e.* without seeds by a so-called *generatio originaria*. See note I, 37, 103. — Plants are called *stirpibus insixa* because they are held in the earth by means of the *stirpes*, which includes the lower part of the stalk or trunk with the root. Comp. § 28, extr. *Temperatio* is the right measure, the proper degree of heat, as above c. 5, 13 *caeli temperatione*. Of course *ea* does not belong to *temperatione* but is accusative and repeats the idea of the subject; as c. 9, 24 *id vivit*, and § 27 *ea et ipsa*.

86. 27. *fusio* is the property of water, when it is not confined, to spread on all sides. The expression serves therefore to define further the preceding, *liquor*. The Mss. have *effusio* without *et*. Instead of *deinde* corresponding to *primum* follow later *Atque etiam maria* . . .

86. 31. *maria* . . . *tepescent*. Plutarch Quaest. Nat. c. 8: *τὴν τῆς θαλάττης σύμφωνον οὖσαν θερμότητα ἐκκρίνουσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἄνεμοι καὶ τρέφουσιν*.

86. 34. *excitatus*; modern science calls it "sensible" as opposed to latent heat.

87. 1. *recalescunt*; supply mentally: *si quando perfrizerunt*.

87. 1. *aër . . . maxime frigidus*. Plutarch De Primo Frig. c. 9: *οἷ μὲν Στροκόλ τῷ ἄρε τῷ πρῶτῳ ψυχρῷ ἀποδίδασιν*. Comp. Diog. L. VII, 137. The Stoics held cold as well as heat to be a substance, a sort of matter, and located it more particularly in the air. Seneca Qu. Nat. II, 10: *Natura aëris gelida est*. When other things grow cold it is a result of the intervention of this material cold; and this explains what is said above of the freezing of water: *aquilonibus reliquisque frigoribus addextis*.
durescit umor, “when the cold substance contained in the north winds or other objects comes to unite itself with the water.” So what follows directly about the air, multo calore admixtus, as also a few lines before admixtum esse calorem refer to the admixture of the material heat which is the ether.

87. 3. oritur ex respiratone aquarum. See c. 33, 84: Nam ex terra aqua, ex aqua oritur aër, ex ære aether.—Below c. 45, 117 however the warmth of the air is explained by the proximity of the ether.

87. 5. quam similitudinem = cuius rei similitudinem or c. r. simile quid. Comp. De Fin. V, 15, 42: ea sequimur ad quae nati sumus. Quam similitudinem videmus in bestiis; and ibid. suam cuique rei naturam esse ad vivendum ducem; quae similitudo in genere etiam humano apparel.

87. 10. mundum ipsum; the universe itself, as opposed to its constituent parts. Comp. c. 12, 32: nulla pars corporis est, quae non minoris sit, quam nosmetipsi sumus. So ipsius mundo c. 22, 58, and mundum ipsum c. 31, 80; 34, 86.

87. 16. Natura est igitur. Natura is not the subject but the predicate to the subject understood from the foregoing, calidum illud atque ignem: “this warm and fiery principle is a substance, which” &c. For the difference between this and the earthly fire, fire in its narrower sense, see below c. 15, 40.

87. 19. cum allo iuncta atque conexa. More correctly it would have been: ex pluribus iuncta et composita. Ἄν παντὶ πολυμερεὶ σώματι is the phrase in Sext. Emp. IX, 119 where this argument of the Stoics is given.

87. 20. ut in hone ine mentem for ut or qualis in hone ine mens est. Comp. note I, 29, 82.

[The ἠγεμονικόν is the supreme, governing principle of the world, the highest reason, the soul of the universe, the fiery spirit which penetrates every thing (πνεύμα δὲ ὡς τοῦ κόσμου ἀδήκον); just as in man the ἠγεμονικόν is the reason. Diog. L. VII, 139: οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸν ὄλον κόσμον ζῶον ὄντα καὶ λογικόν ἐχειν ἠγεμονικόν μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, καθά φασιν Ἀντίστατος ὁ Τίρσος; the world then is conceived by the Stoics as a living being (ζῶον), and its reasoning soul as the godhead. God is the universe; but is also the ἠγεμονικόν, the soul of the universe, a part of the universe. The whole argument is thus stated by Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. IX, 119: ἐν παντὶ πολυμερεὶ σώματι καὶ κατὰ φύσιν διουκουμένῳ ιὐτὸ τὸ κυρίευον (= ἠγεμονικόν). Καθὼς καὶ ἐφ ὁμῶν μὲν ἡ ἐν καρδίᾳ τοῦτο τιγχάνειν ἀξιωσταὶ ται ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ ἡ ἐν ἀλλω τινὶ μέρει τοῦ σώματος. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φυτῶν]
87. 34. omnem vim mundi natura divina contineri; “the universe, with all that pertains to its being and idea, depends for its existence and maintenance upon a divine being that pervades it.” For contineri comp. § 29 init. Instead of it we have § 28 init. sustineri; below retineri; and § 31 teneri; which all come to the same thing.

88. 1. ad sensus commovendos. The phrase in the Greek original was perhaps πρὸς κίνσαι αἰσθήσεως ὑπο αἰσθητικῆς, i.e. for the activity of the perception and consciousness; whereas Cicero’s words have reference rather to a working on the senses, which is not in question here.

88. 2. hic noster calor, i.e. the natural heat that pervades the world immediately surrounding us, the earthly beings; not the common fire as opposed to the elemental fire, as a recent commentator imagines. For this common fire according to § 41 is confectior consumptorque omnium, whereas hic noster calor is that heat which preserves and vivifies things, the θερμὸς ψυχῆς, as Aristotle calls it, De Gen. Anim. III, 11. Comp. above p. 73, Remark.


88. 10. Audiamus enim Platonem. The following proposition from Plato is not cited apropos of what immediately precedes, nam quid . . . teneatur, which is rather to be regarded as a sort of parenthesis; but of the clause preceding that, namely praeertem cum . . . moveatur, and to give the reason why this clause was presented as the chief argument for the proposition that the mundi ardor (αὐτῆς) is a being endowed with perception and thought. The passage of Plato which Cicero refers to is found in Phaedr., p. 245 C, § 51, and is translated Tusc. I, 23.—For esse before ponit, which some have objected to, comp. Acad. I, 5, 19: corporis autem alia ponebant esse in totis, alia in partibus; and other examples in Madvig De Fin. V, 25, 73.


88. 28. Primum enim. Instead of the corresponding secundo or deinde we have § 34 autem as very often happens.—The order of beings here corresponds to the order of their souls, which the Stoics distinguished, therein agreeing with Aristotle. Plants are endowed with a ψυχὴ φυτική αὐ
NOTES.

θρεπτική only, beasts with a ψυχή αισθητική besides, men with a λογική also. Comp. Arist. De. An. II, 3; Macrobi. In Somn. Scip. I, 14, 7; and 19, 23.

13 88. 34. **Quartus autem gradus.** It is evident that while the first three grades are known by experience, the fourth is only assumed to complete the series, which otherwise would not include the most perfect beings, as is seen from § 35.


89. 1. **ratio recta constansque;** reason that always hits the mark, true to itself, never falling into contradiction with itself: λόγος ὀρθός καὶ ὁμολογούμενος καὶ βέβαιος καὶ ἀμετάπτωτος (Plut. De Virt. Mor. c. 3); to think and act in conformity with this is wisdom and virtue.

The *recta ratio* is *supra hominem putanda* only in so far as regards an inborn reason, not one that is gradually developed and brought to perfection. For although man very seldom really reaches it, it is not to be thought utterly impossible; *homo enim sapiens fieri potest* he says below § 36. But comp. De Offic. III, 4, 16; De Amic. c. 5, 18.

35 89. 4. **in utraque institutione,** in the case of any organized system of things; of any things which are arranged by nature or by man.

89. 9. **in omni natura,** i.e. in universa natura or rerum omnium natura, hence in mundo. On *rerum omnium natura,* which is here at least as fitting as *r. omnis n.* comp. Schoen. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 362. [ac connects sic and multo magis; “in the same manner and in much higher degree.”]

36 89. 25. **deterior potius.** potius is by no means superfluous, merely strengthening deterior. On the contrary it alone really serves for the comparison of the two members; the assertion is that the predicate deterior would be applicable to the condition of the mundus rather than to that of man. The comparison to which the comparative deterior points is not fully developed in the sentence, because it is easily understood without that; we may supplement thus, *deterior de duabus.*

37 89. 31. **undique aptum:** “on all sides, i.e. in all respects suitably arranged.” — **omnibus suis numeris et partibus.** The second expression might have been omitted; for numeri often denotes all the essential parts of a thing, conformably to the Greek usage; as in Diog. L. VII, 100: τὸ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν παρὰ τὸ πάντας ἀπέχειν τοὺς ἐπιζητουμένους ἀρίθμους ἅπα ὅ τῆς φύσεως.
89. 32. Selve enim Chrysippus. The sense of the argument which Cicero does not bring out very clearly is doubtless this: All which simply serves something else as a means to an end is not absolutely, but only relatively perfect. The universe alone, since it comprehends everything within itself and so serves nothing else as a means, is its own end and absolutely perfect. Hence that cannot be wanting to it without which it would not be absolutely perfect, namely, reason. — On enim see note c. 16 init.

90. 3. ad mundum ... imitandum. This does not refer to an artificial or an artistic imitation of nature, but to a conformity in will and deed with the supreme law of reason and right; the ὅμοιοποιήμενως τῇ φύσει ζήν. Comp. De Senect. c. 21, 77: Sed credo deos immortales sparsisse animos in corpora humana, ut essent qui terras tuarentur, quique caelestium ordinem contemplantes imitarentur eum vitae modo atque constantiam; Senec. De Vita Beata c. 3: a natura non deerrare et ad illius legem exemplumque formari, sapientia est. Other examples in Beier on Cic. De Offic. I, p. 325.

90. 4. [Sed mundus ... complexus est. We should expect the present here; comp. De Fin. II, 34, 112: non ... maria pedibus peragranti, sed omne coelum ... complexum; and ibid. III, 5, 17: quiddam ... complexum et continens veritatem.]

90. 9. similitudines adiungens. Chrysippus often used them; see above c. 8, 22.

90. 15. effectur tamen in homine virtus. The general idea of virtus according to De Leg. I, 8, 22 is nihil aliud quam in se perfecta et ad summum perducta natura, the complete development of all the faculties and capacities of any being: τὸ τι ἢν εἶναι of Aristotle. Such virtus is realized (effectur = ad effectum perductum) in man, i.e. in the wise man (§ 36), although rarely and with difficulty because of the hindrances which oppose him. It is however always realized in the divine universe which nothing hinders (§ 35).

90. 19. quae ... gignuntur. Comp. c. 36, 92.—We have already seen I, 10, 25; II, 27; 12, 30 that other philosophers before the Stoics considered the heavenly bodies to be gods.

90. 22. animantia. Comp. Somn. Scip. c. 3: ex illis sempiternis ignibus, quae sidera et stellas vocatis, quae ... divinis animatae mentibus &c.

90. 25. inmenso mundo. Cleomed. II, 84: πάντα τῶν κόσμων φωτίζει 40 σχεδὸν ἀπειρομεγέθη δύνα. Inmenso mundo is a dativus commodi. [Schoeemann does not supply the in.]

90. 26. Is elius tactus est, "its effect, its influence upon us is such":
whereas before tactus denoted the sense of touch itself. Comp. De Div. II, 46, 97: ex quo intellegitur plus terrarum situs quam lunae tactus (the effect of the moon) ad nascentium valere. Comp. De Or. II, 14, 60.


90. 32. confector consumptorque. The second word serves to define the first, which of itself alone might be ambiguous. Confectrix rerum omnium vetustas is cited from Cicero by Lactantius VII, 11, 5.

90. 34. Ille corporeus, i.e. qui est in corporibus; although in other places the word rather means "corporeal," corpore praeditus, as also in Cicero Timae. c. 4 and 8. On the other hand in De Fin. III, 14, 45 res corporeae are bodily endowments, as health, beauty &c.—It is hardly necessary to remark that ignis corporeus here is quite the same with hic noster calor above § 30, the heat which gives life and growth to all earthly creatures. This comes from the ardor caelestis, the ether of the highest regions, where it is pure and unmixed with grosser matter. Cicero uses ardor for the Greek άιθρια (from αιθρο); and Balbus below c. 36, 91 thinks it necessary to make a sort of excuse for employing it as being less current in Latin.

91. 5. et quidem, here equivalent to et profecto; an addition with emphasis.

92 91. 8. Aristotelii videtur. No such remark is to be found in the extant writings of Aristotle; but the Ps. Plutarch (Plac. Phil. V, 20) says: ἐστι πραγματεία Αριστοτέλους, ἐν τῇ τέσσαρα γενή ζωῶν φαι, χερσοί, ἐνθά, πτωνά, οἰφάνω. Besides comp. note I, 13, 33; and Bernays, p. 102.

91. 13. In his sensum inesse &c. It would have been more correct, and more adapted to the purpose of the argument, had Cicero written: in his sensum acerrimum inesse et intellegentiam celerrimam.

16 91. 15. Etenim leet videere. Etenim introduces not a reason for the proposition immediately preceding, which, as following from undisputed premises, needed no further reason, but rather a reason in addition to those already brought forward; it is therefore a new link in the chain of reasoning, and would have been introduced quite as well at least by porro or praeterea. Cicero often uses etenim and enim in this way. Comp. Madvig De Fin. I, 1, 3. The warrant for this usage is to be found in the real meaning of enim, which originally was not causative but only asseverative.
91. 26. neque naturam significat, "points neither to a mere force of nature," i.e. a blind and unconscious force. For this signification of the word, which the connection absolutely requires, comp. c. 32, 81; I, 13, 35; and III, 11, 27. Significare is used in the same way c. 22, 54: significant eandem mentem atque prudentiam; and c. 33, 85: tantam naturae soleritiam significat; declarare in the same sense is found in c. 32, 81.

91. 30. aut natura aut vi aut voluntate. It is plain that natura here denotes the force of nature that works unconsciously in everything, vis a force that operates from without; to both these is opposed the motion resulting from free will and inherent power. This view of Aristotle, as well as that cited above § 42, occurred doubtless in the dialogue peri philosophias. No passage that exactly corresponds is found in his extant writings, but in De Caelo III, 2 he says: άνάγκη γάρ ἡ βίαν εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν ἡ κατὰ φύσιν. In the same work I, 2 however he distinguishes a motion of three kinds, ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου, peri τὸ μέσον. The last, the circular motion, is by nature peculiar to what he calls the πρῶτων στοιχείων, and what others call aether; the heavens and the heavenly bodies are composed of this πρῶτων στοιχείων, their motion being so far a natural one, and yet withal a voluntary one; this is to be understood of the planets.

91. 33. [in] sublime. The preposition probably was added by copyists, who were unacquainted with the adverbial use of sublime. Comp. Priscian XVII, 14, 11 and the citations of Kühner, Tusc. I, 17, 40.

92. 15. certa notione animi praeestiamus. This expression, like the following praesensionem notionemque nostram, refers to the προλήψις, which the Stoics believed in, like the Epicureans. See note I, 17, 44 and 14, 37. It is a φυσική ἐννοια (Diog. L. VII, 54), which arises in the mind without particular teaching or reflexion, ἀνεκ διδασκαλίας κἀκεφαλής, in a natural and simple manner, ἀνέπτεσθηντως. Plut. Plac. Phil. IV, 11. In another passage, De Stoic. Rep. c. 17, these προλήψεις are also called ἐμφυτευσεῖς in the same sense as Cicero calls them innatas c. 3, 12. — Man has then a natural preconceived notion of the divine nature, and is convinced of the substantial truth of this notion immediately, intuitively, and without proof; and he admits the truth of any further scientific idea of the divine nature only in so far as he finds it to correspond to this preconceived notion, so far as he can bring it into harmony with that; this Cicero expresses below by accommodare; comp. Orat. c. 7, 23: unum (Demosthenem) accommodare ad eam, quam sentiam, eloquentiam.

92. 18. primum hunc ipsum mundum. The corresponding deinde is wanting. The heavenly bodies evidently would come next; but in the tirade against Epicurus Cicero forgets so entirely the form of the sentence,
that when he comes back to the stars there is no proper place for the
deinde.

92. 21. minimeque resipiens patriam, i.e. Atticam. Attici praeter
Gellius III, 3: Non dubium est, quin istae fabulae resipiant stilum Plau-
tinum.

92. 30. paulo post; c. 22, 58 ff.

92. 32. noll prae te ferre, "don't make a parade" as if it were
something to boast of, and not rather to be ashamed of.


92. 34. [Novum etiam oculorum judicium, i.e. your sense of sight
seems to be differently constituted from that of other people, as well as your
mental judgment.]

92. 35. Sed sint ista pulchriora . . . The contrast to this conces-
sion does not come until § 48, and then in a different form. Except for the
intermediate sentences Cicero would have continued somewhat thus: illud
tamen certe manifestum est, hanc aequabilitatem motus &c.

92. 35. dumtaxat aspectu, "at least so far as the appearance is
concerned," taking this only into consideration. Comp. Madvig De Fin.
II, 7, 21.

93. 1. [ea figura. The Stoics, in agreement with Aristotle, imagined
the universe to be a globe consisting of several concentric spheres, which
with the earth were held fast in space by the force of gravity. Diog. L. VII,
140: ἐνα τῶν κόσμων εἰναι πεπερασμένων, σχῆμα ἔχοντα σφαιροειδές· πρὸς γὰρ
τῶν κίνησιν ἀρμοδίωτατον τὸ τοιοῦτον. Kühner.]

93. 5. globus (sic enim σφαῖρα interpretari placet). The lan-
guage seems to indicate that globus in the mathematical signification was
not yet generally in use in Cicero's time. He uses it for the heavenly
spheres in Somn. Scip. c. 4; of the earth ibid. c. 6 and Tusc. I, 28, 69.
Originally it meant only a "lump," akin to glomus, as Priscian I, 8, 44 re-
marks. Seneca Quaest. Nat. IV, 11 and often in other places, as well as
Pliny several times, uses pila in speaking of the earth.

93. 8. a medieoque tantundem absit &c. [Schoemann has the
old reading a medioque tantum absit extremum, quantum idem a summo;
quo nihil &c.; and wrestles with it in the following note.] The extreme
(extremum) of the sphere or circle is the whole surface or circumference;
and if one were to specify any point as the "highest" (sumnum), this
would necessarily lie on the surface of the sphere or in the circumference
of the circle, and could not be opposed, as is here done, to the extremum.
If the passage is not corrupt, we must assume that Cicero did not mean by
extremum the whole surface or the whole circumference; but imagined
two diametrically opposed points, one above the centre called sumnum,
the other below, which would have been more correctly called imum, not
extremum. In this case the error would only be that an expression which
might be applied to other bodies or figures is here applied to the sphere or
circle alone.

93. 10. eruditum illum pulverem, i.e. mathematical studies; be-
cause the old mathematicians made use of a table covered with fine sand
and a small stick called radius to draw geometrical figures. [Tusc. V, 23,
64: ex eadem urbe humilem homunculum a pulvere et radio excitabo, qui
multis annis post fuit, Archimedes.] — physici, with irony. Comp. I,
27, 77.

93. 18. caelum palatum. Probably palatum was originally “what 49
covers like an arch,” and hence could be used of the heavens that overarch
the earth, as well as of the palate that overarches the mouth. The Greek
obpavos also means both palate and heaven; and the same homonymy
is found in other languages, as J. Grimm remarks in Haupt’s Zeitschr. für
Deutsches Alterthum VI, p. 541.

93. 19. quorum alterum, i.e. the fixed stars. — alterum autem, the 19
planets. — conversiones duas; two sorts of revolutions, a daily one
around the earth from East to West, and another around the sun from
West to East; in c. 20 he speaks of the different periods required for this
in the case of different bodies. — isdem spatulis, sc. utramque; each
of these two revolutions always takes place in the same path; for this is
the proper meaning of spatium. Comp. c. 40, 103.

93. 26. easdem . . . opacet. It is incorrect to say that the sun
darkens any part of the earth. It leaves it in shade while it is shining on
the opposite side. So Horace improperly says in the Carm. Sac. 9: alme
sol, curru nitido diem qui promis et celas; and when Pliny H. N. II, 5, 4
says hic (sol) reliqua sidera occultat, illustrat, the illustrare can only
happen when the sun sets and so allows the stars to become visible. So
Livy XXXIII, 7, 9 says: inga montium detexerat nebula, the mist, i.e. by
passing away. Comp. below c. 40, 102. Similar examples in Reisig
Vorles., p. 306 with Haase’s note; and Lobeck Paralip., p. 559; Kühner
Ausf. Gram. § 597 r., p. 1074.

93. 27. umbra terrae soli officiens, the shadow of the earth which
shuts out the sun, i.e. the light of the sun. The conical shadow of the
earth, falling in any part of the heavens, banishes in a certain sense the
light of the sun, and makes night; hence umbra terrae meta noctis, De Div.
II, 6, 17.
93. 29. [modi, “regular,” according to measure, modus.]

93. 30. circumitus orbium = circumitus in orbem, revolution in a circle. Comp. Timae. c. 9: nox et dies . . . unum circumitum orbis efficit.
— While the sun revolves around the earth from East to West 365 times and a fraction, it moves backward along the ecliptic through the twelve signs from West to East; sometimes it approaches nearer to our orbis terrarum while moving up to the sign of the Cancer in the North, sometimes it goes farther from it while moving downward to the sign of Capricorn.
— The calculation of the tropical solar year of 365\(\frac{1}{4}\) days is moreover much older than the introduction among the Romans of the Julian year which was based upon it.

50 94. 2. solis annuos cursus, i.e. the moon makes in a month the passage through the twelve signs of the Zodiac, which the sun completes in a year.

94. 7. [Schoemann reads (Ita) for (Inde) and says:] Ita before in lunae has fallen out in the Mss. Inde might have been used instead.

94. 11. earum quinque stellarum. It is well known that the ancients were acquainted with only five, or, counting the sun and moon, with seven planets. Yet many people surmised that there might be several others invisible for their feeble light. Senec. Nat. Qu. VII, 13, 1.

94. 13. progressus et regressus. The apparent motions of the planets are sometimes forward and sometimes backward, called nowadays the direct and the retrograde motions.

94. 15. tum adeunt, tum recedunt. This, like antecedendo et retardando § 52, is to be taken in reference to the sun. All the planets, as well as the sun, move through the Zodiac; at times they are nearer, at times farther from the sun; sometimes they go before, sometimes after it. Of course all this is to be understood of their apparent, not their real motion.


94. 20. ad eandem inter se comparationem, “to the same relative position.” Comparatio means originally “arrangement together,” at first of pairs, afterwards of several objects.

94. 22. Quae quam longa sit . . . The length of this so-called
magnus annus, μεγας ενιαυτος, in which the ἀποκατάστασις, or the return of
sun, moon and planets to the same relative position, should take place was
fixed by Cicero in the Hortensius at 12,954 years (according to the Dial.
de Causs. Corr. Eloqu. c. 16). Other estimates, some larger, some smaller,
may be found in Lindenbroc on Censorinus. c. 18; or in Voss on Virgil
Ecli. IV, 5. Some persons held that after the expiration of the great year
the destruction of the world by fire (the ἐκπερωσις, see c. 46, 118) would
take place and a new world would arise. Nemes. De Nat. Hom. c. 38;
Thomasius De Exustione Mundi, § 7 ff.

94. 25. XXX fere annis. The period is a little more than 29 years
164 days.

94. 31. annis XII. More exactly in 11 years 315 days 14 hours.
94. 33. The year of Mars consists of 686 days and 23 hours. For 53
lustral comp. note I, 31, 87.
II, 8, p. 16 Cron. gives 339 days; the period is really only 87 days 23
hours.—Annus vertens, like mensis vertens in Plaut. Pers. IV, 4, 76,
with reflexive meaning of the participle corresponds to the Greek περιπλά-
νεων or περιπελλόμενος ἐναυτός.
95. 2. unius signi intervallo; really not more than 28 degrees.
95. 5. Lucifer . . . Θεωρως. According to some Pythagoras, ac-
cording to others Parmenides, first discovered that the morning and evening
stars were the same planet. See Diog. L. VIII, 14; IX, 23.
95. 6. cursum anno conflict; in 224 days 16 hours.
95. 7. et latitudinem . . . The paths of the planets intersect the
Zodiac, which forms a wide girdle, in an oblique direction; so that they
approach sometimes the upper or northerly, sometimes the lower or souther
ly border.
95. 8. duorum signorum intervallo; at the most 48 degrees.

95. 11. non possum intelligere : "I cannot conceive of." Comp. 21
III, 15, 38. Of course sine mente &c. belong not to intelligere as an ad-
verbal qualification, but to the object of intelligere.
95. 17. cursus . . . caelo inhaerentes. Taken strictly this might be
called a contradictio in adiecto; but the sense is made plain by what fol-
lows, namely, that the revolution of the fixed stars is not dependent on or
caused by the motion of the encircling heavens or ether but they have
their own distinct sphere: orbis in quo infixi sunt . . . stellarum cursus
sempterni, as is said in Somn. Scip. c. 4, 17. This was imagined to con-
sist of a solid crystalline matter. A separate sphere was also assigned to
each of the five, or, counting the sun and moon, seven planets, in and along,
with which it revolved. The clearest exposition of the matter is given by Schwegler on Aristot. Metaph. XII, 8, 12, p. 274 ff. Comp. also Ideler on Arist. Meteor. I, p. 418.

95. 27. nec vanitas, "no unreliaibleness, falsity." They never falsify the reckoning; as above c. 5, 15 it is said: in quibus nihil unquam immena et infinita vetustas mentita sit.

95. 27. omnis ordo, "complete order"; so c. 22 fin. omnis ornatus.

95. 33. Haud ergo &c. I fancy I shall make no mistake if, after what I have already said, I commence my discussion about the godhead, or nature (which according to the Stoics are the same), with a quotation from Zeno.

96. 1. ignem esse artificiosum &c. Diog. L. VII, 156: δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς (τοῖς Στρωκίοις) τὴν φύσιν εἶναι πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὡδῷ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν. ὡδῷ βαδίζον denotes a mode of operation constant, definite and designed, as also below c. 32, 81. In distinction from this πῦρ τεχνικὸν Zeno called the earthly fire πῦρ ἀτέχνον, as Balbus above c. 15, 41 called it confector et consumptor omnium. Stobae. Ecl. I, p. 358. From another point of view Æschylus (Prom. v. 7) calls it πάντεχνον because of its usefulness for various arts.

96. 5. magistrum artium reliquarum. Apuleius (De Mundo, Tom II, p. 134 Altenb.) expresses the idea involved in this as follows: Nam quid, oro te, ornatum atque ordinatum videri potest, quod non ab ipsius (mundi) exemplo imitatura sit ratio? All artistic effort is a creation with intelligence and design after the example of nature, which creates with intelligence and design. Omnis ars est imitatio naturae, Senec. Ep. 65.

96. 6. omnis natura; every force of nature, acting in any portion of the universe or in any single being, in contrast to the natura ipsius mundi, the universal nature working throughout the universe. Comp. c. 10, 28.

96. 9. non artificiosa solum, sed plane artifex. The former is less than the latter; artificiosus may be said of one who has a high degree of skill without being a thorough artist, an artist by profession; the latter is the artifex, the artist in all that he undertakes.

96. 11. ut ceterae naturae . . . sic natura mundi. Ut . . . sic introduce not only parallel but contrasted expressions. (See Goerenz on De Fin. I, 1, 3.) As on the one hand the nature of individual beings is bound up in and conditioned by their semina, their germs in which the law of their development is contained (in seminitibus vis inest earum rerum, quae ex iiis prosignuntur, De Div. I, 56, 128), so on the other hand universal nature follows her own free and rational determination.
BOOK II.—CHAP. XXII, XXIII, §§ 56-61.

96. 23. [nec cessantium &c., “neither leading a life of complete inactivity, as the Epicurean gods are represented to do, nor yet performing their functions with a labor that is excessive or irksome.” Balbus alludes to the remarks of Velleius in I, 20, 52.]

96. 29. monogrammos deos. Gods, who have only the outlines of a form, liniamentis dumentaxat extremis, as is said above I, 44, 123. In the same way Lucilius called a pale and emaciated man, who was a mere shadow, vix vivum hominem ac monogrammum. Nonius, p. 37 Merc. Comp. above I, 18, 49; 27, 75; 35, 98.

96. 34. [ multae . . . naturae deorum. For the expression comp. in the preceding chapter natura mundi, ceterae naturae; De Fin. 4, 7, 16: omnis natura vult esse conservatrix sui. Below 23, 62 he says simply Utilitatum igitur magnitudine constituti sunt ei di.]

96. 35. non sine causa. These words express a concession or recognition. The Stoic does not reject the view in question, though he does not undertake to establish it by reasoning, because that is impossible for him to do. The universality of the view alone gives it a claim to recognition. Although he only allows it to hold good at first of individuals, and those the wisest, yet its universal acceptance proves to him that there must have been an anticipation of it in the minds of men.

97. 3. quod erat a deo natum. Comp. below § 62: qui utilitates quasque gignebant; and De Offic. II, 5, 16: nulla tam detestabilis pestis est, quae non hominum ab homine nascatur.

97. 4. nomine ipsius del: so it is only by metonymy, the gifts being called after the givers, not themselves deified as many erroneously thought. See I, 14, 38 and III, 16, 41. Comp. Plutarch De Is. et Osir. c. 70: ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς τὸν ἱερεῖον βιβλία Πλάτωνος ἱερεῖα φαμεν Πλάτωνοι, καὶ Μέναδρον ὕποκρίνεσθαι τὸν τὰ Μενάδρον ποιήματα ὑποτεθέντων, οὕτως ἐκεῖνοι τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ἤνθυμα τὰ τῶν θεῶν δόρα καὶ ποιήματα καλεῖν οὐκ ἔρειδοντο. Also Schoem. Opusc. Ac. II, p. 56.—The following verse is from Terent. Eun. IV, 5, 6.

97. 7. res ipsa. In default of a more definite expression Cicero makes use of the vague and general term res, a certain something wherein a greater power is revealed, and in which a man, although he feels it within himself, recognizes a gift or inspiration from higher powers. Comp. c. 31, 79. In most Mss. vis is found after ut ea ipsa; evidently an error, as the connection shows. Had Cicero thought it necessary to add a noun, he would have used res; as immediately after, ipsa res deorum nomen obtinuit.

97. 9. a M. Aemilio Scauro; about A.U.C. 645, when he was censor. Fides and Mens had temples in Rome before this, as Cicero immediately says of the former. A. Attilius Calatinus was consul 496 and 500, dictator
505. Cicero mentions a temple consecrated by him to Spes, De Leg. II, 11, 28. The worship of Fides is said to have been instituted by Numa, Liv. I, 21.

97. 11. a M. (Claudio) Marcello; in the second Punic war. Q. Maximus, next mentioned, is the famous Fabius Cunctator who conquered the Ligurians in 221.—nou has probably fallen out before multis; for there was at the most an interval of twenty-nine years between Fabius Maximus and M. Marcellus.

97. 16. Voluptatis. The customary name in worship was Volupia; as also Libitina for Lubentina Venus.—vocabula consecrata sunt, "the names were devoted to the appellation of divine beings," instead of "the things denoted by those names were deified."

97. 18. sed tamen. Although sensual pleasure according to the Stoics was not included among the things which nature requires (res naturales), yet it excites nature very powerfully and so comes under the head of those things in quibus vis inest maior aliqua.

24 97. 26. hune Liberum Semela natum, i.e. the Greek Dionysus, to whom the name of the oldItalic god Liber was transferred on account of certain resemblances. But Dionysus, at least as Cicero thought, was a deified mortal, while Liber was considered a god by birth. Comp. Preller Röm. Myth., p. 440 ff.

97. 27. Libera, also an old Italian goddess, like her mother Ceres; both were afterwards identified with Greek goddesses, Persephone and Demeter.—The mysteries here referred to are doubtless the Eleusinian, in which Dionysus (Iacchus) was worshipped along with Demeter and Persephone or Kore; but this mystic Dionysus seemed so different from the mythical son of Semele that Cicero had no hesitation in explaining him to be the same with the old Italian Liber.

97. 30. in Libero non item; i.e. whereas Libera is universally considered the daughter of Ceres, and the name is explained from that circumstance, Liber does not pass for the son of Ceres.—But whose son he was considered to be we do not know.

97. 32. quorum cum remanerent animi. Comp. note I, 15, 39.

98. 2. induti specie humana, i.e. the fact that these divine beings, which are really nothing but forces of Nature, were not only personified, but were conceived of in human form, gave occasion to the mythological fables of the poets.

98. 9. id est igneam. The Stoic adds this to indicate how the view of the ancients is to be understood in conformity with the doctrines of his school.
98. 12. spatiorum ac temporum. The second word serves to ex-plain the first. If there were room here there would be much to say against the explanation given in the text of the name and idea of Kronos, common as it was, if not universal, among those who in ancient times took the stories of the gods as allegories. Cotta refutes, as they deserve, in III, 24, 62 the etymology of Saturnus and most of those which follow. A more probable one, Saturnus a satu, is given by Varro L. L., V, 64. The older form of the name was Saturnus, i.e. Saïturnus, which would explain too the length of the first syllable in Saturnus. See Ritschl De Fictil. Litt. (Derolin, 1853), p. 7 ff. Others derive this name from the Sanscrit, from Savitar, which denotes the “begetter,” and was also an epithet of the sun. So Schweizer in the Zeitsch. für Vergleich. Sprachwiss. IV, 68.

98. 18. ut eum alligaret, because the lapse of time in a certain sense depends on the measure of time given by the heavenly bodies, by which the divisions of time, years, months and days are fixed.—The sudden change of subject is allowable, as there was no danger of confusion. Similar examples in Wopken’s Lectt. Tullian., p. 264.

98. 19. Iuppiter...Iuvans pater. Against this see note c. 2, 4. Yet the derivation here given by Cicero was a very natural one and especially commended itself to the religious feeling of the ancients on the same ground that he suggests for their placing optumus before maxumus. Comp. Or. pro Dom. c. 57, 144: quem propter beneficia P. R. optumum, propter vim maxumum nominavit. — conversis caelibus = obliquis casibus. [Iuppiter stands without a subject, as the clause a poëis...dicitur mentions only an incidental circumstance; at hunc igitur, l. 39, the thread is again taken up, but with the construction changed. So Müller explains the text; commonly Iuppiter is taken as subject of dicitur, l. 21, and hunc igitur Ennius begins a new sentence. Müller’s text gives the full force to the igitur.]

98. 29. exsecrabor in the second verse from Ennius appears to be used for consecrabo, a usage which, though no other example of it is known, does not contradict the etymology and the original meaning based on it, namely, the separating of something from the number of other things as sacrum (consecrated to the deity). Heindorf’s explanation is far less probable; he takes exsecrabor hoc quod lucet for iram caeli imprecabor, and refers cui to some person on whom the speaker desires the anger of heaven to fall.—The verses of Euripides, it is uncertain from what play, perhaps from the Antiope, are found in Stobae. Ecl. I, 3, 2; Lucian, Iup. Trag. 41, and others as follows: ὥρας τῶν ὕψου τῶν ἀπειρου ἀθέα, καὶ γὲν περί ἔχοντ' ὕψας ἐν ἀγκάλαις· τούτων νόμιμε Ζῆνα, τῶν ἦγος θεῶν. The translation is probably Cicero’s own.—breviter, which precedes in the Mss., must either be changed to graviter or cancelled.
99. 5. inter mare et caelum. The Stoic prefers to say "between sea and sky," i.e. aether, rather than "between earth and sky," because he thereby at the same time intimates the intermediate nature of the air between water and ether. Comp. c. 39, 101; 45, 117; Ps. Aristot. De Mund. c. 3; and further in Balfour on Cleomed., p. 315 Bak.

99. 9. a iuvando. The derivation is hardly admissible. The name is rather from the same root as lovis, and to be compared with the Greek Διόνυς.

99. 10. ex fabulis; according to the mythological fables, for which it may suffice to refer to Hom. II. XV, 187 ff.

99. 11. [Schoemann reads altero], old form for alteri. Comp. Reisig, Vorles. § 121.

99. 13. Neptunus. The comparison of this etymology with that of Portunus is curious enough. It is quite possible that the name is related to nare, but we must think on the signification of flowing, which the verb has lost in Latin, but which the Greek νάω and νέω retain. The forms νάω (for νέω), the Fut. νείσχμα or νευσχμα, and ναῦς, navis, testify to the digamma in these words. So then Nevitunus, Neutunus, Neptunus would not be improbable, and the name would be of the same root as the Greek Νηρέως. Others compare it with the Sanscrit Naupati, the name given in the Rigveda to the god of the overhanging cloud-heavens.

99. 14. Diti. The identification with Πλοῖτων is easily and often made; whether correctly so is a question.

99. 16. Proserpina may be a corruption of the Greek Περσεφόνη, which was introduced the more easily because in this form it reminded one of proserpere, and seemed to point to the springing up of plants. The explanation of the Greek name is uncertain.—The words nuptam dicunt which have fallen out in the best MSS. stand in some after nomen est.

99. 19. a gerendis frugibus Ceres. So Varro says too, L. L., V, 64, but wrongly. The name seems rather to be related with Ceres manus, cited from the Carmina Saliaria, and explained to mean creator bonus, from the root cer, from which creo also comes. Comp. Corssen, Krit. Beitr. z. Röm. Lautlehre, p. 342. — That Δημήτρη was the same as Η Μητρή is an error that prevailed among the learned Greeks, and has been obstinately held by some moderns. Comp. Ahrens Dial. Dor., p. 80, and Kühner, Greek Gr. 1, p. 122 (Germ. ed.). It is equivalent to Δεία μήτηρ, goddess mother. Δεία is cited by Hesychius as the Tyrrhenian name of Rhea, like the equivalent dea. This form also occurred in the Doric dialect; see Grammat. Vat. at the end of Gregor. Cor., p. 692 Schaeff.

99. 22. Mavors is to be connected with mas, maris, which originally was the same as mars; this by reduplication became Mamers, and by
BOOK II.—CHAP. XXII-XXVII, §§ 66-68.

interchange of m for ν Mavors, Mavors. The name denotes then the manly, the strong one. In the prayers of the Fratres Arvales Marmar and Marmor occur. Comp. Corssen in the Zeitsch. f. Vgl. Sprachk. II, 1. Other derivations and explanations are given, which cannot be discussed here. [See Preller, Röm. Mythol., p. 296, note 1.]

99. 22. Minerva, anciently Menerwa (Quintil. I, 4, 17), from the root men, to which mens, memini, memοϲ belong, signifies the wise, the thinking one.

99. 24. principem in sacrificando. The examples and proofs in Brisson. De Formul. I, 75 show that Ianus used to be named first in solemn sacrifices and invocations of the gods.

99. 25. Ianum...ab eundo. The root of the verb is of course i,27 which suffers the umlaut only in some forms, so that it is unnecessary to attribute to Cicero the form Eanus, as Cornificius does in Macrob. Saturn. I, 9; and as ianua denotes “the door,” “the entrance,” it is very natural to consider Ianus as the god of the entrance, of doors and gates. (Comp. especially K. Boethke, Ueb. d. Wesen des Janus. Progr. des Gym. zu Thorn 1863.) It is still a question, whether this was really the original idea of the god, or whether the name was not at first Dianus, from which came Ianus, as Iovis from Diovis, and Iuno from Diuno.

99. 29. In ea dea...sacrificatio extrema est. The adjective is apposition, not predicate, to precatio et sacrificio. The expression is equivalent to extrema pars or exitus precationis et sacrificationis.—est in ea dea = versatur in ea dea, i.e. in eius deae veneratione. The remark itself in respect to the Romans is nowhere else expressly confirmed: indeed others, for example Ovid. Fast. VI, 298, 303, say that Vesta was invoked at the beginning; which agrees with the Greek rites. For among the Greeks Εὐτία was according to many authorities first, according to some few last, invoked. Comp. Griech. Alterth. II.4, p. 258; and especially A. Preuner, Hestia-Vesta (Tübing. 1864), pp. 9-29.

99. 31. di Pennates; a general designation of those gods who were worshipped at home as protectors of the household; they did not however like the Lares form a separate class of subordinate deities, but belonged to the number of the highest gods. The relation of the name with penitus and penus is evident.

100. 2. Sol...qua solus. So Varro also thinks, L. L., V, 68. But the name rather comes from the same root from which οἶλας and οὐλήνη come in Greek, and Solen in the Northern languages (Goth. Sauil, Lith. Saulė, “the sun”). Comp. Corssen, Beitr., p. 386.

100. 5. Dianam, eamque Luciferam: Ἄρτεμιν φωσφόρον οὲ οὐλώ-
φόρον. It is true that in Cicero's time Artemis was invoked among the Greeks as the goddess of childbirth, a function which was ascribed to her as the goddess of the moon. As early as the tragedians she was represented as the goddess of the moon.

100. 8. vagantibus, sc. stellis, i.e. the planets. The moon is called vaga luna in Hor. Sat. I, 8, 21 (see Heindorf in loc.). Omnivaga is found nowhere else. The moon does in fact appear more than other heavenly bodies to be wandering here and there.

69 100. 8. Diana ... quia noctu quasi diem efficeret. There is some truth in this. Diana denotes the heavenly goddess of light; from the root mentioned in the note to c. 2, 4.

100. 11. 'menses.' There is no doubt that the name of the moon, μῆνις, as well as others in the cognate languages, really contains the idea of measuring and signifies the moon as the measurer of time. Comp. Lassen, Ind. Alterth. I, 765; II, 1118. This meaning can be also recognized in μῆν and menses. For the various views quo post conceptionem mense infantes edi soleant comp. Censorin. De Die Nat. c. 7.

100. 12. Timaeus of Tauromenium in Sicily, historian, at the beginning of the third century B.C.—The temple at Ephesus was set on fire by the Ephesian Herodotus to gain for himself an imperishable name, which he has succeeded in doing. Comp. Solin. c. 40.

100. 16. Venerem. It is quite as certain that the name does not come from venire, as it is uncertain whence it really comes. According to Pictet, Origenes Indo-Europ. II, p. 692, it comes from the Sanscrit van = colere, servire, amare, whence also veneror, the old German wīn, friend, and the northern vān.

28 79 100. 19. a physicis rebus ... inventis, "from correct and useful observations of physical objects." For videtisne see III, 27, 69, note.

100. 21. [errores turbulentos, "troublesome errors"; our word "troublesome" comes through the French from turbula, with the English suffix — some, German — sami.]

100. 22. [enim generally stands second in the sentence except there be some unimportant word accompanying the emphatic one. See M. 471, Obs. 1.]

100. 23. noti sunt; ironically; we act as if we knew them.

100. 27. apud Homerum. II. XX, 67 ff.

100. 29. cum Titanis, for Titanibus. This metaplasmus is found especially in the quotations from Ennius in Lactantius B. I., although only Titan occurs in the nom. sing. But Priscian V, 4, 26 gives also Titanus; the abl. Titano is found in Varro L. L., VII, 16; and Lactant. also has the nom. pl. Titanii, which Priscian cites from Naevius.
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100. 31. Sed tamen... The connection is: Although these fables are stupid affairs and we discard them altogether, we are not on this account to reject the popular deities too; only we must have the right idea of them.

101. 6. superstitiosi. It is quite clear that the derivation of the word given in the text deserves no consideration; nor any more the various opinions of ancients and moderns, excepting perhaps that of J. Grimm, Deutsche Mythol. II, p. 1059: "superstitio, from superstes, denotes in the case of individual men a continued persistence in opinions which the majority of sensible persons have abandoned."

101. 9. religiosi a relegendo. See note I, 2, 3. The verse cited by Gellius IV, 9: religentem te oportet esse, religiosus ne fuas (for that is the true reading), cannot be held to warrant the derivation given in the text by Cicero, as religens is not a current word, but one manufactured by the poet to support that derivation. Competent scholars have long thought that no grammatical objection lies against the derivation from religare, especially when it is considered that there was an old form ligère for ligere. Comp. Ebel in the Zeitsch. f. vgl. Sprachk. IV, p. 449.

101. 12. [superstitiosus and religiosus here designate merely the words superstitiosus and religiosus; but in accordance with the more usual Latin usage are taken into the sentence and put in the ablative as though they were used in their actual meaning. See Nägelsbach Lat. Styl. § 3, 2, c.]


101. 24. praecise dicitur, "is an elliptical expression," in which something is omitted which must be mentally supplied. Comp. Ad Herenn. IV, 30, 31: praecisio est cum, dictis quibusdam, reliquum relinquitur inchoatum in auditoris inducio.

101. 25. Areopagi. In Cicero's time the Areopagus had, as the council of state, a far more extended sphere and more important influence on public affairs than in the flourishing period of Athens, when, especially after Pericles, its competence was very limited. Comp. Ahrens de Athen. statu inde ab Achaic. foed. inter. Goetting, 1829, p. 34 ff.; and Philipp, der Areopag und die Epheten, p. 314.

101. 32. unum... Ilmatum, i.e. praeter ceteros or in paucis ilmatum. It is not alone with superlatives that unus serves to strengthen the expression. Comp. Lucret. VI, 1229: illud in his rebus miserandum et magnopere unum arrumnabile erat; Horat. Sat. I, 10, 40: potes... commodis garrire libellos Unus vivorum, Fundani; II, 6, 57: me mirantur ut
unum egregii mortalem altique silenti; Epod. XII, 4: sagacious unus odoror. In the text the Mss. carelessly have unum before convenit, where it gives no adequate sense.

102. 2. constitutas, "set in order"; for the Stoic did not, any more than other ancient philosophers, believe in an actual creation of the world by the gods, that is, a creation out of nothing. Comp. note c. 35, 88. In the passage farther on: ab animantibus principiis ea esse generata, it is only intended to say, that the existing divine factors in the creation of the world, themselves issued from the elemental ether, the λόγοι σπερματικοί (Plut. De Plac. Phil. I, 7, 17; Diog. L. VII, 148), or the δύναμες γόνων (as M. Aurel. IX, I extr. calls them) which are spirit and matter in one, have caused later created things to issue from themselves. It must however be confessed that this proposition does not really belong here, where the discourse was to be, not of the origin of things, but of the government of the world.

102. 8. ea esse generata. The Mss. have eam...generatam, which would refer to sentiens natura. But by this last expression we can only understand, as the subsequent explanation §§ 81–86 shows, the soul of the universe, i.e. the portion of the original deity entering into the universe (see Introd., p. 8), which first manifests itself in the λόγος σπερματικός, Cicero's animantibus principiis, but is by no means created by them.

102. 12. simulacra...imagines. The change of expression does not denote a difference in the views of these philosophers, but the two words are synonyms employed for the sake of variety. Comp. I, 12, 29 where the gods of Democritus are also called imagines; and I, 26, 74. It is quite true however that the eidos of Democritus differ from those of Epicurus in this, that the latter proceed from the divine beings existing in the intermundia; the former arise from the atoms flowing forth from the formless divine substance (see note on I, 43, 120), which take various forms by their own agency. Comp. Papencordt De Atomic. Doctr. (Berolin. 1832), p. 70; and Schoemann's essay De Epicuri Theolog. in his Opusc. Ac. IV, p. 353.

102. 12. quodam pacto negat. This is true in a greater degree of Epicurus, whose so-called gods were hardly worthy the name, than of Democritus, whose gods were not entirely without influence on the affairs of men. See above I, 43, 120.

102. 18. VI magna incitata. A necessity assumed to be original, and yet set in action by any other force, would be a contradiction. VI magna then is not to be translated "by a powerful force," but "with powerful force," [abl. modi]; and incitata is to be taken in a medial, not a passive sense ["acting powerfully"].
102. 24. **Etenim.** See note c. 16 init.

102. 26. [Ergo here introduces the *argumentum ex contrario* in the form of a question: "can it then be that...?" The answer follows in *Ad et ignorantiam rerum* &c. Comp. Tusc. I, 31; II, 39; Seyffert, Scholae Lat. I, p. 129.]

102. 30. [minime cadit in malestatem, "by no means falls in with (our idea of) the majesty of the gods," does not comport with it.]

102. 34. **inter seque...coniunctos.** See note on 62, 154.

103. 2. **eadem...ratio.** This follows of course; because the contrary is inconceivable, namely a specific difference between the divine and human reason, however great the quantitative difference may be.

103. 3. **eademque lex.** Comp. De Leg. I, 6, 18: *Lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae iubet ea, quae facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria.* Ibid. 7, 23: *inter quos autem ratio, inter eos etiam recta ratio communis est; quae cum sit lex, lege quoque conciliati homines cum deis putandi sumus.

103. 7. **quae qui convenit,** for quas &c. Comp. note on c. 5, 15.

103. 10. **nisi ab superis.** Comp. c. 6, 18. Under *superis* we are to understand particularly the heavenly bodies. Somn. Scip. c. 3, 15: *homines animus datus est ex illis sempiternis ignibus, quae sidera et stellas vocatis.* With mind of course comes at the same time the capacity for reason and all the virtues.

103. 15. **cum satis docuerimus.** Namely, c. 15, 16.—et *caelum* 80 = et *aethera.* See c. 36, 91.—*mundum ipsum,* the universe in general. See note c. 10, 28.

103. 21. **naturae.** Above c. 30, 75 it was called *naturae sentienti.* The epithet is here omitted, because the Stoic idea of *natura,* which on account of the indwelling soul of the universe includes the attribute of *sentienti,* is yet to be set forth, as opposed to others who took the term *natura* in a different sense. Comp. c. 33, 85.

103. 24. **vim quandam sine ratione.** Comp. I, 13, 35; II, 16, 43; III, 11, 27.

103. 25. **all autem.** We have seen above c. 22, 57 that the Stoics especially belonged to these. Comp. Acad. I, 7, 28: *(natura sentientis), in qua ratio perfectora insit, quae sit eadem sempiterna: quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi, eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque perfectam: quem deum appellani, omniumque rerum, quae sunt ei subiectae, quasi prudentiam quandam.

103. 27. **declarantem...quid sequatur; i.e.** she allows in each
case her designs and aims to be seen. Sequis aliquid, "to pursue something as an end." — For via progradinentem comp. c. 22, 57.

103. 29. seminis enim ... An example to confirm what was just said.

104. 1. ut Epicurus. Sext. Emp. IX, 333 gives Epicurus's own words: ἰ τῶν ὀλίγων φύσις σώματα ἑστι καὶ κενόν. Comp. Lucret. I, 419: Ommis ut est igitur per se natura duabus consistit rebus: nam corpora sunt et inane. — By the following quae his accecidant, i.e. their accidents, is to be understood the motion of the atoms in empty space, and the origin of things resulting from it.

104. 3. natura constare ... mundum &c. The sense is: We mean that the world is not a mere mechanical lifeless aggregate like a stone or a clod of earth, but a living organic whole like an animal or a plant.

104. 4. nulla cohaerendis natura, without a force of organic coherence working in it. Natura, like φύσις, denotes also the δύναμις ἐκνο-κοινὰ τοῖς σώμασι, as Galen says Comm. in Hipp. Ep. 6, p. 5 init.; and Cicero also uses cohaerere in other places of the organic combination in one whole. Comp. c. 34, 87; 45, 115; 62, 155; Acad. I, 7, 28: omni naturae cohaerente et continuata; De Leg. I, 8, 24: alia quibus cohaerent homines; De Orat. II, 80, 325: ut non adjectum aliquod sed cohaerens cum omni corpore membrum esse videatur; Sen. Quaes. Nat. II, 2 extr.: naturam corporis nulla ope externa sed unitate sua cohaerentis. The same author, Ep. 102, calls bodies thus organically cohering continua, in contrast to the composita, those artificially put together by external means. On this subject Sext. Emp. IX, 78–84 deserves to be consulted.

104. 11. Elusdemque exspirationibus &c. Comp. c. 15, 40; and 46, 118, where however the heavenly bodies only are in question. The nourishment of the air and the ether by aqueous evaporation from the earth forms part of the doctrine of the intertransformation of the elements, which is set forth in § 84.


104. 15. aër nobiscum videt &c., i.e. our seeing, hearing and speaking takes place with the help of the air. The Stoics explained sound as resulting from the wave-like vibrations of the air when disturbed; we hear when the ear receives these vibrations. Seeing results from the formation in the air between the object and the eye of a cone of rays of light, the apex of which falls upon the eye. Plut. Plac. Phil. IV, 19; Diog. L. VII, 157, 158. But the opinions of the ancients were very various. Comp. Gell. V, 16 and Schneider on his Ecl. Phys. II, p. 245 ff.

104. 18. Quaerisque in medium locum mundi qui est infimus &c.
The *medius locus* of the universe, which is therefore also the lowest (see c. 45, 116), is occupied by the earth, c. 36 init. That which falls upon it from above is the various sorts of atmospheric storms; that which rises up from it into the higher regions is the evaporation from it; that which moves around it is the heavens with the heavenly bodies; and by virtue of these motions proceeding from, tending to, or encircling this general centre the world appears to be a coherent, uniform system, a *continens unagque natura.* [The real object of *efficiunt*, so far as the sense is concerned, is contained in the adjectives *continetem* and *unam*; "these operations make the continuity and unity of nature."]

104. 22. *vicioissitudine eorum.* The mutual transformation of the elements here alluded to was taught before by the older natural philosophers, like Heraclitus, who called it a ὄδος ἄνω κάτω, a rising and falling; the fire (or ether) is condensed into air, the air into water, the water into earth, the earth again becomes water, &c. Senec. Quest. Nat. III, 10; Plut. De Prim. Frig. c. 14; Diog. L. IX, 9; comp. below III, 12, 31. Many propounded similar ideas, for which see Ideler on Arist. Meteor. I, p. 426; Schwegler on Arist. Metaph. I, p. 72.

104. 27. [coniunctio continetur. Such expressions are frequent: *curriculum circumscripti*, for *dedit*; *terminabit modum*, for *ponet*, *faciet*; *societatem coniungere*, coire for *facere* &c. See Nägelsbach Lat. Styl., p. 289.]

104. 30. *utrumvis ut sit.* See c. 46, 118.

104. 30. *natura mundum administrari.* Cicero might properly have omitted here the epithet *sentiente*, as he had already expounded the Stoic idea of nature, and the verb *administrari* itself indicates a designed, intelligent government. In what follows the epithet is sometimes expressed, sometimes omitted.

105. 1. *Etenim.* The remark made c. 16 init. holds true here.

105. 7. *seminator et sator.* The Stoics call the various manifestations of the deity in the various parts of creation λόγοι σπερματικοί (see note c. 30, 75); but the unity which lies behind all these and manifests itself in them is called in the singular λόγος σπερματικός, as creative reason. Diog. L. VII, 136. Cicero translates σπερματικός by *seminator et sator.*

105. 18. *ea fortuita.* For the neuter see note on c. 5, 15.

105. 26. *solarium discriptum*; a real sun-dial, because of the lines drawn upon it, in distinction from the solarium ex aqua, a water clock, the etymological meaning being lost sight of. The former is also called by the Greek name *scotheron* or *scothericum*; the water clock is also called *clepsydra,* and was originally extremely simple, but since the Alexandrine artists
Ctesibius, a complicated hydraulic machine. Censorin. D. D. Nat. c. 23, speaking of the introduction of both into Rome, says: Illud satis constat, nullum (solarium disciprum) in foro priusuisse quam id, quod M. Valerius ex Sicilia ad vectum ad rostra in columnam posuit (ann. 481); deinde aliquanto post P. Cornelius Nasica censor ex aqua fecit horarium (ann. 595), quod et ipsum ex consuetudine noscendi a sole horas solarium coepit vocari.

105. 30. sphaeram; a so-called planetarium, to represent the planetary system and its motions, with wheels fitting into one another; of course not like the modern ones with clockwork, but still moved apparently by means of an ingenious hydraulic mechanism: machinazione quadam as is said below c. 38, 97. Cicero, Tusc. I, 25, 63 speaks of one that Archimedes had: Archimedes, cum lunae, solis, quinque errantium motus in sphaeram inligavit, effecit . . . ut tarditate et celeritate dissimilimos motus una regeret conversio. Comp. Fabric. on Sext. Emp., p. 577; and Biblioth. Gr. IV, 14, 16.


105. 34. Hi autem; the Epicureans. In order rightly to understand what follows it must be remembered that mundus, like the Greek κόσμος, really denotes the world not from the material but from the formal point of view. Plin. H. N. II, 4: Nam quem κόσμον Graeci nomine ornamenti appellaverunt, eum nos a perfecta absolutaque elegantia mundum; Plut. Plac. Phil. II, 1: Πυθαγόρας πρῶτος οὐνόμασε τὴν τῶν ὅλων περιοχῆς κόσμον ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τάξεως. Comp. Ideler on Arist. Meteor. I, p. 325. The substance of the world too according to the Stoics was not created (see note c. 30, 75), but proceeded from the original existence which is also the highest god, just as all the individual gods which bear rule in the world proceeded from him. But these gods that have thus come into being also take part in the arrangement and order of the world; the world, becoming, gradually developing itself, is fashioned and ordered with their cooperation; and so has become a mundus or κόσμος, a symmetrical whole. The supreme god is the architectus (§ 90); the inferior gods are his servants and aids.

106. 2. Archimedes. On his sphæra see note on 34, 88. It was set up on the arx at Syracuse (Ovid. Fasti VI, 279), and enclosed in a glass case or ball, as we gather from the description of Claudian. Epigr. 18 (68). Marcellus brought it to Rome and placed it in the temple of Virtus. Cic. De Re Pub. I, 14.

106. 5. apud Acclum. In his Medea, as is seen from Nonius, p. 90, where the ninth of the following verses is quoted.—Verse 4, reflat. The shepherd takes the ship for a monster that, snorting (spiritu), blows away
the waves before him. — V. 5, interruptum . . . nimbum, a breaking rain cloud. — dum . . . dum seem anciently to have been equivalent to tum . . . tum. Catullus LXII, 45, says sic virgo dum intacta manet, dum cara suis est for cum . . . tum (or for dum . . . usque eo, as Quintil. IX, 3, 16 takes it). Comp. Savelberg in the N. Rhein. Mus. XXVI, p. 135. But Drakenborn in Livy XL, 42, 7, and Arntzen on Aurel. Vict. 89, show that dum and tum are often confounded by the copyists. — V. 10, Triton, the sea god, subject to Neptune (see I, 28, 78), who presided especially over streams. — In the last verse perhaps erigit should be the reading for eruit, as Lachmann Lucret., p. 346 thinks.

106. 24. [The common text has: Delphini." — Item alia multa. — "Silvani &c. Müller proposes item illa moles ?]

107. 1. tantique muneris. See note I, 8, 19.

107. 4. in media parte mundi. Comp. c. 39, 98. This was not only the opinion of the Stoics, but was of old the prevailing view of the majority of people; expressly testified to by Thales (Plut. Plac. Phil. III, 11), Anaximander (Diog. L. II, 1), Pythagoras (Id. VIII, 25), Leucippus (IX, 30), Diogenes of Apollonia (IX, 52) and others.

107. 5. [animali. This seems to be the true reading, and is that of Baiter in both editions. Cicero is here giving only a simple definition of aër, as in N. D. III, 14, 34: simplex est natura animantis, ut vel terrena vel ignea vel animalis vel umida; and Tusc. I, 17, 40: . . . reliquae duae partes, una ignea, altera animalis; Tusc. I, 18, 42: spirabilem, id est animalem. Prof. Schoemann retains animabili of the Mss. and gives the following note]: animabili, “animating,” “vivifying”; because, as is said c. 45, 117, vitalem et salutarem spiritum praebet animantibus. The adjectives in -bilis often have an active meaning. See below note c. 39, 98.


107. 13. quasi vero non Graulus hoc dicat. As the part in the play
represented a Greek, the poet certainly erred in making the speaker refer to the Romans as nostri, and so to the Greeks as strangers. The criticism of Cicero is just. The following words At Latine loquitur contain an objection to this criticism, which is however immediately answered. This objection, says Cicero, would only hold if we were not obliged really to imagine the speaker as a Greek; but the poet himself in the following verse of the same piece shows us expressly that we must do so. — Evidently the whole digression is introduced to give an appearance of the greater ease of friendly conversation, as also in III, 10, 25.

107. 17. ex aethere . . . existunt. Comp. c. 15 init.

107. 22. mota loco for moti, the speaker still thinking of sidera.

107. 23. confagrar. Cicero was writing hastily and left out of account the possible alternative that the earth might also grow cold if the sun were to move away from it.

107. 29. unius et viginti . . . litterarum. That is the number of letters in the Latin alphabet; for Y and Z are foreign to the Latin language and only used in Greek words; so that Quintil. I, 4, 9 calls X the last of the Latin letters. Comp. Priscian I, 15 and Corsen li. Aussprache &c.; I, p. 7. [For the order of the words, adjectives with adjectives &c. comp. Phil. II, 27, 66: permagnum optimi pondus argenti; Liv. 10, 46: frequenti publicorum ornatu locorum; Nägelsbach Lat. Styl., p. 466.]

107. 31. annales Ennii. An epic poem containing the Roman history up to the time of the poet, the beginning of the sixth century.

107. 32. quod nescio. The relative pronoun serves to recall what precedes, in this case posse . . . annales Ennii effici; and the sentence would be grammatically complete without the following words tantum varaere fortuna, which only contain the same idea in another form. Comp. note c. 9, 24.

108. 1. quam πονότης Graeci vocant. Cicero adds this remark because the Greek word was quite familiar to his readers, but the Latin word was first coined by himself, as he says Acad. I, 6, 24, where he reckons it among the verbi inauditis. The Greek πονότης too was first coined by Plato, as is remarked in his life in Westermann's Biogr., p. 393, as well as in other places. The word occurs in Theaet., p. 182 A, where Plato himself calls it an ἀγλόκοσον δνομα.

108. 9. quic locus est proximus, according to the division given above c. 30, 75. As Balbus has in fact been treating of this part of the argument since c. 36, he calls attention to it as it were in a supplementary way. This is not to be regarded as an error of Cicero, but is a part of the imitation of extempore discourse, which very well admits of the fuisse disputare (see note c. 7, 20).
108. 10. *Aristoteles.* No passage corresponding to that quoted in the text is found in the extant writings of Aristotle; yet Sext. Emp. IX, 22 cites the following passage of his: θεασάμενοι γὰρ μὲν ἡμέραν μὲν ἡλιον περιπολοῦντα, νύκτωρ δὲ τὴν εὐτακτὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀστήρων κτίσιν, ἐνυφάσαι εἰναι τινα θεὸν τὸν τῆς τοαύτης κανῆσας καὶ εὐπεμβόλεις αἰτίον. It was probably from the dialogue *perī filosofias* mentioned above I, 13, 33; II, 15, 42, 44.

108. 32. *quaes cum viderent.* [Schoemann reads *haec for quae*, and says] the Ms. all have *quaes cum viderent*. If Cicero really wrote thus, he must in his haste have lost sight of the construction of the sentence, which is in itself not impossible. It is still quite as probable that he wrote *haec* nor *quaes*, and that the words *cum viderent* went with *immutabilis cursus*, and that the conclusion of the sentence commenced with *profecto*. That is Madvig’s opinion. [Müller prefers to suppose that at the end of so long a passage Cicero changed the construction and wrote *quaes* than that the copyists changed *haec* into *quaes*, or themselves interpolated the *quaes*. Baiter II brackets the *quaes*.]

108. 35. *quondam eruptione Aetnaeorum ignium.* It is impossible to ascertain which of the various eruptions of Aetna is here alluded to; the notices of the ancients in regard to them are collected by Cluver. Sicil. Ant. I, 8, p. 104 ff.

109. 15. *horas,* i.e. *horarium* or *horologium.* It would be difficult to find other examples of *horas* in this signification, except perhaps in the expression *ad horas mittere*, Cic. Brut. c. 54, 200: “to send some one to look at the clock”; Petron. c. 71: *horas inspicere.* The words *machine natione quadam* show that a hydraulic clock is alluded to.

109. 24. *ipsa in se se nutritus suis conglobata;* gathered into the shape of a ball by reason of the tendency of all its parts towards the centre. Comp. c. 45, 116: *omnibus eius partibus in medium vergentibus.* The same explanation of the spherical form is often found also in other places, as *e.g.* in Arist. De Caelo II, c. 14. Others derived it from the revolution of the heavens around the earth; Plin. H. N. II, 64: *immensus eius globum in formam orbis assidua circa eum mundi volubilitate cogente.* Comp. Bake on Cleomed., p. 276, and Ideler on Arist. Meteor. I, p. 497.

our text animali); and patibilis III, 12, 27; and others still in Perizon.

109. 33. lapsus; used of any gliding motion, and hence of the flight
of birds through the air.

110. 10. alludit; the most picturesque expression of the beating of the
waves on the shore, as if in sport (ludus). Catullus LXIV, 67: ipsius ante
pedes fluctus salis alludebant; Cic. Topic. 7, 32: solebat Aquilus quaer-
rentibus quid esset litus ita definire: qua fluctus alluderet (al. cluderet;
so in the passage in the text the Mss. have cludit or cludit, wrongly; the
latter perhaps has arisen out of accludit, since, according to Fleckeisen,
Philol. XI, p. 189, the old form cluido was for ludo). — ex duabus natu-
ris; to a person on the shore neither the land overflowed by water, nor
the shallow water, where the bottom is easily seen, seem precisely either
one or the other, but rather a sort of union of both land and water.

110. 11. mari finitum us aër. See note on c. 26, 66. — die et nocte
distinguitor; because it is light by day and dark by night, and so ap-
ppears as it were of different colors. Ovid Metam. XV, 189: Nec color est
idem caelo cum lassa quiete Cuncta iacent media, cumque albo Lucifer
exit Clarus equo.

40 110. 17. omnia cingens ... aether. Comp. I, 14, 37, and below
c. 45, 115. De Div. II, 43, 91: caelum, extremum atque ultimum
mundi.

102 110. 23. binas ... reversiones. Comp. note on c. 19, 49 in fine.
The one reversio takes place when the sun reaches the extreme point (ex-
tremum) of his course in the North and from there turns towards the
South; the other, when it moves again from the extreme Southern point
towards the North.

110. 24. (sol) tristitia quadam contrahit terram, for efficit ut
terra contrahatur quadam tristitia; an expression similar to one noticed
above c. 19, 49: sol terras opacat.

103 110. 26. luna ... malor quam dimidia pars terrae. Not everybody
held this opinion; some, among them Posidonius himself (Plut.
Plac. Phil. II, 27), and still later Pliny (H. N. II, 11, p. 20 Gr.), thought
the moon larger, or at least not smaller, than the earth. For other views
see Forbiger Handb. der alten Geographie I, p. 524, and Ideler on Arist.

110. 27. hisdem spatulis, in the same path; for the path of the moon,
as well as that of the sun and all the planets, lies within the Zodiac.

110. 32. e regione sohls, over against the sun, or, astronomically
speaking, in opposition with the sun; over the earth, while the sun is under
it. On the other hand what Cicero expresses by opposita is called in astronomical language conjunction, δύσοδος, when moon and sun stand near each other in the heavens, the moon being between the earth and the sun, and in regard to us before the sun, opposita, or sometimes just under it, supposita, in which case a total or partial eclipse results. Thales understood the causes of the eclipses of the sun and moon so well that he was able to predict one of the sun. See Diog. L. I, 23 with the remark of Menage. But this is doubted by more recent writers on the history of astronomy. See Philol. XXII, p. 550.

III. 3. [notarum. So Ms. A, and Baiter in both edd. Schoemann 104 has the following note]: notata . . . similitudine. The Mss. have in part nota, in part notarum, the latter being only a conjecture, which is grammatically admissible and not improbable on diplomatic grounds; but the reading in the text notata is quite as probable, i.e. animadversa et consignata, understanding as subject the imagination of the observer.

III. 5. Aratus of Soli in Clicia, B.C. 275, wrote a didactic poem in 41 two parts, Φαινόμενα, “phenomena of the stars,” and Διωσημεία (Διωσημεία), “signs of the weather”; it was translated by Cicero, and again by Caesar Germanicus, i.e. Domitian, not as has been supposed by the son of Drusus, adopted son of Tiberius. Of Cicero’s translation we have only fragments, though of considerable extent; of that of Germanicus the first part is complete, of the second only a couple of verses remain. Besides these there is a translation of Rufus Festus Avienus of the fourth century much more free than those of Cicero or Domitian; but these last even, like all the ancient translators, did not consider such exactness necessary as is nowadays required in a translator.

III. 9. cetera. The other heavenly bodies in contradistinction to the immovable axis.

III. 14. duplici de cardine, “on the two-fold axis.” Cicero calls 108 the axis around which the universe revolves two-fold (this he did not find in Aratus), because he imagines it as divided into two parts by the earth, which lies in the middle of the universe, and through which the axis necessarily passes.—The pole which he has in mind is the North pole, the only one visible to us.

III. 17. Cynosura, the little bear, properly only the polar star, then the whole constellation; Helice, the great bear, also called the septem triones, the seven plough oxen, or in the singular septentrio on account of the seven very bright stars which compose it; this name was then also given to the lesser bear, the Cynosura. See c. 43, 111 and Heyne on Verg. Georgics III, 381.
NOTES.

111. 31. *superaque.* Priscian XIV, 2, 11, p. 980 Putsch.: *Quaedam praepositiones etiam syncopam passae sunt, ut supra pro supera, et infra pro infera, et extra pro extera.* Nam antiqui trisyllaba ea proferebant, ut Cicero in Arato: 'Torvi' draco,' etc.

112. 1. [cum totius est.] Schoemann has *quum totius sit* with the following note.] The Mss. have *est,* which no doubt should be changed. The following *tum* has also fallen out in the Mss. Comp. Schoemann Opusc. Ac. III, p. 335.

112. 3. *non una modo.* mōdō is here used, according to the older Iambic measure; later it was used as a Pyrrhic, mōdō. Comp. Lachmann on Lucret. II, 1135.

112. 14. *ortus ubi atque obitus* &c., where the East and West join, i.e., under the North pole, where the meridian, drawn through our zenith and prolonged beyond the pole, touches the horizon and divides the East and West sides of the heavens. Comp. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 336. For *subi-toque reconditi* of the Mss. the true reading is probably, as Grotius thought, *subito aequore conditi.* — *Subito,* part. perf. pass. from *subire.*

112. 20. *Engonasin; ὑν γόβασσα, a kneeling, armed man very near the head of the dragon, hence id caput attingens.* The kneeling man, Lat. *ingenicus,* also *nixus* (gni*xus* according to Fleckeisen in the N. Rh. Mus. 1852, p. 230), was explained by some to be Hercules, by some Theseus, by others in different ways. See Voss on Aratus v. 63. — The *Corona,* mentioned directly after, was explained to be the garland of Ariadne carried to heaven by Dionysus. Arat. v. 71.

112. 22. *Anguitenens, Ὀφυόχος,* the serpent-holder, was, according to the so-called *katasterismoi* of Eratosthenes, Aesculapius, whom Jupiter struck by lightning and then transferred to heaven; others explained it however differently. See Hygin. P. Astr. II, 14. — *elix* in v. 3 is to be read as a monosyllable like *cuius* below c. 44, 112. — *Nepal,* v. 6, "of the Scorpion."


113. 13. *pedibusque tenetur,* i.e. *calcatur.* — The *tremula flamma* in the following verse denotes the scintillation of the stars.

113. 18. *obductus = objectus or obversus.*

113. 19. *truculenta tuetur.* The neuter of the adjective performs the office of an adverb, like *insueta rudens* Virg. Aen. VIII, 248; *crebra ferit* Georg. II, 500; *acerba ruens* Lucret. V, 34; and oftener in the
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singular, as acutum cernere Hor. Sat. I, 3, 26; torvum clamare Virg. Aen. VII, 287; laetum fremere Stat. Theb. III, 618. The usage is peculiar to poetic language; a few expressions however are common in prose, as sublime which occurs several times above II, 16, 44; 37, 89; 39, 101; rectum c. 57, 144.

113. 30. Hyadas . . . a pluendo; because when they rose early with III the sun in May the rain generally came on. See however Göttling, Ges. Abh. I, p. 179, who doubts this explanation and defends the translation Ssculae, which was also considered an error by Gellius XIII, 9, 4.

114. 3. Cynosurae . . . Arcti; the bear Cynosura, to distinguish it from the other bear Helice. See c. 41, 105.

114. 8. aspectum . . . parentis; her mother, Cassiopeia, mentioned above. The construction of ausugere with the accusative is doubted but still not incredible.

114. 11. contigit caput alvo. The constellation does not present the entire body of a horse, but only the fore part as far as the belly; and this stands just above the head of Andromeda. The horse referred to was Pegasus. Arat. v. 213–233.—The stella fungens is a star between the belly of the horse and the head of Andromeda, which can be taken as part of one as well as of the other; hence ἄνωθεν ἀνάγεσθαι in Aratus, v. 205.—For duplices formas comp. Virg. Aen. I, 93: Duplices tendens ad sidera palmas; Cic. De Prov. Cons. c. 6, 13: has duplices pestes sociorum.

114. 18. aquilonis tangitur auris; the wind blowing from the North pole touches him more than the other, which lies farther South.

114. 22. Culus, in one syllable, like eius above c. 42, 109.—genus, 44 old form for genu. Comp. Priscian. VI, 4, 19.—omni ex parte; the Vergil iae lie all together near the left knee of Perseus, crowded in a very small space; ἡλθα πᾶσαi says Arat. v. 251: brevis locus occupat omnes, German v. 255. They are called Vergil iae, the Spring constellation, according to Festus, quia earum ortu ver finitur. But this explanation is doubted. Greek πλεύδες, “ship stars,” because when they rose the sailing season began; others derive from πλευς, as they are a closely packed group of stars. Comp. Rivola, Ueb. d. Griech. Sternbilder, Progr. d. Gymn. zu Bruchsal, v. 1861; and M. Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, p. 17 of the Amer. edition. Others still have referred the name to πελεύδες, which denotes a sort of pigeon.

114. 25. Flides, the Lyra, according to Aratus transferred to heaven by its inventor Hermes.

114. 30. Capricornus. The old name Ἀιγόκερος means only goat-horned, and refers, according to the most probable view, to the horned
and goat-footed Pan. See Voss on Arat. v. 285. Hence corpore semiferus. He "breathes cold," because the winter solstice happens when the sun is in that constellation.

113 115. 3. posteriore vi corporis; with the powerful hinder part of his body he as it were draws the bow behind him, because this immediately follows him. The bow is carried by Sagittarius.

115. 4. Ales, called by others Cygnus; afterwards comes the Aquila.

115. 14. Perhaps Aries tagit, i.e. tangit, should be read for Aries tegit. See Lorenz on Plaut. Mostell. v. 453; and Neue, Formenlehre, p. 315. — Flumini . . . , the constellation of the river, called by some, as Aratus, v. 360, Eridanus, by others the Nile. — quem, as if fluvii, not fluminis, went before.

115. 17. procera Vincla, the band that encircles the tails of the two fishes. — Nepae, of the Scorpion. See c. 42, 109. — Near this comes the Ara, which is fanned by the breath of the South wind because it lies in the South, just as above § 111 the northernmost fish is touched by the North wind.

115. 22. Centaurus, referred to Chiron. The lower part of his body lies near the Chelae, i.e. the claws of the Scorpion. He holds in his hand his prey, here called quadrupes vasta. It is clear that cedit, i.e. accedit, is preferable to the caedit of the Mss. for this reason alone, that the Centaur cannot hold the beast in his hand and slay him at the same time.

115. 31. Ille . . . Ante Canem, the Προκίδων, precursor of the great dog, i.e. Sirius. Both were explained to be the hunting dogs of Orion. Geminis sub ipsis, immediately under the Twins. See Wagner Quaest. Virg., p. 468. — Extremam in the preceding verse refers to the Hydra, as is seen from Arat. v. 448.

115 116. 5. intelligi . . . non possunt. Comp. De Leg. II, 7, 16: quid est enim verius quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte arroganter, ut in se rationem et mentem putet inesse, in caelo mundoque non putet, aut ut ea, quae vix summa ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putet?

45 116. 12. quasi quodam vinculo. To such a band may be compared the fiery ether which encircles the universe (c. 40, 101) and pervades all its parts, which is the living and divine principle (animans et deus, c. 46, 118), the source of all forces operating in the universe and hence of gravitation or the centripetal force quae ad medium rapid et convertit extrema.

116 116. 18. medium infimum in sphaera est. Comp. c. 33, 84; Tusc. V, 24 fin.; Sallust De Deis et Mundo c. 7 extr.: σφαίρας πάσης τὸ κάτω μέσον ἑστιν.
II. 30. *nisus suo conglobata.* The same as was said of the earth above c. 39, 98: *in se se nutibus suis conglobata.*

II. 31. *sua momenta sustantant,* they always preserve their equilibrium because in the sphere the weight (*momentum*) of one side is always balanced (*sustentatur*) by that of the other.

II. 32. *ut ante dixisse videor,* namely, c. 18, 47. On *videor* comp. note I, 21, 58.

II. 34. *vaporibus aluntur.* Comp. c. 15, 40 and 33, 83.

II. 1. *refundunt eadem,* for *eosdem.* See note c. 5, 15.

II. 4. *Panaetius* of Rhodes, the most distinguished of Stoic philosophers of his time, *vel princeps disciplinae Stoicae* (*De Div. I, 3, 4,* flourished about B.C. 140. — It is evident from several notices that he deviated in many points from the views of the older heads of his school.

II. 4. *ut . . . omnis mundus ignesceret.* Heraclitus had already held ένα είναι κόσμων, γενναθαι τε αυτών ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ πάλιν ἐκπυρώσθαι κατά τινας περίοδους ἐναλλαξ γίνονται αἰώνα . . . *Diog. L. IX, 8.* The Stoics, like Heraclitus, held the existence of an original fiery element (the *στοιχεῖον καὶ ἐξυχήν* according to Chrysippus in Stobae. Ecl. I, p. 312), namely the ether, which they also called *fire,* though they distinguished it from the coarser earthly fire; moreover they believed that the universe which had originally been developed from this element would return to it again, and after that come forth from it anew. Comp. *Diog. L. VII, 141* who also gives the opposing view of Panaetius, namely that the world was eternal. — Instead of *ignesceret* we should expect *ignescat* on account of the preceding *putant.* The change, on which see note I, 22, 61, was all the easier because of the intervening *dubitare dicebant.*

II. 11. *cum summam Saturni refrigeret.* The planet Saturn is *called summa,* being the extreme one of the system so far as the ancients knew. On the different influences ascribed to the planets see Plin. *H. N. II, 8,* p. 14 Gr.: *Saturni sidus gelidae ac rigentis esse naturae, multoque eo inferiorem Iovis circulum . . .; tertium Martis, quod quidam Herculis vocant, ignei, ardentis a Solis vicinitate . . .; huius ardore nimio et rigore Saturni interiectum ambobus ex utroque temperari Iovem, salutaremque fieri.*

II. 13. *duae Soll oboediant,* *i.e.* Venus and Mercury, which, as being nearest the sun and regulated by it in their motion, are subject to it.

47  117. 19. Age; see note I, 30, 84.

117. 26. a caulibus, i.e. a brassicis. Caulis often occurs in this special signification. See Heindorf on Hor. Sat. II, 4, 15. Hence several Mss. have brassicis as a gloss on this passage, which afterwards with a que annexed crept into the text. The antipathy between wine and the cabbage is often mentioned, and it was thought that eating cabbage prevented drunkenness. See Geopon. V, 11; Plin. H. N. XX, 9, p. 618; XXIV, 1, p. 860 Gr.

117. 30. corlis tectae. The so-called pachyderms are meant, to which the elephant, the rhinoceros, the hippopotamus, the swine &c. belong.

117. 31. squama like pluma is used here in a collective sense, in which pluma is often, and squama rarely, found. But Juvenal, Sat. IV, 25 says: hoc pretium squamae, for squamarum, i.e. piscis squamosi.

118. 6. altero conatum haberent . . . altero secernerent; a so-called chiasmus; for the first altero refers to appetitum last mentioned, and the second to the first mentioned sensum.

118. 12. atque etiam allorum . . . As the contrast is between the lower or short-legged and the higher beasts, we should expect after allorum referring to the former a corresponding form referring to the latter; e.g. alia autem, quae altiora sunt . . . The law of symmetry is neglected, as not seldom happens. Comp. Madvig De Fin., p. 809.

118. 15. manus is frequently used of the trunk of an elephant, and Lucretius calls the elephant anquimanus. It must be noticed that manus, like χειρ, is often used of the whole arm including the hand; as Plaut. Mil. Glor. II, 4, 7: dispessis manibus patibulum quom habebis.

118. 16. habebat. The tense is used in reference to the point of time when nature first produced the beasts, and, as an artist does, fitted one piece to another and all parts to the whole. The imperfects that follow are to be explained in the same way.

118. 17. [The Mss. read aliis generis; Müller brackets the generis, leaving aliis, as Cicero seems not to have used the genitive form alius except in Inven. II, 6, 21 res alius modi, and because many beasts devour their own kind as well as others.]

48  118. 21. si quid incidit, "if anything comes in their way"; the allusion is plainly to the spiders that make no net in contrast to those that do so and have just been mentioned. On the various sorts see Plin. H. N. XI, 24; Arist. H. A. IX, 39.

118. 22. Pina vero . . . Greek πίνυ or πίνυς, a sort of muscle. What Cicero says here and in De Fin. III, 19, 63 of its societas with the squilla, a small sea-crab, which from its relation to the muscle is called πωγκερίς,
is also stated by Pliny H. N. IX, 42, p. 635; Plut. De Sol. cert. An. c. 30; and several other writers. According to modern naturalists however the thing is very doubtful. — pinæ of the Mss. after morsu must be stricken out; morsu belongs to squillae.

118. 27. admirandum est, congressu̇ne &c. Mirari and admirari not only express a feeling of wonder, but include also the idea of not understanding; and as this implies uncertainty, ignorance, both verbs may take after them an indirect question. [Comp. English “I wonder whether” &c. admiratio in the next sentence is “matter for admiration, wonder or perplexity.”]

118. 32. anitum for anatum. See Lachmann on Lucret., p. 16.

118. 34. exclusi totique is not a ὑστερον πρῶτονov; for the fossere continues more or less after the excludere, as Cicero himself says below c. 52, 129.

119. 3. platalea. This name occurs nowhere else. Pliny H. N. X, 49 40, p. 700 calls the bird platea and says the same of it as Cicero does here. Aristotle H. An. IX, 10 says of a πελεκας, that he throws up the muscles which he swallowed alive with the shells closed; and then as they are dead and the shells are open he takes out the meat and leaves the shells. It is the meat that Cicero here calls ea quae sunt esculenta. — What Pliny and Cicero tell of the robbing of the booty from other birds is told by modern naturalists of a sort of mew, the Lestris parasitica or Larus parasiticus. — Instead of in quod ipsa invaderet the Mss. have id quod, evidently an error, because the relative sentence does not serve at all to define the preceding captum. Comp. Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, 337.

119. 9. Ranæ marinae. The animal here meant is called by Pliny H. N. IX, 42 rana piscatrix, ἀλεις in Plut. d. Sollert. An. c. 27, and Antig. Hist. Mir., p. 74 West. It is not properly a frog, but a fish which has some resemblance to a frog, now called Lomachus piscatorius. It has on the head a pair of thread-like prolongations with the ends rounded which it makes use of as a sort of bait. Comp. Oppian. Halieut. II, 86. [Moveri is used in the middle sense.]

119. 13. Illud . . . animadversum, “the fact observed by Aristotle.” — a quo pleraque sc. animadversa sunt. But this observation is not found in the extant works of Aristotle.

119. 19. ea . . . adiuvat, namely, when they fly with the wind blowing from behind; whereas the preceding aër . . . adversus pellitut refers to a flight against the wind, when the triangular form of the flock helps the flight. Comp. Plut. ibid. c. 10. — What is said of the birds in the rear laying their heads and necks upon those in front is disputed.
is a fact however that they relieve each other in leading the train.—
[Schoemann reads una succedit ex iis and continues this note:] In the
Mss. una has fallen out because of the foregoing um. It is difficult to
believe that Cicero himself left out the subject of the sentence.

119. 25. [Iam introduces something new; vero emphasizes it as more
important than the preceding; illa also calls attention to the points which
immediately follow defining it. So in § 127 init.: Iam illa cernimus, ut &c.
In § 132 Iam introduces the last of a series, which is much less common.
Sections 132 and 141 are interesting for the use of the particles introducing
the several points.]

119. 27. ea quae . . . reperta sunt. The physicians did not invent
the methods which the dog and the ibis make use of, but they devised the
application of these methods to the use of men. Cicero's expression is
elliptical; the thought would be more fully expressed as follows: quae . . .
reperta sunt, haec a bestiis quoque fieri videmus; nam vomitione canes
&c. Comp. Pliny H. N. XXIX, 4: vomitiones quoque hoc animal homi-
nibus monstrasse videtur; also Plutarch c. 20. — [For Atque Schoemann
reads At quam and refer to his Opusc. Ac. III, p. 339.] On illa . . . quod
see note on III, 7, 17; and on nuper above c. 5, 14. — It is pretty gen-
erally admitted that dogs cure their indigestions by vomiting, which they
produce by eating grass; and in general many beasts possess the instinct,
when they are sick or wounded, of eating or doing whatever will cure
them; and so the purgationes of the ibis may be quite true. But we can
hardly believe what is next said of the panthers and wild goats, especially
the falling out of the arrows after the animals have eaten dictamnus. Still
both circumstances are related by several ancient authors.

120. 4. odoris foeditate. The skunk cannot be meant, as that ani-
mal is found only in America; but there are several European animals that
possess the property of producing bad odors when they are under the in-
fluence of fear.

120. 8. arborum omniumque rerum &c., "of trees and all other
plants." So very often the genus is subjoined to the individual or the
species by the simple copula; as Pindar in novemque lyrici . . . magni
Iovis et deorum nuntius; and similar examples in Burmann on Petron. c.
2. In the absence of a word embracing the whole genus of vegetable
growths,—for planta denotes only slips, layers, &c.,—Cicero either uses
stirpes, which properly denotes only the trunk of the plant, or he adopts a
circumlocution. As here, so in c. 33, 83; and similarly c. 10, 26 and 28.
Comp. Ad. Famil. VII, 26, 2: terra nata; and Madvig De Fin. IV, 5, 13.
BOOK II.—CHAP. L—LIII, §§ 126-132. 277

120. 20. eoque, namely cibo, fngit animal; the seed devotes all the nourishment which it accumulates to the development of the germ.—saeptum, sc. locis, i.e. utero.

120. 31. aqua et sustinentur et fetum fundunt; a sort of zeugma, for the ablative aqua properly goes only with sustinentur; with fetum fundunt it would be in aqua.

120. 34. nascuntur et educantur. Grammatically of course only ova can be taken as the subject; but the reader naturally understands the young ones creeping forth from the eggs.

121. 12. tota aestate; a hundred days, during the whole three summer months. Pliny H. N. V, 9, p. 269: Inceptit (Nilus) cresere luna nova, quae post solstitium est, sensim modiceque, cancrum sole transeunte; abundantissime autem, leonem; et residit in virgine iisdem quibus accretit modis. In totum autem revocatur intra ripas in libra, ut tradit Herodotus, centesimo die. See Herod. II, 19.


121. 15. Indus...maximus. Several of the ancients, as Arrian Ind. c. 4, expressly state that the Ganges is larger than the Indus; but the largest rivers of Europe and Africa, the Danube and the Nile, are smaller than the Indus. Id. ibid. c. 3.—Of the inundations of this and the neighboring rivers Strabo speaks in XV, I, p. 692; but what Cicero says of the sowing that results is not found anywhere else; and it cannot be determined what the semina frumenti similis were. Strabo ibid., p. 694 mentions a wheat-like grain that grew wild in the land of the Musciani east of the Indus. Comp. besides Theophr. Hist. Pl. IV, 5: φέρει δὲ (ἡ Ἰνδία) καὶ σπέρματα ἰδία, τὰ μὲν τοῖς χειρόποιος (pulse) δομοῖα, τὰ δὲ τοῖς πυροῖς καὶ ταῖς κριθαῖς; and further on, γένος ἀγρίων κριθῶν ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἄρτων ἑδεῖς καὶ χονδρός καλὸς. And Pliny H. N. XVIII, 7, p. 431: hordeum silvestre, ex quo panis arud eos praecipium.

121. 25. ventos Etesias. This was the designation of the winds which rise at a definite time and blow continuously for a season from the same quarter; especially the northwest winds, which generally blow from the summer solstice to the dog-days. See Forbiger Handb. d. Alten Geogr. I, p. 619.

121. 29. aestus maritimi. See note c. 7, 19. [Schoemann reads 131
mutuo for [multum] and remarks:] instead of mutuo perhaps multum should be read; the Mss. have multum. [Kayser: motu lunae, apud Baiter II.]

121. 29. montes vestiti atque silvestres; the second expression to define more nearly the first. Comp. c. 64, 161: vestitusque densissimos montium.

121. 31. [For utilitates, a conjecture of H. A. Koch, Schoemann reads dotes.] — dotes denique innumerables, “in short, gifts without number” with which the earth is provided, and which serve mankind partly for nourishment and partly for other necessities of life (ad victum et ad vitam). Denique is regularly used to close with a general and comprehensive term an enumeration of several particulars. — artes, which is the reading of the Mss. for dotes, is an error in copying which often occurs; see Schoen. Opusc. Ac. III, 340; had Cicero mentioned the arts here, he would have erred in putting together things which should remain distinct. For the arts are invented by man; this capacity of invention is all that nature has given him; they should therefore not be thrown together with the salutary and useful phenomena and products of nature, which by their dotes, the properties with which nature has endowed them, are useful and valuable to men. Moreover the arts are afterwards mentioned in their proper place, c. 59, 148. Dotes is precisely the word for the sense required here. [Dotes is a conjecture of Schoemann.]

122. 15. os . . . spiritu augeatur, “the mouth is gifted with breath”; for augeri aliqua re is never used except of things which are to one’s advantage, useful or agreeable. But the old physiologists themselves would hardly have acknowledged that the breath was especially of advantage to the mouth; rather as Cicero himself says, c. 55, 136, the breath is the cibus animalis, quo maxime abuntur animantes.

122. 17. [For [ab his] Schoemann writes ab his without brackets and gives this note :] manditur ab his. ab his might have been left out here, but still it is defensible. See Opusc. Ac. III, p. 372.

122. 18. adversi dentes are the front teeth, as adversum corpus the front of the body.

122. 21. stomachus, the oesophagus; not the stomach proper, but the way to it. Celsus IV, 1: deinde duo intinera incipiunt; alterum asperram arteriam nominant, alterum stomachum; arteria exterior ad pulmonem, stomachus interior ad ventriculum fertur.

122. 22. tosillas, tonsils, the glands at the back of the mouth at the commencement of the oesophagus. Colles faucium spectantes uvam (the uvula), Lact. De Opif. Dei, c. 11, 9.

122. 24. depulsum . . . depellit. The use of the same word twice at so short an interval, where it would have been easy to use, for depellit, perhaps deglutit, or for depulsum, depressum (as Bünemann on Lact. De Opif. Dei, c. 10, 16 proposed), is evidently a fault which is only explained by the haste and carelessness with which Cicero wrote this part of the book devoted to anatomy, and of which there are many other traces. Comp. note on c. 58, 145.

122. 31. quodam operculo, the epiglottis, Gr. ἐπιγλώττις. See Gell. 138 XVII, 11 where various views are mentioned in regard to its use.

122. 33. alvi natura. Comp. De Fin. V, 11, 33: hoc intellegant, si quando naturam hominis dicam, hominem dicere me; nihil enim hoc differt; Lucret. I, 276: cum mollis aquae fertur natura repente fluimine abundanti. It is easy to see that such a circumlocution would not be everywhere admissible; it is only so where the object is considered in respect to its natural constitution and purpose. —alvus means here the stomach, but farther on (multiplex et tortuosa) the bowels; the term therefore includes both the ventriculus and the intestina. Alvus superior is used for the stomach in Cato R. R. 156. Greek ἡ ἄνω κοιλία and ἡ κάτω κοιλία.

122. 34. pulmones et cor . . . spiritum ducant. The part which the heart was supposed to bear in the process of breathing is given more definitely below c. 55, 138. It is of course one of the many errors in this part of the book; to note them all would require too much space and be of little use.

123. 9. [The Mss. have in re spiritu which Lamb, Schoemann and Müller correct to in respiratu, Madvig and Baiter to intrante spiritu.] tum se contrahunt adspirantes, tum in respiratu dillant. Above c. 54, 136 the word respiret is plainly used of breathing out, exhaling the air already in the lungs; and likewise below in § 138. Adsipirare however in cases where it seems to mean this really means only the breathing upon something, adflare, adhalare, as De Div. I, 36, 79, where the influences are spoken of quae sunt ex disparili adsipiratione terrarum. Comp. ibid. 57, 130; and above c. 33, 83 adsipiratio aeris where the point is not so much the inhaling as the influence of the air which is necessary to the growth of animals in breathing and in other ways. Respirare too is never used really for inhaling as opposed to exhaling, but only of breathing in general, the spiritus reciprocatio (Gell. XVII, 11, 4) in which the others alternate; or it means to recover the breath after the breathing has been for a time interrupted. In the present passage Cicero meant by adsipirantes only the breathing upon something. He avoided the word
exspirantes because this is ordinarily used only of dying. Respiratus can only mean in this passage inhaling the air, and so differs from respirare in the passages above referred to. The form respiratus is found elsewhere only in Apulei. Met. IV, 15: parvis respiratui circa nares et oculos datis foraminibus; where, as is seen, the breathing in general is spoken of, like the Gr. ἀναπνοή. Madvig conjectures intrante spiritu for in respiratu.

[The passage is singularly confused. Dr. Kühner (Wesen der Götter, Uebers. ii. Erkl., p. 228 note) considers adspiratione aeris in 33, 83 as clearly meaning the inhalation of the air. If we suppose Cicero in the present passage to have stated the facts correctly, he must mean by adspirantes "exhaling," and by in respiratu "inhaling the air"; and if so, he uses the terms very carelessly. Dr. Kühner however thinks that he used the terms in the usual sense, and misunderstood the facts; that is, that he really thought the lungs contracted by inhalation, and expanded by exhalation. Prof. Schoemann in his second edition seems to think that the terms are used in the ordinary sense, but that Cicero from mere carelessness says the contrary of what he should have said.]

187 123. 18. ad quas omnes eius viae pertinent, i.e. omnes sanguinis viae. The prevailing view of the ancient physiologists was that the liver was the central organ for the veins, and that it turned the chylus into blood and passed it on to the veins. Comp. Galen. De Usu Part. XVI, 1, 10, 14.

123. 19. per quas lapsus cibus, i.e. the food changed into blood, the chyle which has become blood.

123. 33. spiritus per arterias. This view was the prevailing one before Galen. It was supposed that the air entered not only the lungs but the left chamber of the heart, and passed from thence into the arteries. Galen in a special essay proved that the arteries also contained blood.

123. 34. toto corpore = per totem corpus. Comp. § 141 toto corpore fusus.

124. 2. [finiendos. Heindorf conjectured fingenbos.] 124. 5. qui . . . a corde tracti. The idea that the nerves proceeded from the heart was refuted by Galen, as an error held by many (among them by Aristotle), in the book De Hippocr. et Plat. Dogm. lib. I. But nervi, like vēpa, denotes also the tendons and sinews, by later writers tendines, σωματικά; and Cicero in this sense says: nervos, a quibus artus continentur. Comp. Philipson. ἔλθ ανθρωπ., p. 12; and Anke in Philol. XXXII, p. 590.

124. 6. ad hanc providentiam; an abbreviated expression for ad haec, quae de providentia dixi.—The following a dis (or a deo in older editions) is not genuine. If Cicero had really written that, he certainly
would not have continued quae . . . constituit, but qui constituerunt. Perhaps he really wrote ab ea, i.e. a naturae providentia.

124. 9. humo excitatos &c. Comp. De Leg. I, 9, 26: nam cum ceteras animantes (natura) abieisset ad pastum, solum hominem erexit, ad caelique quasi cognitionis domiciliique pristini consentium excitation.

124. 11. ex terra homines . . . ex terra, standing at the beginning, properly goes with spectatores in the second member which Cicero had in mind on commencing the sentence, though he inserted for the sake of contrast the negative member, non ut incolae.

124. 19. [In] sublime; see note c. 16, 44. — ludicum magnum earum est, "their judgment is of great importance." Comp. c. 58, 146; De Orat. III, 59, 222: oculorum magnæ est moderatio, is of great significance.


124. 32. primum . . . saepsit; quas primum perlucidas fecit. Sed lubricos oculos fecit corresponds to the first primum; firmas autem to the second. The use of primum twice in this way is a fault which might have been avoided with more care.

124. 34. ut continerentur. It is a little doubtful what the subject of this verb is, oculi or membranae. It comes however to the same thing; for the membranae, which Cicero means, are the exterior parts of the eye itself, the cornea. By means of its hardness and stiffness it maintains its form (continetur) so as not to be dispersed or put out of place.

125. 1. pupula, also pupilla, the pupil, Gr. κόρη, of the picture which is represented in it; ἐν ᾦ τῷ εἰδωλῶν ἀντιλάμπει τοῦ βλέποντας. Plutarch De Fac. in Orb. Lun. c. 27.

125. 8. et somno convinentibus etc. The reading of the Mss. in this passage contains so gross a violation of grammatical construction that it is difficult to believe that Cicero really wrote it so. After convinentibus, whether taken as abl. abs. or dat., a clause ought to follow with some other subject than oculi; such is not the case, but instead of it comes utque quiescerent. Nothing can be made of this utque, or ut qui as some Mss. have it; it must have crept in through an oversight. But the copyists, misled by the preceding apertis, have written convinentibus instead of con- venentes (convinentes) sc. oculi, as Cicero wrote; in this way we gain the necessary subject to quiescerent. In the intervening sentence quam . . . egeremus the pronoun eis would have been enough. The use of the sub-
stantive itself, oculis, in its place may be compared with similar examples such as are given in c. 9, 25 note.

[This passage is quoted by Isidorus, Etymolog. XI, 39 ed. Migne, and runs thus: Munitae sunt autem (palpebrae) vallo capillorum, ut et apertis oculis, si quid inciderit, repellatur, et somno conviventibus, tamquam involuti quiescant latentes. In our text we have changed † ut qui of Müller and the Mss. to ut ii, — taking the sense of the passage to be this: i. 8, et somno conviventibus (sc. palpebris), cum oculis ad cernendum non egeremus, ut ii (sc. oculi) tamquam involuti quiescerent.] 144 125. 17. ne quid intrare possit, si pateret. The elliptical expression might be supplemented by quod fieret or fieri posset, si pateret. So Gell. V, 19: tam iure legaque filius siet, quam si ex eo patre natus esset, i.e. quam esset filius, si . . . Comp. Kühner on Tusc. V, 33, 96.

125. 24. his naturis = rebus huius naturae.

125. 25. testudine . . . aut cornu. In stringed instruments the strings are stretched sometimes over a hollow body, testudo, as in the case of the cithara (guitar), sometimes between two hollow arms, as in the case of the lyra. These were called cornua. See § 149.

125. 35. multa cornunt subtilius, sc. quam bestiae. The comparative is used in all languages in such a way that for the other side of the comparison one must supply not a positive, but a negative. See Nitzsch on Plato's Ion, p. 66. Here we must supplement subtilius quam bestiae, quae nihil subtilier cornunt.

126. 1. tum venustatem. The tum is awkward, because there is no corresponding tum afterwards and it cannot be taken as correlative to the preceding primum, unless with Hand Tursell. I, p. 766 we strike out the words colorum etiam et figurarum as a spurious addition. Perhaps some old reader wrote on the margin tum for the following atque, and copyists afterwards inserted it in the text in the wrong place. — The word decentia is of Cicero's coinage, as the ut ita dicam indicates, in order to express the idea of εὐπρέπεια better than could be done by venustas and ordo. [Schoemann reads et figurarum tum venustatem, the common reading. Müller thinks something has been lost, perhaps cum . . . corresponding to tum.]

126. 4. timidumque cognoscunt. One or the other cognoscunt might have been omitted or something else, like dignoscunt, been used in its place, but the haste of the writer is evident too in this repetition.

126. 7. intervalla, distinctio. The former denotes the differences of tone in respect to pitch, in English "intervals," διαστήματα διάφορα τε περὶ καὶ βαρύτητος (Schneider Ecl. Phys., p. 310); the latter probably
refers to the specific difference of the tones of different voices or instruments, the tone-colour, Germ. *Klangfarbe*, Fr. *timbre*. — *Canorum* indicates a full-sounding, melodic voice, as opposed to *fuscum*, a muffled, indistinct one; but the former is elsewhere called by a term transferred from colour *vox candida*, a bright, clear voice, *serena* in Pers. Sat. I, 9 (comp. Heinrich’s note). — *Leve, asperum*, the soft voice that falls pleasantly on the ear as contrasted with the rough and unpleasant. — *Flexibile, durum*, the flexible voice, that passes easily through the various changes and gradations of tone, opposed to that which is stiff and unmanageable. The other two terms *grave* and *acutum* refer to the pitch; the bass and treble voices.

126. 10. *gustandi et . . . tangendi* for *gustus et tactus*; the gerund instead of the verbal substantive. On *magna iudicia* comp. c. 56, 141. — [pariter et, Heindorf and Schoemann, for † et parte, Müller; Baiter II et arte.]

126. 13. *cilorum conditiones* = *conditurae*, from *condire*.

126. 15. *mentem*, the intellectual faculty in general; *rationem*, the faculty of judging and reasoning; *consilium*, that of devising the means for any given end; *prudentiam*, that of forming an opinion of any particular matter, acquired by observation and experience. — Farther on *intellgentia* is the faculty of perception; *consequentium rerum con- tectio et comprehendio*, the capacity of grouping and comprehending things which belong together; so that *comprehensio* has a meaning here somewhat different from its usual one which corresponds, like *perceptio*, to the Stoic *καταληψις*; so *comprehendimus* immediately below.

126. 21. *idque ratione* [bracketed by Schoemann]; a suspicious addition. The meaning can only be “and in fact by means of the reason,” which is precisely the faculty of forming judgments; or “and in fact conformably to reason,” that is, properly, logically. Cicero possibly wrote *et quae racione*, “by grouping together what belongs together we form conclusions as to what follows and to what extent it follows from a given premise.”

126. 25. *quae vos . . . infirmatis*, an allusion to the scepticism of the Academy. See Introd., p. 13. He uses the plural to include not only the opinion contained in the clause with *quod*, but also the arguments which follow. Comp. III, 7, 17.

126. 29. *ut vos soletis dicere*, *i.e.* you and your professional brethren, the orators. In regard to Cotta as an orator see Introd., p. 17; and with the following eulogy on eloquence comp. De Orat. I, 8; De Invent. I, 2.

127. 4. *vox principium a mente ducens* . . . To understand this
as the Stoic did one must remember that according to Chrysippus, from whom this portion of the argument is doubtless directly or indirectly taken, the thinking faculty resided in the breast, in the heart, and thus close to the lungs. See Gaien. De Hippocr. et Plat. Dogm. II, 3 sq., and III, 8. The thought is formed here as ὁ λόγος ἐνδιαθέτει and comes forth as speech, λόγος προσθηκή; through the organs of speech. — The Mss. have percipitur instead of percitetur [the reading in Schoemann's text].

127. 6. finita dentibus can hardly be right. Probably it should be munita dentibus. See Opusc. Ac. III, p. 377.

127. 6. vocem inmoderate profusam, the inarticulate sound; as on the other hand moderatio vocis is used in De Leg. I, 9, 27 for the articulation. By means of the articulation are formed the different and definitely determined sounds, sōni vocis distincti et pressi, the characteristic endowment of the μετακτεῖς ἄρθρωσις, by which they are distinguished from the beasts of which the vox is immoderate profusa.

60 127. 13. mollæ commissuras et artus, “the movable, pliant connections and joints”; for which he might have said commissuras artum. Artus are really the same as articuli, Gr. ἀρθρα, although the word is afterwards used for the members of the body; mollis is originally equivalent to mobilis, from which it is derived; the meaning “soft” is only a secondary one.

150 127. 24. condita is here more probably from condere than from condest. The salting and especially the conserving, condire, of alimentary substances is usual only to a limited extent; the laying aside however, condere, is general; and the most important substances, the grains and vegetables, need no conserving. Comp. too c. 62, 156 and 63, 157.

127. 25. vescimur . . . capiendo is an inexactness of expression worth noticing, for quas capimus, alimus or quae capiuntur, aluntur.

127. 31. [ferrum eligimus; Mss. elicitum. So in 130. 26 for remedia eligimus the common reading is eliciamus. In Tusc. III, § 83 stirpes aegritadinis . . . eligendae sunt and in III, § 84 fibrae stirpium . . . eligendae sunt the reading of the Mss. eligendae is now accepted instead of the common elidendae. In Div. II, § 149 where the common reading was superstitionis stirpes omnes eiciendae Madvig and Baiter adopt eligendae. Müller proposes to read eligimus and eligamus in our text; the last is in fact the reading of Ms. A; the former has no Ms. authority.]

127. 32. venas penitus abditas. These words form the second half of a trochaic tetramer, and it is quite possible that not only here but in De Offic. II, 3, 13 Cicero had in mind a passage from some poet. Still the metre may have been only a matter of chance. Comp. note c. 9, 25;
also the passage I, 19, 40: Epicurus autem qui res occultas et penitus ddbitas might be taken for an iambic tetrameter.

128. 2. adfert. The subject arborum consectio omnisque materia is to be supplied from the preceding sentence.

128. 19. pietas cui coniuncta iustitia est. Pietas according to the definition given I, 41, 116 is itself iustitia adversum deos. reliquaque virtutes refers to the connection of all the virtues one with another, the coniunctio confusioque virtutum as Cicero says De Fin. V, 23, 67, which is often mentioned as a cardinal principle of the Stoic ethical philosophy. Comp. Diog. Laert. VII, 125: τὰς δὲ ἀρετὰς λέγοντι ἀντακολοθεῖν ἀλλήλας, καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν.

128. 20. par et similis. These expressions are frequently used together to express complete similarity in every respect. The difference between them is that par indicates the value, importance or power of a thing, similis its constitution, external or internal. Quintilian X, I, 102 speaking of Sallust and Livy says that they were pares magis quam similes, i.e. equal in worth, though different in character; and Seneca De Ira I, 9 speaking of the passions says: quos (affectus) numquam deprimere possis, nisi pares illis similesque opposueris, i.e. passions equally strong and like in kind.

128. 20. deorum for vitae deorum; a short mode of expression quite common in comparative sentences, where in comparing together the attributes of two objects the object itself is mentioned in the second member of the comparison instead of its attribute. Comp. Cic. pro Flac. c. 26: cuius ego civitatis disciplinam atque gravitate non solum Graeciae, sed haud scio an cunctis genibus anteponam; De Repub. II, 1: praestare nostrae civitatis statum ceteris civitatibus; De Orat. I, 4: ingenia nostrorum hominum multum ceteris hominibus omnium gentium praestiterunt. — The opinion, that the wise man (and he alone can enjoy the vita beata) is inferior to the gods only in the duration of his happiness, is characteristic of the Stoic philosophy. Seneca Epist. 73: Iuppiter quo antecedit virum bonum? diutius bonus est. Sapiens nihil se minoris aestimat, quod virtutes eius spatio breviore clauduntur; comp. Ep. 77: quomodo fabula sic vita: non quam diu, sed quam bene acta sit, refert; Cic. De Fin. III, 14, 46: Stoicis non videtur optabilior nec magis expetenda beata vita, si sit longa quam si brevis. Further examples in Gataker on Antonin. III, 7.

128. 26. omnia hominum causa... This opinion is also distinctly Stoic. Comp. Cic. De Fin. III, 20, 67; De Offic. I, 7, 22; De Leg. I, 8, 25; and other examples in Upton on Epictet. I, 6, 1. Πλινθο. 755.
NOTES.

although no Stoic, says H. N. VII, proem: *Hominis causa videtur cuncta aliqua genuisse natura*; and the Christian Lactantius, De Ira Dei, c. 14, says: *vera est sententia Stoicorum, qui aient nostra causa mundum esse constructum; omnia enim, quibus constat mundus, ad utilitatem hominis accommodata sunt*; on the other hand Seneca more modestly and rightly says, De Ira II, 27: *nimis nos suspicimus, si digni nobis videmur, propter quos tanta moveantur.* [Comp. Montaigne, Essais, Liv. II, c. 12.]

62 128. 28. deorum hominumque causa. Comp. above c. 6, 16. The following phrase *quaerque . . . inventa sunt* is probably spurious, because it contains only a gratuitous and jarring repetition of what was just said; moreover *inventa*, which can only refer to discoveries made by man, seems out of place here where the discourse turns only on the provident care of creative nature.—The following proposition in regard to the world as a state common to gods and men was a favorite idea with the Stoics, constantly repeated. See especially Aurius in Euseb. pr. Evang. XV, 15: *ὅ κόσμος τεινει τούς ἐστὶν ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἄνθρωπων, τῶν θεῶν μὲν τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἔχοντων, τῶν ἄνθρωπων ὑποτελεῖσθαι κοινωνίαν δ' ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν, δὲ ἐστὶ φύσεω θύμως.* Comp. Cic. De Leg. I, 7, 23; De Fin. III, 19, 64. In the Herculaneum Fragment Col. IV, 22 it is ascribed to Chrysippus, in the third book *peri φύσεως.*

155 129. 2. ad mundi cohaerentiam. See note to c. 32, 82. —tamen et spectaculum . . . is not for *etiam spectaculum,* but points to something which Cicero was about to add in opposition but afterwards forgot, or at least does not bring in the corresponding form. He might have said: *et magnum hominum vitae utilitatem afferunt: eorum enim cursus dimentati &c.* As it is, this last proposition, introduced by *enim,* follows as a proof of the remark immediately preceding in regard to the regularity and ingenious adaptation observable in the movements of the heavenly bodies. For it is just this which has made it possible for mankind to measure time rightly. —The words *ad rationem sollertiamque prae-stantior* are not to be interpreted by supplying *incitandum,* as if the question were of arousing the reflection and inventive power of man by the observation of the heavenly bodies. *Prastans ad aligum rem* means: “excellent in regard to (on account of) something”; as in De Leg. II, 13, 33: *multa ad veritatem admirabilia: “prophecies wonderful in regard to their truthfulness”*; Pro Fontei. 15: *vir ad usum et disciplinam peritus, ad casum fortunamque felix: “an experienced man as regards practice and knowledge, a lucky one as regards chance and fortune.”* —On *insatiablellor* see note c. 39, 98.

129. 8. vario leguminum gener. By this are to be understood
chiefly leguminous plants; not however exclusively, but according to Varro R. R. I, 23, 2 those quae velluntur e terra, non subsecantur; quae, quod ita leguntur, legumina dicta; and 32, 2: dicta a legendo, quod ea non secantur sed vellendo leguntur. Gr. χέδροποι, χέδροπα or χέδροπες, which is considered as a corruption of χέδροπος, from χειρ and ὑβέπευ. Comp. Nicand. Theriac. 652; Ideler, Arist. Meteor. II, p. 526.

129. 23. nisi forte . . . dubitationem adsert, quin . . . To understand the clause with quin properly we must bear in mind that the sense of the preceding one is: nam non sane dubitationem adsert.

129. 27. bestias hominum gratia. What the Academic might have replied to this may be gathered, since the corresponding passage in the third book is lost, from Porphyrius De Abst. III, 20. See also what Celsus says and what Origen ctr. Cels. IV, 74 answers.

129. 30. neque all . . . potuissent. This pluperfect is often used in this way instead of the imperfect, inasmuch as the possibility of the thing is represented as the condition which must be fulfilled before the thing itself can take place. Comp. De Offic. II, 3, 12: neque enim valetudinis curatio neque agri cultura . . . sine hominum opera ulla esse potuisset; Ibid. c. 4, 15: quid enumerem artium multitudinem, sine quibus vita omnino nulla esse potuisset. In the same way audire potuisses, above I, 21, 57, is to be explained; and si potuero, often used for si potero is to be regarded from the same point of view.

[The possibility of happening would seem to be a necessary condition to the actual happening of anything whatever; otherwise it would never happen. The idea of possibility lies here not in the tense, but in the very signification of the word potuissent; and the difference between potuissent and possent is that the former represents the possibility as existing at some earlier time. The idea seems to be that if it were not for the care of men sheep not only would not now be able to exist and flourish, but would never have been able to do so at any time, according to the original ordinance of nature.]

129. 35. se esse generatos. Eos would have been more correct: but the reflexive is used because canes, though not grammatically the subject, is thought of as such, being implied in canum custodia.

130. 4. ab illo aureo gener. Aratus, whom Cicero has in mind here, and from whom he quotes the following verses 130 ff., says of the golden age, v. 110: αὕτως δ' ἕλεον, χαλεπὴ δ' ἀπίκευτο θάλασσα, καὶ βιον ὀβύσω νής ἄπόκροθεν ἡγίσκοντο, ἄλλα βάσει καὶ ἀργήρα &c.; but according to others (as Hesiod W. & D. v. 117; Virgil, Georg. I, 125; Ovid, Met. I, 101) the earth produced in abundance in that age all sorts of fruits spon-
taneously and without culture; the necessity for culture came up at a later period.

130. 10. eorum visceribus. See note c. 6, 18.—Varro R. R. II, 5; Aelian. V. H. V, 14 and others state that in ancient times it was considered wrong to kill an ox in Italy and Greece, and it was forbidden under severe punishment. Pliny H. N. VIII, 45, p. 556 narrates that at Rome a man was once punished with exile for this crime. The ox was only rarely offered in sacrifice to the gods, under particular circumstances. See Hermann Gottesd. Alterth. § 26, 20 or Schoemann Griech. Alterth. II, p. 245.

64 130. 14. animam pro sale &c. This is cited as a saying of Cleanthes by Clemens Alex. Strom. VII, p. 304 Sylb.; as a saying of various Stoics by Plutarch Sympos. V, 10, 3; and by many others. See Villioin Theol. Phys. Stoic. at the end of Osann’s edition of Cornutus, p. 396.

130. 20. alites et oscines. Festus, p. 3 Müll.: alites volatù auspicia facientes; id., p. 196: oscines aves ore auspicium facientes.

130. 21. res augurare was said either of things which were consecrated and placed under the protection of the gods by taking the auspices, or of undertakings for which one secured the divine approval (auctoritas) by the same means.

131. 23. exerceamur in venando &c. Other authors speak in the same way of hunting, as Xenophon De Ven. 1, 18, and especially 12, 1: τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον μάλιστα παυθεὶν: and the subject is treated in detail.

130. 25. remedia . . . ellgamus. [Schoem. reads eliciamus, and says:] We gain from them medicinal remedies by investigation and labor, as above c. 60, 151: e terrae cavernis ferrum eliciimus [for eligimus of our text]. ellgamus, which is found in the Mss. is far less appropriate, and certainly only a slip of the pen.


131. 2. nihil tam inrident Epicurus. See above I, 20, 55. Diog. L. X, 135: μαντικὴν δὴ ἀπασαν ἁναρεῖ, καὶ φησι μαντικὴ δὲ ἀνθρωπος. Of course conformably with his opinion about the gods he could not judge differently.

133. 6. multa augures provident. The reading of some Mss. praevident, approved by many, is probably an error, not because the word is never used by Cicero, as has been too quickly assumed, but because it is out of place here. The augurs in Rome were not prophets: non enim sumus ii nos augures, says Cic. De Div. II, 33, 70, qui avium reliquorumque signorum observatione futura dicamus. The signs, which they ob-
served, were regarded only as indications whether the gods were favorable or not to any proposed undertaking; they were supposed, as it is expressed in De Harusp. Resp. c. 9, to give rerum bene gerendarum auctoritatem, a guaranty for the successful issue; and when the predictis augurum are spoken of we are to understand not prophecies of future events, but only general assurances of a happy issue, or warnings against disaster. Aves eventus significant aut adversos aut secundos, De Div. II, 37, 79. So here provident is to be taken only of the care on the part of the augurs that nothing should be undertaken against the wish of the gods as ascertained by the auspices. How important their sphere of action was may be seen from Cic. De Leg. II, 12, 31.

131. 7. vaticinationibus, the utterances of inspired seers, like those of the Sibylline books which passed at Rome for state oracles, those of the old Marcius fratres and others. See De Div. I, 2, 4; 40, 89.

131. 8. multae saepe res ... partae. The sense is: warnings and prognostics of this sort make it possible for men to attain many things according to their desires (ex sententia), and to further their interests (utilitates). utilitates serves to define the general expression res. The reading of the Mss. hominum sententia (without ex alque utilitate is evidently an error. See Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 378.

131. 10. sive vis sive ars sive natura; a power bestowed by the gods, a skill gained by observation, or a natural gift. Comp. De Div. I, 6, 11: duo sunt divinandi genera, quorum alterum artis est, alterum naturae. The first includes divination from signs, as that by the haruspices, the augurs, the astrologers and those who divined by means of the sortes (see III, 6, 14 note); the second includes the interpretation of visions, the divine inspiration, instinctus inflatusque divinus, which last is in the present passage denoted by vis.

131. 20. ab hulusce terrae continuatione distantium, i.e. ab hoc orbe terrarum, from the portion of the earth which we inhabit, and which, as is said in the following section, forms a large island. There were thought to be four of these islands, orbis terrarum, oikoboevai, separated by the great sea; one inhabited by Europeans and their avolkovoi; the second in the same hemisphere, but in the southern half, the inhabitants of which were called antinouoi; the third and fourth in the northern and southern half of the opposite hemisphere, the inhabitants of which were called peplokoi and antipodes of the Europeans. See Cleomed. I, p. 16 and Bake's note, p. 291 ff.

131. 33. neminem nisi juvante deo ... The wisest and best of antiquity at all times held that men needed the divine assistance in order to
attain to a high degree of virtue, and that the gods willingly gave this assistance to the good; although especially since the sophists there were many who acknowledged only the external good things of life as the gift of the gods. In this sense Cicero represents Cotta as speaking below III, 26.

132. 3. quales supra commemoravi, c. 2, 5.—saepe praesentiae; adverb for adjective.

132. 10. ita refellendum. The pronoun, left out by the copyists, is indispensable. Refellendum relates to the preceding assertion of the care of the gods for men. This divine care, says Balbus, is not to be disproved by adducing such misfortunes as are here mentioned, and then representing them as evidences of the divine anger; or in case they fall upon the good, towards whom the gods can have no hostile feeling, by representing them as proofs that the gods have no thought for the affairs of men.


132. 14. Magnis viris prosperae semper evenlunt omnes res, i.e. to the wise, the virtuous; for according to the Stoic doctrine virtue sufficed for their happiness, and external things could not make them happy or unhappy. This reason is indicated in the following phrase: si quidem satis dictum est &c., which is equivalent to ad hanc rem demonstrandum satis dictum est; this however the speaker does not mention to establish the truth of the proposition magnis ... res, but only as his own justification for asserting it.

132. 20. in utramque partem ... disputare. Comp. Tusc. II, 3, 9: Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in contrarias partes disserendi.

132. 22. amplificavit Academia. Cicero often speaks of the advantage derived by an orator from the study of the Academic philosophy from which he would gain the habit of looking at both sides of every subject. Comp. Orat. 3, 12; 21, 80; and De Fato 2, 3.
BOOK THIRD.

137. 11. **Sic mehercule**, "Certainly I do"; *i.e.* of course I have prepared myself well, as I had to do to meet such an antagonist as the Stoic; whereas to meet an Epicurean required no particular preparation. Cotta had said before (§ 1) that he was preparing himself during the discourse of Balbus to reply to it: *quid contra dicerem, meditaber*; and when he remarks there, as well as below in § 4, that he hopes not so much to refute Balbus as to beg for further explanation on several points, we recognize not only the Academic philosopher desiring of further knowledge, but the man of the world paying a compliment; not without a touch of irony too which does not escape Balbus, who answers: *sin me interrogare voles non tam intelligendi causa quam refellendi &c.* *Sic,* instead of *si,* an error of the copyists, is similarly used by Cicero in De Fin. III, 2, 9: *iam infici debet tis artibus, quas si, dum est tener, combiberit, ad maiora veniet paratior.*—*Sic; et quidem diligentius saepiusque ista loquemur inter nos &c.*; cf. Madvig’s note. See also Wopkens Lectt. Tull., p. 171, Hand’s note.

137. 18. **ludere videtur.** Comp. I, 44, 123.

137. 24. [see Madvig proposes *cepi,* or rather *percepi.*]

138. 5. **ducet oratio.** Comp. c. 17 init. Also *pergit oratio* and *iter sermonis* De Legg. I, 13, 37.

138. 14. **Tt. Coruncanum . . . P. Scaevolam**; see I, 41, 115 note. Scipio here mentioned is P. Cornelius Cn. f. L. n. Scipio Nasica, who was Pontifex Maximus and Consul (563), and was once publicly pronounced by a resolution of the Senate to be the best man in Rome. See Cic. De Fin. V, 22, 64; Livy XXIX, 14, 8.

138. 16. **C. Laellum,** the famous bosom friend of Scipio Africanus the younger, whom Cicero introduces as the speaker in his discourse on friendship. He was called by his contemporaries the wise man, *sapiens,* and above II, 66, 166 he is mentioned with Coruncanius, Scipio and others as one of the good men especially beloved by the gods. His *oratio nobilis,* alluded to here, was delivered in the year 600 against the proposed law of the tribune L. Licinius Crassus who proposed to abolish the *coöptatio* of the priestly colleges of the *pontifices,* the *augures* and the *decemviri sacris*
as the Stoic did one must remember that according to Chrysippus, from whom this portion of the argument is doubtless directly or indirectly taken, the thinking faculty resided in the breast, in the heart, and thus close to the lungs. See Galen, De Hippocr. et Plat. Dogm. II, 3 sq., and III, 8. The thought is formed here as λόγος ευδιάθετος and comes forth as speech, λόγος προφορικός, through the organs of speech. — The Mss. have *percipitur* instead of *percietur* [the reading in Schoemann’s text].


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**62 128. 28. deorum hominumque causa.** Comp. above c. 6, 16. The following phrase *quaeste . . . inventa sunt* is probably spurious, because it contains only a gratuitous and jarring repetition of what was just said; moreover *inveni*, which can only refer to discoveries made by man, seems out of place here where the discourse turns only on the provident care of creative nature. —The following proposition in regard to the world as a state common to gods and men was a favorite idea with the Stoics, constantly repeated. See especially Arian in Euseb. pr. Evang. XV, 15: ὁ κόσμος ὁ λόγιος ἔστιν ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τῶν θεῶν μὲν τῶν ἁγιων ἐχόντων, τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ὑποταγμένων κοινωνίαν ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἀληθινὸς διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν, ὡς ἀντὶ φύσει νόμος. Comp. Cic. De Leg. I, 7, 23; De Fin. III, 19, 64. In the Herculanean Fragment Col. IV, 22 it is ascribed to Chrysippus, in the third book περὶ φύσεως.

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**129. 8. vario leguminem genere.** By this are to be understood
chiefly leguminous plants; not however exclusively, but according to Varro R. R. I, 23, 2 those *qua quae belluntur e terra, non subsectantur; quae, quod ita leguntur, legumina dicta;* and 32, 2: *dicta a legendo, quod ea non secantur sed vellendo leguntur.* Gr. *χέροποι, χέροπα or χέροπες,* which is considered as a corruption of *χέροποι,* from *χείρ* and *ὄρεια.* Comp. Nicand. Theriac. 652; Ideler, Arist. Meteor. II, p. 526.

129. 23. *nisi forte . . . dubitationem adfert, quin . . .* To understand the clause with *quin* properly we must bear in mind that the sense of the preceding one is: *nam non sane dubitationem affert.*

129. 27. *bestias hominum gratia.* What the Academic might have replied to this may be gathered, since the corresponding passage in the third book is lost, from Porphyrius De Abst. III, 20. See also what Celsus says and what Origen ctr. Cels. IV, 74 answers.

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[The possibility of happening would seem to be a necessary condition to the actual happening of any thing whatever; otherwise it would never happen. The idea of possibility lies here not in the tense, but in the very signification of the word *potuisset;* and the difference between *potuisset* and *possent* is that the former represents the possibility as existing at some earlier time. The idea seems to be that if it were not for the care of men sheep not only would not now be able to exist and flourish, but would never have been able to do so at any time, *according to the original ordinance of nature.*]

129. 35. *se esse generatos.* *Eos* would have been more correct: but the reflexive is used because *canes,* though not grammatically the subject, is thought of as such, being implied in *canum custodia.*

130. 4. *ab illo aureo genere.* Aratus, whom Cicero has in mind here, and from whom he quotes the following verses 130 ff., says of the golden age, v. 110: *ἀντως ἐς ἐζων, χαλεπή δ’ ἀπέκειτο θάλασσα, καὶ βίων ὀμπο ὑψες ἀπάρηθεν ἔγινεκον, ἀλλά βόες καὶ ἀργαρα &c.;* but according to others (as Hesiod W. & D. v. 117; Virgil, Georg. I, 125; Ovid, Met. I, 101) the earth produced in abundance in that age all sorts of fruits spon-
taneously and without culture; the necessity for culture came up at a later period.

130. 10. *eorum visceribus.* See note c. 6, 18. — Varro R. R. II, 5; Aelian. V. H. V, 14 and others state that in ancient times it was considered wrong to kill an ox in Italy and Greece, and it was forbidden under severe punishment. Pliny H. N. VIII, 45, p. 556 narrates that at Rome a man was once punished with exile for this crime. The ox was only rarely offered in sacrifice to the gods, under particular circumstances. See Hermann Gottesd. Alterth. § 26, 20 or Schoemann Griech. Alterth. II, p. 245.


130. 20. *altæs et oscines.* Festus, p. 3 Müll.: *altæs volutæ auspicia facientes;* id., p. 196: *oscines aves ore auspicio facientes.*

130. 21. *ree augurare* was said either of things which were consecrated and placed under the protection of the gods by taking the auspices, or of undertakings for which one secured the divine approval (*auctoritas*) by the same means.

161 130. 23. *exerceamur in venando &c.* Other authors speak in the same way of hunting, as Xenophon De Ven. I, 18, and especially 12, 1: *tö δὲ πρὸς τὸν πόιμεν μᾶλιστα παιδέει·* and the subject is treated in detail.

130. 25. *remedia . . . eligamus.* [Schoem. reads *eliciamus,* and says:] We gain from them medicinal remedies by investigation and labor, as above c. 60, 151: *e terrae cavernis ferrum elicimus* [for *eligi- mus* of our text]. *eligamus,* which is found in the MSS. is far less appropriate, and certainly only a slip of the pen.


131. 2. *nihil tam inridet Epicurus.* See above I, 20, 55. Diog. L. X, 135: *μαντικῆν δὴ ἀπασαν ἀναρεῖ, καὶ φησί μαντικὴ ὡς ἀνθριππος.* Of course conformably with his opinion about the gods he could not judge differently.

163 131. 6. *multa augures provident.* The reading of some MSS. *praevident,* approved by many, is probably an error, not because the word is never used by Cicero, as has been too quickly assumed, but because it is out of place here. The augurs in Rome were not prophets: *non enim sumus ii nos augures,* says Cic. De Div. II, 33, 70, *qui avium religorum-gue signorum observatione futura dicamus.* The signa, which they ob-
served, were regarded only as indications whether the gods were favorable or not to any proposed undertaking; they were supposed, as it is expressed in De Harusp. Resp. c. 9, to give *rerum bene gerendarum auctoritatem*, a guaranty for the successful issue; and when the *praedictis augurum* are spoken of we are to understand not prophecies of future events, but only general assurances of a happy issue, or warnings against disaster. *Aves eventus significant aut adversos aut secundos*, De Div. II, 37, 79. So here *provident* is to be taken only of the care on the part of the augurs that nothing should be undertaken against the wish of the gods as ascertained by the auspices. How important their sphere of action was may be seen from Cic. De Leg. II, 12, 31.

131. 7. *vaticinatioibus*, the utterances of inspired seers, like those of the Sibylline books which passed at Rome for state oracles, those of the old *Marcii frates* and others. See De Div. I, 2, 4; 40, 89.

131. 8. *multae saepe res...partae*. The sense is: warnings and prognostics of this sort make it possible for men to attain many things according to their desires (*ex sententia*), and to further their interests (*utilitates*). *utilitates* serves to define the general expression *res*. The reading of the Mss. *hominum sententia* (without *ex*) *alque utilitate* is evidently an error. See Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 378.

131. 10. *alve vis alve ars alve natura*; a power bestowed by the gods, a skill gained by observation, or a natural gift. Comp. De Div. I, 6, 11: *duo sunt divinandi genera, quorum alterum artis est, alterum naturae*. The first includes divination from signs, as that by the haruspices, the augurs, the astrologers and those who divined by means of the *sortes* (see III, 6, 14 note); the second includes the interpretation of visions, the divine inspiration, *instinctus interruptusque divinus*, which last is in the present passage denoted by *vis*.

131. 20. *ab hulusce terrae continuatione distantiurn, i.e. ab hoc orbe terrarum*, from the portion of the earth which we inhabit, and which, as is said in the following section, forms a large island. There were thought to be four of these islands, *orbes terrarum*, separated by the great sea; one inhabited by Europeans and their *oinoikous*; the second in the same hemisphere, but in the southern half, the inhabitants of which were called *oinoikous*; the third and fourth in the northern and southern half of the opposite hemisphere, the inhabitants of which were called *peplos* and *antipodes* of the Europeans. See Cleomed. I, p. 16 and Bake's note, p. 291 ff.

131. 33. *neminem nisi Iuvante deo...* The wisest and best of antiquity at all times held that men needed the divine assistance in
attain to a high degree of virtue, and that the gods willingly gave this assistance to the good; although especially since the sophists there were many who acknowledged only the external good things of life as the gift of the gods. In this sense Cicero represents Cotta as speaking below III, 26.

132. 3. quales supra commemoravi, c. 2, 5.—saepe praesentiae; adverb for adjective.

132. 10. ita refellendum. The pronoun, left out by the copyists, is indispensable. Refellendum relates to the preceding assertion of the care of the gods for men. This divine care, says Balbus, is not to be disproved by adducing such misfortunes as are here mentioned, and then representing them as evidences of the divine anger; or in case they fall upon the good, towards whom the gods can have no hostile feeling, by representing them as proofs that the gods have no thought for the affairs of men.


132. 14. Magnis viris prosperae semper eveniunt omnes res, i.e. to the wise, the virtuous; for according to the Stoic doctrine virtue sufficed for their happiness, and external things could not make them happy or unhappy. This reason is indicated in the following phrase: si quidem satis dictum est &c., which is equivalent to ad hanc rem demonstrandum satis dictum est; this however the speaker does not mention to establish the truth of the proposition magnis . . . res, but only as his own justification for asserting it.


132. 22. amplificavit Academias. Cicero often speaks of the advantage derived by an orator from the study of the Academic philosophy from which he would gain the habit of looking at both sides of every subject. Comp. Orat. 3, 12; 21, 80; and De Fato 2, 3.
BOOK THIRD.

137. ii. **Sic mehercule,** "Certainly I do"; *i.e.* of course I have prepared myself well, as I had to do to meet such an antagonist as the Stoic; whereas to meet an Epicurean required no particular preparation. Cotta had said before (§ 1) that he was preparing himself during the discourse of Balbus to reply to it: *quid contra dicerem, meditabar;* and when he remarks there, as well as below in § 4, that he hopes not so much to refute Balbus as to beg for further explanation on several points, we recognize not only the Academic philosopher despairing of further knowledge, but the man of the world paying a compliment; not without a touch of irony too which does not escape Balbus, who answers: *sin me interrogare voles non tam intelligendi causa quam refellendi &c.* *Sic,* instead of *si,* an error of the copyists, is similarly used by Cicero in De Fin. III, 2, 9: *iam infici debet ipsis artibus, quas si, dum est tener, combiberit, ad maiora veniet paratio.* — *Sic; et quidem diligentius saepiusque ista loquemur inter nos &c.;* cf. Madvig's note. See also Wopkens Lectt. Tull., p. 171, Hand's note.

137. 18. **Iudere videtur.** Comp. I, 44, 123.

137. 24. [accepti. Madvig proposes cepi, or rather percepti.]

138. 5. **Ducet oratio.** Comp. c. 17 init. Also *pergit oratio* and *iter sermonis* De Legg. I, 13, 37.

138. 14. **Ti. Coruncanium . . . P. Scaevolam;** see I, 41, 115 note. Scipio here mentioned is P. Cornelius Cn. f. L. n. Scipio Nasica, who was Pontifex Maximus and Consul (563), and was once publicly pronounced by a resolution of the Senate to be the best man in Rome. See Cic. De Fin. V, 22, 64; Livy XXIX, 14, 8.

138. 16. **C. Laelium,** the famous bosom friend of Scipio Africanus the younger, whom Cicero introduces as the speaker in his discourse on friendship. He was called by his contemporaries the wise man, *sapiens,* and above II, 66, 166 he is mentioned with Coruncanius, Scipio and others as one of the good men especially beloved by the gods. His *oratio nobilis,* alluded to here, was delivered in the year 600 against the proposed law of the tribune L. Licinius Crassus who proposed to abolish the *cotipatio* of the priestly colleges of the pontifces, the augures and the decemviri sacris
as the Stoic did one must remember that according to Chrysippus, from whom this portion of the argument is doubtless directly or indirectly taken, the thinking faculty resided in the breast, in the heart, and thus close to the lungs. See Galen, De Hippocr. et Plat. Dogm. II, 3 sq., and III, 8. The thought is formed here as λόγος κειμένος and comes forth as speech, λόγος προφορικός, through the organs of speech. — The Mss. have perciptitur instead of percietur [the reading in Schoemann’s text].

127. 6. finita dentibus can hardly be right. Probably it should be munita dentibus. See Opusc. Ac. III, p. 377.

127. 6. vocem inmoderato profusam, the inarticulate sound; as on the other hand moderatio vocis is used in De Leg. I, 9, 27 for the articulation. By means of the articulation are formed the different and definitely determined sounds, soni vocis distincti et pressi, the characteristic endowment of the µέτοπες ἀνθρώπων, by which they are distinguished from the beasts of which the vox is immoderato profusa.

127. 13. molles commissuras et artus, “the movable, pliant connections and joints”; for which he might have said commissuras artuum. Artus are really the same as articuli, Gr. ἄρθρα, although the word is afterwards used for the members of the body; mollis is originally equivalent to mobilis, from which it is derived; the meaning “soft” is only a secondary one.

127. 24. condita is here more probably from condere than from condire. The salting and especially the conserving, condire, of alimentary substances is usual only to a limited extent; the laying aside however, condere, is general; and the most important substances, the grains and vegetables, need no conserving. Comp. too c. 62, 156 and 63, 157.

127. 25. veselmur . . . capiendo is an inexactness of expression worth noticing, for quas capimus, alimus or quae capiuntur, aluntur.

127. 31. [ferrum eliminus; MSS. elicimus. So in 130. 26 for remedia eligamus the common reading is eliciamus. In Tusc. III, § 83 stirpes aegritudinis . . . eligendae sunt and in III, § 84 fôbrae stirpium . . . eligendae sunt the reading of the MSS. eligendae is now accepted instead of the common elidendae. In Div. II, § 149 where the common reading was superstitionis stirpes omnes elimendae Madvig and Baiter adopt eligendae. Müller proposes to read eligimus and eligamus in our text; the last is in fact the reading of Ms. A; the former has no Ms. authority.]

127. 32. venas penitus abditas. These words form the second half of a trochaic tetrameter, and it is quite possible that not only here but in De Offic. II, 3, 13 Cicero had in mind a passage from some poet. Still the metre may have been only a matter of chance. Comp. note c. 9, 25;
also the passage I, 19, 40: *Epicurus autem qui res occultas et penitus additis* might be taken for an iambic tetrameter.

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[The possibility of happening would seem to be a necessary condition to the actual happening of anything whatever; otherwise it would never happen. The idea of possibility lies here not in the tense, but in the very signification of the word potuissent; and the difference between potuissent and possent is that the former represents the possibility as existing at some earlier time. The idea seems to be that if it were not for the care of men sheep not only would not now be able to exist and flourish, but would never have been able to do so at any time, according to the original ordinance of nature.]

129. 35. se esse generatos. Eos would have been more correct: but the reflexive is used because canes, though not grammatically the subject, is thought of as such, being implied in canum custodia.

130. 4. ab illo aureo genero. Aratus, whom Cicero has in mind here, and from whom he quotes the following verses 130 ff., says of the golden age, v. 110: αυτως δ’ ζουσιν, χαλεπη δ’ άπέκειτο θάλασσα, και βιον ουσω νης επόπτρεθεν γηνεσκον, άλλα βις και δροτρα &c.; but according to others (as Hesiod W. & D. v. 117; Virgil, Georg. I, 125; Ovid, Met. I, 101) the earth produced in abundance in that age all sorts of fruits σφιν-
taneously and without culture; the necessity for culture came up at a later period.

130. 10. eorum visceribus. See note c. 6, 18.—Varro R. R. II, 5; Aelian. V. H. V, 14 and others state that in ancient times it was considered wrong to kill an ox in Italy and Greece, and it was forbidden under severe punishment. Pliny H. N. VIII, 45, p. 556 narrates that at Rome a man was once punished with exile for this crime. The ox was only rarely offered in sacrifice to the gods, under particular circumstances. See Hermann Gottesd. Alterth. § 26, 20 or Schoemann Griech. Alterth. II, p. 245.

64 130. 14. animam pro sale &c. This is cited as a saying of Cleanthes by Clemens Alex. Strom. VII, p. 304 Sylb.; as a saying of various Stoics by Plutarch Symposium. V, 10, 3; and by many others. See Villoison Theol. Phys. Stoic. at the end of Osann’s edition of Cornutus, p. 396.

130. 20. alites et oscines. Festus, p. 3 Müll.: alites volatu auspicia facientes; id., p. 196: oscines aves ore auspiciun facientes.

130. 21. res augurare was said of things which were consecrated and placed under the protection of the gods by taking the auspices, or of undertakings for which one secured the divine approval (auctoritas) by the same means.

161 130. 23. exerceamur in venando &c. Other authors speak in the same way of hunting, as Xenophon De Ven. 1, 18, and especially 12, 1: τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον μάλιστα παιδευεῖ: and the subject is treated in detail.

130. 25. remedia ... eligamus. [Schoem. reads eliciamus, and says:] We gain from them medicinal remedies by investigation and labor, as above c. 60, 151: e terrae cavernis ferrum eliciamus [for eligimus of our text]. eligamus, which is found in the Mss. is far less appropriate, and certainly only a slip of the pen.


131. 2. nihil tam invidet Epicurus. See above I, 20, 55. Diog. L. X, 135: μαντικὴν δὴ ἀπασαν ἀναιρεῖ, καὶ φησὶ μαντικὴ ὡς ἀνθρικός. Of course conformably with his opinion about the gods he could not judge differently.

183 131. 6. multa augures provident. The reading of some Mss. praevident, approved by many, is probably an error, not because the word is never used by Cicero, as has been too quickly assumed, but because it is out of place here. The augurs in Rome were not prophets: non enim sumus ii nos augures, says Cic. De Div. II, 33, 70, qui avium reliquirum-que signorum observatione futura dicamus. The signs, which they ob-
served, were regarded only as indications whether the gods were favorable or not to any proposed undertaking; they were supposed, as it is expressed in De Harusp. Resp. c. 9, to give rerum bene gerendarum auctoritatem, a guaranty for the successful issue; and when the praedictis augurum are spoken of we are to understand not prophecies of future events, but only general assurances of a happy issue, or warnings against disaster. Aves eventus significant aut adversos aut secundos, De Div. II, 37, 79. So here provident is to be taken only of the care on the part of the augurs that nothing should be undertaken against the wish of the gods as ascertained by the auspices. How important their sphere of action was may be seen from Cic. De Leg. II, 12, 31.

131. 7. vaticinationibus, the utterances of inspired seers, like those of the Sibylline books which passed at Rome for state oracles, those of the old Marcii fratres and others. See De Div. I, 2, 4; 40, 89.

131. 8. multae saepe res ... partae. The sense is: warnings and prognostics of this sort make it possible for men to attain many things according to their desires (ex sententia), and to further their interests (utilitates). utilitates serves to define the general expression res. The reading of the Mss. hominum sententia (without ex) alique utilitate is evidently an error. See Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 378.

131. 10. sive vis sive ars sive natura; a power bestowed by the gods, a skill gained by observation, or a natural gift. Comp. De Div. I, 6, 11: duo sunt divinandi genera, quorum alterum artis est, alterum naturae. The first includes divination from signs, as that by the haruspices, the augurs, the astrologers and those who divined by means of the sortes (see III, 6, 14 note); the second includes the interpretation of visions, the divine inspiration, instinctus instatusque divinus, which last is in the present passage denoted by vis.

131. 20. ab hulusce terrae continuathone distintium, i.e. ab hoc orbe terrarum, from the portion of the earth which we inhabit, and which, as is said in the following section, forms a large island. There we thought to be four of these islands, orbes terrarum, oikogenues, separated by the great sea; one inhabited by Europeans and their σωλωκος; the second in the same hemisphere, but in the southern half, the inhabitants of which were called ἀντινοθες; the third and fourth in the northern and southern half of the opposite hemisphere, the inhabitants of which were called πελοκος and ἀντινοθες of the Europeans. See Cleomed. I, p. 16 and Bake’s note, p. 291 ff.

131. 33. neminem nisi iuvante deo ... The wisest and best of us antiquity at all times held that men needed the divine assistance in order to
attain to a high degree of virtue, and that the gods willingly gave this assistance to the good; although especially since the sophists there were many who acknowledged only the external good things of life as the gift of the gods. In this sense Cicero represents Cotta as speaking below III, 26.

132. 3. quales supra commemoravi, c. 2, 5. — saepe praesentiae; adverb for adjective.

132. 10. ita refellendum. The pronoun, left out by the copyists, is indispensable. Refellendum relates to the preceding assertion of the care of the gods for men. This divine care, says Balbus, is not to be disproved by adducing such misfortunes as are here mentioned, and then representing them as evidences of the divine anger; or in case they fall upon the good, towards whom the gods can have no hostile feeling, by representing them as proofs that the gods have no thought for the affairs of men.


132. 14. Magnis viris prosperae semper eventunt omnes res, i.e. to the wise, the virtuous; for according to the Stoic doctrine virtue sufficed for their happiness, and external things could not make them happy or unhappy. This reason is indicated in the following phrase: si quidem satis dictum est &c., which is equivalent to ad hanc rem demonstrandum satis dictum est; this however the speaker does not mention to establish the truth of the proposition magnis . . . res, but only as his own justification for asserting it.


132. 22. amplificavit Academia. Cicero often speaks of the advantage derived by an orator from the study of the Academic philosophy from which he would gain the habit of looking at both sides of every subject. Comp. Orat. 3, 12; 21, 80; and De Fato 2, 3.
BOOK THIRD.

137. 11. Sic mehercule, "Certainly I do"; i.e. of course I have prepared myself well, as I had to do to meet such an antagonist as the Stoic; whereas to meet an Epicurean required no particular preparation. Cotta had said before (§ 1) that he was preparing himself during the discourse of Balbus to reply to it: quid contra dicerem, meditabar; and when he remarks there, as well as below in § 4, that he hopes not so much to refute Balbus as to beg for further explanation on several points, we recognize not only the Academic philosopher despairing of further knowledge, but the man of the world paying a compliment; not without a touch of irony too which does not escape Balbus, who answers: sin me interrogare voles non tam intelligendi causa quam refellendi &c. Sic, instead of si, an error of the copyists, is similarly used by Cicero in De Fin. III, 2, 9: iam infici debet iis artibus, quas si, dum est tener, comberit, ad maiora veniet parator. — Sic; et quidem diligentius saepiusque ista loquemur inter nos &c.; cf. Madvig's note. See also Wopkens Lectt. Tull., p. 171, Hand's note.

137. 18. ludere videtur. Comp. I, 44, 123.
137. 24. [accepi. Madvig proposes cepi, or rather percepit.]
138. 5. duce oratio. Comp. c. 17 init. Also pergit oratio and iter sermonis De Legg. I, 13, 37.

138. 14. Th. Coruncanium . . . P. Scævolam; see I, 41, 115 note. Scipio here mentioned is P. Cornelius Cn. f. L. n. Scipio Nasica, who was Pontifex Maximus and Consul (563), and was once publicly pronounced by a resolution of the Senate to be the best man in Rome. See Cic. De Fin. V, 22, 64; Livy XXIX, 14, 8.

138. 16. C. Laelium, the famous bosom friend of Scipio Africanus the younger, whom Cicero introduces as the speaker in his discourse on friendship. He was called by his contemporaries the wise man, sapiens, and above II, 66, 166 he is mentioned with Coruncaniam, Scipio and others as one of the good men especially beloved by the gods. His oratio nobilis, alluded to here, was delivered in the year 600 against the proposed law of the tribune L. Licinius Crassus who proposed to abolish the coöptatio of the priestly colleges of the pontifices, the augures and the decemviri sacris.
faciundis, and to introduce in its place the popular vote. Comp. Cic. Lael. c. 25, 96, and below c. 17, 43.

138. 21. Sibyllae Interpretes, i.e. the quindecimviri sacris faciundis, a college of which the duty was to keep the Sibylline books, to consult them on the order of the Senate, to report thereon and to carry out the necessary religious observances prescribed by them; from which last duty the title of the office was taken. They were called quindecimviri since the year 673 (probably); before this decemviri, since 378; in the earlier period duoviri.

138. 23. Romulum auspiciis, Numam sacrís. Nothing is commoner than this reference of the Roman auspices to their founder Romulus, who not only was himself an excellent augur (De Div. II, 33, 70; 38, 90, De Repub. II, 9, 16) and founded the state auspicio (De Repub. II, 9, 16) but also handed down to his successors the connection between the state and the gods thus instituted by the auspices of the foundation. The more precise arrangement of the sacra, i.e. the religious observances by which the gods are rightly worshipped and of the orders of priests instituted for carrying them out, is quite as often ascribed to Numa (De Repub. II, 14).

8 7 138. 35. Primum quidque. See I, 27, 77, note.
138. 35. et, si id est primum. The connection is as follows: si id est primum, esse deos, id ipsum cur ita sit, nihil tu me doces. But inasmuch as the double relative clause quod...eximi non potest is inserted after the first member, a tamen is inserted in the second member for the sake of the contrast; and in order to bring out distinctly the opposition between faith and knowledge Cicero introduces here also the relative clause quod...auctoritate maiorum, which in fact only repeats what has been said although with an addition. On eximi [which Baiter and Schoemann read for excedi] see Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 378 sq.


4 9 139. 17. Quam simile istud sit, tu videris; a turn of expression, which intimates that the opponent upon closer examination would satisfy himself of the inaptitude of the comparison. In a similar manner, Acad. II, 7, 19: Epicurus hoc viderit et multa alia; De Div. II, 53, 108: vide, quaeo, quam sint ista similia; nam mihi non videntur.

139. 24. duo lumina; two openings for the light, or for seeing; just as lumina is often used for fenestrae.

139. 24. ab animo ad oculos. Tusc. I, 20, 46: viae quasi quae-dam sunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares a sede animi perforatae; and in
the same passage fenestrae animi, as in Lactant. De Opif. D. c. 9, 2: mens oculis tamquam fenestris utitur.

139. 31. argumentando dubiam factas. Procl. on Plut. Tim., p. 10 416 Schn.: o panta apodeiktika neymikos aityn malista thy apodeixin anaphei.

139. 34. quo haec regantur. The pronoun haec, though not referring grammatically to caelum, denotes "all these things," i.e. the universe, which we unavoidably think of when we regard the heavens. Comp. II, 2, 4 where haec logically includes more than caelum caelestiaque just preceding.

140. 3. istum potius quam Capitolinum. Cotta is quite right here; the unthinking multitude formed their ideas of the gods from the pictures and statues they saw about them, and connected these together in the closest manner; so much was this the case, that they in some degree divided a deity according to the different temples and representations into different persons, which might even be jealous one of another. It once happened to the Emperor Augustus (only in a dream it is true), that the Jupiter Capitolinus complained of the more jealous adoration which was paid to the Jupiter Tonans. Suet. Aug. c. 91; Dion Cassius LIV, 4; Catull. XIX, 20 represents one Priapus quarrelling with another.—In quisquam nostrum however Cotta without doubt says too much. There were many people who, although they did not share the views of the philosophers, did not follow the common multitude; and who, although conceiving of the gods as similar to men and under human forms, still regarded their proper essence and their divine power, their energeia, numen, not as limited and confined in these forms, but as pervading a wider sphere according to the office and power of each; they imagined the numen of Jupiter, for instance, as dwelling in the aether and like this pervading the whole universe: topikos men on pantaxou to theion ipnovin antonon tais meloi energeias pantaxon einai anagke. These words of Philoponus (in Lobeck Agl., p. 913) represent pretty nearly the general view of thinking people. Comp. also Seneca Quaest. Nat. II, 45. [Iovem is second accusative after appelleth.]

140. 5. quos . . . ne animantis quidem. This refers to the heavenly bodies which the Stoics held to be gods. II, 15.

140. 8. opinio . . . cotidie cresceret. II, 2, 5.

140. 8. stultorum. See note on I, 9, 23; and for the following: qui illos insanos esse dicatis, comp. Cic. Paradox. IV.

140. 10. videmus. The present for videre nonnumquam solemus; like the similar expression II, 2, 6 praesentes saepe di vim suam declarant.
140. 10. In Salaria, scil. via. This was the name of the road leading from Rome into the Sabine country to Reate, quia per eam Sabini sal a mari (i.e. from the salt works near Ostia) deferebant. Fest. Paul., p. 327 Müll. — The city gate corresponding was anciently called Salaria, afterwards porta Collina. Festus, p. 326. — nescio quid; a depreciatory expression.

140. 12. homines homine natos. According to the poetic mythology both had a mortal mother, Leda; one, Castor, had also a mortal father, Tyndarus, while Pollux was a son of Jupiter.

140. 13. Homerus . . . recens ab illorum actate. The Tyndaridae were, as brothers of Helen and Clytemnestra, contemporaries of the Greeks who fought before Troy, although they died before the war in the flower of youth. Homer was thought by many, as by Krates and his followers, to have lived immediately after the Trojan war; see Procl. Chrestom. in Becker's edition of the Scholia to the Iliad, p. 1. But Cicero in another passage (De Republ. II, 10, 18) cites the opposite opinion of others, according to which Homer lived about thirty years before the Spartan Lycurgus, whom he places a hundred and eight years before the first Olympiad, i.e. 885; and in Tuscul. V, 3, 7 he makes Homer and Lycurgus contemporaries. The reason of his attributing the other view to Cotta is easily seen. The passage of Homer alluded to is II. III, 243.

140. 14. cantherilis albis. Balbus in II, 2, 6 said cum equis albis. The expression here substituted is derisive; for cantherius or canterius, properly gelding, is also used, like caballus, of common pack-horses. So the following nullis calonibus, "without grooms."

140. 16. M. Catoni, the old Censorius.

140. 19. quod probari potest, i.e. what at least may pass for probable. We know moreover that the Academics recognized in general no certainty but only probability. See Introd., p. 13.

140. 21. divinos esse et aernos. See note on I, 15, 39.

140. 25. (ab) A. Postumio aedem . . . dedicatam. The temple was vowed by the dictator A. Postumius at the battle of Lake Regillus; it was dedicated at a later time by his son. So says Livy II, 20, 12 and 42, 5, although he says nothing of any apparition in the battle.

140. 27. Graecorum . . . proverbium. Suidas: ἀληθεστερα τῶν ἐπὶ Σάγρα. παρομία ἐπὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν μὲν, οὐ πιστευομένων δὲ. The proverb also occurred in Menander. See Meineke on his fragments, p. 17. For the battle on the Sagra see note on II, 2, 6.

140. 31. After the apparitions of the gods Balbus (II, 3, 7) had cited divination as a proof of the existence of the gods. The commencement of
Cotta’s answer is lost; the portion that remains goes to prove that divination, even if it were any thing more than a figment of the brain, would still be of no use to men, because what was destined to happen would happen at any rate and could not be avoided by knowing it beforehand. This argument is also found De Div. II, 8, 20.


141. 4. fissum lecoris: probably a fissure or cut separating the different lobes of the liver, called limes in Seneca CEd. 365. The fissure denoted good or evil fortune according to the circumstances; there was a fissum vitale, a fissum familiare, and other similar sorts. See De Div. II, 6, 12, 13; Brisson. De Form. I, 31; Müller Etrusk. II, 182.

141. 4. sortis, such as were used in the temple of Fortuna at Praeneste for divination; they were counters, which when mixed like a pack of cards were thrown into a vase, and one or more were drawn out. Hence the expressions sortes aequare, sortem ducere or trahere. Comp. De Div. I, 18, 34; II, 33, 70; 41, 96; Suet. Tiber. 14. The sortes were not all of the same kind, and those expressions do not have the same meaning with all.

141. 10. Declorum devotionibus. See II, 3, 10.

141. 11. [eorum refers to deos in the preceding sentence; iniquitas is unfairness, injustice.]

141. 18. Faunus omnino quid sit nescio; i.e. as a philosopher, and especially of the Academy, he does not know it; as pontifex of course he knows what the Faunus is, at least he knows what invocations and prayers are to be directed to him, what manifestations of power are to be expected from him, what sanctuaries and feasts are sacred to him; on all this consult the citations of Merkel on Ovid. Fast. Prolegg., p. CCII. For nam as a particle of transition see note on c. 24, 61.

141. 22. formatas for informatas, more common in this sense, which was also used above II, 5, 13.—The following repetition of the reasons adduced by Cleanthes changes the order there followed, putting the third before the second; evidently because Cotta after answering the argument from divination wishes now to treat only the third, that drawn from the wonderful and awe-inspiring phenomena of nature, leaving the second and fourth for a later part of the discourse when he means to speak of the divine providence, the same arguments being applicable to both. He thus avoids repeating the same thing as Balbus did. That portion of Cotta’s discourse is however lost.
18  141. 35. illa etiam differemus. The plural is used because the pronoun refers not only to quod Chrysippum dicere aiebas, but to the more remote quae ... comparabas, et cum ... adferabas. Comp. II, 50, 126; 59, 147. The words quae in domo pulchra cum pulchritudine mundi comparabas are to be taken as a shorter expression for quae in domo pulchra cum pulchritudine mundi comparandā dicebas: for taken literally they would not agree with what Balbus had said II, 6, 17, and with what Cotta would be likely to say. — Before the following cum ... adferabas one must supply of course quae dicebas.

142. 7. physice. Comp. I, 27, 77 and II, 18, 48. Here too there is a little irony, for the physics of the Stoics amounted to very little for an Academic.

142. 10. cum docere velles deos esse, i.e. in that part of your discourse where you attempted to prove the existence of the gods. The following words, quare et mundus &c., are to be taken with quae a te nudius tertius dicta sunt, "the reasons which you adduced to show that the universe &c. was endowed with feeling and mind." — For nudius tertius see Introd., p. 20.

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142. 19. sed ab hac ea quae estione ... separantur; i.e. the complete proof of the reality of divination falls under another head; in the investigation of the existence and nature of the gods it is taken for granted.

142. 29. Modo possemus eum animantem cogitare. This is not to be construed with the preceding dicebas and non dubitabas, as if Cotta meant to represent it as having been said by Balbus; for Balbus did not make this a condition; he merely deduced the animation of the world as a necessary consequence from the proposition that it was the best and most perfect of everything. Cotta now objects to this deduction, that it involves something inconceivable. Before Modo possemus we must supply something like recte, or non intercederem or the like. For modo see Hand Tursell. III, p. 638.

142. 30. cogitare vel potius ... cernere. One can think, cogitare in the wider sense of the word, of all sorts of things, even of phantoms; but we can really perceive, cernere, only what is true and actually existing.

21  142. 34. nullo modo prorsus for prorsus nullo modo. The adverb strengthens the negation, the negation does not negative the adverb. So prorsus strengthening the negation is placed after non in De Fin. II, 5, 17: Non prorsus, inquit: "not at all," not, "not quite." Comp. Madvig's note. So with the ordinary non omnino, whereas omnino non is more rare. So in Greek often, où πάνυ, oùk ἄγαν.
143. 1. Nihil est mundo melius in rerum natura. Balbus says II, 12, 32: mundus melior (est) quam ulla natura, and mundum universum pluris esse necesse est quam partem aliquam universi: but he nowhere uses the peculiar expression chosen by Cotta, which really amounts to only this, nihil est mundo melius in mundo. This includes, it is true, nulla pars mundi est mundo melior; but Cotta evidently uses it with the object of offsetting it with his own as a complete counterpart; namely, Ne in terris quidem urbe nostra, scil. quicquam melius est; although the relations of the objects compared together in the two sentences, mundus to rerum naturae, and urbs nostra to terrae, are essentially different.—The following argumentation, which agrees completely with that of Alexinus given by Sext. Emp. IX, 108, deserves the name of calumnia which Balbus applies to similar ones II, 7, 20. It grossly misuses the word melius, which of course may mean very different things as applied to different objects and relations; and by taking it in some of its relative significations and applying it to the universe one may succeed in throwing an appearance of ridicule on the opinion of the Stoics; but this vanishes as soon as the word is taken in the sense which the Stoics intended. Comp. Prantl Gesch. der Logik I, p. 44.

143. 8. Istum locum Zenonis conclusio . . . dilatavit. [Schoemann reads dilatabit with the following note.] “Zeno’s conclusion will widen the application of that proposition”; i.e. by means of Zeno’s conclusion the proposition can be made to include more than you would wish; it can be used to prove not only that the universe is intelligent but also that it can read &c. The expression may be compared with I, 35, 98: si semel susceperimus genus hoc argumenti, attende quo serpat. Dilatare is to make a wider application of a thing; so in De Leg. III, 14, 32: lex dilatat in ordinem cunctum. The dilatavit of the Mss. is evidently false; no one would imagine that Zeno so turned the proposition. Nor can dilatavit be equivalent to effectit ut dilatari possit. [We have kept the reading dilatavit of Müller, which is also given by Baiter in both editions. In a note Müller proposes the present, i.e. locus conclusionis dilatatur. There seems to be no valid objection against the perfect, the sense being that Zeno’s way of putting the argument has made it possible to extend its application farther than he intended.]

143. 10. Saepe dixit. The syncopated form is also found in the Mss. of Cicero De Fin. II, 3, 10; Ad Att. XIII, 32; Pro Caecin. 29, 82. Comp. Madvig Cic. De Fin., p. 153; and Bücheler in the N. Rhein. Museum XI, p. 59. — nihil fieri nisi ex eo; Schoemann reads sine deo for nisi ex eo. See the Appendix in loco.

143. 21. fidicinem etiam et tubeinem; a similar calumnia to
that noticed above. Cotta pretends not to know that all the arts are only
especial developments or applications of the general power which the
Stoics ascribed to the universe, and that it is illogical to transfer to the
universal power what can only arise from its subdivision.

143. 23. [et quidem has the Mss. authority. Schoemann and Baiter
I and II read atque idem. The same Mss. have et quidem in II, § 41,
which Schoemann there retains, but Baiter I, II changes to atque item. et
quidem, adding a term with some emphasis, is not uncommon, and there
seems to be no reason for deviating from the Mss.—Müller does not
bracket erit mundus.]

143. 32. Quid Chalcidico Euripo ... constantius? There were
probably other opinions about this, for the irregularity of the currents in
the Euripus was proverbial. Comp. Plat. Phaed., p. 90 C. Diogenian.
Prov. III, 39; IV, 72. There is however in this irregularity a regular
movement as Babin explains in Spon's Reisen &c. translated by Menudier
in Griechenland II, p. 220.

143. 34. freto Sicilensi. Pomp. Mel. II, 7: id angustum et anceps
alterno cursu modo in Tuscum modo in Ionium pelagus perfuit.

143. 35. Europam Libyanque ... The quotation is from an un-
known poet, perhaps Ennius in the Annals; it is cited also in Tusc. I, 20,
45. The fretum Gaditaniun is meant.

144. 1. aestus maritim . . . See note to II, 7, 19.

144. 8. confugitis ad deum. But whoever says that these things are
ordered by nature working blindly and unconsciously (see II, 32, 81 note)
no more gives an explanation of them than he who sees in them the work-
ing of a divine law. Can one be proved any more than the other? Cotta
promises to bring the proof (quem ad modum docebo, at the end of the
chapter); but the passage in which he attempted it is lost.

144. 16. in eodem ... errore versantur, it rests upon the same
Wopkens Lect. Tull., p. 77. The expression is generally used in speaking
of persons.

144. 17. [Quid sit melius, "What is to be understood under the term
melius?" Cf. § 21: Sed cum mundo negas quicquam esse melius, quid
dictis melius? &c.]

144. 30. At enim quaerit ... Socrates. See II, 6, 17.

144. 31. Et ego quaero, unde orationem ... To judge of this
objection see note on c. 9, 23.
BOOK III. — CHAP. X—XII, §§ 24—29.

144. 33. **ad harmoniam canere mundum.** The Pythagorean view of the harmony of the spheres is jocosely caricatured by Cotta. What Pythagoras really meant may be seen in the Somn. Scip. c. 5: *Quis hic, inquam, quis est qui complet auris meas tantus et tam dulcis sonus? Hic est, inquit ille, qui intervallis conjunctus imparibus, sed tamen pro rata portione distinctis, impulsu et motu ipsorum orbium conficitur, et acuta cum gravibus temperans varios aequabiliiter concentus efficit; nec enim silentio tanti motus incitari possunt, et natura furt, ut extrema ex altera parte graviter, ex altera autem acute sonent.* Comp. Martin, Études sur le Timée de Platon II, p. 35 ff.

144. 35. **non artificiosse ambulantis.** See II, 22, 57.

145. 3. **quasi cognitione continuata.** See II, 7, 19. — For the following *illa ... naturae viribus* comp. note on II, 9, 25.

145. 5. **[continerentur, cohaerent et permanent.** We have given here the reading of Bailer II. The passage which Cotta refers to is II, 7, 19: *Haec (i.e. several operations of nature just mentioned) ita fieri omni- bus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur.* The *ea* there refers to the operations of nature in question, and it seems more natural to take it in that sense here; and Cotta has already said, § 27, *Naturae ista sunt ... omnia scientis et agitantis motibus &c.,* having in mind certain phenomena of nature. He goes on to say *illa* (these same natural phenomena) *cohaerent et permanent naturae viribus,* i.e. this *consensus* is due to the force of nature and no divine influence is necessary to explain it. In *estque in ea &c. we take ea to refer to natura.*

145. 7. **consensus, quam συμπάθεια Graeci vocant.** Comp. De Div. II, 14, 34: *ex conjunctione naturae et quasi concenitu atque consensus, quam συμπάθεια Graeci appellant.* Also the same, II, 60, 124 and 66, 142.

145. 10. **quaes Carneades adferebat.** See note on I, 2, 4. Sext. 129

Emp. IX, 138 ff. gives some of the following arguments of Carneades out of his discourses, made public by his disciples, especially by Clitomachus. — Madvig correctly remarks that in the second member of the following sentence Cicero should have written *nullum esse animal semipiternum* instead of *nullum esse corpus semipiternum.*

145. 12. **ne individuum quidem.** Probably a causal conjunction has fallen out before these words, perhaps nam. The proposition that no body is immortal rests upon the further one that no body is indivisible and indestructible, which Cotta also refers to in I, 24, 66 as an *oraculum physicorum.* — **ne quidem** does not amplify, but simply means “also not,” as it often does. Comp. below c. 17, 43.
nullum est eorum, referring to the preceding omne animal, equivalent to omnia animalia, a constructio ad sensum. So in De Fin. IV, 20, 57: cumque omnis controversia aut de re soleat aut de nomine esse, utraque earum nascitur &c.—On patibilis see note on II, 39, 98. Cicero uses it in passive sense, Tusc. IV, 23, 51; but not elsewhere.

et si omne animal tale est, i.e. ferendi et patiendi necessitati obnoxium. This sentence with the conclusion drawn from it is for the moment put in hypothetical form, to be repeated afterwards with atqui in a positive form; and the mortality, the divisibility and the destructibility of all living things then follow as a matter of course. — Moreover in this series of propositions the first, si nullum corpus inmorte sit &c., seems to be superfluous in so far that no especial application is made of it to the mortality of the animalia; if there had been, it must have been put in between the first and second proposition, somewhat in this way: ergo cum nullum animal sit nisi corporum, consequitur etiam animal nullum inmortalit esse. But Cotta might omit this as a thing to be taken for granted.

Ergo itidem. Ergo seems to imply that the divisibility is a consequence of the ferendi et patiendi necessitas just mentioned, which would hardly be granted without qualification; ergo then would have been better left out. The opinion of some, that ergo may be equivalent to deinde, is properly rejected. See Hand Tursell. II, p. 464. — The following sentence would be better omitted as it only repeats what has just been said.

similiter Igitur. This igitur joins the conclusion with the preceding protasis introduced by si. So below § 33. Comp. De Invent. I, 34, 69: quodsi melius gubernantur ea, quaee consilio, quam quae sine consilio administrantur, nihil autem omnium rerum melius administratur quam omnis mundus; consilio igitur mundus administratur.

omnia [quaee sunt], e quibus cuncta constant. If Cicero really wrote thus, sunt cannot be taken as the verbum existentiae and as a complete predicate; for in that case omnia quae sunt would mean “all that exists,” which is plainly not intended here; sunt must therefore be taken as the copula, and the sense must be omnia quae sunt cunctorum elementa. But the strange form of expression is a very improbable one; Cicero probably wrote: si omnia, e quibus, quae sunt, cuncta constant; or the words quae sunt should be erased.

Etenim omne corpus . . . This sentence does not give the reason of what immediately precedes, but that of the proposition: mutabilitia sunt omnia.

sentit igitur . . . dulcia et amara. Carneades in Sext. Emp. IX, 139: ei yap eisai theoi, zow eisw. ei de zow eisav, aiodhavovrau.
πάν γάρ ζώον αἰσθήσεως μετοχή νοεῖται ζώον, εἰ δὲ αἰσθάνονται, καὶ πικράζονται καὶ γλυκάζονται. — γλυκαζόμενος δὲ καὶ πικραζόμενος εἰναρετήσει τοι κἄν δισεαρετήσει· δισεαρετών δὲ τις, καὶ ἀχλήσεως ἐσταὶ δεκτικός καὶ τῆς ἐπι τὸ χείρον μεταβολῆς· εἰ δὲ τούτο, φθαρτός ἐστιν. δοκεῖ εἴπερ εἰδὴ, φθαρτοὶ ἐστιν· οὐκ ἢ ἄρα θεὸι εἰσίν. The same line of argument is there carried out for all the separate senses.

146. 7. nec potest ullo sensu lucunda accipere, non accipere contraria. The nec potest really refers only to the last member, non accipere contraria; and the sentence might have been thus written: nec potest ullo sensu, quum incunda accipiat, non incipere contraria; or: incunda quidem accipere, non autem accipere contraria. It belongs then to the kind spoken of above I, 9, 23.

146. 13. [sin autem quid &c. Baiter I and II, and Schoemann read 33 sin autem, quod animal est, id &c.]

146. 23. quin id intereat. The pronoun might have been omitted; but similar passages are not rare. Comp. above II, 9, 24; Verres I, 59, 154: Quis in circum maximum venit, quin scuo quoque gradu de avaritia tua commoneretur? Sallust Jug. 36, 7: novus homo nemo tam clarus erat, quin scuo indignus illo honore habetur.

146. 26. Etenim. Comp. note on II, 16, 42. — The argumentation 14 of Carneades may be found in Sext. Emp. IX, 180: εἰ ἐστι θεῖον, ἢ ἐστι σῶμα ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματον· ἀλλὰ ἀσώματος μὲν οὐκ ἄν εἰς διὰ τὰς ἐμπροσθέν ἡμῶν εἰρήμενας αἰτίας· εἰ δὲ σῶμα ἐστιν, ἢ ἐστιν σύγκριμα ἐστιν ἢ τῶν ἀπλῶν στοιχεῖων ἢ ἀπλῶν ἐστι καὶ στοιχειόθες σῶμα. καὶ εἰ μὲν σύγκριμα ἐστὶ, ἤθερτον ἐστιν. πάν γάρ τὸ κατὰ συνοδόν τινων ἀποτελεθέν ἀνάγκη διαλυόμενον φθειρε-σθαι.

146. 28. concreta est. [Schoemann has concretum est with this note:] scil. animans, to be supplied from natura animantis. There is no doubt that animans may be used in the neuter singular, although Cicero in other places only uses the neuter plural. [Baiter II reads concreta.]

146. 34. Heraclium sequentes. He taught too, according to Diog. 35 L. IX, 7: ἐκ πυρὸς τὰ πάντα σωνετάναι καὶ εἰς τούτο ἀναλίσθαι; ορ in his own words quoted in Clem. Alex. Strom. V, c. 14, § 105: κόσμον τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπάνων οὕτε τις θεῶν οὕτε ἄνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἄει καὶ ἐκκαὶ ἐκείναι πάν ἄείων ἀπόκευμον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννυμένον μέτρα. [Baiter II brackets non omnes ... modo.]

147. 1. quoniam intellegi noluit, omittamus. A sort of attraction, the relative being taken into the dependent clause instead of being made the object of the leading verb, omittamus, in the accusative; so that sum must be supplied. So Corn. Nep. Thrasyb. 4, 1: huic corona
data est; quam quod amor civium, non vis expresserat, nullam habuit individiam. The same attraction with the demonstrative occurs Sallust Catil. c. 11, 2: hic quia bona artes desunt, dolis atque fallaciis contendit. — On intellegi noluit comp. I, 26, 74.

147. 2. omnem vim esse ignem. More distinctly expressed it could have read: omnem vim vitae esse ignem; for this was the opinion of the Stoics. See II, 9, 23, 24.

147. 7. Id ... de caldo, i.e. id quod de caldo dicitis, commune huic est cum umore et spiritu; or: pariter de umore et spiritu dicit potest.

147. 9. animal intrinsecus, the same as ex sese animal which occurs below, “having life from itself, an independent existence.”

147. 10. animam, unde ... constet animus. It was an ancient and wide-spread opinion that the soul was aerial and maintained by breathing. Comp. Tusc. I, 1, 19: Animum autem aliui animam, ut fere nostri declarant nomine. Nam et agere animam et efflare dicimus ...; ipse autem animus ab anima dictus est. Further details may be found in Lobeck Aggl. p. 755 ff.

147. 19. ad eundem etiam interitum venire. In the foregoing member Cicero used the subjunctive after necessa est; it is easy to see why he now changes to the infinitive. This might be taken to depend on the foregoing eadem duci possunt, but not so well; and the change of construction occurs in other passages. Comp. Acad. II, 12, 39: ante videri aliquid quam agamus necessa est, eique quod visum sit, assentiatur, for assentiri; De Fin. V, 9, 25: necessa est finem omnium hunc esse, ut natura expleatur ...; sed extrema illa et summa inter animalium genera distincta et disperita sint, for esse.

147. 23. all autem solem &c. See II, 33, 83 and 46, 118.

147. 24. Eamque causam Cleanthes adfert. This is not mentioned elsewhere as the opinion of Cleanthes, but agrees very well with that which Diog. L. VII, 145 ascribes to the Stoics in general, that the sun draws its nourishment from the great sea. For the great sea separates our oikouμένη from the opposite southern one (see note to II, 66, 164), and lies itself in the hot zone between the two tropics, one of which, the Tropic of Cancer, Cicero here calls the solstitialis orbis, the other, the Tropic of Capricorn, brumalis. — It has been noticed that the words cur se ... progressiatur form a hexameter. Comp. note on II, 60, 151.

147. 26. Hoe totum quale sit, mox. Balbus had put forth this view of the nourishment of the heavenly bodies by watery vapours in the portion of his discourse devoted to the discussion of the divine providence, II, 45, 118. Cotta proposes to postpone his answer until he comes to consider the same subject. But this part of his argument has been lost.
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For the following sentence commencing with nunc autem see Rem., p. 73.

147. 30. Qualem autem deum intellegere nos possimus &c. 15

"How can we form for ourselves an idea of a god without virtue?" For intellegere in this signification comp. I, 10, 25; 14, 36; II, 21, 54. The following argumentation is also borrowed from Carneades. See Sext. Emp. IX, 152 ff. It simply shows however that categories, which apply very well to men and human relations, cannot be transferred to the deity, which Aristotle has shown in regard to the various virtues Eth. Nic. X, 8. Arnobius I, 31 says of God: tu es de quo nihil dici et exprimi mortalium potis est significacione verborum; quid ut intelligaris, tacendum est, atque ut per umbram te possit errans investigare suspitio, nihil est omnino mutandum. And III, 19: Quicquid deo dixeris, quicquid tacitae mentis cogitatione conceperis, in humanum transitil et corrumpitur sensum, nec habet propriae significationis notam, quod nostris dicitur verbis atque ad negotia humana compositum. Unus est hominis intellectus de dei natura ceritissimus, si scias et sentias nihil de illo posse mortali oratione depromi.

148. 11. plecem Syri venerantur; Derceto or Atergatis, a mater nal natural deity. She had not however quite the form of a fish, but according to Diod. II, 4: τὸ μὲν πρόσωπον ἔχει γυναικός, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο σῶμα πάν ἱχθύος; or according to Lucian De Dea Syr. c. 14: ἡμακὴ μὲν γυνῆ, τὸ δὲ ὀκόσον ἀκ μηρῶν ἐς ἀρους πόδας ἱχθύως. Dagon, the god of the Philistines, also had the form of a fish, but the head and hands of a man.

148. 13. Alabandus and Tenea or Tennes, the mythical oikosai of Alabanda in Caria and of the island Tenedos on the Trojan coast, were worshipped as heroes. Alabandis (or Alabandeis) is the Greek form Ἀλαβανδεῖς. Comp. Schneider Formenlehre, p. 308, and Lachmann's Lucretius, p. 281 note. Below c. 19, 50 Cicero uses the Latin form Alabandenses.

148. 14. Leucotheam, quae fuit Ino &c. For the fable see the classical dictionaries. Here it may be remarked that Ino and many others of the so-called deified mortals were originally real deities, but afterwards fell to the level of deified heroes, following the vicissitudes of forms of religion which were gradually changed and forgotten.

148. 18. Omitto illa; sunt enim praeclara; "I pass over the next proposition (i.e. that the universe is God), for it is all very excellent,"—although not true—as we must suppose the Academic thought; so that in the praise there is a touch of irony which would have been still more apparent if Cotta had said: sint etiam praeclara, "it may be all very fine so far as I know."
NOTES.

140. 10. **in Salaria**, scil. *via*. This was the name of the road leading from Rome into the Sabine country to Reate, *quia per eam Sabini sal a mari* (i.e. from the salt works near Ostia) *deferebant*. Fest. Paul., p. 327 Müller.—The city gate corresponding was anciently called *Salaria*, afterwards *porta Collina*. Festus, p. 326.—*nescio quid*; a depreciatory expression.

140. 12. **hominem homine natos**. According to the poetic mythology both had a mortal mother, Leda; one, Castor, had also a mortal father, Tyndarus, while Pollux was a son of Jupiter.

140. 13. **Homerus ... recens ab illorum aetate**. The Tyndaridae were, as brothers of Helen and Clytemnestra, contemporaries of the Greeks who fought before Troy, although they died before the war in the flower of youth. Homer was thought by many, as by Krates and his followers, to have lived immediately after the Trojan war; see Procl. Chrestum. in Becker’s edition of the Scholia to the Iliad, p. 1. But Cicero in another passage (De Republ. II, 10, 18) cites the opposite opinion of others, according to which Homer lived about thirty years before the Spartan Lycurgus, whom he places a hundred and eight years before the first Olympiad, *i.e.* 885; and in Tuscul. V, 3, 7 he makes Homer and Lycurgus contemporaries. The reason of his attributing the other view to Cotta is easily seen. The passage of Homer alluded to is II. III, 243.

140. 14. **cantheris albis**. Balbus in II, 2, 6 said *cum equis albis*. The expression here substituted is derisive; *for cantherius or canterius*, properly *gelding*, is also used, like *caballus*, of common pack-horses. So the following *nullis calonibus*, "without grooms."

140. 16. **M. Catoni**, the old Censorius.

12 140. 19. **quod probari potest**, *i.e.* what at least may pass for probable. We know moreover that the Academics recognized in general no certainty but only probability. See Introd., p. 13.

140. 21. **divinos esse et aeternos**. See note on I, 15, 39.

13 140. 25. (ab) **A. Postumio aedem ... dedicatum**. The temple was vowed by the dictator A. Postumius at the battle of Lake Regillus; it was dedicated at a later time by his son. So says Livy II, 20, 12 and 42, 5, although he says nothing of any apparition in the battle.

140. 27. **Graecorum ... proverbum**. Suidas: ἀληθέστερα τῶν ἐπὶ Σάγρα παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν μέν, οὐ πιστευομένων δὲ. The proverb also occurred in Menander. See Meineke on his fragments, p. 17. For the battle on the Sagra see note on II, 2, 6.

6 140. 31. After the apparitions of the gods Balbus (II, 3, 7) had cited *divination* as a proof of the existence of the gods. The commencement of
Cotta’s answer is lost; the portion that remains goes to prove that divination, even if it were anything more than a fragment of the brain, would still be of no use to men, because what was destined to happen would happen at any rate and could not be avoided by knowing it beforehand. This argument is also found De Div. II, 8, 20.

141. 1. Id esse fatum. Comp. note on I, 20, 55. Chrysippus’s definition in Eusebius Pr. Ev. VI, 7, 13 runs thus: τὸ ἀπαράβατον καὶ εἰς αἰώνος καθήκον τῶν αἰτιῶν, ὅσα οὕτωι κατηραγκάσθε γενέσθαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλως ἔχειν κεκόλυται.

141. 4. fissum fecoris: probably a fissure or cut separating the different lobes of the liver, called times in Seneca Ed. 365. The fissure denoted good or evil fortune according to the circumstances; there was a fissum vitale, a fissum familiare, and other similar sorts. See De Div. II, 6, 12, 13; Brisson. De Form. I, 31; Müller Etrusk. II, 182.

141. 4. sortis, such as were used in the temple of Fortuna at Prænestæ for divination; they were counters, which when mixed like a pack of cards were thrown into a vase, and one or more were drawn out. Hence the expressions sortes aequare, sortem ducere or trahere. Comp. De Div. I, 18, 34; II, 33, 70; 41, 96; Suet. Tiber. 14. The sortes were not all of the same kind, and those expressions do not have the same meaning with all.

141. 10. Decorum devotionibus. See II, 3, 10.

141. 11. [eorum refers to deos in the preceding sentence; iniquitas is unfairness, injustice.]

141. 18. Faunus omnino quid sit nescio; i.e. as a philosopher, and especially of the Academy, he does not know it; as pontifex of course he knows what the Faunus is, at least he knows what invocations and prayers are to be directed to him, at least manifestations of power are to be expected from him, what sanctuaries and feasts are sacred to him; on all this consult the citations of Merkel on Ovid. Fast. Prolegg., p. CCII. For nam as a particle of transition see note on c. 24, 61.

141. 22. formatas for informatas, more common in this sense, which was also used above II, 5, 13. — The following repetition of the reasons adduced by Cleanthes changes the order there followed, putting the third before the second; evidently because Cotta after answering the argument from divination wishes now to treat only the third, that drawn from the wonderful and awe-inspiring phenomena of nature, leaving the second and fourth for a later part of the discourse when he means to speak of the divine providence, the same arguments being applicable to both. He thus avoids repeating the same thing as Balbus did. That portion of Cotta’s discourse is however lost.

150. Aether and Dies are parents of Uranus or Caelus according to a different genealogy from the common one, given by Hesiod. The same is also followed by Hyginus Praef., p. 2, who gives almost all of the brothers and sisters which follow here; in Hesiod the majority of them are given as descendants of Night, and Cicero agrees with him, as he makes them brothers and sisters of Aether and Dies, who in Hesiod are children of Night; only there the Night produces them alone. — On Amor for Cupido see Schoemann Opusc. Ac. II, p. 60.

150. 13. Aristaeus. According to the poetic mythology, from which the various popular beliefs were quite divergent, Aristaeus was a son of Apollo and Cyrene; the latter was represented as a mortal woman, although a daughter of a river god, Peneus, and a nymph. The origin of the culture and use of the olive, the keeping of bees and of the dairy was attributed to him, and for this he was deified.

150. 13. Theseus Neptuni. The myth historically explained makes him the son of the Athenian king Aegus and of Aethra, daughter of the king of Troezen, but, says Plutarch, Thes. c. 6: ἦν δὲ λύσαι διάδοσιν ὡς ἐκ Ποσειδῶν τεκνωθεῖν. But Aegus is really itself a surname of Poseidon, and only by a transformation of the genuine myth designated a human king of Attica; just as Aethra was originally a goddess of the air related to Athene. See Müller, Proleg., p. 272.

150. 16. Iure civili. This denotes the Roman law as distinguished from the ius naturale and the ius gentium; sometimes the expression has more special significations, which are unimportant here. Comp. De Offic. III, 5, 23; 17, 69 with Beier's notes.


150. 19. Musa matre nati: not Muis matribus; for according to some Calliope was the mother of both; according to others they had different mothers.

150. 21. [Videigitur, ne . . . ; "See whether it may not be the case that."] — quod tu quoque visus es dicere. See II, 24, 62.

150. 24. Hecatam. She is the daughter of Asteria in the theogony of Hesiod. For other and different genealogies see Schoemann. Opusc. Ac. II, p. 240.

150. 26. [Schoemann and Müller have the common reading cur non
Eumenides? quae si deae sunt, quarum . . . lucus Furinæ, Furinæ deae sunt &c. We have given in the text the emendation of Madvig, adopted by Baiter I and II. Schoemann in his Appendix does not venture to adopt this because it differs too much from the Mss. reading; and thinks that by placing a colon after Furinæ the difficulties are removed. (We omit this note in the Appendix.) The common text gives this sense: If the Eumenides are deities, the Furies are also deities,—which though true is not important. Madvig’s emendation is only a way of untying the knot, but at least gives a reasonable sense.]

150. 28. lucus Furinæ. Plutarch C. Gracch. c. 17 calls this ἀλος, 'Ερυμων, from which it appears that he took the same view with Cicero in regard to this deity; who according to Varro L. L., V, 84 was little known, although there was a Flamen Furinalis and a feast Furinalia.

150. 30. Natio only occurs here; and the form of the name, whether 47 Nascio or Natio, is doubtful. The fact that the Romans paid worship to her in the territory of Ardea would show that she was a deity especially belonging to Ardea; possibly the same that Strabo V, 3, p. 376 calls Aphrodite; after Ardea became a part of the Roman state the Romans also joined in her worship, as they usually did in the various religious observances of annexed states.

150. 35. Moneta appears in this connection as an especial deity, corresponding to the Greek Mnemosyne, which is translated in the same way by others also; whereas in other places and in Cicero himself, De Div. I, 45, 105, Moneta is a title of Juno, “the warning one,” which she is said to have received on a special occasion. As the mint was near her temple it was called after her, officina Monetae; see Liv. VI, 20, 13; and her title was transferred to coined money.

151. 3. Serapim Isimque. The worship of these Egyptian deities had found entrance into Rome as early as the sixth century of the city (Valer. Max. I, 3, 5), and although it was repeatedly forbidden under penalty it constantly reappeared, until at length it was tolerated and after the beginning of the eighth century publicly recognized. See Orelli ad Arnob. II, 73; Preller Röm. Myth., p. 727 and Regionen der Stadt Rom., p. 123. The prohibition of the worship of foreign deities did not rest upon a denial of their existence, but rather on the opinion that certain deities and religions were fitted for some nations but not for others.

151. 12. Coloni nostri Circelenses. Circeii in the Volscian territory possessed the ius Latii as early as the time of the elder Tarquin. According to Westphal (Die Röm. Campagna, p. 60) the common people of that region preserve to this day a reminiscence of the Circe whose temple Strabo mentions at Circeii (V, 3, p. 232).
151. 16. apud Pacuvium, in the tragedy Medus. Aegialeus also occurs in Diodor. IV, 45; Justin. XLII, 3.

151. 17. [vereor, quid agat Ino; "I don’t see what is to become of Ino."]

151. 20. lege censoria; i.e. in the contract made by the censors with the publicani, who undertook the collection of the Bœotian taxes. Amphiraus had a temple at Oropus; Trophonius at Lebadea in Bœotia.

151. 22. Erechtheus according to the story perished in the war against the inhabitants of Eleusis under Eumolpus, after he had slain the latter. For this reason Cotta here couples his name with that of Codrus who likewise died for his country. Erechthus was originally a surname of Poseidon, like Ægeus; it was also perpetuated in the public worship in the title Ποσειδών Ἐρεχθείος. The temple, the Ἐρεχθείον, was on the Acropolis, and the priesthood was hereditary in the family of the Butades.

151. 31. filiaeque elus. According to the story, which contradicts itself in many particulars, the daughters of Erechtheus in obedience to an oracle gave themselves up as a sacrifice to the gods to obtain victory for their country over its enemies; for this they are several times cited by Cicero as examples of self-denying love of country. Tusc. I, 48, 116; De Fin. V, 22, 62; Pro Sest. 21, 48.

151. 31. [Leonaticum. Schoemann reads:] Leontidum, the daughters of Leos, a mythical hero of Attica, who in time of famine, following the direction of the oracle, suffered death to save her country. One of the ten tribes instituted by Clisthenes was called after Leos the φυλή Λεωνίδα, and the citizens of the tribe were called Λεωνίδαι (Paus. I, 5, 2; Ps. Demosth. Epitaph., § 29; R. G. Theokr., § 18), as if his name had been Leon; so after the same analogy the daughters might be called Leontides.

151. 35. Stratoniæus, an Athenian player on the cithara, famous for his witty sayings, of which Athenaeus VIII, p. 348 f. gives some examples; they at last cost him his life, for a Cyprian King whom he had offended by one of them had him poisoned. See Engel Kypros I, p. 496.

152. 7. Arquil, an ancient form for arcus, like senati, tumulti, versi, sumpti and other similar examples. See Schneider Gram. II, 1, p. 471. But according to Charissius, p. 117 Keil, where this passage is cited, Cicero wrote Arcuis. Cf. Fleckisen Krit. Miscell. (Dresd. 1864), p. 43. In the theogony of Hesiod Ἰρις, the goddess of the rainbow, is the daughter of ᾿Ωμίας, a son of the sea, who is the cause of the wonderful phenomena of Nature, rainbows and harpies, i.e. whirlwinds, waterspouts and the like. The name Iris is wanting in the Mss.; but nata, not natus, is found in the greater number, and those the best. See Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 349.
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152. 9. [qua speciem habeat &c. So the Mss. read; the edd. generally change to habet, but without reason. The clause gives the reason commonly assigned, not the writer's.]

152. 12. una Centauros peperisse dicitur; a cloud, to which Zeus gave the form of Hera, was embraced by Ixion and brought forth a Centaur; from this one a train of others descended. Pindar Pyth. II, 50 ff.

152. 13. tempestatas. There was a temple devoted to them near the Porta Capena, founded by the consul L. Corn. Scipio; see the comment. on Ovid Fast. VI, 193. The custom afterwards mentioned of sacrificing on the departure of a fleet and of throwing the pieces of the sacrifice into the sea is mentioned also by Livy XXIX, 27, 6. Comp. Preller Röm. Myth., p. 293.

152. 15. Nostril quidem duces &c. The custom of offering sacrifice on the sailing of a fleet, and of throwing the victim into the sea is also mentioned by Livy XXIX, 27, 6. Comp. Preller Röm. Myth., p. 293.

152. 17. ita enim dicerbas. II, 26, 67.

152. 18. Tellus. Her temple at Rome is often mentioned, and the feast of the Fordiciada on the 15th of April, at which pregnant cows were offered to her, is said to have been founded by Numa. See Ovid Fasti IV, 628 ff. and the commentators.

152. 20. Fontis delubrum Maso . . . dedieavit, the consul C. Papirius Maso who in 523 defeated the Corsicans. The temple was near the Porta Capena, where before that time stood an altar of Fons or Fontus; and near this was said to be Numa's grave. See De Leg. II, 22, 56. There was also a feast, the Fontanalia, celebrated on the 13th October. See Müller on Varro L. L., V, 22.

152. 20. in augurum pretatione: in the formula of prayer used by the augurs in their ceremonies, especially when they consecrated the templum (in templo effando, Varro VI, 53) and prayed for the auspices. Comp. Brisson. De Form. I, 106. Of the rivers here named besides the Tiber the Almo is often mentioned; the Anio occurs much oftener, and some have proposed to substitute that name here; the other names are probably not found elsewhere.

152. 28. quid theologi nominantur; see note on c. 16, 42. This passage shows that the theologi, so called, held the doctrine of Euhemerus referred to in the note on I, 42, 119; i.e. they held the same fundamental doctrine (in regard to the explanation of the belief in the gods); while they took independent views of the individual gods, the fables concerning them, and their explanation as applied to human beings and transactions. This Euhemerism especially suited the opponents of polytheism, and the
Christian apologists are very fond of making use of it in argument. Many passages might be cited from Clem. Alex. (Protrept.), from Arnobius, Lactantius and others, from L. Ampelius (Liber Memorialis), and Johannes Lydus (De Mens.), some of which support, others contradict the indications given by Cicero. The only point to be noticed here is that under all the names hereafter mentioned, even Aether, Caelus, Sol and the like, according to the doctrine of Euhemerus, we are to understand human beings of former ages who actually bore those names.

152. 33. cœlius ... sepulcrum ostenditur. Callimachus expresses indignation at this, Hymn. in Ioœ. v. 8: Κρήτες άει ψευστα· καὶ γὰρ τὰ· φον, ὦ ἄνα, σείν Κρήτες ἑτεκτήναντο· σοὶ δ᾽οί βάνες· ισοὶ γὰρ αἰεί.

152. 35. qui appellantur Anaces Athenis. The name has the same meaning apparently as 'Ἀνακτές. Their temple at Athens, τὸ Ἀνακτίου, is often mentioned; but they are not generally distinguished from the Tyndaridae. Cf. Plut. Thes. c. 33; Num. c. 13.

153. 1. [Tritopatreus, a son of Jupiter by Proserpine. Schoemann reads Tritopatores, [Zagreus], Eubuleus, Dionysus, with the following note:] Tritopatores, properly “ancestors” (Pollux III, 7). The name seems to have been applied in long-forgotten theogonies to certain deities to whom the origin of the human race was attributed. Cf. Lobeck Agl., pp. 754–765, according to whose opinion Zagreus, wanting in the Mss., is here inserted in the text. It is impossible to explain with certainty or to form an opinion upon the statements here made by Cotta on the authority of his theologi, as we have no knowledge of the data which formed the basis of their opinions. [See also Preller, Griech. Myth. I, 371.]

153. 12. quœae Heliopolis appellatur. The Egyptian name was On, at the same time the name of the god. According to Jablonski, Panth. Aeg. I, p. 137, it means “light.”

153. 13. quem Acantho Rhodi. The name does not occur elsewhere; it is singular too that the father’s name is not mentioned with the mother’s; the passage is doubtless corrupt, and it is impossible to restore it.

153. 16. Apollinem eum. There is no verb here to govern the accusative; for the following esse voluerunt belongs only to the relative clause, which was itself the cause of the omission. It would have been very easy to supply it, as it must have been some word of the same meaning as esse voluerunt. A case of anacoluthia not unlike this is found in Brut. c. 27, 105: Hunc qui audierant prudentes homines, in quibus familiaris noster L. Cælius, qui se illi contubernalem in consultu fuisse narrabat, canorum oratorem et volubilem fuisse dicebat. Here the predicate is wanting for homines. It would be dicebant; but the following
dicebat belongs only to the relative clause and its subject L. Gellius; and
the authority of all the Mss. and the general connection of the passage
forbid our changing it to dicebant.

153. 16. culus in tutela Athenas. The allusion is to the Apollo
worshipped by the Athenians as πατρωφός, their tutelary deity; he was after-
wards identified with the Pythian Apollo, the son of Zeus and Leto or La-
tona, but originally was certainly different. See Schoem. Opusc. Ac. I,
324 and 347.

153. 20. Memallo. This name too is doubtless corrupt; but no certain
elevation is possible. The islands afterwards mentioned are the Liparoean
or Aeolian, north of Sicily. The name Vulcaniae, Greek Ἡφασιάδες, had
perhaps fallen into disuse in Cicero’s time; hence he says nominabatur.

153. 22. Dio matre. This is the reading of the best and the greater number of Mss., not Dia. Cicero certainly did not find the Latin name of
an agrarian deity in the writings of the Greek theologi whom he here fol-
ows. Serv. note on Aen. I, 297; IV, 577, and Ampelius c. 9, agree on
the reading Die. Cf. also below c. 23, 59. The remarks of Welcker,
Griech. Götterlehre I, 329 in favor of Dia are not to the point.

153. 23. Valantis. Cicero apparently gives this as the translation of
the Greek name Ισχυρός. According to the fable he was an Arcadian hero,
who won the favor of the Thessalian Coronis, which Apollo had enjoyed
before him. But Ischys is nowhere else mentioned as the father of Tropho-

153. 28. [Aegyptum. Lactantius and Baiter II write in Aegyptum.]

De Is. et Osir, p. 154 and R. Pietschmann, Hermes Trismegistus (Leipsic,
1875), pp. 29 and 38 sq.

153. 34. Cynosuris. The reference is probably either to the Arca-
dian mountain Κυνόσυρα, mentioned by Steph. Byz., or to a place in the
district of the Cynuraei, mentioned by Pausanias VIII, 27, 3.

154. 3. Corybantis filius. Apollo is sometimes called son of Cory-
bas in other places; but his birth in Crete and his contest with Jupiter for
the island are only mentioned here. As Corybas and the Corybantes orig-
inally belonged to the Phrygian mythology, and were from this adopted by
the Greeks especially in Samothrace and Crete, so this second Apollo owes
his existence doubtless to a combination of Phrygian and Greek fables; his
quarrel with Jupiter may have had reference to the collisions of different

154. 5. ex Hyperboreis, i.e. from the fabled Northern regions beyond
Boreas, where the Delphians themselves were sometimes said to have orig-
154. 7. Νόμιος. Apollo shares this surname with Hermes. Arist. Thesm. V. 977. It really means however not the lawgiver, as Cicero and others explain it, but the god of the pastures and flocks; and Ἀπόλλων νόμιος is properly, so far as the idea is concerned, the same with Aristaeus, mentioned in c. 18, 45 as the son of Apollo. Cf. Pind. Pyth. IX, 65 (115). The form Nomionem of the Mss. is only an error of the copyists.

154. 10. Υπις as the name of a male deity only occurs here. It is often found as a surname of Diana, where it is regarded as a collateral form of διή, δίη, and explained as referring to the oversight of the actions of men and to the punishment of their transgressions.

154. 12. Διόνυσος μνητὸς. It is extraordinary that just here the Dionysus of the common mythology, son of Zeus and Semele, is passed over. Those that are mentioned all belong either to the Orphic or other fables unknown to us. — On the Trieterides see Schoem. Griech. Alterth. II, p. 502.

154. 17. [Elide. Eli Mss. and Baiter II.]

154. 23. orta Nilo. The Egyptian Neith is meant, commonly identified with Minerva; although others call her not the daughter of Nīlus, but of Zeus (Diod. I, 13), or of Hermes (Plut. De Is. et Osir, c. 7). According however to Jablonski, Panth. A. I, p. 168, Nīlus is just the same as Zeus.

154. 24. [a love. Schoemann omits the preposition.]

154. 25. Coryphe probably owes her origin to later mythologists, who explained the story of the birth of Minerva from the head (ἐκ κορυφῆς) of Zeus by substituting a nymph, Coryphe, for the head. Cf. Schoem. Opusc. Ac. II, p. 163. — For the following, daughter of Pallas, see Tzetz. on Lycochr. v. 355, and Müller Kl. Schr. II, p. 135.

154. 32. quibus intellegis resistendum esse. When Cotta in this passage, as also in c. 21, 53 speaks against Euhemerism, he does so solely in the interest of religion, of which in several passages I, 22, 61 and 62; III, 2, 5, 6 he has avowed himself a devoted adherent. He wishes therefore that the popular deities should be considered not only as men who have been wrongly deified, but as really gods. As an Academic he could attach no importance to this; he must on the contrary have considered the fables about the gods as reprehensible in so far as they were believed to be real histories of the gods; and Euhemerism, which took ground against this belief and considered them merely as accounts of the actions of men, must have rather seemed to him commendable. — Cotta might however blame the Stoics from both points of view, because instead of setting them aside they appeared by explaining them allegorically to bring them to a certain extent into credit again. — Instead of allaque eiusmodi the Mss.
have *atque or et eiusmodi*, so that *eiusmodi* would stand for the subject, which is quite contrary to usage.

155. 2. Nam mentem. We must supply some phrase like: *idemque de religuis dicendum est*, to which *nam* relates, inasmuch as it clearly does not introduce the reason of the proposition immediately preceding. It is here rather a particle of transition; and the usage is in such cases to be explained by supplying an intermediate clause in conformity with the context. So above c. 6, 15; for further details see Hand Tursell. III, 147.

155. 4. *in nobis met insunt ipsis*. Cf. the explanation in II, 23, 61 and the note. In regard to *honos, salus* and *victoria* the Stoic might have offered an answer, and for *Fortuna* he would perhaps have said that what appeared to men as *inconstantia* and *temeritas* was not really such, but only an ἄθροισίνω λόγοι δόμος αίτια, according to Plut. De Plac. Phil. I, 29 and Stobaeus Ecl. I, p. 218.


155. 16. *quod miserandum sit, laboratis = laborem, qui miserandum sit, suscipitis.*

155. 20. *Quid Velovi facies?* Festus answers this, p. 379: *Ve syllabam rei parvae praeponebant, unde Veiove parvum lovem.* Of the correctness of the answer we will say nothing; but we see from Ovid Fast. III, 445 that by *Veiovis* many people understood a small, youthful Jupiter.

—The etymology of *Volcanus* is found in Isidorus, p. 1026, 32 Goth.: *dictus Volcanus quasi volans candor, vel quasi volicanus, quod per aërem volet*, which is at the least no worse than the most of those given by Balbus II, 25-27, or than a recent one, which derives the name from the Greek, ὄλκαοι = “dragging the foot,” because of his lameness. Comparative philology refers the name to a Sanscrit root *ulka, valka*, which means “burning.”


155. 29. *figuras deorum*: divine forms, in which the gods are embodied and live.

155. 30. *Quid tantus error fuit.* “The error of deifying natural objects went so far.” — The deification of *Febris* Cicero mentions and disapproves in De Leg. I, 11, 28, but speaks only of an altar; so in regard to *Mala Fortuna*. *Orbana* is mentioned by Tertullian Ad. Nat. II, 15 as a goddess, *qua in obitatem semina extinguit.* But in that passage the Mss. have *Orbana.*
NOTES.

156. 1. Neptunum esse dicit animum &c. This refers to II, 28, 71, where the language differs, but the sense is the same. The phrase Idem de Cerere is only a passing hint, which the reader is expected to complete for himself.

156. 6. quallis tu eos esse vis. After these words something has evidently fallen out: non esse scio, or the like.

156. 15. After Sed there is a long break, comprising the whole third part of the argument, setting forth the objections against the divine providence, and a part of the fourth, against the particular care of the gods for men; all of which is lost.

156. 16. Nequaquam istuc istae ibit &c. From the Medea Exul of Ennius, corresponding to vv. 365 ff. of the tragedy of Euripides: ἄλλα ὁμι ταιτρα ταῦτα, μὴ δοκεῖτε πω. ἔτι εἰόρ ἁγώνες τοῖς νεωστὶ νυμφίοις, καὶ τοῖς κηδείσσαις ὡς σμικροὶ πόνοι, δοκεῖς γάρ ἂν με τόνδε θυπείσσαι τον τίν; — The following ille traversa mente &c. come from the same source and correspond to vv. 371, 398–9 of Euripides, although the translation in both cases is not quite correct. The remaining verses in §§ 66 and 67 have no corresponding ones in the Medea of Euripides; but they may still have existed in that of Ennius, inasmuch as the plays of the Roman dramatists were not simple translations, but more or less free adaptations of the Greek originals.

157. 17. malor mihi moles &c. From the Atreus of Attius, cited also in De Orat. III, 58 and Tusc. IV, 36.

157. 21. This and the eight following verses are from the same tragedy of Attius. They are the words of Atreus, who complains of his brother Thyestes for having seduced his wife Aërope. Ille exo, an old syncopated form for illesse; so despeex Plaut. Mil. Glor. II, 6, 72, surrex Hor. Sat. I, 9, 73, disesse II, 3, 169, and other similar examples in Lucretius. — The succeeding verses Addo hoc &c. refer to another crime of Thyestes. Atreus had received from Hermes a ram with golden wool, on the possession of which the duration of his authority depended. Thyestes with the aid of Aërope stole it.

158. 1. Vadeturne. Occasionally a question is introduced by the simple enclitic ne where an affirmative answer is expected and nonne might be used in its place. Cf. De Offic. III, 17, 68: suntne igitur insidia, tendere plagas, and the remarks of Heusinger and Beier. Vide me? Vadetisne? are especially common. So in German Sichst du wohl? might often be used for Sichst du nicht? See II, 28 init., and below c. 34, 83; Tusc. II, 11, 26; 21, 50; 22, 53; Rosc. Am. c. 24, 66; Hand Tursell. IV, p. 74.
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158. 3. Sentit ... ut peccetur; i.e. quomodo or quantopere. Cf. Pr. Rusc. Am. c. 24, 66: Videistine ut eos agitent Furiae? — [forum, curia, campus; i.e. the courts, the legislature, the popular assemblies (Campus martis).]


158. 15. Idcirco consuluit; a shorter turn for idcirco consuluisse 70 dicitur, i.e. a vobis.

158. 22. uterentur; utantur would have been more correct. But 28 comp. I, 22, 61 note.


158. 34. omnis opinio ratio est. It is to be borne in mind that 71 ratio properly denotes only the act of thinking, and that the meaning “reason, faculty of thinking,” is derived from the other.

159. 8. levitates comicae, i.e. quales in comedia proponuntur. — 29 The following verses are just at the beginning of the Eunuchus of Terence.

159. 13. In Synephebis. See I, 6, 13 note.

159. 18. studeat tul. So Plautus uses cupere with the genitive, Mil. Glor. IV, 1, 17, and often besides; also fastidire Aul. II, 2, 67.

159. 21. allquod nomen; some debt. — In the following verses praestrigias praestrixit it was necessary, even against the authority of the Mss. Cf. Bücheler in the Jahrb. f. Philol. CV, 109.


160. 7. quid ut judicetur. For the position of ut after the interrogative word see Or. pro Sest. § 84: quid ut faceret? Pro Tull. § 55: quid ut profeceret? Also Madvig. De Fin. II, 19, 61 note.

160. 7. Quo tabularium incenderit. In the Social war the archives of Heraclea in Lucania were set on fire and burned. Cic. pro Arch. c. 4, 8.
This is probably alluded to here. Of Q. Sosius nothing is known. The predicate splendidus applies not to the person, but to his position.

160. 9. quit transscriptserit tabulas publicas. Transscribere is also used of falsified copies of documents Pro Cluent. c. 14, 41: testamentum in alias tabulas transcriptum signis adulterinis obsignavit.

160. 10. [sex primorum. Schoemann writes:] Sex primorum. This name was applied at Rome to the highest of the scribae quaestores who consisted of three decuriae. See Mommsen Röm. Staatsr. I, p. 273. These are more probably alluded to here than, as I formerly thought, the chief officers of a curia of some municipium, who were also called after their number, as Sex primi, Quinque primi or Decem primi.

160. 12. auril Tolossantii. Q. Servilius Cæpio, Consul in 648, took the Gallic town of Tolosa, plundered the temple of Apollo and appropriated the greater part of the booty to his own use. In the succeeding year he suffered defeat at the hands of the Cimbri, which was generally considered as a punishment for the sacrilege he had committed. He was deprived of the imperium and his fortune was confiscated. The phrase Aurum Tolossanum was therefore proverbially used of any possession which brought misfortune to the owner. Gell. III, 9, 7; Iustin. XXXII, 3, 9 seqq.

160. 12. conurbationis Jugurthianae. So also in Brut. c. 33, 127. The allusion is to the bargain of several Roman dignitaries with Jugurtha, who bribed them and induced them to prefer the advantage of their enemy to the honor and interest of the state. See Sall. Iug. c. 40.


160. 14. rogatone Peducaea. The tribune of the people S. Peducaeus in the year 640 proposed an inquiry de incestu against some Vestal virgins who had broken their vow of chastity. For further details see Asconius, Or. cont. Mil. § 32, p. 46 ed. Orell.

160. 14. sicae, veneni, peculatus. Among the so-called quaestiones perpetuae, i.e. the ordinary criminal procedures, there was one inter sicarios et veneficos, for murder and poisoning, and another for peculatus, embezzlement of public funds.

160. 15. lege nova. The reference is to the Lex Cornelia of the Dictator Sulla of the year 673 de falso, against fraud; it is also called testamentaria because one of the chapters was directed against forgeries of wills.

160. 16. illa actio. The form of indictment.

160. 17. tot ludicia de fide mala. This is the general term; the terms which follow denote actions brought for special offences falling under this head; tutelae, for unfaithfulness of a guardian to his ward; pro socio, for
breach of contract of partnership; *mandati*, for failure to perform a commission; *fiduciae*, for neglect to restore a pledge for debt after the debt had been paid. Cf. De Offic. III, 17, 70: *Q. Scaevola fidei bonae nomen existimabat manare latissime, idque versari in tutelis, societatis, fiduciae, mandatis, rebus emptis, venditis, conductis, locatis.*

160. 19. *lege Plactoria*, for the protection of minors (under twenty-five years) against fraud in legal matters. The law allowed a criminal action in such cases, and this might be brought not only by the injured party, but by any third person; hence the term *judicium publicum rei privatae.*

160. 21. *quod C. Aquillus . . . protulit*; perhaps in the edict which he issued as praetor in 688, when he held that office with Cicero. The following definition of *dolus* is also given in De Offic. III, 14, 60.

161. 7. *Contra deum . . . Hiberus*; because the sort of excuse which physicians, pilots and the like might offer for the failure of their undertakings would be insufficient in the case of the gods.


161. 13. *a Neptuno patre.* See c. 18, 45 note. When Theseus, deceived by the calumnies of Phedra against his son Hippolytus, prayed to Neptune to put him to death, Neptune fulfilled his desire, though he must have known the innocence of Hippolytus and have foreseen that Theseus would bitterly repent having offered the prayer. Cf. De Offic. I, 10, 32; III, 25, 94, where this example is used to show that it is sometimes better to break than to keep one’s word. The well-known fable of Phaethon is found in Ovid. Metam. I, 751 sqq.


161. 20. *prorsus, si, qui auderunt &c.* This is a second conditional protasis, *si verum est* &c. being the first, and repeats the same thought in another form. Cf. De Fin. I, 3, 7: *Quamquam si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem, ut vertunt nostri poetae fabulas, non male meroeret de meis civibus, si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem;* where Madvig gives other examples.

161. 30. *[eius nomen.]* Schoemann reads *eius numen.*] The question is not of the name, but of the power and mode of action of the divine providence, so that *nomen providentiae* would be a useless circumlocution.


162. 5. *Telamo*; in the tragedy of Ennius of the same name. The verse is also cited De Div. II, 50, 104.
162. 5. cur...neglegent; an elliptical expression for cur dicendi sint neglegere; cf. the similar ellipsis without, and the note on I, 9, 21.

162. 11. duo Scipiones. The brothers P. and Cn., who both perished in Spain at short intervals in the second Punic war. Livy XXV, 33–36.


162. 13. Marcellum, M. Claudium, the sword of the Romans against Hannibal; he fell in the year 546 in the battle near Venusia. Livy XXVII, 26, 27.


162. 15. Reguli, M. Atilii, who when proconsul in Africa in 499 was taken prisoner by the Carthaginians, and in 504 put to death. The story of the cruelties of the Carthaginians towards him is justly thought to be apochryphal. See Ruperti on Sil. Ital. VI, 539.

162. 15. Africanum, the conqueror of Carthage, P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus. He died suddenly in 625 during the Gracchan troubles; and his nearest relatives, even his wife Semporia, sister of the Gracchi, were by some suspected of having poisoned him. See Appian. Civ. I, 20.

162. 18. P. Rutilius Rufus, because when quaestor in Asia he had defended the provincials against the extortions of the publicani, was unjustly convicted on a trial pecuniarum repetundarum, and afterwards lived in exile at Smyrna.

162. 19. Drusus, M. Livius, as tribune of the people treated the people’s party and the optimates on an equality, and hoped to reconcile them; he incurred the ill will of both, and was assassinated at the instigation of Varius in 663. For Varius see c. 33, 81.

162. 20. Q. Scaevola with many others was put to death by the Marian party in 669. A. Preuner has recently expressed doubts about the ante simulacrum Vestae, Hestia-Vesta, p. 321. See also Preller Röm. Myth., p. 539, note 1.

162. 21. a Cinna, L. Corn., who was head of the party after the death of Marius, and consul in 669 with Cn. Papirius Carbo.

162. 22. C. Marius, Q. Catulum (Lutatum). After his return from Africa in 668 Marius put many of his opponents out of the way, and forced Catulum to commit suicide. See Plut. Marius, c. 44.

162. 30. Q. Varius, when tribune of the people in 663, had a lex maiestatis passed, in consequence of which investigations were instituted against those who had brought about the Social war, and many of the most prominent men were condemned. Two years later he himself was judged under his own law and died in exile, but it is not known in what way. On
the murder of his colleague Drusus see c. 32, 80. Nothing more is known of the poisoning of Metellus.

163. 1. Phalaris, tyrant of Agrigentum in Sicily about 550, of whose cruelty many incredible stories are told, a part of which are evidently inventions. He was finally put to death by the citizens of Agrigentum who rose against him; the accounts vary as to the manner of his death. See Beier on De Offic. II, 7, 26. — Apollodorus, tyrant of Cassandria, the ancient Potidaea, likewise notorious for his cruelty, was put to death after the taking of Cassandria by Antigonus I. — poenas sustulit, the more unused expression, but used by Cicero also in Cat. II, 13, 28 (poenam sui sceleris sufferat) and Pro Font. c. 17, 39 (victoriae poenas sufferre). Cf. Nonius, p. 396.

163. 4. Anaxarchus of Abdera had once deeply offended the Cyprian tyrant Nicocreon in the presence of Alexander the Great; afterwards, when Nicocreon had him in his power, he put him to death.


163. 9. Harpalum. The allusion is apparently to the notorious pirate, called by other authors Skirtalos or Skirpalos, into whose hands Diogenes himself had once fallen.

163. 17. cum ad Peloponnesum classem appulisset. This is evidently an error; nothing is known of an expedition of Dionysius to the Peloponnesus. The occasion of the error was the surname Olympii, which Cicero referred to Olympia in Elis. But there were temples of the Olympian Jupiter in many other places, even in Syracuse where this story is located by Aelian. V. H., I, 20.

163. 23. Epidauri. This is also an error, occasioned by the fact that the Epidaurian temple of Aesculapius was the most noted. Valer. Max. I, 1, 3, who agrees with Cicero, is no authority, as he only drew his information from Cicero. According to Athenaeus XV, 693 Dionysius also robbed the god of his table; the two stories are about equally probable.

164. 4. [In tyrannidis] rogum is the reading of Baiter II. Schoemann has et impunitus rogo; and Müller leaves the Mss. reading in typanidis rogum without attempting to amend, but thinks that Baiter is perhaps correct. The passage is hopelessly corrupt. The last emendation that we have seen is that of Hofmeister, Hermes XII, 516: Tyndaride in rogum. Schoemann has the following note: et impunitus rogo Illatus est. The sense is: as he was unpunished during his life and his death was quite a
natural one, so he passed unpunished to the funeral pile, inasmuch as his body was not maltreated nor was the honor of burial refused him as was customary in the case of criminals. — But impunitus is only a conjecture; the MSS. have in Tymanidis rogum or rogo; and it is possible that Tymanis was the name of the builder of the costly funeral pile on which according to the ancient authorities Dionysius was burnt. This is the opinion of Welcker, Rhein. Mus. N. F. VI, p. 399. — atque stands in the place of an adversative conjunction; a simple copula is often used where the connection of thought is plain of itself.

164. 9. sine uilla divina ratione; "without any divine order"; so immediately below, ratione et disciplina, rational order and constitution. The idea that the voice of conscience itself is only a mode of operation of the divina ratio is designedly left out of consideration by the Academic for purposes of the argument, although it might easily have suggested itself and was by no means ignored by the wisest of the ancients.

164. 10. Iacent omnia = omnia corrunt. It is the conscience alone, Cotta means, that gives to life its solid basis, not the divine ordinance; for we are precluded from recognizing such divine government when we see that neither virtue is rewarded nor vice punished. Against this argument see among others Plato Repub. X, 612. 613; Simplic. on Epictet., p. 357 Schweigh.; and Sallust De Deis et Mund. c. 19.

164. 13. mundi [in homines] moderatio. The words in brackets are an addition of some interpolator and are not only superfluous, but violate good usage.

164. 23. virtutem nemo umquam acceptam deo rettulit. Here too the Academic in the heat of argument is betrayed into saying what is plainly untrue. Homer in II. XIII, 730, and in other passages says that all human endowments, even a right mind (νόμος ἡ τάξις), come from Zeus. "God alone is good," says Simonides, "and no one attains to virtue without the help of the gods"; Sim. Fr., p. 16 and 45, Schneidewin. — "Zeus, from thee come the great virtues to men," says Pindar Isthm. III, 6. "Men are good and wise through the deity," Pind. Ol. IX, 30. "The greatest gift of the gods is to be not evil-minded"; Aeschylus Ag. 927. And Socrates in Plato's Phaedrus, p. 279 B prays to the gods to grant him, that he may be inwardly beautiful and that his outward circumstances may correspond, just as in several of the Homeric hymns the gods are invoked to grant virtue and well being. Cf. Spanh. on Callim. h. in Iov. 96. Utterances like these are found in any number (cf. Schoen. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 108); and although there are in abundance others which could be cited in support of Cotta's argument, yet if we should count and weigh the suf-
frages, we should arrive at the conclusion that the most and the best rather agreed with the Stoic (II, 66), and that the sort of self-confident reliance on one's own strength and goodness which thinks to get on without the help of the deity was an illusion that became more and more general after the time of the sophists, but was never the prevailing view of really classical antiquity. Of course it was understood that even the gods do not make a man virtuous without or against his will; he must meet them half way, he must desire their aid and have the will on his part to coöperate in the work of virtue. In this sense the poet says: ἐν μέγαρ κεῖται μχείν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις δίκαν ὁδίαν (in Clem. Alex. Strom. V, 12, 137); and this is the idea of Plato Rep. X. 617 E: ἀφετὶ ἀδέσποτον, ἤν τιμῶν καὶ ἀτιμάζων πλέον καὶ ἐλαστον αὐτῆς ἐκαστος ἔξει· αἰτία ἐλομένον, θεὸς ἁναίρετος: a passage which has been wrongly cited by some commentators of Cicero as agreeing with the views of Cotta.

164. 33. Herculem decumam vovit; a reference to the oft-mentioned Roman custom of consecrating the tenth of one's gain to Hercules. See Heindorf on Horace Sat. II, 6, 10; Jahn on Persius II, 11.

164. 35. Pythagoras. The story is told of several persons; according to Diog. Laërt. VIII, 12 the proposition discovered was the so-called problem of Pythagoras or magister matheos. The doubt expressed by Cotta is solved according to some by assuming that the ox was only one of dough.

165. 5. Quamvis ille. Other examples of this easily-explained usage may be found in Kühner's Tusc. IV, 24, 53 note.

165. 9. ut Diogenes dicebat. A reference to the saying cited above c. 34, 83.


165. 13. atque el quidam amicus. The omission of the verbum dicendi is not so violent as to prove the passage necessarily corrupt. Cf. F. A. Wolf Verm. Schr., pp. 159, 160. Tac. Hist. IV, 75: ad ea Cerialis Civili et Classico nihil. The verb for nescio quid is also wanting above c. 5.

165. 14. ex tot tabulis pictis, i.e. of votive tablets. Schol. Cruq. ad Horat. Sat. II, 1, 32: Votiva tabula est, quae ex voto posita est in templum aut aliquo loco publico, in qua descripta h. e. depicta est fortuna alicius. Ita solent naufragi suum naufragium in tabella depictum... in templis alicui deo consecratum suspendere. The Samothracian deities especially were invoked by mariners.

165. 17. Inquit; with reference to II, 66, 167; said not especially of Balbus, but of any opponent whatever; inquit is often so used.
165. 29. expetantur eae poenae a liberis &c. Hom. II. IV, 160: εἴπερ γὰρ τε καὶ αὐτίκα Ὄλυμπιος ὅνικ ἐκέλεσεν, ἐκ δὲ καὶ ὑψὲ τελεῖ, σῶν τε μεγάλῳ ἄπετιναι σῶν σφώνα κεφαλῆι γνώμετ' τε καὶ τεκέον. Cf. 1 Mos. 20, 5; and Plutarch De Sera Summi Numinis Vindicta.

165. 33. Quinam Tantalidarum. The verses are from Attius, as Charisius I, p. 70 shows: but it is uncertain from which play.

166. 3. portenta et flagitia. See I, 11, 28; 16, 43; 24, 66.

166. 4. Hipponactis iambus; Hipponax of Ephesus, about 540 B.C., inventor of the choliambus and writer of satirical poems against his personal enemies. Cicero says iambus because the choliambus is also an iambus, and the latter name is sometimes given to any satirical poem. — Archilochus mentioned afterward, of Paros about 700, was the reputed inventor of the iambus, and satirized his enemies in his poems with such bitterness that some of them are said to have committed suicide from vexation and shame.

166. 11. ab Apolline potius, for Lycurgus was said to have been called to lawgiving and instructed by the Delphian Apollo. Herod. I, 65; Plut. Lyc. c. 13; Plat. Leg. init.

166. 11. Critolaus, an Achaean general, unable to bear the presumption of the Romans who interfered in Graecian affairs especially between the Achaeans and the Lacedaemonians as judges and attempted to control them by no means impartially, brought on the outbreak of the war which ended in the destruction of Corinth.

166. 12. Hasdrubal, a Carthaginian general in the war against Massinissa of Numidia, the ally of the Romans; this war gave the Romans the pretext for the third Punic war.

166. 17. ut enim hominum membra &c. The same comparison occurs also De Div. I, 53, 120: si animal omne ut vult ita utitur motu sui corporis prono, obliqua, supino, membraque quocunque vult flectit, contorquet, porrigit, contrahit, caque ante efficit paene quam cogitat, quanto id deo est facilius, cuius numeri parent omnia. Nomen very properly denotes the effective power of the gods; the same word is used by I.ucteti III, 144 of the power of the soul over the body: corpus paret et ad numer numentis nomenque movetur. The proper meaning is = nutus, "nod," whence the derived meaning is easily explained; and nutus mentis in Lactantius De Opif. Dei, c. 7: nervi quibus mens . . . minimino nutu totius corporis molem temperat ac flectit.

166. 20. materiam enim rerum &c. For explanation of the passage cf. Cic. Acad. i, 7, 27: subiectam putant (Peripatetici et veteres Academici) omnibus sine ulla specie atque carentem omni qualitate ma-
teriam quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque effecta sint; quae tota omnia accipere possit, omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte &c. Cf. Plat. Timae., p. 51 A. This primumaeval matter, from which the so-called four elements and all other material things proceed but which is itself endowed with no definite quality, a ἡν ἀπως, is according to the Stoics τοο οὐσία τῶν δυντων ἀπάνων, ἣ πρώτη ἠλη. Diog. L. VII, 150, cf. 137.

166. 28. non eas? [So Baiter and Schoemann. Müller has 93 [modo] eas; Madvig proposes Si non eas &c.]

166. 29. contemnet. The future indicates that this must be considered as necessarily following from what precedes.

166. 31. idem dicitis . . . idem vultis = qui dicitis or quamquam dicitis . . . tamen vultis. By the use of the pronoun of identity in both members the contrast is all the more emphasized between statements which are contradictory with each other and which are still both held by the same persons. Cf. Acad. II, 20, 63: qui tibi constares, cum idem nugas quicquam certi posse reperiri, idem te comperisse diceres. It is more usual in such oppositions to put the first member in the form of a relative clause which is equivalent to a concessive clause, and then in the second member to designate the person in question, who has been previously indicated by a demonstrative pronoun or by a substantive, by a demonstrative pronoun like is or idem, as I, 22, 61; 43, 121.

166. 32. dispertiri . . . somnia. Cf. De Div. I, c. 20 sqq.

167. 14. cur non . . . praeficit? The Stoics really maintained this; but Cotta thinks he has sufficiently shown that it is an error, and so with this idea asks: “Why is it not so?”

167. 9. finem. Cf. De Fin. IV, I, 1: quae cum dixisset, finem ille; II, 6, 17: tum ille, finem, inquit, interrogandi, si videtur.

167. 14. pro aris et focis. Both are often joined together; “for what is dearest and holiest.”

167. 15. quos . . . sanctos esse dicitis. Plut. Qu. Röm., c. 27: παν τεχος ἀβεβηκτον και ιερων νομιζονι. Injury done to the city walls was a capital crime; and removal of them to enlarge the boundaries of the city (pomerium proferre) was only allowed with the approval of the gods, ascertained by the auspicia.
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Introduction, page 9. We are justified in ascribing personality to the original deity of the Stoics because he is endowed with consciousness, will and wisdom; and we cannot conceive these attributes as existing independently of a personal being. But the Stoic deity is not on the one hand simply immanent in the universe, like that of a one-sided pantheism; nor on the other a blind natural force, the uncomprehended force of atheism: he pervades the world, but is not lost in it and still remains exalted above it. Of course there is no question of an absolute personality in the case of this deity, partly above the world, partly immanent in it, in fact the two ideas of the personal and the absolute are irreconcilable; and the longer we meditate on the nature and attributes of the deity, the more surely shall we come to the conclusion of Arnobius whose words are cited in the note to III, 15, 38.

That the Stoics were unable to conceive of the deity as a purely immaterial being will perhaps not seem unpardonable even to those who hold the opposite opinion; and so much the less will they be blamed for conceiving of the matter of the divine being as ether, the source of light and heat, since they were neither the first to hold such a view, nor have there been wanting even in recent times men of the greatest honesty and religious feeling who thought as they did.

Introd., pp. 11, 12. In Book II, 6, 16 the Stoic says: Etenim si di non sunt, quid esse potest in rerum natura homine melius? in eo enim solo est ratio, qua nihil potest esse praestantius. Esse autem hominem, qui nihil in omni mundo melius esse quam se putet, desipientis adrogantiae est; ergo est aliquid melius; est igitur profecto deus. The Stoics rightly thought it incredible that in this world emanated from the original deity man should be the only being endowed with reason except the heavenly bodies, the simple aspect of which seemed to show their ethereal nature, and their wonderful and regular movements to prove their intelligence. They found in the popular religion a belief in the existence of other beings of a higher grade than man, although they could not assent to the conception.
current in the mythology and the traditional worship. In their opinion those unseen beings must be of higher reason and wisdom than mankind; and hence having the duty and the power of taking part in the world as servants of the supreme God according to his will and law, and of aiding men, the nearest related beings, in their imperfection and necessities, thus earning their gratitude and reverence. These are the beings intended, when the providentia deorum is spoken of, as in II, 29, 73; and the expression denotes the participation in the government of the world which they exercise in conformity with the supreme will; hence it is unimportant whether we say deorum or dei providentia. Christian theologians, who recognized the substantial agreement of this view with the biblical doctrine of the angels, have found fault with the Stoics for giving the name of gods to those servants in the divine government; still, if one calls to mind the original meaning of the word θεός or deus, he will find nothing to criticize. It would rather be desirable to set aside a special and distinctive name for the supreme being, just as in fact Ζεύς is not seldom used, though having really the same meaning as the other.

Nor can the Stoics be reproached for not withdrawing from the traditional polytheistic public worship. They did not wish to give their fellow citizens unnecessary and useless offence; they did not neglect to oppose and correct the superstitious and unreasoning views of the people, although they were not very adroit or successful in it. The curious etymologies and generally forced allegorical explanations of the mythological fables, examples of which we find in Balbus's discourse and elsewhere, were evidently not very well adapted to gain acceptance with the people.

Nor should we wonder that the Stoics, in spite of their opposition to what was offensive in the mythological fables, found it impossible quite to avoid many ideas upon religious subjects which they found generally prevalent and in which they themselves had been brought up from childhood. To this class belongs the belief in soothsaying, in visible apparitions and exhibitions of power of divine beings, which Balbus appeals to and uses even as proofs of the existence of the gods. Nevertheless the Stoics, as time went on, divested themselves more and more of such remnants of ancient superstition, which in reality had no necessary connection with the real essence and the moral teaching of their system; and what Gellius XIX, 1, says of the doctrine of Epictetus cannot be denied, namely that it agreed substantially with that of Zeno and Chrysippus.

In Epictetus as well as in the ethical writings of Antoninus, of Seneca and others we find, besides the firm and living belief in one supreme God of the universe, the no less firm and living belief in those numerous supernatural beings which they call sometimes gods, sometimes demons; and
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they seem to make no difference between these two, unless it be that the second denotes especially the beings nearest to man; just as man’s reasonable soul is often called the demon that dwells in him. This whole class of subordinate beings appears in general to be employed in the service of the supreme being, filled with the divine Logos, and hence friendly disposed to men; men have a dimmer and less vivid consciousness of the divine Logos, which needs quickening and strengthening; and in this they are aided by these inferior beings, who act as mediators between them and the highest God, with whom direct communication seems to be hardly conceivable. In this sense Antoninus IX, 40 recommends men to pray to the gods for moral light and strength; Zeus, that is the supreme being, says Epictetus, Diss. I, 14, 12, has given to every man his demon to watch over him. Man, says he (III, 24, 60), must strive to be on friendly terms with the gods, he must be mindful that he is related to them (I, 9, 11 and 23), and hence must try to be like them. These teachings are really only another form of expression for the highest moral law ὡμολογομένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν; for it is the higher nature of man that is here in question, which manifests itself as the divine Logos in the reason and conscience, and constitutes his relationship with the gods. Τῷ λογικῷ ζῷῷ ἡ αὐτῇ πράξις κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ λόγου. Antonin. VII, 11.

The ethical doctrines of the Stoics have thus an essentially religious character, though not a theological one; the theological portion is limited to a very few simple propositions, which would rather recommend than injure them in the eyes of many. Not to enter more fully into the subject a single point may be mentioned, which has been noticed by Simplicius in his commentary to Epictetus, Enchir., p. 8. He says: καὶ τοῦτο δ’ ἂν τις τῶν λόγων τούτων θαυμάσειν, ὅτι τοὺς πεποιθομένους καὶ ἐργαζομένους τὰ λειγ- μενα μακαρίως ἀποτελοῦσι καὶ εὐδαίμονας, οὐδὲν δεχθέντες τὰς μετὰ θάνατον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀμοιβὰς ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι, κἂν πάντως ἀκολουθῶσιν καὶ αὐταί. And so it really is; Epictetus never refers to a reward to be expected after death. Although the Stoics never denied the continuing existence of the soul after death, many of them having expressly professed their belief in it, yet they never presumed to speak of a future judgment, of punishment of the wicked and of rewards for the righteous. Of course they thus surrendered a motive for well doing, which may be the most powerful for the majority of people, and which for this reason cannot be abandoned in a catechetical instruction intended for the multitude.

Summary, p. 24. To complete the note on the law of Isonomy the remarks of Prof. Schoemann in the N. Jahrb. f. Philol. 1875, p. 690, are given here. The complete silence in regard to this doctrine of all other sources
of information justifies us in supposing that Cicero's Velleius was in error on this point, and that he ascribed to Epicurus something that came, not from him, but from some later follower of his; and which was rejected by the others, because they saw that the law itself needed first to be proved and that this could hardly be done in the Epicurean system of physiology. It was therefore allowed to drop; and thus we may explain the absence of any mention of it even where it would seem to be necessary. Who the Epicurean was who advanced it cannot of course be ascertained. Only thus much is clear that Cicero did not use the same source in this part of his book for c. 16–21 as for c. 8–16; and Chr. Petersen (Phaedr. fr. π. θεῶν, p. 45) has advanced the theory that for c. 16–21 he used a book of the Epicurean Zeno; and he finds a confirmation of this in §59. This is certainly not impossible; but more cannot be said. If the theory of Petersen is correct, it would also follow that Cotta's refutation of Velleius in the second part of this book, which in §109 treats especially of the Isonomy, was taken, not from Clitomachus, whom Cicero certainly used in the third book, but from some later Academic who had written against the Epicurean author whom Velleius has followed in c. 16–21. Further conjectures are useless.

I, 10, 24. It is generally acknowledged that significetur of the Mss. is a false reading; the emendation of Lachmann (note on Lucret., p. 351), sic incitetur, corresponds somewhat better to the traditional reading so far as the written characters are concerned than sic officiatur, the reading proposed in the note; but it does not meet the requirements of the sense, as is shown in the note. Comp. also Opusc. Ac. III, p. 284 and 303.

I, 10, 25. The words, mentem, menti autem cur aquam are wanting in the Mss. It is hardly necessary to answer at length the opinion of the most recent translator, that it is enough to write motu for mente without attempting to supplement the text at all. Comp. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 285. Baiter, recognizing the break, writes: si di possunt esse sine sensu et mente, mentem cur aquae adiunxit? menti autem cur aquam adiunxit, si ipsa mens const. pot. vac. corp.; thus substantially agreeing with the emended text. Madvig prefers to erase the words si di possunt esse sine sensu et mente in this sentence, and to insert them as a parenthesis in the next sentence regarding Anaximander, after nativos esse deos.

I, 11, 28. A detailed discussion of this passage (by Schoemann) may be found in the Jahrb. f. Philol. 1875, Hft. 10, p. 685, the substance of which is given here:
universe, and Karsten, Xenoph., p. 136 has observed that the *mente adiuncta* of Velleius is to be understood, not of an original immanence, but of a connection of the *mens* (the intelligence) with the *omne* that has come from without; and he considers it an error of Velleius.—The *praeterea* immediately following in the traditional punctuation, of which the commentators say nothing, has been, to say the least, misunderstood in the strangest manner by the translators. It is unnecessary to give again here the examples cited in the Jahrbuch. They all have this in common, that they construe *praeterea* with the preceding words *mente adiuncta omne*, which affords no adequate sense. Velleius must have only stated what Xenophanes had said in regard to the connection of the *omne* with *mens* besides the fact itself. This is of two sorts, namely, that it is limitless, and that it is God; or in other words that the predicate of infinity as well as that of deity may be made of it. It might occur to some one perhaps to take the words *quod esset infinitum* as an inserted relative clause; but such a clause would not follow, but rather precede, *praeterea*. The difficulty is best met by taking *quod*, not for a relative pronoun, but as a conjunction = “that.” It is conceded that it has this function in the phrase *praeterea quod*; and there appears to be no rational ground why it may not have the same force with *praeterea*. There are, it is true, no *exempla probantia* of the usage; but in Bünemann’s note to Lactantius I. D. III, 8, 15 several examples are cited of *praeterea quod* for *praeterquam quod*, two also of *praetereo quod*, which one might be inclined to regard as an error for *praeterea quod*.

*I, 13, 34.* *et modo mundum tum mentem divinam esse putat.* *tum mundum* would of course have been more elegant, as Baiter and others before him have written. But as *et tamen modo mundum* is found in the best Ms.s., it seemed unadvisable to reject the *modo*. The *tamen* may be considered a copyist’s error for *tum*, and the *tum* an emendation, which had crept into the text from the margin, of some corrector who wished to remedy the inelegance. In regard to this, not at all an unusual one, consult Hand Tursell. III, p. 649; or notice the example in this very book, c. 12, 31: *et modo unum, tum autem plures deos*. Zumpt, in the Orationes against Verres, p. 296, shows that *tum* and *tamen* are sometimes confounded.

*I, 15, 39.* *fatalem vim*, the reading of a single Ms., is doubtless only a conjecture, which I have adopted, not because I thought it the correct reading, but because it at least gives a better sense than *fatalem umbram* of the other Ms.s. For other emendations see Baiter’s note and my *Opusc.*
Ac. III, p. 363. — That *ignem* in the succeeding clause is not to be understood of the common earthly as opposed to the etherial fire, as the most recent translator has it, would be evident, not only from the note to the passage and what is said in the summary of the second book, p. 73, but from the position alone of *ignem* in the phrase, which would be hard to explain if the common fire were really intended.

I, 19, 49. A. Brieger (Beitt. zur Kritik einig. phil. Schr. des Cicero, Posen, 1873) has rightly remarked that in the words *eam esse vim et naturam deorum, ut non sensu sed mente cernatur* the phrase *mente cerni*, opposed to *sensu cerni*, can mean nothing but the *ψυχῆς αἴσθησις*, i.e. the simple perception by the faculty which Lucretius calls the *mens animi*, and in which the feeling, perceiving and thinking capacity of the soul dwells. The same statement is therefore made here as in Lucret. V, 149, *tenuis enim natura deum longeque remota sensibus a nostris animi vix mente videtur*. But we must not neglect the difference of *vis et natura deorum* and *tenuis natura deum*. The latter, on account of the epithet *tenuis*, can only be understood of the divine *quasi corpus* which the mind perceives, because in virtue of its possessing the same *tenuitas* it is in immediate contact with and directly affected by it; the *vis et natura deorum* is something more than this quasi corporeality, and denotes the whole outer and inner constitution upon which the *vitae actio* and the *mentis agitatio* (§ 45 ff.), virtue, wisdom, happiness and immortality of the gods depend. If in the passage under discussion we are to understand simply the corporeality of the gods, of which we are cognizant by mere perception, Cicero could not have written *cernatur*, which would only admit *vis et natura* for its subject, but *cernuntur*, sc. *di*, which I (Prof. Sch.) have therefore restored. The perceptible *tenuitas* of the gods, although not the same as their *vis et natura*, still is a part of it, is one side of their being, and may therefore as depending upon this be designated by *ut*; it lies in the nature of the gods that their corporeality as well should be perceivable only by the *mens*, and not by the senses. In the Greek original which Cicero used there was probably an infinitive depending on ὀφει, perhaps κοινωνίας, which could be rendered in Latin by the singular as well as by the plural of the finite verb. Thus Cotta in his reply (§ 105) takes the proposition as applicable only to the corporeality and not to the collective being of the gods, and speaks of the *speciem dei* because this alone in the gods is what we immediately perceive, *quod mente cernitur*. When Cicero makes him say *percipi cogitationem* instead of the *mente cerni* of Velleius, we may regard it as the result of the same haste apparent in other passages which caused him to overlook the difference between...
In the last part of the passage the words *mentem intentam infixa* *nostram intelligentiam capere* are evidently to be understood not of the simple contemplation or perception by the *mens*, but rather of the process of reasoning which follows, examines and searches for the true purport of our perceptions. Perception alone is only receptive and can naturally give only the *species deorum*, as Cotta (§ 107) rightly remarks; but a perception that is only receptive and passive is not enough for the human mind; it is thereby roused to an individual activity. This is again of two kinds: first, so to speak, a cursory one, and the ideas which come from it spontaneously are very properly called *προλήψεις, notiones anticipatae, antecipae informationes* (§ 43). If they are sometimes called *intelligentiae*, this is hardly done without an epithet to denote their nature, such as *inchoatae, adumbrae, obscureae*, Cic. De Leg. I, 9, 25; io, 30; 22, 59 (comp. on De Offic. III, 10, 76); in reality they are only *opiniones* (§ 45); they cannot become *intelligenta* but through more exact investigation and rational foundation which the mind aims at while it is busy with them. This is denoted by the Greek *ἐπὶ βάλλειν, ἐπὶ βολή* (Schneider ad Epicur. Physic., p. 65), and Cicero expresses it by *animus se inicios et intendens, or, as in our passage, mens intenta infixa que.*

Now if the *intelligentia* thus gained is spoken of as one *quae sit et beata natura et aeterna* it is plainly nonsense; and this is generally acknowledged. The emendation I (Prof. Sch.) proposed in my Opusc. Acad. IV, 347 I called *paullo obscurior*; but it is not so obscure that it might not be understood with a little thought. Bake's *quam sit ea beata natura et aeterna* (Mnemosyn. II, p. 415) may be easier so far as the Mss. are concerned; but one of the defenders of this reading has not overlooked the fact that *quam* cannot possibly be taken of the measure or degree of happiness and immortality of the gods. He has recourse therefore to the assumption that the difficulty of the passage results from a rather stupid misunderstanding on the part of Cicero. He thinks Cicero found in the Greek original that he was translating *ὅκι*, which there had the force of *ὅτι* corresponding to “that” introducing a sentence; and that he erroneously took this for the adverb equivalent to *quantum* or *quantopere*. If Cicero had found *ὅκι* in the original, he would have translated it by *ut*, as he did in the phrase of Protagoras in c. 23, 63.

On the law of Isonomy cited by Velleius in § 50 as an argument for the happiness and immortality of the gods I have expressed my doubts on p. 24. If Epicurus and the greater part of his followers did not make use of this law, it remains to inquire what other argument they did advance. There are no express data on this point and we can only form conjectures. We read in Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. III, 4; V, 129 Fabr.: *ἀφθαρτὸν τι καλ*
μακάριον ἐννοήσας τὸν θεὸν εἶναι τοῦτο νόμιζε; imagine to thyself an immortal and happy being, and think that God is such a one. The ideas of immortality and happiness might or must have arisen in the mind as the natural opposites of misery and mortality, whether impressions came to it from the gods or not; but there is none among all the objects, from which impressions come, to which these ideas correspond, all of these are proved to be mortal and not happy with the single exception of the gods, perceived by means of their impressions always uniformly appearing. If then there are any immortal and happy beings, and there is no sufficient ground to deny it, the gods must be such. De hoc argumentandi genere utcumque indicabitur, hoc tamen fatendum erit, non infirmius esse, quam quo alios quoque theologos philosophantes in divinarum rerum quaestionibus usos esse hodieque uti videmus.

I, 24, 66. Democritus derived the origin and further development of all things by necessity from the motion, the whirl (δίνη) of atoms, as Cicero himself says, De Fato, c. 10, 23: Democritus, auctor atomorum, accipere maluit necessitate omnia fieri, quam a corporibus individuis naturales motus avellere; and Diog. L. IX, 45: πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι, τῆς δίνης αἰτίας ὁμίας τῆς γενόσεως πάντων, ἦν ἀνάγκην λέγει. But since this necessity existed nowhere else than in the atoms themselves, and the δίνη was not caused by anything external to them, Cicero was right in saying nulla cogente natura and calling the concourse of the atoms fortuitous, just as Aristotle referring to the doctrine of Democritus and Leucippus says, Physic. II, 4: ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γίνεσθαι τὴν δίνην καὶ τὴν κίνησιν τὴν διακρίνασαι καὶ καταστράφασαι εἰς τάσιν τὴν τάξιν τὸ πάν. For Democritus did not accept any sort of nature external to and working upon the atoms, or any regulation of their motions toward a given end. Comp. Bonitz on Aristot. Metaph., p. 76. There was no reason therefore to accuse Cicero of an error in the matter, as the most recent translator has done.

I, 25, 71. The proper sense of the phrase concretio individuorum corporum is given in the note. The misunderstanding of this has misled not only Lactantius, De Ira Dei, c. 10, 27, but some earlier writers on the history of philosophy, to the opinion that Epicurus either held the gods to be entirely incorporeal, or at least attributed to them bodies consisting not of atoms but of some indeterminate substance. More upon this subject may be found in Schoemann’s Schediasma De Epicuri Theologia, Opusc. Ac. IV, 342.

I, 28, 79. The nàevus in articulo pueri might seem too small a matter to be at all regarded by the lover. It has therefore been proposed to read nàevus in Lyco puer; one Ms. has in Pericle puer.
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I, 37, 103. The reading of the Mss., superior aetheri, ignibus altissima ora reddatur, retained by Baiter, seems to me plainly erroneous, and seems to have arisen from some one's explaining ignibus, which here as in c. 15, 39 (see note) means the aether, by aetheri, and by this note creeping into the text and taking the place of the proper reading aeri. If aether is sometimes used for aër (see Munro on Lucretius II, 1115), such a use would be incredible here, where the element opposed to the ignibus and situated below them is in question.

I, 37, 105. It seems proper here to discuss the passage of Diog. L. X, 139 which, as it is preserved in the Mss., partly coincides with what Cotta here and Velleius in c. 19, 49 give as the doctrine of Epicurus, but partly differs so much, that some have felt obliged to infer that Epicurus held a doctrine about the gods which is mentioned neither by Cicero nor by anyone else, while others hold the passage as corrupt and any restoration difficult or impossible. The passage runs thus in the Mss.: ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ φασιν (i.e. Ἑπίκουρος) τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητικοῖς, οὗς μὲν κατ’ ἄρθρῳν ὠφεστῶτας, οὗς δὲ κατὰ ὁμοιότητι τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιφάνειας τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδῶν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτελεσμένων ἀνθρωποειδῶς. If the reading be correct, it is clear that two classes of gods are here distinguished; and hence several writers, Tennemann (Gesch. d. Phil. III, p. 416 f.), Heindorf (on Cic. D. N. I, 19, 50), Steinhart (article on Epicurus in the Allgem. Encyklop. d. Wissensch. u. Künste, I, 35, p. 477, note 64), Hegel (Vorles. ü. d. Gesch. d. Philos. published by Michelet, Werke Th. XIV, p. 507), have accepted such a distinction and attempted to explain it in their own way. In my essay De Epicuri Theologia, p. 352 ff. I have set forth the arguments against this in detail. I think I have shown that the distinction is quite inadmissible, and that in the passage of Diogenes the οὗς μὲν...οὗς δὲ must be necessarily regarded as corrupt. Gassendi and Meiners have already expressed the same opinion. The former proposed οὐ μὲν, οἷς δὲ, the latter (Verm. Philos. Schr. II, p. 121) οὐ μὲν...ἄλλα. My own is perhaps a more probable emendation: οὐ μὲν κατ’ ἄρθρῳν ὠφεστῶτας [γνωστῷ] οὗς δὲ κατὰ ὁμοιο- διαν &c. After γνωστῷ was mutilated as I have indicated, and the remaining οἷς taken for οὗς, nothing was easier than to change the preceding οὐ μὲν into οὗς μὲν, so that οὗς δὲ could be referred to it. The passage thus corrected agrees perfectly with what we know from other sources. The κατ’ ἄρθρῳν corresponds to ad numerum; the gods cannot be counted, not individually distinguished by us; but they are still perceivable in consequence of the similar nature of the impressions continually coming to us from them. It is clear that ἐπιφάνειας and transition mean the same thing; but it will hardly occur to any one to take them as meaning only
a passing by of the impressions. The ὀμοιωδεῖα or similitudo certainly denotes the similarity of the nature of the impressions to that of the mind of man, since both consist of the most minute atoms possible. Comp. Lucret. III, 244; Diog. L. X, 66; Stob. Ecl. i, 52, p. 798. From this similarity of nature it comes that the impressions of the gods are perceived directly and not through the medium of the coarser senses, according to the familiar principle of the old physicists similia similibus cognoscuntur; comp. Trendelenburg on Aristot. De Anima, pp. 220, 228; or Bonitz on Aristot. Metaph., p. 161. Sext. Emp. Adv. Logic. I, 116 proves that Democritus taught this; comp. Papencordt De Atomicor. Doctr., p. 49; and doubtless Epicurus as well.—That γνωστοὺς is precisely the correct expression for the perception which results from the influence of the impressions may be seen from the letter of Epicurus to Herodotus, § 68, where those things which are perceived by the senses are called γνωστὰ κατὰ αἰσθήσεις; and in the letter to Menoeceus § 123 the perception of the gods through the impressions is called γνώσεως ἐναργῆς, whereas the proper understanding of the nature of the gods can only be reached by reflection and reason, the gods are only λόγῳ θεωροῦτο.—Finally the words ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτελεσμένων certainly mean that the impressions all have the same effect (ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ἀποτελοῦσα), the same thing that Cotta says c. 39, 109: fluentium frequenter transitio fit visionum, ut e multis une videatur.

II, 18, 47. a medique . . . quantum idem a summo. In order to remove all the difficulty from this passage I formerly proposed an emendation, namely a medique ubique tantundem abit extremum, striking out quantum idem a summo, which is only found in a single Ms. in the margin. I mention this here only to controvert a somewhat prevalent misconception. Because Cicero, Sallust and the older authors in general only use ubique in passages where a relative or interrogative pronoun precedes, qui ubique and the like, and because it very often seems as if ubique in such passages were equivalent to et ubi, Lachmann, Lucret. IV, 638, p. 251, has stated with his usual confidence that in the older language and even in Cicero’s time ubique could nowhere be used in any other sense, and that it was a gross imperitia to suppose that it could as well be used in the same manner as the other words compounded with the indefinite que, undique, usque, uterque &c. (a usage which still occurs in Horace, e.g. Sat. II, 5, 23). The fact in regard to Cicero and the older writers had been observed by others long before Lachmann; cf. Duker De Latinit. Vett. I. Ctor., p. 415 (380 ed. Lips.). We may concede that in very many places where ubique occurs after a pronoun it may be perfectly well taken for et ubi; but that in any passage whatever it can be taken only in this way
cannot be granted at all. The indefinite sense, "in all places whatever," is always admissible; and there are passages where this is the only one possible, as e.g. Cic. Verrin. V, 67, 172: Omnes hoc loco cives Romani, et qui adsunt et qui ubique sunt, vestram severitatem desiderant. It seems therefore an error to conclude from those other passages that the indefinite meaning of ubique was an innovation adopted perhaps in the time of Horace; and this seems to me all the more improbable, since utrobique or utrubique, which also contains ubi, occurs in Cicero and his contemporaries as an indefinite quite in the same way and without a preceding pronoun, and since in general it is a mistake to conclude from the non-occurrence of an expression in the extant remains of these authors that they never made use of it. I might have proposed ubivis instead of ubique.

II, 23, 61. The praenomen (A) before Atilio, which is wanting in the Mss., is added at the well-founded suggestion of Fleckiesen. See his Kritische Miscellen in the Progr. des Vitzthumschen Gymnasiums, Dresden, 1864, p. 56.

II, 50, 126. Baiter reads, according to Madvig's proposal: purgantes autem alvos ibes Aegyptiae curantur. But inasmuch as, so far as I know, all the Mss. have the active curant, and purgatione is found at least in some although perhaps by way of conjecture only for purgante of others, and purgantes is found in none, I have not felt authorized to make the change.

II, 54, 136. et terendo cibo et praeterea spiritu. After the preceding omne quod acceptit certainly cibo is an unnecessary and perhaps erroneous addition. Still I have not omitted it for the reason that, if one should strike out all such little irregularities which the best writer may be guilty of, he would easily run the risk of correcting the author instead of the copyist.

II, 55, 136. Madvig's conjecture, intrante spiritu, is certainly so far as regards diplomatic criticism entirely unobjectionable, and bears witness of the masterly skill in this department which has made him an authority, and explains how many have unquestioningly assented to him, as Baiter does in this passage. But since Cicero has reminded us above I, 5, 10, non tam auctores in disputando quam rationis momenta quaerenda sunt, we may be allowed here to look a little more closely for the reason of the thing. If Cicero had written intrante spiritu, we should have to assume
that by these ablatives he only intended to characterize the simultaneous occurrence of both these processes, i.e. the entrance of the air and the expansion of the lungs, without thinking of the actual relation of the two which we designate as a conditional or a causal one; the lung does not expand if or because the air enters, but the contrary, if or since the lung expands the air enters, as in a pair of bellows, with which indeed the breathing process is for this reason compared, e.g. by Aristotle De Resp. c. 21. Now it is quite possible that the matter was not quite clear to Cicero, or that he thought it unnecessary to describe it more definitely, which it would have been quite easy to do by writing, say trahentes spiritum. But as little as I should be inclined to grant this, no more can I regard Madvig's conjecture as free from objection. Moreover if the original text had read thus, such an easily understood expression would hardly have become so corrupted as the variations found in the Mss. show. But if the original text read in respiratu, the change to respiritu with or without in is explicable from the difficulty the correctors found in respiratus, just as for example in Cic. Attic. I, ep. 18, 3 and Liv. XXX, 15, 3 the Mss. waver between suspiratus and suspiritus. Orelli omitted in before respiratu; as it has sufficient warrant in the Mss. I have thought best to leave it, and so have not quite followed Lambinus.


II, 57, 143. et somno coniventibus ... utque tamquam involuti quiescent. O. Heine in the Philolog. XV, p. 685 assumes here a gap to be supplied perhaps by tegumentum esset. Perhaps [tegumentum ess]et quo ...

II, 59, 147. [et] qualis sit (Schoemann for qualisque sit). As the copula is wanting in the Mss. it is not improbable that the words are nothing but a gloss to quam vim habeat. Hence Baiter has bracketed them, as also the preceding idque ratione, on the genuineness of which no one save the most recent translator will believe.

II, 66, 165. Sin autem his consulunt. Bouhier with some reason supposes that Cicero wrote si autem. At least sin would not be used here in the usual way, namely as introducing an assumption that contradicts or extends one that precedes, whether expressed or implied (see Opusc. Ac. III, p. 372, note 2). It is clear that neither of these is the case here, but only a further consequence is drawn from what precedes.
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III, 3, 8. *et non altero coniveam* for the Mss. *contuear* is an emendation accepted also by Baiter after Madvig's confident recommendation. So in c. 4, 9 *cur contuveres* for *contuere* found in the best Mss., which others have changed into *contuerere.* The variations in Plinius, e.g. X, 75, 97, p. 215 Sillig, besides the examples cited by M., show how commonly the copyists confused these two verbs.

III, 9, 23. *Saepe dixit nihil fieri sine deo nec ullam vim esse naturae, ut sui dissimilia posset effingere.* The statement *nihil fieri sine deo* nowhere occurs, at least in this form, in the discourse of Balbus; and even supposing that here, where the Stoic doctrine of the divinity of the world is criticized, *sine deo* were equivalent to *sine mundo,* there can have been no probable reason why Cotta should not choose the expression which was evidently more fitting and liable to no mistake. One Ms., certainly not of the best, which Creuzer denotes by La, has *sine mundo;* but, as *mundus* has been mentioned just before, *sine eo* might appear sufficient and more probable, as it did to Creuzer. But even thus the expression does not seem definite and clear enough to designate what is here required. *fier in aliquo* may be said of everything which takes place without the cooperation of any one; but here, where the question is plainly of the origin of things, where the *mundus* is to be conceived as not only cooperating but as creating and producing, some other expression seems to be required. Heindorf saw this plainly and for *sine eo* conjectured *nisi ex eo,* just as we find shortly after *ex eo procreantur;* comp. II, 35, 88: *mundus ex quo orintur et sunt omnia.* — In the next sentence *nec ullam vim esse naturae,* *ut sui dissimilia posset effingere* we must evidently understand by *natura* only nature in general (*natura mundi* II, 22, 58, ἡ τοῦ διὸν φύσις M. Aurel. VII, 75), i.e. the creative power of the universe, but not any natural existence in particular. Hence Walker rightly saw that we should read *illum* for * ullam.* It is further to be noticed that the expression *sui dissimilia,* which Cotta employs, does not quite correspond to the sense of what Balbus had said; for Balbus had not and could not say that the all-creating *natura* could create nothing *unlike* itself, but only that it could create nothing better and more perfect than itself; II, 33, 86: *ea quae efferant aliquid ex se se perfetores habere naturas quam ea quae ex iiis efferantur;* comp. II, 8, 21.

III, 14, 36. *intrinsicus* is the reading, undoubtedly correct, of Bouhier instead of the opposite *extrinsicus,* which is here impossible; formerly I adopted *et sentiens,* proposed by Wytenbach in its place. Although there may be no other example of *intrinsicus animal,* the explanation given in the notes is not to be doubted.
III, 17, 43. There is certainly something wanting after *si di sunt*. Something should follow which could be regarded as an apparent reason for the divinity of such beings as the Nymphs, and then be refuted by Cotta as not valid proof; perhaps *si di sunt quibus sacra sunt* or the like. *On ne nymphae quidem igitur* see Opusc. Ac. III, p. 380.

III, 19, 50. It seems to me nearly certain that *Leontidum* should be read for *Leonaticum* of the Mss. In regard to the name Leocorium, O. Müller, Ind. Schol. Gotting. 1840, supposes that it denoted properly a place appointed for the expiation of the sins of the people (*λεωνάροις*; after the analogy of *νεωκρός*); Lobeck, Pathol. I, p. 550, says: Suspectus est Leos heros et omnis illa de filiabus eius fabula, sicut omnia quae de Graecorum sacrificiis humanis tradita sunt. Nomen Leocorion vel Leocori cuiusdam monumentum est vel populi curiam s. *λήθαργος* significat.

III, 29, 72. Instead of the Mss. *parumne semper in ratione versantur* Baiter reads *parumne saepe* according to the conjecture of Madvig and older critics, which does not seem to me necessary. It is clear enough that *parum semper* cannot be united; but *parum* should be taken with the following *in ratione versantur*, which is required by *parumne subtiliter disputat* coming directly after. It need not surprise one that it is separated from it by *semper*; there is a good reason for the position. *Semper* points to the fact that the *levitates comicæ* are not always committed, though they may often be so, without *ratio*, without a sort of reasoning to justify them.

III, 31, 77. *Et si verum est* &c. Baiter, after Madvig, reads *Ut si verum esset* . . . , brackets the words *si, qui audierunt* to *interpretarentur* as a spurious interpolation, and makes the apodosis to the protasis commencing with *ut* begin in § 78 with *sic, si homines*. . . There is no doubt that Cicero might have written thus, and that it might have been better had he done so; but it does not seem to me necessary for that reason to change the traditional reading of the Mss. What is best is not always genuine, and slight inaccuracies are easier to excuse in a treatise which evidently affects the freedom of an extemporary conversation. We may therefore excuse the repetition of the protasis in *si, qui audierunt* &c., and the separation of *prorsus* of the apodosis from its verb *lacere*. Madvig thought it necessary to change the *si verum est* to *si verum esset* because, according to his conjecture, only these words could form the protasis to *lacere praestaret*; with the common reading this is unnecessary because the protasis is contained in the clause *si . . . essent discessuri*. It is incredible that this clause merely repeats in hypothetical form the thought expressed at the beginning in more positive form by *si verum est* &c.?—I have
thought best to preserve the traditional reading; excepting the change at
the end of the sentence of philosophos (after Lamblinus) for philosophis,
although the dative is defensible. [Müller has philosophis.]

VARIATIONS FROM THE TEXT OF MÜLLER.

40. 1 sic afficiatur for † significetur — 40. 9 vatera sint for † est —
47. 14 cernatur; nec for cernatur nec — l. 16 appellat, sed for appellat;
sed — perceptis, cum for perceptis cum — l. 18 adfluat; tum for adfluat
cum — 58. 21 argumenta sententiae for argumento sententiam — 62. 1
nec ad speciem nec ad usum for nec specie nec usus — 66. 35 videamus for
videmus — 142. 6 differemus; for differemus, — 143. 18 erit mundus
bracketed — 145. 5 continerentur and l. 6 cohaerent permanent for contine-
retur cohaeret permanet — 150. 27 Eumenides, quarum for Eumenides?
Quae si deae sunt, quarum — l. 27 omit Furiae before deae — 164. 4 [ty-
rannidis] for † typanidis — 166. 28 quidem. Non eas? ne nationes qui-
dem for quidem ; non modo (modo in italics) eas, ne nationes quidem —.
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