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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΑΙΔΩΝ
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THE PHAEDO OF PLATO

EDITED

WITH INTRODUCTION NOTES AND APPENDICES

BY

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PREFACE.

So many editions of the *Phaedo* are already in existence that the appearance of a fresh one would seem to require a word of explanation. The object of the present edition is to assist those who are beginning in earnest the study of Plato's philosophy, and who have advanced far enough to appreciate the peculiar difficulty of his writings. Accordingly my chief aim has been to elucidate the philosophical contents of the dialogue, to indicate as clearly as I was able the consecution of its thought, and to determine its position in the Platonic system. It has therefore been no part of my purpose to enter minutely into points of language for their own sake. But since it is utterly impossible to follow Plato's thought without a thorough mastery of his language, I have not abstained from dealing with such points, so far as seemed necessary for the right understanding of Plato's meaning, or where I thought that they had been insufficiently treated by previous editors. Among existing editions I am most indebted to the notes of
those admirable scholars Wyttenbach and Heindorf. And since I have frequently had occasion to express dissent from the views of Prof. Geddes, I am anxious to take this opportunity of acknowledging the advantage I have derived from his scholarly and lucid commentary.

Finally and above all my thanks are due to my friend Mr Henry Jackson, to whose untiring kindness I owe far more than I can possibly acknowledge: the references to him in the notes very imperfectly indicate how fully he carries out the principle κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων.

Trinity College, Cambridge,
3 November, 1883.
INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. Scope of the dialogue.

A careful student of the Platonic dialogues can hardly fail to notice a certain peculiarity in their structure: he will observe that for the most part we find not one but several motives underlying the whole composition and artistically interwoven; so that if we put the question, what was Plato's object in writing any one dialogue, the answer can rarely be a simple one. These several motives are indeed formally subordinated to one definite end—for a Platonic λόγος is always ζωον συνερτός—but this end is not always, nor indeed often, the most important result of the dialogue or that which Plato had most at heart in its composition. A very good and simple illustration of this is supplied by the Sophist. The declared object of that dialogue is to define the sophist (218 b); and this object, amid all the intricacies of the argument, is held steadfastly in view until its final accomplishment, when the sophist is tracked down, captured, and bound hand and foot in the humorously labyrinthine paragraph which closes the Eleate's discourse. But as a means of obtaining this definition Plato employs his method of διάτησις; and the extreme elaboration with which this process is worked out, together with the high value which we know Plato set upon it, leaves no doubt that the exposition and illustration of this dialectical method is one of the motives of the dialogue. Thirdly, a point suddenly turns up, quite by accident, as it were, and without the slightest premeditation (236 b): the sophist, on the point of being convicted as a dealer in shams, takes shelter in the old puzzle about μὴ ὅν: which puzzle must be solved before the definition can be accomplished. Now it will be observed that the material and formal importance of these three motives are in reverse order. The definition of the sophist, the formal object of the dialogue, is simply a piece of pungent satire; but the method by which this object is attained is a matter of high interest and significance. By far the most momentous issue, however, is that which turns upon μὴ ὅν: the searching criticism of ὅν and μὴ ὅν, as conceived in various philosophies; the masterly
analysis of the five γένη, which clears up the problem of predication; the solution of the hitherto hopeless enigma concerning false judgments; all this constitutes one of the most memorable achievements of the human intellect: a science of logic is now first founded, and philosophy is placed upon a new basis. Yet in form this all-important metaphysical inquiry is merely an accidental difficulty involved in the definition of the sophist, which need not have arisen, had not the sophist turned out to be a sham. We see then how Plato proposes to himself an end mainly for the sake of the means: we may be sure that he cared little about defining the sophist, but very much about the metaphysical questions to which the process of definition was to give rise. Now this indirect way of going about his work is a peculiarity of Plato’s which must be steadily kept in mind if we are to have any hope of understanding him at all. Also we must remember that Plato is before all things a metaphysician: ethics, politics, logic, physics are to him so many forms of applied metaphysics; and if we would rightly follow the current of his thought, it is from a metaphysical source that we must seek to trace it.

Bearing this in mind, let us see what is the result of a similar analysis applied to the structure of the Phaedo. Most persons who should be asked to describe this work would probably reply that it was a treatise in which Plato endeavours to prove that soul is immortal; and this is no doubt a correct account of one motive of the dialogue. But the demonstration of immortality is neither the express purpose nor the most important philosophical result; it holds a position more nearly corresponding to that of διάφορος in the Sophist. As to the main subject of the dialogue Plato leaves us in no uncertainty. Sokrates makes two statements, which appear to Kebes to be mutually conflicting: (1) in this life we are under the protection of good and wise gods, (2) the philosopher will be glad to quit this life. Simmias adds that it seems a little unkind of Sokrates to be pleased at leaving his friends. Sokrates admits that it is only fair that he should clear himself on both these charges. Then, after an interruption on the part of Kriton, which is clearly designed to mark that the serious business of the dialogue is now about to begin, Sokrates proceeds in the following words: ‘Now I desire to render an account to you my judges and to show that it is reasonable for a man who has passed his life in the true love of wisdom to be of good cheer on the threshold of death and to be hopeful of enjoying the greatest blessings, when he is dead, in the other world. How this may be the case, Simmias and Kebes, I shall try to tell you (63 ε).’ Thus we see that the leading motive is to
show that the wise and virtuous man will meet death with cheerfulness, on the ground that his lot will be happy in the world of the departed. And, as in the *Sophist*, Plato never once loses sight of this motive from beginning to end of the work.

Now let us observe how the other subjects are connected with this. The line of defence adopted by Sokrates is as follows: The philosopher is not concerned with the gratification of bodily appetites nor with the pomps and luxuries of this world; the pleasures of the intellect alone are precious in his sight, and to the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom his whole life is devoted. Such being the case, the body which is his soul's constant companion not only brings him no advantage but is a positive hindrance and annoyance, impeding by its importunate affections the free action of the soul in her search for the truth. Accordingly he accustoms his soul to be as independent of the body as is possible, to withdraw from communion with it, and to act by herself—by processes of pure thought without aid of the senses. But this deliverance of the soul, her purification from all corporeal taint, can never be perfectly accomplished during this earthly life; consequently in this life the perfect fruition of intelligence can never be attained. There is but one thing which separates soul from body altogether; and this is death: death extricates the soul from her corporeal entanglement and sets her free to exert her unfettered powers upon the highest objects of cognition. Death then is the realisation of the philosopher's dream; it is the fulfilment of that intellectual enfranchisement which by a lifelong struggle he has but in some scanty measure attained: how then can he fail to be of good cheer when the hour arrives of his release from the close confines of his bodily prison into the wide pure air of free intellectual life?

Very well, replies Kebes; but you are assuming that the soul continues to exist as a conscious and intelligent being after her separation from the body. How do we know that she is not extinguished at the moment of dissolution? Before we can accept your defence it is absolutely necessary that you should satisfy us on this point. Sokrates freely admits the justice of this criticism and says he will do his best to fill up the lacuna in his theory.

We see then that immortality is a distinctly secondary issue, subordinate to the principal theme of the dialogue. The particular mode in which Sokrates has chosen to defend his main proposition demands a demonstration of the soul's immortality as a necessary condition, and that is all; so far as regards the purposes of this dialogue Plato is concerned to prove the soul immortal only in order to prove that the
true philosopher will not fear death. It is to be noticed that as soon as ever the demonstration is, or seems to be, accomplished, Sokrates at once proceeds to enlarge on its ethical bearings in relation to the main proposition, 81 a foll., 107 c foll.

Having thus determined two motives, let us see whether an inspection of the pleadings for immortality will disclose any more. Sokrates begins with two arguments which are to be regarded as two halves of one proof. The first is based upon a law of alternation or reciprocity in nature: given two opposite states, all things which have come to be in either state have passed into it from the opposite state; thus what is now better has become so from being worse; and between every such pair of opposites we have transition in either direction, between hotter and colder, greater and less, sleeping and waking, &c. Now the opposite to living is dead: between these two we daily see the process in one direction, from life to death, the other we do not see. But though we see it not, it must exist. For since living souls are continually being born into the world, and since they cannot come out of nothing, clearly they must come from the souls which have quitted this life. These then must exist after their departure from the body; for if they ceased to be, they could not come again into being. Therefore our souls exist after death. The second argument rests upon reminiscence. All sensible objects remind us of certain ideal types, whereof they are likenesses: they are but adumbrations of these types, faintly reflecting them but incapable of representing them with perfect accuracy. We compare these objects with their types and judge that they fall short of them; whence it is evident that at some time we must have had apprehension of the types. Now we cannot possibly have gained this knowledge since our birth; we must then have possessed it before we were born. Therefore our souls possessed intelligent existence before birth. Putting these two arguments together, we find that our souls existed as intelligent beings before we were born and will continue so to exist after we are dead.

Seeing that his young friends are still doubtful whether the conditions for the operation of this law of reciprocity are necessarily satisfied in the case of soul, Sokrates pushes forward to new ground. He urges that if a thing is to be decomposed, it must first have been composed; that which has no parts therefore cannot be subject to dissolution. This is the fundamental distinction between the objects of sense and the objects of intelligence; the former are composite and perpetually suffering resolution into their constituent parts; the latter are simple and therefore indissoluble. Ideas are changeless and eternal, particulars
are ever-changing and transitory. To which of these natures is soul more akin? clearly to the simple and changeless ideas, which are her proper object of cognition, and which she apprehends by virtue of her likeness to them. Moreover she is mistress over the body, being in her divine simplicity far more powerful. Yet even the body is under certain conditions very durable; how much more lasting then shall the soul not be?

Before proceeding let us pause to mark the stress laid on the affinity of the soul to the ideas, for this will presently play an important part.

We may pass over the objection of Simmias with its refutation as being immaterial to the main argument, and proceed at once to the criticism of Kebes on the foregoing theory. It amounts to this: the above reasoning only makes it probable that soul is much more durable than body and may last a very long time; it does not show that she is actually imperishable nor that she has in her own essence an inalienable principle of vitality. This takes us to the very heart of the matter; Sokrates must trace the causes of generation and destruction down to their very roots.

I do not mean in this place to give any analysis of the marvellously subtle reasoning which serves for the final demonstration, but only to call attention to its fundamental principles. After pointing out the inadequacy of all previous and contemporary theories of causation, Sokrates declares the Ideas to be the sole causes of all things and the sole objects of knowledge. The truth of the Ideas is eternally sure, and whatever inference can be certainly drawn from the ideal theory is verily true. Now everything in nature is what it is by virtue of the immanence of some idea informing it: and so intimate is the connexion of particular with idea, that the former can never give admission to an idea incongruous with the latter. Accordingly if we take any pair of opposite and mutually exclusive ideas, a particular informed by such opposite, or by any idea involving such opposite, can never receive the other opposite: we cannot have cold fire or even three. But soul—vital principle—is soul by virtue of the idea of life inherent; therefore she can never admit the opposite to life, which is death; else we should have dead soul, which is no less impossible and irrational than even three. Soul therefore has in her inmost essence a source of life that can never fail her.

A very moderate familiarity with Plato’s ways of working will now enable us to see where we are to look for the very heart of the dialogue. The assertion of the Ideas as the causes of existence and the objects of cognition; the affirmation that they constitute the ultimate reality
INTRODUCTION.

upon which all sound reasoning must be based—this is the most signi-
ficant metaphysical result of the Phaedo, and this beyond doubt was
Plato's dearest purpose in composing it. And yet, so far as form goes,
this is only subsidiary to the establishment of a doctrine which has
turned out to be necessary to the maintenance of the primary propo-
sition. We saw however in the Sophist that the chief formal motive is
by no means necessarily Plato's principal end; and again we have to
seek the chief end in what is technically but a means.

Such being the three strands intertwined in the thread of which the
fabric of the Phaedo is woven, let us examine their relations a little more
narrowly.

The question of immortality is interesting and important just so far
as it is connected with the cognition of the ideas. True knowledge,
says Plato, is concerned with the ideas alone, because they are simple,
changeless, and abiding: concerning the complex, changeful, and fleeting
objects of sense there can be nothing better than opinion. Soul alone,
acting by processes of pure thought, can apprehend the ideas, because
of her likeness to them: she too is simple and self-identical; and like
is known by like. But during her association with the body she never
has free play for her own activity: the body with its passions and
appetites, its pleasures and pains, its maladies and weaknesses, is ever
hampering and hindering the movements of the soul to such a degree
that even the wisest of mankind can only in part rise superior to these
influences. Consequently the joy of pure and untroubled contempla-
 tion can never be tasted by the soul while her union with the body
continues; only by release from its harassing companionship can she
hope for the full fruition of knowledge. So if her existence is ter-
mminated at the dissolution of soul and body, she never can attain true
knowledge at all: immortality then is an inevitable condition of the
free cognition of the ideas. For this immortality she is justified in
hoping by the very affinity to the ideas which enables her to apprehend
them; nay she is assured of it by the indwelling idea of life itself which
informs her very essence. Thus are immortality and knowledge mutually
interdependent. Schliermacher, who has some excellent remarks on
this subject, sums up as follows: 'So ist denn die Ewigkeit der Seele
die Bedingung der Möglichkeit alles wahren Erkennens für den
Menschen, und wiederum die Wirklichkeit des Erkennens ist der
Grund, aus welchem am sichersten und leichtesten die Ewigkeit der
Seele eingesehen wird.' In the words of Simmias, εἰς καλὸν γέ καταφέσ-
γει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τὴν τε ψυχὴν ἤμων πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς,
καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἧν σὺ νῦν λέγεις.
Such then is the value of immortality, as promising us an existence under conditions more favourable to intellectual activity. I think however Plato intends to turn it to another not unimportant, though minor, use. In the true Platonic system of ethics immortality plays no part. Plato's morality is founded in the very depths of his ontology; for the principle of good and the principle of being are one and the same. It matters nothing whether we live or die: that alone is good which is like the idea of good. But to deduce ethical science from the ἀντὶ ἀγαθὸν calls for a most consummate philosopher; for the great mass of mankind it is simply out of the question. So then, since they cannot frame a moral code for themselves because they do not know the idea of the good, the best they can do is to accept one from the philosopher who does know it, as Plato insists in the Republic. But the philosopher must hold out some inducement for the people to receive his teaching; and this inducement may be derived from immortality. Socrates himself says 'if the soul is immortal, she needs our care not only during the period to which we give the name of life, but for all time; and now it is that we see how grave is the danger of neglecting her.' The philosopher will persuade the people to follow his precepts by showing that a life of intelligent virtue is the forerunner of free intellectual enjoyment in the invisible world, but a life of vice can only lead after death to helpless cravings for bodily pleasures which are out of reach. So by deducing immortality from the ideal theory, Plato uses that theory to provide a working code of morals for those who are incapable of rising to the only true and rational virtue.

But while we affirm that the chief result of the Phaedo is the establishment of the ideas as the true principles of causation and objects of knowledge, in place of the superficial physical laws and incogitable phenomena which did duty for causes and realities with the Ionian philosophers; and while we recognise that the proof of immortality derives its sole value from its bearing on the cognition of the ideas, we must not leave out of sight the original proposition, that the wise man will cheerfully meet death. This, though overshadowed by the superior interest of the metaphysical issues to which it gives rise, is yet far from unimportant in Plato's sight; and this is what gives artistic unity to the dialogue. As a framework in which to set his vindication of the dignity of the ideas Plato could have chosen nothing better than a description of the cheerful fortitude displayed by a man whose life has been devoted to intellectual research. The lesson which Sokrates inculcates by his precepts and arguments he enforces still more vividly by his living example. From his first pleasant moralising on his own fetter-cramped
INTRODUCTION.

limbs to the last half-conscious injunction to fulfil a pious duty, he shows us the very ideal of that character at which he would have us aim. Never was the Platonic Sokrates more genial and gentle, more ready and subtle in argument, more patient of opposition and skilful in encountering it, never more rich in poetry and imagination, than on that last day of his life. It seems as if Plato had determined to use all the resources at his command in bringing home to us the lesson that in philosophy lies the sovereign charm against the terror of death: he appeals to the intellect by the subtlety of his arguments, to the imagination by his fanciful and beautiful myth, and to the emotions by that death-scene which stands alone in all literature. It is in this way that we may recognise the connexion of the myth and the last scene with the main body of the dialogue. The myth is no mere poetical embellishment, nor does the death-scene share only the unity which belongs to the various stages of one coherent narrative. Both are linked by a deeper unity to the remainder of the work, being by different methods subservient to the same purpose. We see then in the Phaedo an affirmation of the ideas as causative and intelligible existences, from which, through the inference of immortality, the ethical deduction is drawn that the philosopher, secure of his well-being in the region of the departed, will meet death with calmness and confidence; and the impression thus conveyed is rendered more vivid by a description of the earth and the underworld and an account of the adventures of the disembodied soul; and finally it is yet more earnestly enforced by a picture of philosophic fortitude taken from actual history. All these elements, argumentative, imaginative, and narrative, are harmonised by Plato in one consummate work of art and jointly directed to one common end.

§ 2. The relation of the several arguments for immortality.

How the several arguments are mutually related, and how many proofs of immortality are contained in the Phaedo, is a question on which most diverse opinions have been entertained: on one estimate all the proofs are reduced to one, while another reckons as many as seven. I do not propose to criticise these various enumerations, which have been ably treated by Bonitz in his admirable 'Platonische Studien': I shall simply examine the relation of the several arguments, and then from the results thus obtained consider whether they are to be regarded as constituting one or more demonstrations. With
the views of Bonitz in the main I thoroughly agree; but I think it is possible to give a somewhat preciser statement than he has done.

First then as concerning the argument of ἀναμνήσεσις 70 c—72 e. This seeks to deduce the soul’s immortality from a universal law of nature, or rather from two laws. The first is γένεσις ἐκ ἑναντίων, which is simply an application of a principle with which we are already familiar in preplatonic philosophy, e.g. the ὁδὸς ἄνω καὶ κάτω of Herakleitos. A γένεσις is a process between opposite states; whatever we see at one pole, as the result of a γένεσις, has passed over from the other pole. The two poles with which our argument is concerned are ξῶν and τεθνηκῶς: ξῶν we define as a state of union between soul and body, τεθνηκῶς as a state of separation. We know that the soul passes to the state τεθνηκῶς from the state ξῶν, and we deduce from the law of alternations that she passes to the state ξῶν from the state τεθνηκῶς. Therefore the soul must have existence in the state τεθνηκῶς, in virtue of our second law, which is that the sum of all things is constant; in Aristotle’s words οὐδὲν γίγνεται ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, πάν ὁ ἐκ ὄντος. This principle, which the physicists, as Aristotle goes on to observe, agreed in affirming of matter, is here affirmed of thought by Plato, for whom matter is but a phase of thought. It is this which is the most important element in the present argument, and to which we shall hereafter have occasion to recur. The result we obtain then is that our soul in passing from ξῶν to τεθνηκῶς is not annihilated in the process, but retains her existence in the state τεθνηκῶς: in popular language ἑστὶν ἐν Λίδου.

The argument from ἀνάμνησις 72 e—77 a, in supplementing the former, introduces us to the ideal theory. By an ingenious process of reasoning Plato shows that our soul must have had cognition of the ideas, and that this cognition must have been attained before our present life: our soul then must have been in existence before she was incarcerated in human form and born into this life. The result then is the antenatal existence of the soul.

But, it might be asked, what more do we gain by this argument of ἀνάμνησις? For though the only result which Plato expressly draws from ἀναμνήσεσις is that the soul exists after death, it would also be a perfectly fair inference that she existed before birth: for the soul that became ξῶν at a human birth must previously have been τεθνηκῶς, that is, existent in a state of separation; else we should have γένεσις ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. This is true; but ἀνάμνησις makes two important contributions: (1) what we have to prove is ὃς ἐστι τε ἤ ἴσχυ ἐν Λίδου καὶ δύναμι
INTRODUCTION.

καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχει: of this only the first half can be deduced from ἀνταπόδωσις, the latter is supplied by ἀνάμνησις, which shows that the soul had cognition of the ideas: ἀνταπόδωσις shows that τεθνηκός is a mode of existence, ἀνάμνησις that it is a state of intelligence: (2) ἀνάμνησις attaches the demonstration of immortality to the theory of ideas, upon which it is finally to be based. Thus we see that the two arguments are mutually complementary.

In fact there is no more surprising feature in the literature to which the Phaedo has given occasion than the fact that many scholars, not only in the face of Plato’s explicit declaration (77 c), but in the face of plain reason, have accounted these two arguments as two distinct proofs. For if we allow that ἀνταπόδωσις furnishes a proof ὧς ἐστι ἡ ψυχή ἐν Αἴδου, and ἀνάμνησις a proof ὧς δύναμιν καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχεν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς, it is self-evident that the two must be combined in order to constitute a proof ὧς ἐστι τε ἡ ψυχή ἐν Αἴδου καὶ δύναμιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχει. We derive from ἀνταπόδωσις evidence that the soul exists in the same state (τεθνηκός) before birth and after death; from ἀνάμνησις we have evidence that this is a conscious and intelligent state.

So then, whatever number of proofs we may finally decide to exist in the Phaedo, it is clear that the two foregoing arguments do not amount to more than one. But even before any objections have been urged, Sokrates proposes to offer further evidence, as though what he has already brought forward were inadequate. Let us see then in what particulars the demonstration seems to be incomplete, in order that we may know what we should expect to be supplied in the sequel.

A severer scrutiny will detect a weakness in each member of the proof. In the first the soul’s continued existence is a simple deduction from a natural law, which is assumed to work with invariable uniformity. But we must recollect that the operation of any cause depends upon the conditions under which it acts: by the same law lead falls earthward and vapour streams upward; and it is conceivable that somewhere in the universe there might exist a set of conditions under which the same law might produce exactly the opposite results. Now if in addition to our knowledge of the law we had a perfect and exhaustive acquaintance with the conditions under which it acts in every conceivable instance, we might be certain of its operation in all cases. But as a matter of fact we have not and never can have such an acquaintance with the conditions. An astronomer, from the data before him, calculates that a planet ought to revolve in an orbit of
INTRODUCTION.

a certain shape in a certain time: observation, however, shows that the
facts do not correspond to the calculation. Then comes another
astronomer with a larger telescope and discovers that the irregularity is
due to the proximity of another body which was invisible to his prede-
cessor. And if his discovery exhausts the number of influences at work
on the planet, he will be able to calculate its orbit with accuracy, but
not otherwise. Similarly although the law of alternation may afford a
strong presumption that our souls return from the dead, this does not
amount to certainty, since we cannot tell that our knowledge of the
conditions is complete. The very fact that in this case we are unable
to perceive one of the twin processes, which elsewhere are both visible,
is enough to awaken our suspicion: we do not know the conditions to
which soul is subject after our dissolution, and they may be such as to
nullify our calculations. We cannot then be satisfied with simply
inferring this immortality of the soul from the uniformity of nature,
we must prove that imperishability is a necessary and inseparable
attribute of her being1.

Such I conceive to be the cause of the dissatisfaction felt with
the argument from ἀνταπόδοσις. I have dwelt upon it at some length,
because, though by no means obvious, it has hitherto, I believe, failed
of being noticed. I now pass on to ἀνάμνησις.

We have already seen that ἀνάμνησις does not by itself prove the
imperishability of the soul; and now since ἀνταπόδοσις has proved
insufficient to accomplish this satisfactorily, the original defect remains
unsupplied. We may have enjoyed apprehension of the ideas before
our birth, but it does not follow that we shall exist to apprehend them
again after our death. But the point to which I would draw attention
is that we have so far failed to make the proper use of the soul’s
cognition of the ideas; the only conclusion we have drawn is that
the soul must have existed to apprehend them; this is far short of the
inference which on Platonic principles is not only justified but perempt-
orially required. What this is, we shall presently see.

1 That such is the defect of the argu-
ment is indicated by Plato himself at
77 D in the words μη ὃς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἀνέμος
αὐτῆς ἐκβαλλομεν ὅτι τού σώματος διαφωτά
καὶ διασκεδάσθησιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τῆς
μη ἐν πηνειμα, ἀλλ’ ἐν μεγάλη τινι
πνεύματι ὀποθνήσκων. That is to say,
our law may be perfectly sound, but there
may yet be disturbing forces, on which
we have not calculated, which interfere
with its operation: the accident of a
tempest at the time of the soul’s egress
may produce conditions which render the
law null and void in the case of that
particular soul.
We now perceive what we are to look for in the ensuing argument: (1) the establishment of the soul’s immortality upon a necessity of her own nature and no mere external cause, (2) the deduction of the required inference from her cognition of the ideas.

In the argument extending from \( 78 \beta \) to \( 80 \delta \) we have the universe divided into the visible and invisible worlds: the former includes all sensible objects, which are composite, and therefore subject to dissolution and change; the latter contains the ideas, which are in composite, and therefore changeless and indissoluble. Now the body is visible, and obviously belongs to the class of things which suffer change and dissolution; the soul, being invisible, should naturally seem to belong to the world of real existences, incoherent and indissoluble. This belief is confirmed if we consider the soul’s attitude in regard to the sensible and intangible worlds respectively. When dealing with sensible objects she is filled with bewilderment and strays giddily through the ever-fleeting stream of inconstant phantasms, where she can find no rest for the sole of her foot: but when she turns to the ideal world she feels herself at home; the ideas she can contemplate in serene repose, seeing that she herself is akin to them; and she then shares the constancy of the objects of her meditations. Additional confirmation is supplied by the observation that soul commands and body obeys; the former is the function of the divine, the latter of the mortal; therefore we infer that the soul most resembles this divine, deathless, simple, indissoluble, changeless, self-identical essence. Furthermore we know that parts of the body, inferior as it is, or the whole body when embalmed, may last for a practically unlimited time; a fortiori then the soul must be still more abiding.

With reference to this argument it is to be observed (1) that it is professedly a sequel to the preceding, \( \delta \theta \epsilon \nu \delta \epsilon \ \delta \epsilon \delta \epsilon \lambda \iota \nu \epsilon \omega \mu e n \) \( 78 \beta \): (2) that the requisite inference from cognition of the ideas is now expressed in the words I have italicised: (3) that the proof now rests upon the essential nature of the soul. Like knows like: therefore since the soul knows the ideas, she must be like the ideas. But the attributes of the ideas are simplicity, unchangeableness, and imperishability; the soul then must resemble them in these attributes. We are no longer dependent upon an external law, with whose workings we are imperfectly acquainted, to establish the soul’s immortality; for we are able to class her with an order of substances to whose essence belongs eternity; and this we are enabled to do by realising that the soul’s antecedent cognition of the ideas involves not merely her existence before our birth, but her likeness and affinity to the ideas themselves. Thus by
following to its logical conclusion the train of thought suggested by ἀνάμυρσις. Plato has raised the theory of immortality from the dim and doubtful twilight of physical speculation to the clear sunshine of metaphysical certainty. This present argument is in fact intended both as a correction and a development of the previous reasoning. We no longer put our trust in the physical law of γένεσις εξ ἐναγίῳ, which, although it may be perfectly sound and may afford a strong presumption of the soul’s immortality, yet is incapable of offering us the assurance we require; and we have legitimately deduced from ἀνάμυρσις a result which may serve as a secure ontological basis for our proposition.

But now we are suddenly brought to a stand. The whole edifice which we have been at such pains to erect collapses in a moment before the criticism of Kebes: we have been building it upon sand. There can be no mistake about this: the objection raised by Kebes is utterly destructive of the theory in its present form. Let us put it to the test.

Surveying the demonstration which has last been summarised, we see at the first glance that it is purely tentative and approximate; it does not even pretend to be more than an argument from probability.

In the first place the eternal objects of intelligence are invisible, while the perishable objects of sense are visible; the soul is invisible, and therefore we have assumed that she belongs to the rank of intelligible and eternal existences. But this assumption is unwarrantable. All that is eternal is invisible; but it does not follow that all which is invisible is eternal. We may say that the soul’s invisibility affords a certain presumption in favour of her eternity, but nothing more. Secondly, the soul apprehends the ideas, therefore she is like the ideas. True; but we are not justified in concluding that this likeness necessarily includes the attribute of eternity: she may, for aught we know, be sufficiently like the ideas to apprehend them and yet not possess all their properties. Thirdly, the plea that she is like the divine because she rules over the body is still less satisfactory: she may possess many divine qualities without sharing the divine attribute of eternity. Fourthly, when we argue that, since body may last a very long time and since soul is far more potent and permanent than body, soul must last a yet longer time, the conclusion is most inadequate of all. In fact the argument, considered as a proof, breaks down at every point: the most that can be obtained from it is in fact the very inference that Plato draws: προσήκει ψυχῇ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἡ ἐγγύς τι τούτου. But this is very different from the certainty we were seeking. Moreover
since, as we saw, this argument corrected, summed up, and developed the previous reasoning, retaining all that was cogent in it and confirming it by fresh evidence, it follows that in losing this we lose all: our whole case utterly collapses. As Kebes justly says, we have shown that the soul must have existed before her present incarnation; we have made out a case of strong probability that she is very durable and may survive many incarnations and dissolutions; but we are no whit the nearer to proving that she is imperishable: we are in fact just where we were. The whole demonstration must be begun over again ὄσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

Is then all the discussion up to this point utterly fruitless? Most assuredly not. The case stands, as I conceive, thus. The objection of Kebes divides the debate on immortality into two distinct portions, the former of which is purely preparatory to the latter. It would have been impossible to proceed at once to the actual demonstration, which on Platonic principles is conclusive, without clearing the way and preparing the ground for it by these preliminary investigations. In them we gradually feel our way to the right standpoint from which to attack the question. Starting from the notion of immortality as a consequence of a natural law, we soon make an advance so far as to connect it with the cognition of the idea—ἀνάμνησις gives us the germ of the principle which ultimately grows to reasoned certainty; and this nascent conception assumes form and substance in the psychological argument that immediately follows: thus, though we fail to gain the assurance of eternity which we seek, we now see pretty well in what direction to look for it. We do not flee all empty-handed from the ruins of our fallen theory; we carry with us two priceless possessions, first the principle that the sum of existence is constant, next the consciousness that the proof of the soul's immortality must stand or fall with the existence of the ideas. Still what I desire specially to emphasise is that not one of the arguments in the first half of the dialogue is a proof of immortality, and not one of them is intended by Plato to be so. Plato never wastes his words. Had he believed that any of these arguments in the first part demonstrated the soul's immortality, he would have stopped there; the addition of the final argument shews that the former were not conclusive. On the other hand Plato would not have introduced the preliminary arguments, had they not been necessary: they do not indeed directly demonstrate immortality, but they enable us to rise to that stand-point from which the demonstration is possible: they are a necessary propaedeutic for the proof which is based directly on the theory of ideas. The long interval which inter-
venes between the arguments I have been discussing and the ultimate proof serves to mark very clearly that they are to be taken by themselves as forming one division, while the final demonstration itself constitutes the other. Plato generally gives some tolerably plain external mark of his divisions: take, for instance, the criticism of Protagoras in the *Theaetetus*. The earlier objections urged against that philosopher's dogma are highly inconclusive, not to say frivolous; so much so, that Protagoras is at last provoked to put up his head from the shades below and to expostulate with Sokrates for condescending to such a method of controversy. After this the debate assumes quite a different character: the arguments put forward are all of a solid and substantial nature. Now there can in my judgment be no doubt that in that part of the criticism which precedes the remonstrance of Protagoras Plato is expressing merely popular objections, which might be urged, and perhaps had been urged, against the μέτρον ἄνθρωπος from the standpoint of ordinary common sense: these he was unwilling to leave unnoticed, although he was conscious that they did not really invalidate the theory of Protagoras. But in the subsequent portion he is arguing from his own point of view and defining what he considers to be the limitations of the doctrine: while, to mark the distinction, he adopts the artistic device of bidding Protagoras emerge from the shades in order to make his own defence. The case of the *Phaedo* is not an exact parallel: for in the earlier part Plato is not bringing forward arguments which are not his own; the reasoning is sound so far as it goes; and though it does not amount to proof of immortality, it materially expedites the discovery of such a proof. But there is a similar reason for marking off the arguments into two separate divisions; and Plato has taken pains to make a broad and conspicuous line of demarcation.  

1 The extent of this interlude and its varied character will be at once made obvious by a brief summary of its contents. After five chapters of ethical comment, 81 B—84 B, we have a narrative passage, describing how, amid the reverent silence that fell on the company when Sokrates had ceased, Simmias and Kebes were heard conversing apart. Interrogated by Sokrates they confess that they are not satisfied, but do not like to press their objections in his present situation. Sokrates replies with his famous simile of the swans, and exhorts them to speak out boldly, 84 C—85 D. Then Simmias states his objection, and Kebes follows with his, 85 E—88 B. After this a short conversation between Echekrates and Phaedo is introduced, and the latter, resuming his narrative, describes the effect of these objections on the audience and upon Sokrates; after which follows the philosopher's warning against μυστικα, 88 C—91 C. The refutation of Simmias occupies three chapters more, 91 C—95 A; next Sokrates restates the objection of Kebes, and not till 95 E does he begin the critique of physical speculation which
INTRODUCTION.

It remains to say a few words concerning the final proof. This depends directly upon the existence of the ideas as ἀρχαί, or principles of causation. Physical causes explain nothing: at best they are facts, not reasons. For a real cause we must pierce through the phantasmagoria of matter to that invisible essence, of which the sensible universe is the outward expression: we must look for the explanation of each thing in its idea. The whole existence of a particular thing is derived from the inherence of its idea; and so long as the thing exists it can never be severed from its idea, nor admit anything inconsistent with that idea: should it admit such an inconsistent idea, it ceases to be that which it is. Now in most cases this may occur: snow may melt, fire may be quenched; for their indwelling ideas do not involve indestructibility. But with soul this cannot be: informed by the idea of life she can only perish by admitting death; but this would be to admit the opposite of her inherent idea, which is impossible: her extinction would involve a direct contradiction in terms, namely dead vital principle 1.

This demonstration, which is worked out with a completeness, clearness, and subtlety peculiarly Plato’s own, is on Platonic principles perfectly incontrovertible: given the eternal ideas as causes of existence, the eternity of soul is an inevitable inference. But though complete in itself it utilises some of the materials of former arguments: the principle that the eternity of soul is inseparably bound up with the existence of the eternal ideas has been the chief feature of ἀνάμνησις and the psychological argument: in this last proof it is precisely formulated, handled in a new manner, and pushed to its logical conclusion. Secondly, the whole argument has for its ultimate premise the constancy of the sum total of existence: οὐκ ἂν ἐν ὑπὲρο ὑπεράνθρωπον μὴ δέχοτο, ἀφ’ ἑν τι ἀλλο ὕπερβο ραν μὴ δέχεται. And this we saw to be the fundamental proposition laid down in the argument of ἀνταπόδοσις. Moreover ἀνάμνησις is still valid to prove the existence of the ideas and the soul’s intelligent activity apart from the body.

I conceive then that there are in the Phaedo three arguments, culminating in a single proof: but that a continuous connexion can be traced through all. The first, consisting of two portions, bases immortality partly on a natural law, partly on the soul’s connexion with the ideas: the second, being a development of the first, drops the natural law and lays is preliminary to the final demonstration starting from 99 e. In all this intermediate portion includes fifteen chapters, forming nearly one-fourth of the dialogue. 1 A detailed analysis of this demonstration is reserved for the commentary upon the passage in question.
stress solely on the connexion with the ideas, but does not attempt to
do more than make out a case of probability: the last takes up the same
principle and treats it so as to evolve not a mere probability but a posi-
tive demonstration, which ultimately rests upon the law of conservation
of energy as laid down in the first argument. So the dialogue proceeds
like an advancing tide, each successive wave sweeping higher than the
preceding. We must not regard any of the arguments as put forward
and then discarded for a stronger; rather the argument is first offered
in a tentative form, afterwards developed and corrected, and finally
remoulded and brought to its consummation.

In conclusion I must briefly advert to two views which are in my
opinion gravely erroneous and misleading. Steinhart treats the ethical
passages, founded on the doctrine of immortality, as intended to furnish
additional proof of that doctrine. The direct proofs, according to him,
are in themselves inadequate, and require a surer foundation in ethics.
This is a vicious circle so obvious that criticism is superfluous: we are
establishing the soul's immortality in order to justify certain ethical
principles, and then we employ these very principles as evidence for the
theory whence they are deduced. Moreover this view involves a radical
misconception of the purpose and structure of the dialogue.

The second opinion against which I feel bound to protest is that
the refutation of the objection raised by Simmias constitutes an argu-
ment for immortality. This is propounded by Ueberweg, with whom
I am sorry to find Prof. Geddes agreeing. Surely nothing can be more
tenable than such a proposition. Simmias suggests that all the facts
established by Sokrates concerning soul—viz. that she is invisible, in-
corporeal, divine, &c.—are compatible with the theory that she is a
harmony. Now if soul is a harmony, it is clear that she cannot be
immortal: therefore it is absolutely necessary that Sokrates should show
that this theory is inconsistent with the conclusions on which they are
already agreed. But in disproving this proposition Sokrates does not
prove the soul's immortality, nor is he one inch the nearer to proving it.
If I wished to ascertain that a certain crystal was not soluble in water,
I should gain very little by a chemical analysis which assured me simply
that the substance was not saltpetre: and similarly it is no evidence for
soul's immortality that she is not identical with one particular thing of
which immortality can never be predicated. Even could we make an
exhaustive list of all things known to be mortal, and could we prove
that soul was not identical with any one of these, we should still not
have established her immortality: she might yet be an additional kind
of mortal existence, different from the rest. It is therefore illogical to
regard the refutation of the harmonic theory as in any sense an argument for immortality. The proposition of Simmias is one which has some *prima facie* plausibility, and which would be absolutely fatal to the notion of immortality: its confutation is therefore imperative, but contributes nothing, even incidentally, to the main argument: this is in precisely the same position after the overthrow of Simmias as it was before his objection was propounded. The whole episode of harmony, though necessary, is in fact parenthetical. The criticism of Kebes, on the other hand, touches the most vital issue and tends directly to the reconstruction of the argument in that shape wherein alone, as I have tried to show, Plato regards it as a complete and final demonstration that soul is immortal.

§ 3. *Plato's attitude regarding immortality.*

(i) The form in which Plato upholds the soul's immortality next demands our attention: it is of all the most scientific and most philosophical: it is that for which there is the most to be said, and against it the least. His theory predicates eternity of universal soul, and of particular souls metempsychosis. ‘The Metempsychosis’, says Hume, ‘is the only system of this kind that Philosophy can hearken to’¹: and so too thought Plato, who does not deem any other theory worthy of consideration. Universal spirit neither has been nor shall be, but is eternally: particular souls have been without a beginning and shall be for ever. In the infinite lapse of their existence they have passed, it may be, through manifold and diverse incarnations, rising and falling now to higher now to lower spheres of intelligence: but the substance, the conscious personality, is unchanged and unimpaired by all these mutations; and though the shock of each successive embodiment destroys more or less the recollection of what has passed, still each life is haunted by memories of a former existence, ready to be awakened by the sights and sounds that fill our present consciousness².

¹ *Essay on the immortality of the Soul.*
² In treating of this view which I have termed metempsychosis, it is to be observed that the actual transmigration is only an accident of it. All that is essential is the limitless duration of the soul's existence; her perpetual reembodiment in various forms is not necessarily involved. If an individual soul can find some permanent and final mode of existence, the theory would be satisfied as well as by a succession of incarnations. And in fact both in the *Phaedo* and in the *Phaedrus* Plato seems to hold out the hope that a soul that has successfully passed all her probationary trials will attain to a permanent state of the highest intellectual fruition possible for a finite existence.
Thus Plato will have no one-sided immortality: the everlasting life of our soul extends backwards into the infinite past as well as forwards into the endless future. It is just herein that the strength of his position lies: thus he escapes the inextricable perplexities which beset the defenders of other views of immortality. The creational theory perhaps never presented itself to his mind; certainly, if it did, he dismissed it as unworthy to be seriously entertained: it is in fact repugnant to the first principles of his argument. On this view the soul of every being that is newly born into the world is a fresh creation out of nothing; and as all souls previously created exist for ever, the aggregate number of souls is for ever multiplying; that is to say, the quantity of spirit in the universe is continually and ceaselessly on the increase. This is of course directly opposed to the great principles that the sum of force is constant and that generation out of nothing is impossible, which form the groundwork of Plato’s arguments for immortality. Once allow that a soul has a beginning, and we lose our only guarantee that it shall not have an end: nay it must have an end, for only that which is without beginning is without end; only the uncreate is imperishable. It is in fact impossible to bring forward any sound arguments for the future existence of the soul which do not also involve its previous existence, its everlasting duration. The creational theory is matter of dogmatic assertion, not of philosophical discussion.

Not only on metaphysical grounds has Plato’s conception so great an advantage; but from the standpoint of practical ethics its superiority is equally decided. The fundamental law of Platonic morals is δραστηρια παθειν. There is indeed no such thing as vengeance in his scheme, but there is an immutable and inexorable sequence of cause and effect. No impunity exists for vice: every act of indulgence is another bar in the soul’s prison-house; it drags her from the pure intellectual sphere which is rightfully hers down to the gross and pestilent atmosphere of sensual delight. From this doom none may escape; the consequences of every action are as inevitable as the laws of the universe. If a man sin, he shall pay for his sin in spiritual degradation; repentance avails nothing, reformation alone can slowly recover the lost position. Now within the span of a single life we know that a man often suffers in his latter days for the vices of his youth: how infinitely wider then is the application of this principle, if we regard that single life as but one out of an endless series. As Plato himself says, we have to consider the effects of our actions not only for this life but for all time: our present state is conditioned by causes stretching we know not how far back into the remotest past, and what we do now will influ-
ence our destiny throughout unknown cycles to come. The indestructibility of force comes terribly home to us here. Now it will be observed that in this reference metempsychosis supplies the Platonist with a ready explanation of the apparent injustice which prevails in the ordering of things—an answer to the question, if the gods are good and care for the affairs of men, why is virtue so often afflicted and vice triumphant? An advocate of the creatonal theory is forced to reply that the balance will be rectified in another life: suffering virtue will be rewarded, and the insolence of vice will be brought low. But such an answer is idle. No future recompense can undo injustice that has once been done: wrong may be redressed but never cancelled. To the Platonist however the solution is easy. No injustice has to be atoned, for none exists. The conditions obtaining at any given time are the inevitable, and therefore perfectly just, result of an infinite series of causes: we must look for the antecedents not in this life only, but in a limitless cycle of prior existences; and what might be unjust relatively to a man's conduct in his present life may be the irresistible effect of his action in some bygone period. It is true that the answer is not complete without reference to ontological and physical principles, which however cannot here be entered upon.

Thus the theory of metempsychosis supplies not only an explanation of this inequality in human affairs but also a most powerful incentive to virtuous action. A man shall be what his deeds and thoughts make him: if he degrade himself by vice, his restoration must be effected, not by some deathbed repentance or compulsory purgation, but by his own laborious endeavour, by living according to the best of his lights in the inferior state to which he has fallen. For Plato never leaves him without hope. The fanciful description of the soul's migrations at the close of the *Timaeus* (92 a) represents a definite ethical doctrine. The soul that has swerved from the course of pure intellectual virtue may inhabit forms of bird or beast, or even fish and mollusc, 'when it is defiled with all manner of iniquity and therefore in place of inhaling the fine and clear element of air is condemned to the turbid and gross respiration of water'. Yet even in this most degraded state there is a chance of retrieval: for these vicissitudes are determined ἐν δικαὶ ἀπόλτως ἀποβολῇ καὶ κτίσεω. A life well spent according to the conditions of even the lowest rank may enable the soul to rise a step in the next incarnation; and the recovery of the whole intellectual inheritance is always possible. The hopeless reprobation of the incurable criminals described in the myth of the *Phaedo* belongs simply to the pictorial presentation:
we find it only when Plato is pressing popular legend into his service; not when he is presenting his own views undisguised by this veil of tradition. I have said that a permanent mode of existence for the soul is not excluded by the Platonic theory. But such permanent mode is only possible when the soul has attained the highest perfection of which she is capable: good may be stable, but evil never.

Among theories then which maintain the personal immortality of particular souls it would seem that Plato's is metaphysically the most defensible and ethically the most fruitful; and while it attaches the heaviest penalties to immorality, it offers the strongest encouragement to any endeavour after improvement. It is not of course contended that this view is exempt from objections and difficulties; merely that these apply with greater force to any other method of defending individual immortality.

(ii) But how far do Plato's arguments tend to prove the immortality of particular souls, as distinct from the eternity of the universal soul? It must, I think, be replied that they go but a very short way indeed. If we examine the several demonstrations, we shall find that what they amount to is that vital principle is indestructible, not that its manifestation in this or that personality is permanent. The result of the argument from ἀναμνήσεως is that, if all things are not to be brought to nought, the sum of vital essence can suffer no abatement; but it offers no shadow of proof that this constant amount of vitality will continue to be distributed into the same conscious personalities: we know by experience that separate conscious personalities continue to be produced in the world, and therefore we conclude that the vital force which constitutes them cannot perish at the dissolution of soul and body; but we have no right to conclude that these personalities retain their individual consciousness after death. Indeed from this argument we cannot infer that vital force will always continue to exist in the form of particular intelligences: that belongs to another aspect of Plato's metaphysics. Proceeding to ἀνάμνησις, although on a bare literal interpretation Plato's language may imply that the soul existed individually before birth, yet this is not at all involved in the principle of the theory: the particular soul retains the knowledge of truths which are the possession of soul at large, not necessarily of this soul in a former personal existence. A similar examination of the remaining arguments of the Phaedo will show that individual immortality is not fairly deducible from any of them. The same applies to the brief but pregnant demonstration in Phaedrus 245c foll. There the case for the eternity of soul is stated with unequalled force and clearness; but it applies to the universal soul alone, and nothing can be
deduced from it regarding the permanence of particular souls. The strikingly subtle argument beginning *Republic* 608 E contains a remarkable expression (611 Α), ἐνοεῖς ὅτι ἄλ ἐν ἔναι αἱ σύναι, sc. αἱ ψυχαί. This seems at first sight like an assertion of the continued existence of the same personalities. A closer examination however shows that this is not the case. Plato simply means that if the whole vital force of the universe is distributed into a certain number of souls, no addition to this number is possible, else the sum total of vitality would be increased, which is inadmissible. We cannot draw from that argument the conclusion that this universal vitality must needs be for ever manifested in a given number of souls; and even if it must, that would not necessarily involve continuity of personality. The whole strength of Plato’s reasoning is expended in demonstrating the eternity of soul as such: there is nothing to prove that particular souls on their departure from the body are not reabsorbed in the universal spirit, merging their proper consciousness in that common force of nature which is ever manifesting itself anew in the forms of individual life.

(iii) Such being the case, it is not irrelevant to raise the question, did Plato really and literally maintain the personal immortality of particular souls? This certainly would seem to be the teaching of the *Phaedo*, and this is the view of the vast majority of Platonic students: but the contrary opinion is supported by the great authority of Hegel and has recently been defended with much ingenuity by Teichmüller; it is not therefore to be dismissed without ceremony. I will discuss the statements of the two critics separately.

First however I must point out a difficulty under which an editor of the *Phaedo* labours in approaching this question: it does not belong to the treatment of the *Phaedo* at all, but to that of the *Timaeus*; and we can hope to attain a satisfactory solution only after a minute investigation of the profound and difficult metaphysics of the latter dialogue. Such an investigation is obviously out of place here, since ὁ λόγος πυρεργος ὃν πλεν ὃν ἔργον ὃν ἔνεκα λέγεται παράσχοι. At the same time it does not seem desirable to leave the subject altogether unnoticed, and I shall therefore treat it as briefly as I am able.

In his statement of the Platonic philosophy Hegel expressly assigns the permanence of particular souls to the region of the mythical. We think of the soul, he says, as a physical thing possessing divers attributes, one of which is thinking—thinking determined as a thing that can pass away and cease. But with Plato the immortality of the soul is

1 Hegel’s *Werke*, vol. xiv p. 207 foll.
inseparably bound up with the fact that the soul is that which thinks—
thought is not a mere attribute of it. We are addicted to thinking of
the soul as if it were a thing that could exist without imagination or
thought. To Plato, on the other hand, the significance of immortality
consists in this, that thought is not an attribute of the soul but its sub-
stance—soul is just thought. Thought is the substance of soul as
gravity is the substance, not an attribute, of body. Take away gravity,
and body is no more; take away thought and soul is no more. Thought
is the activity of the universal, which reflects itself into itself and
is identified with itself: this self-identity is the unalterable and
abiding. Alteration is when one thing becomes another and does not
hold fast by itself in the other. Soul on the other hand consists in the
retaining itself in the other—in the process of apprehension the soul
has to do with external matter, which is other, and yet it retains its self-
identity. Immortality has not for Plato the interest it has for us in a
religious aspect; it depends upon the nature of thought and its inner
freedom. With reference to the Phaedo Hegel observes that we have
hardly any line of demarcation between the outward representation
and the inward idea, but this is far from sinking to the crudity of concep-
tion (Rohheit), that represents the soul as a thing, and inquires about
its duration and existence, as concerning a thing.

Now it appears to me that the foregoing criticism amounts to
something like this. Hegel, analysing the conception of immortality,
seizes at once upon that which he regards as essential to the Platonic
philosophy: this kernel he instantly drags to light, rejecting the husk
of 'Vorstellung'. Whether an individual consciousness shall continue
to exist as such is to Platonism of no metaphysical importance what-
ever: what is of importance is to grasp the true nature of eternity.
The soul's real immortality lies in the operation of thought: eternity
is in the nature of thought and has nothing to do with duration. Such,
I conceive, is Hegel's point. Now that the duration of the individual
is of no metaphysical importance I am willing to admit: Plato's philoso-
phy in no way involves it. I do not however see that it is thereby
excluded; provided the really essential point is maintained, it seems
to me that the question of individual duration is an open one for
Plato; whether a particular consciousness continues for one life, or
for a score, or for an unlimited time, does not appear to affect the
question.

Teichmüller however goes further, and declares that Plato could
not maintain individual immortality without grave inconsistency; from
which premiss he most justly draws the conclusion that Plato did
not maintain it\(^1\). For I cordially agree with him that any interpretation of Plato which attributes inconsistency to him stands self-condemned. It may be very well for writers of Cicero's philosophical calibre to talk of Plato as 'inconstans'; but when modern historians of philosophy impute to this greatest of philosophers self-contradictions of which the merest novice would be ashamed, one cannot but suspect them of seeking to lighten their own labours at Plato's expense: it is easier to accuse him of inconsistency than to work out his meaning\(^2\).

Teichmüller's criticism seems to resolve itself mainly into two points: (1) Plato's reasoning applies only to universal, not to particular soul, (2) the admission of individual immortality makes Plato's philosophy into a system of monadism, not monism. The first point has been already conceded; but it is no proof that Plato did not believe in the permanence of individual souls. The second objection, if sustained, I should regard as fatal, holding as I do that Platonism is essentially a monistic system. But I doubt whether it has been proved. The contention is that, if particular souls are eternal, we have as the ontological basis of the system not one universal thought, but a number of distinct and independent substances or forces, resembling the monads of Leibnitz. But in the first place it must be remarked that eternity is not claimed for particular souls: the individual, \textit{qua} individual, cannot possibly be eternal: all that is claimed is the indefinite prolongation of their existence in both directions; but no extent of prolongation is one step nearer eternity\(^3\). Severance from what we term our body can make no difference; if a particular soul continues her separate existence at all, the conditions of her limitation oblige her to remain in the sphere of \textgreek{γίνεσις}: did she pass to the \textit{νοητὸν} she would necessarily be merged in the universal\(^4\).

\(^1\) The works of Teichmüller which I have consulted on this subject are \textit{die platonische Frage} and \textit{'Studies zur Geschichte der Begriffe.'}  
\(^2\) As I shall presently have occasion to remark, Plato's dialogues indubitably show a development in his system. But this development involves no inconsistency, even though the expression of some thoughts needs modification: rather it brings to light the hidden connexion between ideas hitherto unharmonised.  
\(^3\) Plato most explicitly recognises this, \textit{Timaeus} 37\textit{E} \textit{παῦτα} \textit{μὲρη} \textit{χρόνου}, \textit{kai to} \textit{τ'} \textit{ηγο} to \textit{τ'} \textit{εστὶν} \textit{χρόνον} \textit{γεγονότα} \textit{εἰδη}, \textit{α} \textit{δη} \textit{φέροντες} \textit{λανθάνουμεν} \textit{επι} \textit{την} \textit{άδιον} \textit{οὐδεν} \textit{οὐκ} \textit{ἐρῶθων}. \textit{Λέγομεν γὰρ δὴ} \textit{ὡ} \textit{ηγο} \textit{ἐστιν} \textit{τε} \textit{καὶ} \textit{ἐσται}, \textit{τε} \textit{δὲ} \textit{τὸ} \textit{ἐστι} \textit{μόνον} \textit{κατὰ} \textit{τὸν} \textit{άληθη} \textit{λόγον} \textit{προσήκει}. \textit{And again} 38\textit{B} \textit{τὸ} \textit{μὲν} \textit{γὰρ} \textit{παράδειγμα} \textit{πάντα} \textit{αὐτὸ} \textit{ἐστιν} \textit{ἀυτοῦ}, \textit{ο} \textit{δέ} \textit{αὐ} \textit{διὰ} \textit{τὸ} \textit{τὸν} \textit{ἀπαντὰ} \textit{χρόνον} \textit{γεγονός} \textit{τε} \textit{καὶ} \textit{ῶν} \textit{καὶ} \textit{ἐστόμενος}.  
\(^4\) Teichmüller's objection seems directed against the existence of a plurality of souls in the intelligible world: cf. \textit{die platonische Frage} p. 23 'Vielleicht aber in das intelligible Gebiet zu versetzen, heisst Atomismus, nicht Platonismus.' Very true;
Finite intelligences are for Plato simply manifestations of the universal νοητος: they are not self-existent monads, but evolved from the universai, a mode of whose existence they are. Now if, as we may gather from the Timaeus, the universal νοητος has this mode of existence in perpetuity, can it matter to Plato's doctrine whether each finite intelligence preserves the same thread of consciousness throughout, or is merged in the universal on the conclusion of a given term of existence? One view may be more probable than the other, but neither seems to me to involve monadism. If souls are to be monads they must be as individuals eternal and self-existing; prolongation of their existence, even in perpetuity, will not suffice.

Moreover, although I am convinced as firmly as any one of Plato's consistency, I hold it for certain that we have represented in the dialogues a regular development of Plato's thought, whereof the Phaedo does not belong to the latest stage. We cannot therefore bring everything in the Phaedo into severe conformity with the matured pantheism of the Timaeus. In the latter it is probable that personal immortality does more or less recede into the region of the mythical; it enters only in an extremely allegorical guise. But while in the matured Platonism all is coherent and consequent, in the still maturing Platonism of the Phaedo there are to be found views, as we shall see, which Plato afterwards considerably modified: and even were it shown that personal immortality is inadmissible in the Timaeus, it does not follow that it is so in the Phaedo.

In the interpretation of a writer so much addicted to figurative speech as Plato there must needs be here and there difference of opinion as to where the line is to be drawn between symbolism and substance: and in this case I cannot but think that Teichmüller has drawn the line too high. And I cannot acquiesce in his naive assumption that the mere fact that a doubt exists is decisive in favour of a non-literal interpretation. The onus probandi, I take it, lies with those who do not interpret literally; and in general the proof is not hard to find. We have no hesitation in regarding the creation of the universe by the δημιουργος as purely mythical, because a literal acceptation would reduce Platonism to a chaos of nonsense; we pass a similar verdict on the endless punishment of criminals in the νεκρων of the Phaedo, Republic, and Gorgias, because it is incongruous with the just and benevolent spirit that pervades Plato's ethics, and because it only appears when Plato is clothing his thoughts in a legendary form. In the but the individual soul, as such, whether its continuance be perpetual or not, does not belong to the 'intelligibles Gebiet' at all.
present case however I do not think the incongruity is made out. Moreover the direct and circumstantial seriousness with which the doctrine of immortality is put forward is totally unlike any of the mythical or figurative representations of Plato's thought elsewhere: Hegel himself observes 'wir treffen hier am wenigsten geschieden die Weise des Vorstellens und des Begriffes;' and certainly if Plato is not here in earnest with individual immortality, he may fairly be charged with having passed from mysticism to mystification.

I have made this defence of the literal interpretation not because I consider that the continued existence of the individual is of any real importance in the Platonic system—I should not go so far as to affirm that it was retained to the last—but because, in order that we may follow historically the development of Plato's thought, it is important for us to determine precisely what he means to set forth in each dialogue. And the conclusion which seems to me the soundest is that, although Plato knew very well that neither he nor any one else could demonstrate the immortality of individual souls, yet he was strongly disposed to believe, at least at the time the Phaedo was written, that every soul on its separation from the body will not be reabsorbed in the universal, but will survive as a conscious personality, even as it existed before its present incarnation.

§ 4. Theory of Soul in the Phaedo. 1

Adopting the view defended in the preceding section, we have next to deal with a question arising from a comparison between the psychology of the Phaedo and that of some other Platonic dialogues. Such a comparison will bring to light two points wherein Plato's teaching is at first sight inconsistent and is regarded by Grote and others as distinctly self-contradictory. The object of the present section is to show that no such inconsistency exists.

In the Phaedo (a) the soul is essentially simple and in composite; and this simplicity is urged as an argument for her imperishability (compare 80 b with 78 c foll.): (β) ἐρωτεῖ ἐπιθυμίαν φάβοι and the like are referred to the body as their origin, whence arising they intrude upon the soul and trouble her contemplations, (66 c). On the other hand (α) in certain passages of the Phaedrus, Republic, and Timaeus

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1 The substance of this section appeared in a paper printed in the Journal of Philology, vol. x, p. 120, to which I may refer the reader for a more detailed statement.
the soul is represented not as a simple but as a triple nature, (Phaedrus 246 A, Republic 439 D, Timaeus 69 c): (β) in the Philebus it is expressly declared that all passions have their origin in the soul, body being in itself incapable of giving rise to any sensation; and this position is also consistently maintained in the Timaeus, (Philebus 35 c, Timaeus 64 b, c). The problems we have to solve then are (i) how can we reconcile the simplicity of soul in the Phaedo with her tripartite nature in the other three dialogues, and how does the argument for immortality affect the three parts severally? (ii) how can we reconcile the assignment of passions to body in the Phaedo with their assignment to soul in the Philebus?

(i) Of the first problem only two solutions seem possible, (a) that two distinct views were entertained by Plato at different periods, (β) that the tripartition of the soul is purely metaphorical.

The first alternative cannot be accepted. For reasons which will be discussed hereafter it is impossible to regard the Phaedo as belonging to a different period from the Republic; and there are good grounds for assigning the Phaedrus to the same group. We are bound therefore to expect that these dialogues will agree in all important doctrines.

Moreover there is a remarkable fact to be noticed. The simplicity of ψυχή, so far from being a theory peculiar to the Phaedo, is one which pervades the whole series of the Platonic dialogues from beginning to end, not even excepting those in which the triform nature appears. This is not only conclusive evidence that we are not dealing with doctrines held at successive periods, but it affords strong presumption that the tripartition of ψυχή is a figurative expression.

Let us examine the nature of this tripartition. In the myth of the Phaedrus the soul is likened to a car driven by a charioteer and drawn by two winged steeds. Of this pair one is vicious and unruly, the other generous and docile, aiding the charioteer in subduing his refractory companion. This parable is thus explained in the Republic. In every soul there are two εἰδή or μέρη, λογιστικά and ἀλογον, the latter being subdivided into θυμοειδές and ἔπιθυμητικόν. So we have the soul distinguished into three parts or kinds, rational, emotional, appetitive. We see however that the main division is dual not triple; the three parts are not coordinate but made out by the subdivision of the ἀλογον: this it will be well to bear in mind.

But if this analysis is to be understood as literally signifying that the soul is composed of three distinct parts, the results are truly bewildering. The entire argument of the Phaedo is not merely demolished root and branch, but is shown utterly unmeaning and irrelevant. For
when we dreaded lest the soul on quitting the body should be scattered to the winds and dissolved, we were comforted by the assurance that as she had no parts she could not be divided; simplicity cannot admit dissolution. But now she has three distinct parts, therefore into those parts she can be resolved: and what is to become of them? do they continue to exist separately? or does one of them, or two, or all perish? And what becomes of the soul’s likeness to the ideas, in virtue of which she claimed to apprehend them and to belong to the region of the invisible and eternal? All this is swept away at one stroke. If we answer that it is the λογιστικόν alone with which the argument of the Phaedo is concerned, we are shutting our eyes to the fact that there is not a single passage in Plato where the term ψυχή is applied to the highest εἶδος as distinguished from the two lower: nor have we a right so to apply it here. And if the three εἴδη all are classed as ψυχή, it must be in virtue of some common principle: what then is this principle? what is the bond of union, what the differentiation of the three? The fact that we are led into so helpless a maze of perplexity is ample cause for deciding that the literal interpretation is entirely inadmissible.

But the case is still further strengthened by the statement in the Timaeus. The created gods are described as implanting in a body the human soul, imitating the manner of their own creation by the δημιουργός. The divine element, θείων, which they received from the hands of the creator, they placed in the head: this is the λογιστικόν of the Republic. Then, Plato proceeds to tell us, they fashioned another kind of soul, to which he applies the remarkable term θυμήτων. This is the abode of vehement passions, pleasure and pain, confidence and fear, wrath and hope and love, and all unreasoning sensations. And lest they should sully the divine principle, they placed this mortal soul in another region of the body: and since it was twofold, they divided the two kinds by a partition, setting the spirited portion in the heart, that it might readily hear and obey the commands of the reason; while the appetitive they set in the belly, that it might care for the nourishment of the body. Here the θυμήτων εἴδος corresponds to the ἄλογον of the Republic and includes the θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν.

If this too is to be understood literally, confusion is tenfold worse confounded. For to the three parts are assigned different habitations in the body; all three therefore have extension in space: yet we know very well that for Plato ψυχή is unextended and immaterial. Again the lower εἴδη are mortal; that is, vital principle can admit destruction: a declaration not only subversive of all the reasoning in the Phaedo, but
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flatly opposed to the whole of Plato's convictions concerning soul: nay it extinguishes once for all his hope of discovering a sure basis of knowledge; for if the principle of life and thought can under any conditions cease to be, what is there that shall abide? \( \Theta ων\) \( \psi υχ\), understood literally, is indeed the most absolute contradiction in terms that his vocabulary could furnish. And, as if to bring out this contradiction in the most glaring light, Plato declares (\textit{Phaedrus} 245 d) \( πάσα \ \psi υχ\) \( \digamma\) \( \alphaβαναρος\), all soul, without reservation, is immortal; and presently we have an elaborate statement of the tripartite nature, that is of a mortal and an immortal soul conjoined.

All this constitutes not merely justification but positive necessity for treating the tripartition of soul as wholly metaphorical; and the interpretation of the metaphor is simple enough. The three \( ειδη\) of the soul are not different parts or kinds, but only different modes of the soul's activity under different conditions. The two lower \( ειδη\) are consequent upon the conjunction of soul with matter\(^1\), and their operation ceases at the separation of soul from matter. Soul, as such, is simple, she is pure thought; and her action, which is thinking, is simple. But soul immanent in matter has a complex action; she does not lose, at least in the higher organisms, all the faculty of pure thought; but she has another action consequent on her implication with matter: this action we call perception or sensation. The main division is, as we have seen, dual: \( λογοστικον\) expressing the action of soul by herself, \( αλογον\) has action through the body. The \( πάθη\) belonging to \( αλογον\) Plato classifies under the heads of \( θυμωκικες\) and \( επιθυμητικες\). We see too that the terms of the \textit{Timaeus}, \( θειον\) and \( θνητον\), are abundantly justified. Soul is altogether imperishable: but when she enters into relation with body she assumes certain functions which are terminable and which cease when the relation comes to an end. \( θνητον\) then is the name given to soul acting under certain material conditions; and soul may in that sense admit the appellation, not because she ever ceases to exist \textit{qua} soul, but because she ceases to operate \textit{qua} emotional and appetitive soul. Soul exists in her own essence eternally, in her material relations but for a time.

\(^1\) This is indubitable. In the myth of the \textit{Phaedrus} the gods have the three \( ειδη\), but the gods are corporeal (246 d). That they are so is interesting: it shows how fully Plato recognised that the limitations of individual consciousness preclude a purely immaterial existence. The conditions of individual existence are not necessarily identical with ours; e.g. the gods and superior spirits have \( σωμα\), but not \( σωμα\ \gammaηνων\); but such an existence involves in some sense materiality: the individual belongs to \( γίνεσι\).
Soul then is simple and uniform, the one and only principle of life. All forms of life are manifestations of her, from the highest to the lowest; from the activity of the noblest intellect to the faintest vestiges of vegetable growth. The degree of intelligence varies inversely according to the degree of implication with matter. In the highest forms of individual existence thought has free scope for its activity, and the lower modes of consciousness are in due subordination: but as the material bonds grow tighter, the supremacy of thought wanes, and the dominion of sensation and appetite strengthens; finally reason and thought, even the higher modes of sensation, vanish, and nutrition and growth alone remain. But all these organisms are vitalised by one sole principle of life.

We now have reached a standpoint whence it is easy to solve the difficulties which we encountered at the outset. Once recognise that Plato knew of but one kind of soul, and all is smooth. The essential nature of soul is simple, as much in the *Phaedrus*, *Republic*, and *Timaeus* as in the *Phaedo*. Hence it is beside the point to ask which of the three parts is immortal: Plato is seeking to prove that soul herself is eternal, not that certain relations and functions of soul are perpetual. The vital principle which manifests itself in these modes is imperishable, but the modes themselves are temporary and transient.

(ii) The answer to the second question is to be found with no less ease. The whole argument of the *Phaedo*, as we have seen, deals with soul *qua* soul. With this of course bodily appetites have nothing to do: accordingly Plato assigns them to the body, because they only belong to soul in her bodily relation and through this affect her. Nothing would be gained by pursuing the analysis further; rather the course of the discussion would be hampered by the introduction of matter which had no bearing on the question at issue. In the *Philebus* it is different; there it is Plato's business to give a psychological analysis of the passions in question: accordingly they are assigned to soul, which is the only seat of consciousness. Each dialogue is justified from its own standpoint: the *Phaedo* in attributing passions to the body, because they arise from the corporeal relation of soul; the *Philebus* in giving them to the soul, because body, as such, has no consciousness. There only appears to be a discrepancy, because the analysis of the *Phaedo* is in the *Philebus* carried out more thoroughly: these passions belong to body, because without the bodily environment they could not arise; to soul, because it is by soul alone that they can be felt.

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1 See *Timaeus* 77 A foll.
INTRODUCTION.

Thus it appears that if we insist upon treating Plato's allegorical language as plain prose, we are lost in helpless perplexity; while by a reasonable interpretation of the metaphor we are released from all difficulty and show Plato's teaching to be perfectly consistent and philosophical. There cannot, I think, be much doubt which method to choose. As Hegel observes, 'wenn er [sc. Plato] von der Seele des Menschen sagt, dass sie einen vernunftigen und unvernunftigen Theil habe: so ist dies ebenso im Allgemeinen zu nehmen: aber Plato behauptet damit nicht, dass die Seele aus zweierlei Substanzen, zweierlei Dingen zusammengesetzt sey.'

I conclude this section with a brief summary borrowed from the paper to which I have already referred.

In Timaeus 69 c—72 d we have a θείον εἶδος and a θυγητόν εἶδος of ψυχή: of which θείον = λογιστικόν, θυγητόν = θυμοειδές + ἐπιθυμητικόν. Now ψυχή, as such, is ἀθάνατον: therefore the word θυγητόν can only refer to a particular relation of ψυχή and σῶμα, or operation of ψυχή through σῶμα. θυμοειδές therefore and ἐπιθυμητικόν are not different parts of ψυχή, but only names for different modes of its action through σῶμα: thus θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν are θυγητά, because, when the conjunction between ψυχή and σῶμα ceases, they cease also.

Thus the apparent discrepancy between the Phaedo and Philebus is reconciled. In the one ἐπιθυμίαι are ascribed to σῶμα, as arising from conjunction of ψυχή and σῶμα: in the other they are more accurately ascribed to ψυχή, because they are an affection of ψυχή through σῶμα. Also the argument of the Phaedo is entirely unaffected by the threefold division. All soul is simple, uniform, and indestructible; but in connexion with body it assumes certain phases which are temporary and only exist in relation to body. Thus though the ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμοειδές, as such, are not immortal, because they depend for their continuance upon body, which is mortal; yet the vital principle, which under such conditions assumes these forms, is immortal and continues to exist, though not necessarily in the same mode. For the modes in which vital force acts under temporary conditions are transitory, but the acting itself is changeless and eternal.

§ 5. Position of the Phaedo in the Platonic System.

The whole philosophy of Plato is, as I am fully convinced, set forth in his extant dialogues. It is a system which in its final development forms a harmonious and consistent whole, worked out with unfailing
logical precision from its fundamental principles. But we can hardly suppose that this system sprang all at once in its mature completeness, like a new Athené, from its creator's brain. Plato is not indeed wont to write down his ideas before they are well thought out: but when we reflect where he took philosophy up and where he left it, it would seem wonderful indeed if a series of compositions extending over a long life belonged to one and the same stage of thought. Of philosophy, properly so called, Plato is the originator and creator. The earlier Greek thinkers in their struggles up to the light had struck upon divers principles of profound and vital importance: the names of Héralkleitos, Parmenides, and Anaxagorás are associated with truths which form the very framework of philosophy. But each of the earlier philosophers dwelt exclusively on his own peculiar principle, till in its isolation a truth became a falsehood; they advanced one aspect of the truth as if it were the whole: those on one side of the shield declared that all is convex; those on the other, all is concave. Philosophy first became possible when there arose a συνοπτικός ἄνηφρος, who saw that these truths are complementary, that each is realised in the others. And here I cannot forbear once more to quote a remark of Hegel's: 'We are not to look upon Plato's dialogues as if it were his concern to give expression to sundry philosophies, nor must we suppose that his philosophy was an eclectic system constructed out of the former: it rather forms the knot in which these one-sided abstract principles are truly unified in concrete form.....In the Platonic philosophy we see manifold philosophemes of earlier times, but taken up into Plato's principles and therein unified.' Platonism in fact realises by conciliation principles which in their separation were null and void.

From this point of view we should expect to find in Plato's exposition of his system (1) a phase wherein the necessity of such a conciliation is recognised and its accomplishment more or less effected, while at the same time imperfections and gaps yet remain, (2) a phase in which Plato's severe self-criticism has revealed to him the weak points in his earlier theory, and his unparalleled metaphysical insight has suggested to him the remedy. To leap at once from the one-sided crudeness of preplatonic thought to so profound and comprehensive a philosophy as the later Platonism would seem beyond the power even of such a genius as Plato's: there are few indeed who could have reached the intermediate stage. We may expect to see, and I believe we do see in the dialogues evidence of development in Plato's thought, which passes through definite stages, enabling us to distribute the Platonic writings into three distinct
INTRODUCTION.

periods, which I shall term the Sokratic, the middle, and the later.

Upon the precise nature of this development an entirely new and most important light has been thrown by Mr Jackson in a masterly series of essays recently published in the Journal of Philology, vols. x and xi. His results, so far as he has yet proceeded, I cordially accept in the main; and it is from the standpoint which his researches have empowered us to reach that I now propose to indicate a classification of the Platonic dialogues. I am only concerned to give such a general outline as will enable me to define the period to which I conceive the Phaedo to belong; a full analysis would not serve the present purpose.

At the time he first met Sokrates, the unsatisfactory result of previous speculation had in all probability inclined the young Plato, like most of his contemporaries, towards philosophic scepticism. Sokrates gave a new impetus to his thought; it was from him that Plato derived, along with the interrogatory method, the principle which afterwards bore such abundant fruit—the principle that knowledge is of universals. This is the great contribution of the unmetaphysical Sokrates to metaphysics; but it is in the hands of Plato, not of Sokrates, that it attained its true significance. And even with Plato it at first remained barren. In his earlier dialogues Plato exercises the exuberant strength of his growing thought in the Sokratic method of definition: we find abundant promise of the matchless artistic power that is to come, but little or no advance on the position of Sokrates. Such dialogues are the Euthyphron, Charmides, Laches, and others, mostly of small compass and of slight philosophical importance. They culminate in the Protagoras, the longest and most brilliant of the series. These dialogues constitute the Sokratic period; in them we do not yet find Plato.

But Plato was a true scholar of Herakleitos: he saw that in things which abide not, but ever fluctuate and fleet away, there can be no stable truth nor basis of knowledge. Knowledge is of that which abides firm and changes not, if there exists such in the universe. And now Plato despairs no longer of finding this existence, he sees it in the principle of universals. But not in the universals as he received them from Sokrates; a change must pass upon them before they will serve his end. Sokrates had said, if we would know a thing we must clear our conception of it from all accidental attributes which may be peculiar to particular specimens of the class: if we would know what is a tree, we must obtain from the completest comparison that
our experience enables us to make an exhaustive catalogue of those attributes which are not peculiar to any particular tree but which are common to all, and lacking any one of which a thing would not be a tree. Thus we shall have framed in our mind the definition or concept of a tree, and now we have such knowledge of it as is attainable. But this concept is simply a thought in our own mind, it has no existence of its own: it is, as Protagoras might tell us, doubly unsubstantial; for it is formed from the impressions produced by an ever-changing object upon a subject that is never constant: the image of a flitting insect in running water is not more shadowy than the perceptions from which our definition is formed. Knowledge demands for its object a constant self-existent verity. This led Plato to the hypostasisation of the universal. In place of a mental concept derived from particulars he gives us an essential idea prior to the particulars, whereof it is the cause. These ideas, being veritably existent, can be objects of true knowledge; and they served Plato as a δεισός wherewith to mediate between the immovable unity of Parmenides and the limitless plurality of Herakleitos. We cannot, says Plato, clear at one bound the gulf between ἐν and ἀπειρόν, between the primal unity and the infinite multitude of particulars; we need, as intermediates, πολλά, i.e. a definite number of classes, proceeding by gradually widening generalisations from the infinitae species to the all-embracing unity: and each of these classes represents an idea.

This is the stage of the middle Platonism: as yet the ideas are simply hypostasisations of every logical concept. Consequently we find in the Republic an idea of every group of objects denoted by a class-name. We have at the top of the scale the αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, we have ideas of καλὸν δίκαιον, &c., ideas of natural objects, ideas of ἁρμαστῇ, beds, tables, &c., ideas of relations, great, small, equal, &c., and ideas of κακὸν ἀδικὸν and the like. The particulars in every group derive their nature and existence from the immanence, παρονοσία, of the idea. The Republic is the chief exponent of this phase of Plato's metaphysics: it is also represented by the Phaedrus, Symposium, and others: its main distinguishing characteristics are the assumption of an idea for every group of particulars, and the inherence of the idea in the particulars, also expressed as the participation, μέθεξις, of the particular in the idea.

But Plato presently finds reason to be dissatisfied with this expression of his theory: the difficulties and deficiencies he sees therein are stated with overwhelming force in the earlier part of the Parmenides. The points which chiefly demanded correction were the contents of the
ideal world and the relation between ideas and particulars. The list of ideas is largely reduced, though it is not easy to say precisely to what extent: instead of an idea corresponding to every group of particulars we now have only an idea for every group which is naturally and not artificially determined; thus all ideas of σκευαστὰ are abolished. Next relations are reduced from the rank of ideas to that of universal predicates, or, as Aristotle would say, categories; so that we no longer have ideas of great and small, equal and double, and so forth. Finally ideas of negations are abolished, such as evil, unjust, &c. Therefore one great criterion of the stage to which a dialogue belongs will be the nature of the ideas that are assumed in it.

The second point is no less important, the relation between the ideal and the material world. In the middle period the idea exists (α) transcendentally, ἐν τῷ φύσει, (β) immanent in the particulars. In the period to which we have now come, the transcendental existence of the idea alone is allowed: the particulars no longer participate in the idea, but are regarded as copies, μοιχήματα, of the ideal type, παράδειγμα. In this way the objections formulated in the Parmenides against the earlier account of the relation between idea and particular are avoided. Other characteristics of the later Platonism, as the analysis of ἐστι into πέρας and ἀπειρὸν in the Philebus, and the still subtler analysis of the Timaeus, need not detain us here; since the object of the foregoing statement is merely to indicate the development of Plato’s system so far as is necessary for fixing the position of the Phaedo. The later metaphysic is unfolded in the Parmenides, Sophist, and Philebus, and consummated in the Timaeus.

Guided by these landmarks we shall find it no hard matter to determine the bearings of the Phaedo. In this dialogue we have an idea of ἴσον (74 A), μέγα (100 B), σμικρότερον (100 E), &c. Also we have the idea described as ἐν ἠμῶν as well as ἐν τῷ φύσει (102 D). That is to say, in the Phaedo (1) we see ideas of relations, though ideas of σκευαστά do not occur, and (2) the ideas are immanent in particulars. These are two unmistakable marks that the dialogue belongs to the Platonism of the Republic.

The metaphysical doctrine of the Phaedo is in fact identical with that of the Republic, although it is less precisely formulated. The cardinal point in each dialogue is the existence of the ideas as the sole principle of causation and the one object of true knowledge. In the Phaedo indeed Plato does not bring out in definite language the subordination of the other ideas to the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν as the supreme source of all existence. But this is not due to any discordance of theory, but only to
a difference in the immediate object. The supremacy of the ἄντω ἄγαθον in the Phaedo is plainly indicated in the fact that τὸ βέλτιστον is postulated as the ultimate αἰτία, to which all other causes are merely subsidiary. Moreover a synthesis of these two dialogues will show us that Plato is working on precisely the same lines which he afterwards follows in the Philebus and Timaeus. In the Phaedo he declares that all things are ordered by νοῦς working ἐν τὸ βέλτιστον. But what is the 'best'? by what standard are we to determine it? The answer is indicated in the Republic: the efficient and final causes are indistinguishably blended in the ἄντω ἄγαθον. This identification is pregnant with a significance which is not fully brought to light until we come to the Timaeus; where, behind the veil of poetical embroidery, we behold the universe as the self-evolution of absolute νοῦς, according to the immutable laws of its own nature. The standard of τὸ βέλτιστον then lies in the nature of νοῦς: and νοῦς in operating ἐν τὸ βέλτιστον is working out its own being. This is why the philosopher must seek to base his morality upon cognition of the ἄγαθον itself; for there is no other standard of excellence than the laws of true Being.

The thoroughly Herakleitean conception of the phenomenal world is also quite in keeping with the Republic. In the shadowy realm of the sensible the soul goes astray bewildered and befogged in the whirling eddy of unsubstantial phantoms—ἀμενηνα κάρπνα—that throng around her. In this doubtful region, midway between being and not-being, she can only grope her way under the treacherous guidance of opinion. And here we may note another characteristic of the middle period, in the absence of any really serious attempt to account for the existence or apparent existence of phenomena. Plato does not flatly deny the existence of the visible world, as the Eleatics did; he assigns it a sort of ignominious half-existence: but he gives us no explanation of it beyond such vaguely metaphorical phrases as 'participation in the ideas'. It is not until his latest dialogues that he sets himself resolutely to deal with this problem. He never recedes from his Herakleitean view of phenomena; but he recognises that their appearance is a fact requiring the most thorough investigation.

The position of the Phaedo with respect to the vexed question of predication is very interesting. In the earlier days of philosophy, for fault of adequate logical analysis, the perplexity surrounding this subject was so great that thinkers of most opposite tendencies had been forced to deny the possibility of predication altogether—at most identical propositions could be admitted. From the first Plato perceived that there could be no sound logical or metaphysical basis for a dogma which
would render reason useless and language impossible. In *Phaedo* 102 B, we have his earlier view on the subject. Whatever we predicate of an object is predicable of such object by virtue of the immanence of the idea therein; we call it by a name denoting the attribute of the idea: τούτων τάλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τήν ἐπωνυμίαν ἵσχειν. In fact when we say ‘Simmias is small’, this is merely a convenient expression for ‘Simmias partakes of the idea of smallness’. Accordingly the two statements ‘Simmias is small’, ‘Simmias is great’, though contradictory ὦς τοῖς ἰδίματι λέγεται, are not contradictory in fact; for they only signify that Simmias participates in both ideas: in comparing him to Sokrates we designate him by the ἐπωνυμία of μέγεθος, to Phaedo by that of σμικρότης. Moreover the expression ‘Simmias is smaller than Phaedo’ is only a conventional phrase signifying that the σμικρότης in Simmias is smaller than the μέγεθος in Phaedo.

Now however superior this conception may be to that of Antisthenes and others who denied predication, it is plain that it does not really touch the vital point. The whole puzzle arose from erroneous notions about ὃν and μὴ ὃν; the copula ἐστί was conceived to denote identity and veritable existence, while ὃνκ ἐστι implied absolute negation—abstract non-existence. This is the problem which is handled with such consummate skill in *Sophist* 240 B onwards. But in the *Phaedo* Plato is so far from approaching this question that he does not even betray the slightest consciousness that just herein lies the difficulty; he has in fact evaded, not solved, the ἀσοφία. Here again the *Phaedo* ranks itself with the *Republic*. In the latter (477 A foll.) we have the division into ὃν, μὴ ὃν, and τὸ μεταξὺ, being respectively the objects of γνώσις, ἀγνώσια, and δόξα. In this classification ὃν signifies absolute existence, μὴ ὃν absolute non-existence, while τὸ μεταξὺ comprehends all phenomena. Now although a sensible object is declared to be ἄμα ὃν τε καὶ μὴ ὃν (478 B), this is simply because it lies μεταξύ τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος καὶ τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὄντος—it is an ambiguous semi-reality: but there is no glimmer of the significance in which Plato afterwards declares (*Sophist* 259 B) that it πολλαχῇ μὲν ἔστιν, πολλαχῇ δ' ὃνκ ἔστιν. When the *Sophist* was written, he did not shrink from affirming that τὸ ὄν, ὁσαπέρ ἔστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσάτα ὃνκ ἔστιν. ἐκείνα γὰρ ὃνκ ὃν ἐν µὲν αὐτῷ ἔστιν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τάλλα ὃνκ ἔστιν αὐ (257 A). But in the *Republic* and *Phaedo* there is not the slightest evidence either that Plato had made the logical analysis which led him to this conclusion or that he was alive to the necessity of making it.

1 A confusion of course arises from the assumption of ideas of relation: but with this we are not at present concerned.

2 The difference between Plato's earlier
On this ground also then the *Phaedo* must be classed along with the *Republic* in the middle period. Which of these two dialogues was prior in order of composition is a question which I think is hardly possible to determine. Plato's voice in the *Republic* is clearer, fuller, and more confident. The ontological theory which is somewhat vaguely sketched in the *Phaedo* is in the *Republic* very precisely formulated. But this admits of a double interpretation. We may either suppose that the *Phaedo* contains as it were the first draft of a scheme which is afterwards fully matured; or else that Plato is briefly adverting to a theory which he has already thoroughly expounded. We might point to the more confident tone of the *Republic* with regard to the attainment of knowledge as arguing an advance upon the *Phaedo*; but, it must be remembered, Plato recognises in the *Timaeus* that an approximation to knowledge is all for which the human intellect can hope: albeit the *Phaedo* does not strike one as intermediate between the *Republic* and *Timaeus* in this respect.

The doctrine of *ἀνάγνωσις*, though it does not occur in the *Republic*, is conspicuous in two other dialogues of the middle period, to wit the *Meno* and *Phaedrus*. It is remarkable that this thought, dormant through nearly all the later period, finally reappears, under an altered form, but still easily recognisable, in the *Timaeus*.

So much for the metaphysical relations of the *Phaedo*, which enable us with perfect certainty, if we accept the theory of development which I have indicated, to assign it to the middle Platonism; in fact it constitutes, along with the *Republic*, our chief source of information upon the fundamental principles of that period. Its ethical relations are discussed in appendix I, and therefore need not here be dwelt upon: moreover they are of very slight comparative importance for our present purpose. It is absolutely impossible to fix the position of any Platonic dialogue by its ethical contents: the metaphysical significance alone constitutes the very soul of Plato's works; and this is the guide we must follow, if we would determine the order of their development.

§ 6. Persons of the dialogue.

(i) *Ecchocrates* the Phliasian is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (viii 46), along with his countrymen Phantam Diokles and Polymnastos and the Chalkidian Xenophilos, as the last of the Pythagoreans. These

and later views on predication is very clearly brought out by Mr Jackson in his paper on the *Parmenides*, *Journal of Philology*, vol. xi p. 287 foll.
men, according to the same authority, were scholars of Philolaos and Eurytos, and were still alive in the time of Aristoxenos, the musician and Peripatetic, who was a contemporary of Theophrastos. An Echekrates, the son of Phrynion, is mentioned in the 9th Platonic epistle, 358 b, but there is nothing to show whether he is identical with the Echekrates of the Phaedo: there was, according to the catalogue given by Iamblichos, a Tarentine Pythagorean of that name; Prof. Geddes suggests that Echekrates may have been an Italian by birth who settled at Philus; but the Philiasian occurs as a distinct person in Iamblichos’ list of Pythagoreans.1

Plato’s choice of Echekrates as the auditor of Phaedo’s narrative is judicious. A hearer was required who should be in sympathy not only with the character and fate of Sokrates, but also with his teaching. The theory of ideas plays the most important part in the arguments ascribed to Sokrates, and none would be so likely as a Pythagorean philosopher to turn a friendly ear to this theory. The Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, as Aristotle tells us, bore a considerable resemblance to Plato’s ideal theory: and we may well suppose that a due amount of σκέψις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις would render an intelligent Pythagorean a ready recipient of Platonism.

(ii) Phaedo was a man of much greater note. A native of Elis, he was taken prisoner in the war waged by Sparta and Athens upon his country, b.c. 401. He is said to have been brought as a slave to Athens; but his servitude cannot have been of long duration, since in 399 we find him a member of the Sokratic circle: according to Aulus Gellius (ii 18) he was ransomed by Kebes, and, in the words of Diogenes, τούτης τεθαν ἑλευθερίως ἑφισοῦση. He seems to have possessed genuine philosophic ability; and after the death of Sokrates he returned to his own country, where he founded the Elean school; the same which, after its transplantation by Menedemos, became better known as the Eretrian. Nothing definite seems to have been recorded regarding the views of Phaedo; but probably they bore a considerable resemblance to those of Eukleides, with whom he is classed by the satirist Timon in a passage quoted in Diog. Laert. ii 107:

_ἀλλ’ ὦ μοι τούτων φλεβάνων μέλειν ὅδε γὰρ ἄλλον
οὐδενός, ὦ Φαίδωνος, ὅτις γε μέν, ὦ ἐρυδύαντεσ
Εὐκλείδου, Μεγαρεύσιν δὲ ἤμβαλε λύσαν ἔρισμον._

1 Echekrates, a Lokrian Pythagorean, occurs in Cicero de finibus v § 87: if Cicero is correct in saying that he was one of Plato’s teachers, he is obviously a different man.
A tendency to ἐρωμός certainly characterised his Eretrian successor Menedemos. Phaedo composed dialogues, whereof the names of several are given by Diogenes Laertius ii 105: of these however only two are said by Diogenes to be undoubtedly genuine, Ζωστρός and Σέρων. A fragment from one of his works is thus translated by Seneca epist. xcv 41: minuta quaedam animalia, cum mordent, non sentiuntur: adeo tenuis illis et fallsens in periculum vis est: tumor indicat morsum, et in ipso tumore nullum volnus appareat. idem tibi in conversatione virorum sapientium eveniet: non reprehendes, quemadmodum aut quando tibi prosit, profuisse reprehendes. The neatness of this simile would lead us to suppose that Gellius was justified in the epithet 'admodum elegantes', which he applies to Phaedo's writings.

Phaedo was evidently a special favourite with Sokrates and seems to have been highly esteemed by the other Sokratics: of whom Aischines is said to have composed a dialogue called by his name. The chronology of his life is unknown; at the death of Sokrates however he appears to have been little more than a youth.

(iii) Concerning Ἀπολλοδόρος of Phaleron we know little beyond what Plato has told us. He was a man of impulsive and passionate temperament, which had gained him the name of ὁ μανικός (cf. Symposium 173 D), fervently attached to Sokrates, but frequently, it would seem, not very good company to others (Symp. l. l. σαντῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀ γριαίνεις πλὴν Σωκράτους). Xenophon refers to him twice: once in memorabilia iii xi 17, where he is said to be inseparable from Sokrates; and again in the apologis § 28, where Xenophon again testifies to his strong affection for his master, but stigmatises him as ἄλλος εὔθης. He is of no philosophical importance.

(iv) Simmias was a native of Thebes, where he attended the lectures of the Pythagorean Philolaos. How long he had been a companion of Sokrates is unknown, but both he and his friend Kebes were at the time of their residence in Athens very young men (νεανίσκων, 89 Α): afterwards he seems to have acquired a considerable reputation. He is mentioned in the Phaedrus 242 B: Sokrates vows that no one has caused the production of more λόγοι, whether composed by himself or by others, than Phaedrus; always excepting Simmias—Σεμμίαν γὰρ ἐξαιρῶ λόγου. In Crito 45 B Simmias is said to have brought to Athens a sufficient sum to effect the release of Sokrates. The meagre notice of him in Diogenes Laertius ii 124 is merely a catalogue of twenty-three dialogues of which he was said to be the author. In Plutarch de genio Socratis § 7 Simmias is made to say that he studied philosophy at Memphis in company with Plato and Ellopion of Peparethos.
This is pretty nearly the sum total of our information concerning him.

(v) Of Kebes equally little is known, beyond what we learn from the *Phaedo*. Diogenes says merely Κέβης ὁ Ἐθαῖος. καὶ τούτου φέρονται διαλογοί τρεῖς. Πίναξ, Ἑβδόμη, Φρύνιχος. A composition purporting to be the Πίναξ of Kebes is still extant; but there can be no doubt that it is spurious. Xenophon mentions him twice (mem. i ii 48, iii xi 17), but adds nothing to our knowledge. He, like Simmias, offered to furnish funds to secure the release of Sokrates (*Crito* 45 b). And this is all there is to tell of him.

Yet this Theban pair, little as is known of their lives, will always be full of interest in our eyes, because of the important part they play in this dialogue. They are both alike painted as ardent lovers of philosophy, keen and eager searchers after truth. Both evidently enjoyed the esteem of Plato in a high degree; but the philosopher has succeeded with a few light and subtle touches in thoroughly individualising the two men: we cannot read the *Phaedo* without being conscious of a marked difference in their temperament. Simmias is somewhat dreamy and prone to mysticism; he is intelligent and sympathetic, but not free from vagueness; he is apt to be misled by superficial likenesses, e.g. on the subject of harmony; and he sometimes λανθάνει ἑαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰκόν, as in 76 D. But the intellect of Kebes is bright and keen as a sword: he has an admirable faculty of seeing the point and making straight towards it; all his criticisms are definite and precise and aimed at the heart of the matter; he possesses the invaluable quality of always knowing exactly what he himself means, and he will not put up with any haziness of thought in others. He is notable for his πραγματεία, for tenaciously clinging to the question until it is sifted to the very bottom: he is the hardest of all mortals to convince, yet perfectly open to conviction when once a satisfactory argument has been found. It is always Kebes who at every important point influences the course of the dialogue: he gives the message from Euenos which starts the whole discussion (60 D); he insists on being told why suicide should be unlawful (61 D), and how Sokrates can welcome death without contradicting his own principles (62 C); he points out that the question of the soul's immortality must be raised (70 A); he suggests the theory of αὐτάρκησις (72 E); and finally he brings forward the objection in 87 A, which shows that he has fully grasped the previous argument in all its bearings and perceives exactly what is required for its completion. Thus every important issue turns upon some pertinent remark of Kebes. The chief contribution of Simmias is the discussion
on harmony; which is indeed a theory that must needs be debated, but which, as I have shown, does not affect the position of the demonstration; nor does it show that he has mastered the argument like his clearer-headed companion. Yet, as Sokrates says of him, οὗ φαίλως ἔσκεν ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου: he is a sincere and zealous lover of truth, and not unworthy to share the immortality which Plato has bestowed at least upon the fame of these two Theban friends.

(vi) Of a personage so well known as KRITON it is needless for me to say much: a few words concerning him will complete this account of the interlocutors. He was the oldest and dearest friend of Sokrates, a man of wealth and position and of high character. His sympathy with Sokrates was probably much more personal than intellectual; Plato's picture of him is as of a sensible and kindly man of the world, looking upon life from the point of view of an honest Athenian gentleman, but without any capacity for philosophy. Indeed, if the anecdote in Euthydemus 304 d foll. has any foundation on fact, he may sometimes have remonstrated with his friend for his philosophical eccentricities. Diogenes Laertius however (ii 121) gives a list of seventeen dialogues attributed to him, some of which have such ambitious titles as περὶ τοῦ γνώμαι, τί τὸ ἐπιστασθαι: we can hardly suppose that they contributed much to the solution of these problems. Diogenes sums up the true interest of the man when he says οὗτος μάλιστα φιλοσοφοῦτα διετήθη πρὸς Σωκράτην, καὶ οὗτος ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτοῦ, ὡστε μηδέποτε λείπειν τι τῶν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν.

(vii) The other companions of Sokrates who were with him at the last, but who do not speak, are Kritobulos, the son of Kriton; Hermogenes, son of Hipponikos, a speaker in the Cratylus; Epigenes, son of Antiphon; Aischines, son of Charinos a sausage-seller, or, by another account, of Lysanias; he was a noted Sokratic and the author of eight dialogues (Diog. Laert. ii 64); Antisthenes, founder of the Cynics; Ktesippus, a youth introduced in the Euthydemus; Menexenos, son of Demophon, who gives his name to a dialogue; Phaidondes, of whom we know only that he was a Theban; Eukleides, founder of the Megarian school; and his friend Terpasion, also a Megarian. Of these all but the last three are Athenians.
I append a list of editions of the *Phaedo* and other works of which I have made use.

Platonis Phaedo ed. Wytenbach

" " " Heindorf
" " " Ast
" " " Geddes
" " " W. Wagner
" " Stallbaum’s edition as remodelled by Wohlrab. This is really a variorum edition, containing notes by most previous editors and by Wohlrab himself.

Platon’s Phaedon für den Schulgebrauch erklärt von Martin Wohlrab.

Schanz’s critical edition of the *Phaedo*.

Hirschig’s " " "

Schleiermacher’s introduction translation and notes.

Plato’s Phaedo literally translated by E. M. Cope.

Olympiodori Scholia in Phaedonem.

Hermann Schmidt. Kritischer Commentar zu Plato’s Phaedon.

Bonitz. Platonische Studien.

Ast. Plato’s Leben und Schriften.

Hegel. Geschichte der Philosophie, Plato.

Zeller. Philosophie der Griechen.

Teichmüller. Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe, and Die platonische Frage.

Schanz’s critical writings on Plato’s text.

Since this in no wise pretends to be a critical edition I have thought it needless to give the mss. readings in full; this would have been merely a reproduction of other men’s work. For all who are interested in the text of Plato the edition of Schanz is indispensable; and the readings of other mss. are given by Stallbaum and Bekker. Remembering nevertheless how much it is to the reader’s convenience that he should know exactly how far he can trust the text before him, I have drawn attention in the notes to every case in which my reading materially differs from the mss. I have also marked all noteworthy points of difference from two of the editions which are in most common use,
INTRODUCTION.

viz. those of Stallbaum and of the Zürich editors. Also, seeing that my text is based upon that of Schanz, I have noted all my departures from his readings. Wherever I have had occasion to refer to the four mss. quoted by him, I have adopted the symbols which he has employed to denote them; these are as follows:

\[ \begin{align*}
B &= \text{Clarkianus sive Oxoniensis sive Bodleianus.} \\
C &= \text{Crusianus sive Tubingensis.} \\
D &= \text{Venetus 185.} \\
E &= \text{Bessarionis liber sive Venetus 184.}
\end{align*} \]

Stallbaum and the Zürich edition are denoted by St. and Z. respectively. Where I have deserted Schanz, it has usually been in the direction of a return to the mss. The chief blemish in the text of the \textit{Phaedo} is interpolation, which is not wonderful, considering that few products of Greek philosophy have been read more widely and less intelligently. There are no small number of instances in which words or sentences have indubitably been inserted by some copyist or annotator out of sheer inability to grasp the connexion. But this cannot justify the reckless handling of Hirschig, who cancels or rewrites passages wholesale, for no apparent reason but that they are not such Greek as he would have written himself. The result in many such cases is a deep thankfulness in the reader's soul that Plato, not Hirschig, was the author of the dialogues. Schanz, though a far sounder critic, has, I think, in several cases unduly deferred to Hirschig; and in others has himself bracketed passages without having in my opinion sufficient cause. In matters of orthography I have for the most part followed his guidance. And I cannot conclude without an expression of gratitude for the invaluable work he has given us: indeed only those who have engaged in the task of editing any of the dialogues can fully appreciate the boon which has been bestowed on Platonic students by Martin Schanz.


ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

[ἡ περὶ ψυχῆς, ἡδικός]

TA TOT ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΦΑΙΔΩΝ, ΑΠΟΛΛΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΕΒΗΣ, ΣΙΜΜΙΑΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ,

O TON ENDEKA TΗΠΕΤΗΣ

57 Α — 59 Ε, cc. i, ii. Prologue. Echekrates, the Phliasian, begs for information respecting the last moments of Sokrates. Phaedo assents, and, after explaining the circumstances which delayed the execution, gives a list of the friends who were present at that last meeting, where sorrow and gladness were so strangely mingled.

1. αὐτός] Echekrates merely desires to know whether he can depend upon the account of Phaedo as that of an eye-witness: this remark would have been needless, but for the strange comment of Hermogenes the rhetorician: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἢρετο ὡς θαυμάζων καὶ μακαρίζων τὸν παραγενόμενον, ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνετο σεμενόμενος καὶ μέγα φρονῶν.

6. Φλίαστοις] in apposition to τῶν πολιτῶν. The insertion of τῶν is altogether needless; the article is continually omitted before national names by all Attic writers. Stallbaum compares Apology 32 B, Meno 70 B.

7. ὅστις ἂν] ‘who would have been able to tell us’. In a phrase of this sort I conceive that no definite protasis is in the mind of the writer. I cannot see what is gained by supplying ‘si venisset’ with Rückert, or ‘wenn er gefragt wideiten wäre’ with Wohlrab. The words which follow show that communication between Athens and Phlius did exist, for some Athenian visitor brought the news of Sokrates’ death. It seems needless therefore to speculate whether intercourse was suspended by the war with Elis (Stallbaum), which ended in the year Sokrates died; or by the Corinthian war (C. F. Hermann), which began five years.
τι ἀγγειλαὶ οἷος τ' ἦν περὶ τοῦτων, πλὴν ὅτι δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιὰν ἀποθάνου τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχεν φράζειν.

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἀρα ἐπίθεσθε ὃν τρόπον ἐγένετο;

5 ΕΧ. Ναὶ, ταύτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἤγγειλε τις, καὶ ἐθαυμάζομεν γε ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ύστερον φαίνεται ἀποδιδών. τί οὖν ἦν τούτο, ὁ Φαῖδων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὁ Ἐξέκρατες, συνέβη ἡ γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἢ πρύμνα εὐστεμουμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δῆλον ἦν Ἀθηναίοι πέμπτουσιν.

ΕΧ. Τούτο δὲ δὴ τι ἐστών;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τούτ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλοῖον, ὅσα φασίν Ἀθηναίοι, ἐν ὧ Θησεὺς ποτέ εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δίς ἐπτα ἐκείνους ὄχετο ἀγὼν καὶ ἐσωσέ τε β καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὔξαμον, ὡς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ 15 σωθεῖν, ἕκαστου ἐτους θεωριάν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον ὣν δὴ ἔλει καὶ νῦν ἐτὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπτουσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲν ὃν ἄρχονται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἑστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρέουσαν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτινώσαι, πριν ἂν εἰς Δῆλον τε ἀφικέται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεδομένοι τοῦτο δ' ἐνίοτε 20 ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχωσιν ἀνεμοὶ ἀπολαβόντες αὐτούς. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας, ἐπεὶ δὲν ὁ ἱερεύς τοῦ Ἀπόλλος λαύσης, ὃς ἐστὶ τῇ πρύμναι τοῦ πλοίου τοῦτο δ' ἐνίοτε, ὡστερ λέγω, τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἀγανώσις. διὰ ταύτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει εὖ τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξύ τῆς δίκης 25 τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

II. ΕΧ. Τι δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν θάνατων, ὁ Φαῖδων; τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιθυμεῖσιν τοῦ ἀνδρόλ; ἡ οὖν εἰὼν οἱ ἁρχοντες παρεῖσαι, ἀλλ' ἐρήμος ἐτελεύτα ἕλοιν;

30 ΦΑΙΔ. Ὀυδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσαν τινες, καὶ πολλοὶ γε.

ΕΧ. Ταύτα δὴ πάντα προβομήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἢμῖν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, εἰ μὴ τις σοι ἀσχολία τυχάναι υοῦσα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράζομαι ἵμων διηγήσασθαι'

afterwards. The events of the last day in prison were of course known but to a small circle.
12. τοὺς δίς ἐπτά] the seven maidens and seven youths, according to the legend, who were delivered every nine years to the Minotaur.
18. μηδένα ἀποκτινώναι] So Xeno- phon L.l.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνησθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούντα ἔμοιο εἰς πάντων ἥδιστον.

ΈΧ. Ὀλλὰ μήν, ὁ Φαῖδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκούσανενος γε τοιούτους ἐτέρους ἔχεις; ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἄν δύνῃ ἀκριβεστάτα διεξελθέων πάντα.

Ε Ὁ ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγογας θανάμασθα ἐπιθυμοῦρες. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰς ἑαυτόν καὶ όντος τὸν λόγον, ὡς ἄδεως καὶ γεναιῶς ἐτελεύτα, ὥστε μοι ἐκείνων παρίστασθαι μηδὲ εἰς Ἀδιδού ὅντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας ίέναι, ἀλλὰ 10 τοῦ ἐκείστε ἀφικομένου εὑρίσκειν ἐπὶ τράξειν, εἰπὲ τις πῶς τοῖς καὶ ἄλλοις. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνω μοι ἐλεεινοὺς εἰς ἑαυτόν διδόναι εἴναι παρόντι πένθει: οὔτε ἂν ἥδον ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφῶν ἡμῶν ὅρων, ὥστε εἰς ἐδέσμευν καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοι τινες ἢσαν ἀλλ’ ἀπεχώροις ἀποστολάς τὸ μοι πάθος παρῆν καὶ τῆς ἀφῆθης κράτιας ἀπὸ τε 15 τῆς ἥδους συγκεκραμένη ὅμοι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμομένῳ ὅτι αὐτίκα ἐκείνως ἐμελέτε τελευτῶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδόν τιν υἱὸν διεκείμεθα, ὥστε μὲν γελώντες, εἰσὶ δὲ διὰκρύντες, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφέροντος, Ἀπολλόδωρος οίδα ήμι πο τὸν Β ἀνδρὰ καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

EX. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐκείνως τε τοινῦν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἰχεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγένε ἐτεπαράγημαι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

EX. Ἐντυχον δὲ, ὁ Φαίδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὕτως τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ 20 ὁ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔτη Ἐρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Λισιήνης καὶ 'Ἀντισθένης' ἤν δὲ καὶ Κύρισσίππος ὁ Παιανιός

3. τοιούτους ἐτέρωσι] i.e. they take equal pleasure in the recollection of Sokrates: compare below 59 A καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοι τινας ἢσαν, referring to ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφῶν ἡμῶν ὅρων: and 79 C καὶ αὐτὴν πλακάται καὶ διαγιὰν ὥστε μεθύσουσα, ἢ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενη.

8. εὐδαιμὼν γὰρ] Here the key-note of the dialogue is struck. Its express object is to show ὡς εἰκὸσι ἀνὴρ τῷ ἄντι ἐν φιλοσοφῶν διατράπη τὸν βλϊαν βαρβαρὰ μὲλλὼν ἀποθανέω: and at the very outset we are introduced to Sokrates as a living illustration of his own belief.

13. παρόντι πεῦθει] 'as would seem natural for one who was present at a scene of mourning'. For the two datives compare Phaedrus 234 C τῷ λόγῳ λαμβάνοντι, 'to one who takes a rational view'.

ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ] The nearest parallel in Plato to this remarkable phrase seems to be Protagoras 317 C καὶ τοῖς πολλάς ἐκῆς εἰς ἐκῆ τῆς τεχνῆς: cf. ibid. 319 C, Phaedo 84 A, Republic 581 E. But in all these passages the phrase expresses devotion to some particular pursuit; not, as here, the occupation of a certain time.

25 Ἀπολλόδωρος] Compare 117 D.
καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων. Πλάτων δὲ οἰμαὶ ἦσθενει.

EX. Ξένου δὲ τινὲς παρῆσαν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ναὶ, Σμιμίας τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαϊ-5 δώνης, καὶ Μεγαρόδεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

EX. Τί δὲ; Ἀρίστιππος καὶ Κλεάμβροτος <οὐ> παρεγένοντο;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δήτα' ἐν Αἰγύπῃ γὰρ ἑλέγοντο εἰναι.

EX. ἦ' ἄλλος δὲ τις παρῆν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Σχεδὸν τι οἴματι τούτοις παραγενέσθαι.

EX. Τί οὖν δῆ; τινὲς φῆς ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

III. ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειράσομαι διηγη-15 σασθαί. ἀεὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθεμεν φοιτάς καὶ ἔγω καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τῶν Σωκράτη, συνελεγόμενοι ἔσθεν τί τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐν ὧ καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο πλησίον γὰρ ἥν τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. περιεμένουμεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε, ἐώς ἀνοιχθῇ τὸ δεσ-20 μωτηρίου, διατίρισεντες μετ' ἀλλήλων ἁνεῖγετο γὰρ οὐ πρὸς ἐπείδη δὲ ἀνοιχθῇ, εἰσῆμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διη-μερευόμενοι μετ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωιάτερον συνελέγημεν.

20 τῇ γὰρ προτεραίᾳ [ἡμέρᾳ] ἐπείδη ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἐσπέρας, ἐπυθόμεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφεγμένον εἰη. Εἰ παρηγγείλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλως ἥκειν ὅσ πρωιάτατα εἰς τὸ ἐιώθος, καὶ ἤκομεν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξαλθών ὁ θυρωρός, ὡσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν, εἶπεν περιεμένει καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι, ἐώς ἄν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ.

1. Πλάτων δὲ] There is but one other passage in which Plato mentions himself, Apology 38 b; Πλάτων δὲ ὤδε, ὥς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτήβιδος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύονει με τράκοντα μων τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐγγυάσαι. Forster suggests that the present language im-plies that Plato’s sickness was due to excessive grief. I see nothing however to justify the inference: but doubtless Plato was anxious to explain his absence.

4. Φαϊδώνης] I have retained this form on the analogy of other Theban names and on the authority of Xenophon mem. 1 ii 48: perhaps too the Theban termination as should be restored.

6. <οὐ> παρεγένοντο] οὐ is not in the best mss. but is inserted by Schanz after Cobet. St. and Z. omit it.

8. εἰν Αἰγύπῃ] This has usually been considered to convey a reproach: see Diog. Laert. iii 36, cf. ii 65.

59 c—60 c, c. iii. On the morning after the return of the sacred vessel from Delos the friends meet earlier than usual at the court-house near the prison. After some delay they are admitted and find Sokrates relieved of his fetters and in company with his wife and child. Xanthippe, unable to control her grief, is led out; and Sokrates chafing his cramped leg falls to moralising on the intimate union of pain and pleasure, which he says would have made a good subject for Aesop.

24. περιμένει] This reading seems
to me certainly right. Bonitz, quoted by Wohlrab, accurately distinguishes between the usages of *περιμένει* and *επιμένει* in Plato: the former means 'to await', the latter 'to remain' in a given condition. Cf. below 80 c, and Thaetetus 179 e. So far as I am aware, the nearest approach of *επιμένει* to the meaning of *περιμένει* is in Republic 361 η where δὲ τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἔτεκε, ὡς ἐγὼ, καλεῖν εἰπελθέν τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς ἐκάρτερ βίος ἐπιμένει. If *επιμένει* be read with Hermann, we should translate: 'he bade us stay where we were and not come in until he summoned us'.

1. Παραγγέλλουν] I agree with Prof. Geddes in taking these words: 'are giving directions that he may be put to death to-day'; the directions being given to the officers of the prison. If, as is usually done, we take Σωκράτης to be the object of *παραγγέλλουν*, the clause ὅπως ἐν...τελευτήσῃ becomes nonsense. Wohlrab (in his Latin edition) has a note which is utterly beyond my comprehension.

5. τὸ παιδ[ο]ν] no doubt his youngest son Menexenos.

15. τὸ ἁμα μὲν] The usual reading is τῷ, and this is confirmed by Stobaeus, who cites this passage, ecl. 1104. This would be 'by refusing'. But τῷ is found in the Bodleian and two other mss. and is abundantly justified by Riddell, *Digest of Idioms* § 85. I have therefore followed Schanz in retaining it. 'How wondrous is the relation between pleasure and its seeming contrary, pain; that the pair will never come to a man together'.

18. Ἀλωπος] It is worth while here to notice the consummate skill with which Plato allows the dialogue to unfold itself as in the natural course of conversation. By this simple reference to Aesop Kebes is reminded that Euenos was anxious to know what was the object of Sokrates in versifying the fables of Aesop. In answering the question Sokrates sends a kindly message to Euenos and bids him follow to Hades as soon as he may. The surprise of Simmias at this message draws
from Sokrates: an expression of his belief that the true philosopher will meet death gladly in the hope of being happier in Hades than on earth; and in support of this opinion, as we shall see, the whole argument that occupies the remainder of the dialogue is evolved.

3. ἐπακολουθεῖ σύντερον] In these observations of Sokrates we may find the germ of the Platonic theory of pleasure as a καθάστασις. See for instance Timaicus 64 C τό μὲν παρὰ φῶς καὶ βίων γεγονόμενον ἀδρόν παρ' ἡμῖν πάθος ἀληγεινόν, τὸ δ' εἰς φῶς ἀπὶ πάλιν ἀδρόν ἥδ. Cf. Philebus 31 D &c. The καθαραὶ ἱδοναὶ are exceptions, Philebus 51 B; but, so far as concerns physical pleasures, only apparent exceptions, Timaicus 65 A.

60 D—61 C, cc. iv, v. Κῆβης: This reminds me that Euenos and others desire to know what led you to compose verses during your confinement in prison? So-krates: It was not with any thought of rivalling Euenos as a poet, but because I have been frequently warned in a dream to practise 'music'. This I always understood as an encouragement to persevere with philosophy; but in case music in the popular sense might be meant, I thought it well to be on the safe side. So I took the fables of Αἴσοπ, because I knew them best, and turned them into verse. Tell this to Euenos and bid him farewell and follow me as soon as he can.

8. ἐντείνα] 'putting into verse'. The term is used of setting words to music, Protagoras 326 B; of putting thought into words, Philebus 38 E. The last example seems to me conclusive that the notion of the word is not, as Prof. Geddes considers, derived from stretching a string, but implies fixing in a certain form or position. Cf. Menu 87 A, where it is used of inscribing a triangle in a circle.

9. προοίμιον] This word is applied by Thucydides, III 104, to the Homeric hymn to Apollo: such προοίμια were strictly speaking preludes either to a longer poem (οἴης) or to a religious celebration. Specimens of verses attributed to Sokrates are to be found in Diog. Laert. II 42.

10. Εὔηνος] Euenos of Paros was a sophist and poet. From Apology 20 B we learn that he taught ἀρετή for five minas; from Phaedrus 267 A that he was the inventor of new rhetorical figures: τόν δὲ κάλλιστον Πάρων Εὔηνος εἰς μέσον οὐκ ἔχωμεν, ὡς ὑποθέλωσιν τε πρῶτος εἰρή καὶ παρεπαίνους; οἱ δ' αὐτῶν καὶ παραφώ- γοις φασιν ἐν μέτρῳ λέγειν, μνήμης χαίρει σοφός γάρ ἄνήρ: where see Dr Thompson's note. From both passages we may infer that Plato did not think much of him. The few fragments that remain of his elegiac poems are given in Bergk's poetae lyrici. Bergk however remarks 'qua hic unius Eueni nomine comprehendi, rectius duobus attribui videntur'; and the other epigrams, chiefly erotic, given in the Anthology under the name Euenos,
are undoubtedly the work of different authors.

5. ὡς οὖν ἔρευνοι] After ὡς BD give ὡς, which Schanz brackets and I omit.

7. εἰ πολλάκις] ‘if per chance’; as in L. 61 A.

12. παρακελεύσαται τε καὶ ἔπικελεύειν] ‘to urge and cheer me on’. Each of the three compounds used by Plato in this passage has its distinct shade of meaning. παρακελεύσαται, which is the term frequently applied by Thucydides to a general’s address to his soldiers, means ‘urge to make an effort’; ἔπικελεύειν, which is a much rarer word and occurs nowhere else in Plato, ‘encourage while the effort is being made’; as in Euripides Electra 1224. In διακελεύσαται the proposition has a distributive force: ‘as the partisans of different runners cheer on their favourites’. Cf. Herodotus IX 5 διακελευσαμένη δὲ γινή γυναικί.

14. ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὐσίς τῆς με-
γάλης μουσικῆς] Wagner well quotes Laches 188 c foll. See also Laws 689 b ἡ καλλιτή καὶ μεγάλη τῶν ἕμφορῶν μεγαλίτη δικαιώτατ’ αὖ λέγω τοιούτω. Cf. Republic 411 c foll., 548 b διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἤμελλενεναι.

17. τῆς δημοκρᾶτος μουσικῆς] in the ordinary Greek sense of artistic and literary culture; whereas Sokrates understood by μουσικῇ the philosopher's life.

19. ἀφοσιώσασθαι] ‘to satisfy my conscience’. This anecdote well displays the simply religious character of Sokrates not without a tinge of superstition. ἀφοσιώσασθαι is to clear oneself from all taint of impiety; cf. Phaedrus 242 c; Philolus 12 v ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀφοσιώσασθαι, ‘I wash my hands of it’.

20. καὶ πειθόμενον] Schanz brackets kal.

εἰς τὸν θεόν] Another mark of Sokrates’ old-fashioned piety. Prof.
εποίησα, οὐ ἢν ἡ παρούσα θυσία: μετὰ δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δεόει, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητής εἶναι, ποιεῖν μῦθους, ἀλλὰ οὐ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἡ μυθολογίας, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οὗς προέρουσ εἴχον μῦθους καὶ ἡπιστάμην τοὺς Αἰσώποι, τούτους ἐποίησα, 5 οἷς πρῶτοι ενέτυχον.

V. Ταῦτα οὖν, ὃ Κέβης, Εὐήνῳ φραζότα, καὶ ἔρρωσαν καὶ, ἂν σωφρονῆ, ἐμε διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα. ἀπειμὶ δὲ, ὡς ἔοικε, τήμερον οἶκεν οἷα ἥθησαν. καὶ ὁ Σιμίας, Οἶον παρακελεύει, ἐφη, τούτω, ὁ Σακρατης, Ἐυήνῳ; πολλὰ γὰρ ἦδη ἐντευχήκα τῷ ᾽Ανδρᾶ; τὸ σχέδον οὖν ἐξ ὧν ἐγώ ἠνθημαι οὐδ’ ὅπωστιον σοι ἐκῶν εἶναι

Geddes has some interesting remarks on the special connexion between Sokrates and Apollo, cf. 85 A. I cannot however agree with his suggestion that the προφήμων was a thanksgiving for the thirty days’ reprieve; which would be totally inconsistent with the attitude of Sokrates in the face of death: cf. 116 E.

2. μῦθοι οὖν λόγους] *fiction and not fact*. This distinction is established by Gorgias 523 A, άκουε δὴ, φασί, μάλα καλοὺ λόγου, οὐ σῷ μῖν ἡγίσει μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἴμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον’ ὥς ἄληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω α’ μέλλω λέγειν’; then follows the myth about the judgment of souls; cf. Laws 872 D. μῦθος is defined by Aphthonios, quoted by Wytenbach, ἀς λόγος ψευδῆς εἰκονίζων ἀλῆθειαν. Plutarch, de gloria Atheniensium § 4, says that Pindar was rebuked by Korinna, ὡς ξυμονοῦν ὄντα καὶ μὴ ποιοῦντα μῦθοιν, ὁ τῆς τοπικῆς ἥργον εἶναι αμβέβηκε; further on he says ὃ δὲ μῦθος εἶναι βούλεται λόγος ψευδῆς ἔοικός ἀληθεὺς. Compare Aristotle’s distinction between ἱστορία and ποίησις, poetics 1451 b 4, τοῦτο διαφέρει τῷ τῶν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν τῶν δὲ οἶσιν ἄν γένοιτο. Of course λόγος in its wider sense includes μῦθος, as we have in 60 D tois τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους.

3. οὖς προχειρὸν εἶχον] i. e. in his memory; there is no evidence that the fables of Aesop had been published in writing up to this time. Aesop is said to have been a contemporary of Solon; and the story of his death is told by Plutarch, de sera numinis vindicta § 12: there is also an allusion to it in Herodotus Π 134.

7. ἐμε διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα] This injunction must be considered as modified by the proviso added below, οὐ μὲντοι γ’ ἐν θανάτῳ αὐτόν. Schmidt finds a *dilogia* in the words, and Prof. Geddes takes the same view. But it appears to me that such a premature reference to the μελετή θανάτου is thoroughly unplatonic. It is futile to omit the words ὧς τάχιστα with Heindorf; in any case they must be implied, else we make Sokrates give Euenos the superfluous advice to die some time or other.

51 C—62 C, cc. vi. Simmias: Euenos is not likely to take such advice as that. Sokrates: Yes he is, if he is a real philosopher; not that he ought to take his own life. Κέβης: This seems inconsistent; you first say that the philosopher will be glad to die, and then that he may not kill himself: why may he not? Sokrates: I only know what I have been told. According to one account we are in custody here and may not make our escape. This is a hard saying; but there is a more obvious reason, that we are the property of the gods, who are as justly indignant if we destroy ourselves as you would be, should one of your slaves do so.
61] 

ΦΙΔΩΝ.

55

πελεται. Τί δέ; ἢ δ’ ὃς οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὔνοσ; "Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφὶ ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἐθελήσει τοίνυν καὶ Εὐνόο καὶ πᾶς ὁ τῶν τοῦ πράγματος μέστεστιν. οὐ μέντοι ἵσως βιάσεται αὐτῶν οὐ γὰρ φασὶ θεμιτῶν εἶναι. καὶ ἁμα λέγων ταῦτα καθήκε τὰ δ’ σκέλει ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεξόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λουπὰ διελέγετο. 5 ἥρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης. Πῶς τούτο λέγεις, ὁ Ὁῳκρατεῖς, τὸ μὴ θεμιτῶν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἑθέλειν δ’ ἢ ἀν τὸ ἀποθηκευοντὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον ἐπεσθαί; Τί δέ, ὁ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκηκόατε σὺ τε καὶ Σιμμίας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολαῖο συνεργοῦντες; Ὁδὲν γε σαφῶς, ὁ Ὁῳκρατεῖς. Ὄλλα μὴν καὶ ἐγώ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν τὸ λέγων ἢ μὲν οὐν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοῶς, φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ Εἰσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μελλοντα ἐκείστε ἀποθηκευον τις συσκόπεον τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποθηκευον τῆς ἐκεί, πολὴν τινὰ αὐτῆς οἴκωμα εἶναι τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιῶς ἄλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἡλίου ὑστερῶν ἡρῴω;

VI. Κατὰ τί δή οὖν ποτε οὐ φασὶ θεμιτῶν εἶναι αὐτῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτηνοῦνα, ὁ Ὁῳκρατεῖς; ἦδη γὰρ ἐγώγη, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ σὺ ἡρῶν, καὶ Φιλολαῖο ἡκούσα, ὅτε παρ’ ἡμῖν διητάτο, ἦδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων


4. οὐ γὰρ φασι] It is worthy of note that the whole of this rather superficial reasoning against suicide, which is quite outside the main argument of the dialogue, is carefully and repeatedly marked as secondhand. It seems as if Plato wished to avoid any prejudice and misrepresentation which his panegyric of death might bring upon him; while his slight and rapid treatment of this subject would show that he did not feel strongly upon it. That he did not in all cases disapprove suicide is certain: cf. Latius 854 c καὶ ἐὰν μὲν σοι δράτης ταῦτα λαβὼν τῷ νόσσημα—εἰ δὲ μὴ καλώς τάσσων σκέψαμεν ἀπαλλάσσω τῷ θεω. Also 873 c ὃς ἐὰν εὐαγείρην, μήτε πόλεως ταξίδης δίκη, μήτε περισσώρων ἄφρων προσεπίσηση τόχῳ ἀναγκαίοις, μήτε αἰσύνης τινός ἄφρον καὶ ἄβιον μεταλαχών, ἀργά δὲ καὶ ἀνάβλασις δεδέξας ἐωτίς δίκην ἄδικον ἐπιδύζη.

9. Φιλολάω] From this it is evident that Philolaos spent some time at Thebes, where Kebes and Simmias attended his lectures. We have absolutely no authentic information about the life of this eminent Pythagorean; and the genuineness of the fragments ascribed to him has, I think, been once for all disposed of by Mr Bywater, Journal of Philology vol. I p. 21 foll.

οὐδὲν γε σαφῶς] ἔθος ἂν τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις δὲ ἀνακατώτατον λέγειν, says Olympiodorus, whom the editors all repeat. I think Plato’s meaning is that the arguments of Philolaos against suicide were not conclusive enough to satisfy the πραγματεία of Kebes.

12. διασκόπεων τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν] This is an accurate description of the conversation that is to come: when reason has done all she can, fancy comes to her aid with a myth.

13. τῆς ἔκει] Schanz brackets these words: Hirschig proposes κέκεισ.

14. μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν] before which execution was not legal; cf. 116 ε.
3. **ei toúto múnon**] Of this *locus vexatus* I shall first give my own interpretation before mentioning other views that are held upon it. I accept the text precisely as it stands without alteration or omission. The first thing to be done is to fix the meaning of *toúto*. It can hardly be doubted that *toúto* means here exactly what it does in 62c, *álle eikós, ēfhi o Késis, toúto ke phainetai: where the context clearly requires that toúto = μη themiōn einai avtōn èstwv apoktinóvna*. Taking it in that sense here I should translate: 'perhaps you will be surprised if this question alone of all admits a simple answer—if the same thing does not happen to man in this as in all other cases; I mean that to some men at some time death is better than life: and for whom death is better, you will perhaps think it strange that they may not do themselves a good turn but must wait for some other helper'. I conceive the clause *kai ouvēpote...gēn* to show how it is that the question is not áplovn. Unless death were sometimes better than life the question whether suicide were sometimes lawful would never be raised, for no one would dream of committing it. *ósper kai tálλa*, i.e. as in other cases either of two opposites may be better according to circumstances. The whole sentence amounts to this: you will think it strange if in the case of suicide we can lay down an invariable rule; that there are no persons for whom it is better to die than live; and if there are, that they may not release themselves from life.

Mr Jackson, in a paper read before the Cambridge Philological Society Dec. 1, 1881, has a most searching examination of this passage. Understanding *toúto* as I do, he is of opinion that the clauses *kai ouvēpote tawvēnei...gēn* and *thamaposton ios...anvêrōtou* are interpolations. My interpretation, which differs from all those that he criticises, seems to me to meet many of his objections; and though I am far from affirming that he may not be right in rejecting these words, I am loth to do so when I believe they afford a reasonable sense. As regards certain phrases to which he objects, I think *ouvēpote* is simply in antithesis to *éstw* ὄτε; and may we not with Mr Cope translate *τῷ ανδρότη* 'mankind', a universal expression which is afterwards qualified by *éstw ois*?

Prof. Geddes has an elaborate note, but I am entirely unable to agree with his view. He seems to regard *kai ouvēpote* as beginning an independent sentence. There is no difficulty about *ou* after *thamapiston ei*, cf. 97 λ.

Schanz places a full stop after *tálλa* and inserts *álλa* before *éstwn*. If the text is to be altered, I should prefer Mr Jackson's plan.

7. *μὴ ὥστω*] Z. and St. add *óstw*, which is wanting in B pr. m.

9. *ὕπτω Ζεῦς*] This little provincialism was doubtless a favourite mode of em-
62] ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.

tωά λόγον. ὃ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτωι λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος ὃς ἐν τινὶ φρονμῇ ἐσμὲν οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἕαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδὲ ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τὸ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιος διδεῖν οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεὸς εἶναι ἣμῖν τοὺς ἑπιμελουμένους καὶ ἢμᾶς τοὺς ἅ ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι· ἡ σοι οὐ δοκεῖ ὦτος; εἰ Ἔμογε, φησίν ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ’ ὦς, καὶ οὐ ἂν τῶν σαυτῶν κτημάτων εἰ τι αὐτὸ ἐαυτὸ ἀποκτείνων, μὴ σημαντῶσο σοῦ ὃτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπάνοις ἂν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἰ τινὰ ἔχουσα τιμωρίαν, τιμοροῦ ἂν; Πάνν γ’, ἔφη. Ἡ ἰσως τοιῶν ταύτη οὐκ ιον ἄλογον, μὴ πρότερον αὐτῶν ἀποκτείνων δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς επιτεῆψῃ, ὦσπέρ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἢμῖν παροῦσαν.

VII. Ἀλλ’ εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτο γε φαίνεται. ὃ μέντοι

phasis with Kebes, and well known to his friends as characteristic.

1. ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ] The ancient commentators explain that the Orphic traditions are meant. This seems more probable than any reference to the Eleusinian mysteries.

2. ἐν τινὶ φρονμῇ] ‘in ward’. We might translate ‘on a sort of garrison duty’, following Cicero, Cato maior 20: vetatque Pythagorae iniusam imperatoris, id est de, de praesidio et stationes vitae decedere. But the common Pythagorean notion was that the body is the soul’s prison, whence she may not come forth until her term is fulfilled: compare Athenaeus IV xiv. 157 c προς ὑπὸ τοῦ Καρναῖος εὕρη, Εὔνείδος ὁ πυθαγορικός, ὁ Νικίων, ὁς φησί Κλάρχος ὁ περιπατητικός ἐν δευτέρῳ βίων, ἔλεγεν ἐνδεδείχθαι τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ τῆς ἔνδει βίω τὰς ἀπάντων ψυχὰς τιμωρίας χάριν, και διέστασαι τῶν θεῶν ὡς, εἰ μὴ μενοῦν ἐπὶ τούτως ὑπὸ ὅτι ἐκῶν αὐτῶν λίπη, πλέκως καὶ μείζον ἐμπεσούμενον τάτη γλυκίας. διὸ πάντως εὐσκαθοδομεῖν τὴν τῶν κυρίων ἀνάπασας φοβεῖσθαι τοῦ ᾃ ἐκόντας ἐκβάλλει μόνον τὸν ἐν τῷ τῆς ἁθάνατος ἀπασισί προλάβεσθαι, πεπαλαιομένοις τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῆς τῶν κυρίων γίγνεσθαι γνώμης. Cf. Phaedrus 250 c, with Dr Thompson’s note; Crito 400 c, Gorgias 493 Α.

4. οὐ τρίδιος διδεῖν] ‘not easy to see through’. Sokratic elpavela: evidently he does not think this theory worth much. Olympiodoros, with perhaps unconscious sarcasm, observes ἀνάγκην οὖν μίσας τὸν μέλλοντα θεάσασθαι αὐτῶν.

6. ἐν τῶν κτημάτων] Cf. Latos 905 Α ἐξιμακοὶ δὲ ἦμαν θεόν τα ἀμα καὶ δαμοίες, ἡμεῖς τ’ αὐτῷ κτήματα θεῶν καὶ δαιμώνων: also 902 Β. Elsewhere man is called the plaything of the gods: Latos 803 Α ἀνθρωπὸν δὲ, ὅπερ εἶπομεν ἐμπροθέν (644 D, E), θεοὶ τα παθηματο μεμηχανημένον, τούτο αὐτὸ τὸ βέλτιστον γεγονέται.

11. πρὶν ἀνάγκην] Although ἂν may very easily have dropped out before ἀνάγκην, I have not thought proper to insert it against all the mss. I am not satisfied that Plato could not write πρὶν alone with the subjunctive; and in Timaeus 57 Β it is not easy to account for the loss of ἂν: λύμενα ὃ παύεται, πρὶν ἢ παντάπασιν ὑδόμενα καὶ διαλυτένα ἐκφυγή πρὸ τὸ εὐγενεῖς, ἢν κυκλῆνα, ἐν ἐκ πόλλος ὁμοῖος τῷ κρατήσασθα γεγομένων, αὐτῷ ἀναγομεν μεν. Cf. Latos 873 Α.

62 c—63 E, cc. vii, viii. If this be so, replies Kebes, it seems inconsistent to say that the wise man will be glad to die. For only a fool would desire to run away from wise and good masters and guardians, such as the gods are to us.
ΠΑΝΤΟΤΕ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟ ΤΟ ΧΩΡΙΟΝ, ΝΕΑΡΕΣ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΙ ΠΟΤΟΣ ΑΝΩ ΕΚ ΑΥΤΕΣ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥΣ

8. Περιεργό τινα και τον Σωκράτη

Σωκράτης, ο οποίος δεν είναι μόνος ή δύο, είναι μια καλή ισότιμη πτυχή της Φιλοσοφίας. Η διεύθυνση του συμπεριφερόμενου συνόλου, αν και με αναθεωρημένη ιδέα, θα πρέπει να διακανοντοστοιχίζεται με την αυτονομία της φιλοσοφίας και της αποκατάστασης της σωματικής λογικής.
Δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε. οἵμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρή με πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογηθεῖσαθαι ὥσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σίμμας.

VIII. Φέρε δή, ἢ δ' ὡς, πειραθῶ πιθανότερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογηθεῖσαθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ἔφη, ὁ Σίμμας τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μή ὄμην ἥξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἁγαθούς, ἑπείτα καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἁμένινος τῶν ἐνδιάδε, ὡδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἄναγκαστῶ τῷ θανάτῳ νῦν δὲ εἰ ἧστε ὅτι παρ' ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἁγαθοὺς καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἂν πάνυ διασχυρισάμην ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς ἐστοτάτοι πάνω ἁγαθοῖς ἥξειν, εἰ ἧστε ὅτι, εἰπέρ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, διασχυρισάμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. ὡστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὅτως ἄναγκαστῶ, ἄλλα εὐθεῖας εἰμι εἶναι τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι καὶ ὥσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἁμένων τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς ἡ τοῖς κακοῖς. Τι οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σίμμας, ὁ Σώκρατες; αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν τί διάνοιαν ταῦτην εἰ μὴ ἔχεις ἀπίεια, ἢ κἂν ἡμῖν μεταδοίης; κοινὸν γὰρ δὴ ἔμοινε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἁγαθον τοῦτο, καὶ ἁμα σοι ἀπολογία ἔσται, ἐὰν ἀπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσῃς. ἄλλα πειράσομει, ἔφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεψόμεθα, τί ἔστιν ὁ βουλεσθαὶ μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπέων. Τι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε 20 ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δοῦσει τὸ φάρμακον, ὅτι χρή

6. παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλου] Sokrates follows the popular distinction between the ὀφάπακης and χθόνας θεὶ. Mr Cope translates 'in the company not only of Gods wise and good, but next also of men'. I think however the meaning is settled by Lact. 958 D τα μέν περὶ τα θεία νόμμα τῶν τε ὑπὸ γῆς θεῶν καὶ τῶν τραυ: and soon afterwards, 959, we have exactly the same phrase as here; παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους ἀπείνας δύοντα λόγοι, where θεοὺς ἄλλους can only mean 'other gods'.

9. παρ' ἄνδρας τε] The proper apodosis to the τε has been displaced by the parenthesis καὶ τοῦτο...διασχυρισάμην, which modifies the form of the succeeding clause. The meaning of the parenthesis seems to be that Sokrates does not feel sure enough as to the exact condition of souls after death to make any positive statement about their association with one another: all he is quite sure of is that, whatever their condition, they are under the care of good and wise gods.

11. ἔχων] We cannot supply ἔπιθεω, because Sokrates is confident that he will be in the company of gods, not that he hopes to be. But the infinitive construction is carried on from the previous sentence, although the particular force of the governing verb is no longer appropriate. Perhaps however Schanz is right in bracketing ἔχων.

14. πάλαι λέγεται] in the current traditions of Greek religion.

15. αὐτὸς ἔχων] 'are you minded to depart keeping this persuasion to yourself?'

19. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα] This little episode serves to mark the conclusion of the introductory matter.
60 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

σοι φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι; φησὶ γὰρ θερμαϊνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγομένους, δεν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιούτον προσφέρειν τῷ φαρ-μάκῳ εἰ δὲ μῆ, εὐίστε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δίς καὶ τρῖς πίνειν τοὺς ἐπὶ τοιούτον ποιούτας. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, "Εα, ἐφη, χαίρειν αὐτὸν δὲν μόνον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ παρασκευαζόμενο ός καὶ δίς δῶσον, εἶν δὲ δὲν, καὶ τρίς. Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν μὲν τῇ ὕδη, ἐφη ὁ Κρῖτων ἀλλὰ μοι [πάλαι] πράγματα παρέχει. "Εα αὐτόν, ἐφη. ἀλλ' ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ὕδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοίναι, ὡς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἄνηρ τῷ ὑπτὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν μὲλλὼν ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὔελπὶς εἶναι ἐκεί μέγιστα οἶσθαι ἄγαθα, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ τῶς ἀν ὅν τῇ τοῦτο ὑπτὶς ἔχοι, ὁ Σμύμλη τε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.

IX. Κυδωνιέοντο γὰρ ὅσι πυθαγόνω τοῦ ἀπόκομοι φιλοσοφίας λειτηθέναι τοὺς ἀλλους, δητι οὐδὲν ἀλλο αὐτοὶ ἔπητη-15 δενοῦσιν ἦ ἀποθηήσειν τε καὶ τεθυάναι. εἰ οὖν τούτο ἄληθες, ἀποτον δῆτον ἀν εἰπον προθυμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βιοὶ μηδὲν

5. το ὅντο is needlessly bracketed by Schanz.
7. [πάλαι] The mss. are uncertain about this word, which Schanz brackets. Z. and St. retain it.
63 E—64 A. After the interruption Socrates restates the thesis which he has to defend: that the philosopher will meet death with good courage, in the confident hope that he will enjoy the greatest blessings in the other world.
8. ὡς μοι φαίνεται At this point the main business of the dialogue begins: all that precedes has been merely preparatory to this thesis, and all that follows is logically evolved in its defence.
64 A—67 B, cc. ix—xi. The philosopher's whole life is nothing else than the study and practice of death; how then shall he be dismayed when that comes for which he has always been striving? This paradox is explained as follows. First we define death as the state of separation of soul and body. Now the philosopher's aim is the attainment of knowledge and wisdom. But the body is for ever thwarting his endeavours; (1) by its pleasures and appetites, (2) by the intrusion of sensual perceptions, (3) by its weaknesses and maladies. All these hinder the free action of the soul and prevent her from gazing calmly on the truth. Accordingly so long as the soul is in union with the body, she can never attain to perfect wisdom; only death, by setting her free, enables her, if ever, to reach the truth. But the true philosopher will do all he can during life to anticipate this condition: he will withdraw his soul, so far as may be, from all communion with the body: its pleasures and pains he will scorn, its perceptions he will ignore; and so when the hour of release arrives the soul will be pure and unsullied by material taint; she will be fit to enjoy the free life of intelligence that is now before her.
15. ἀποθηήσειν τε καὶ τεθυάναι] 'dying and being dead.' ἀποθηήσειν represents the philosophic training, the gradual emancipation of the soul from bodily passions; τεθυάναι the perfected philosophic ἔξω, the complete independence of soul, so far as is permitted by the conditions of corporeal life.
64] ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. 61

خلاف ή τούτο, ἦκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτού ἀγανακτείν, δὲ πάλαι προεθυμοῦντό τε καὶ ἐπετίθενον. καὶ ὁ Σιμίλας γελάσας Ἡ τοῦ Δία, ἐφή, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάνυ γέ με ἕν ἕν γελασθεὶσάτα ἐποίησας γελάσαι. οὐμαι γὰρ ἃν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρήσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας καὶ ξυμφάναι ἂν τούς μὲν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ, ὅτι τῷ ἄντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατώσι καὶ σφᾶς γε ὑπελίθασιν ὅτι ἄξιοι εἰσίν τοῦτο πάσχειν. Καὶ ἄληθε γὰρ οὐ λέγομεν, ὁ Σιμίλα, πλὴν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι. λέληθε γὰρ αὐτοῦς ἦ τε βανατωσί καὶ ἦ ἄξιοι εἰσίν θανάτου καὶ οἶον θανάτου οἴ οὐς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι. εἴτωμεν 10
c γὰρ, ἐφή, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, χαίρειν εἰσόντες ἑκείνοις ἡγούμεθα τι τῶν βανατῶν εἶναι; Πάνυ γέ, ἐφή ύπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμίλας. Ἂρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἡ τήν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σῶματος ἀπαλαγην; καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλαγεῖν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονεῖαι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχήν ἀπὸ τοῦ 15 σῶματος ἀπαλαγεῖσαι αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὐτὴν εἶναι; ἀρα μὴ ἄλλο τι [γ] ὁ βανατὸς ἦ τούτο; Οὐκ ἄλλα τούτῳ, ἐφή. Σκέψαι δὴ, ὁ ἅγαθε, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκῇ ἀπέρ ἔμοι. ἐκ γὰρ τούτων 20

6. τοὺς μὲν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν] In the mouth of Simias I think these words must refer to the Thebans: cf. Sophist 242 ν τὸ δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν Ἐλεατικὸν ἔθνος. ‘The majority would think what you say of philosophers excellent—my countrymen would give an especially cordial assent’. Simias is glancing at the proverbial dullness of the Boeotian mind.

7. καὶ σφᾶς] Sc. τοὺς παρ᾽ ἡμῖν.

15. γεγονέναι...ἐναὶ] Note the significant change of word.

16. ἀρα μὴ ἄλλο τι] If γὰρ be right, it can only be a ‘deliberative’ subjunc-

tive. For in a question we can hardly accept Heindorf’s suggestion, ‘ante μὴ intelligit potest δεδοκαρε’.

20. περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς] Olympiodoros classifies those here mentioned as (1) ἐνεργείᾳ φυσικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι, (2) φυσικαὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι δὲ, (3) οὐτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι. This however, as Wytenbach points out, is an Epicurean distinction: cf. Cicero de finibus I xiii § 45, and Diog. Laert. x 149: where the examples do not correspond with the present passage.
Όλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἐφί, ἢ τοῦ τοιοῦτου πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτῶν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχήν τετράφθαι; Ἔρωτη. Ἄρτι οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις δήλος ἦστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύνῳ ὁ τι μάλιστα τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντος τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; Φαίνεται. Καὶ δοκεῖ ζε ἢς τοῦ, ὁ Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὃ μηδὲν ἢς τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἂν εἶναι ἦν, ἀλλ’ ἐγγὺς τι τείνει τοῦ θεοῦ ναὶ ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἑδονῶν αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰσιν. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ ἑξεις.

Χ. Τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτῆν τῆς τῆς φρονήσεως κτήσις; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὐ, εἰς τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ξητήσει κοινωνίας συμπαραλλαμβάνεται; οἷον τὸ τοιοῦτο λέγω ἅρα ἔχει ἀλήθειά τινα θυσίας τε καὶ ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τὰ γὰ ταια καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν αἰεὶ θρυλουσίων, ὅτι οὕτω ἀκούομεν ἀκριβεῖς οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ ἁρμόμεν; καὶ τοῖς εἰ αὐταῖ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθητήσεως μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσιν

2. ἀφεστάναι αὐτῶν] With the whole of these three chapters should be compared Timaeus 87 c—90 d. It would be an error to suppose that Plato, with all his contempt for the body, was a friend of asceticism. In the passage of the Timaeus above mentioned he says that a due balance should be maintained between soul and body; a vigorous soul ought to have a vigorous body for its vehicle. Accordingly the body should be kept in good health and condition for the sake of the soul; for no less emphatically than in the Phaedo he declares that all is to be subordinate to the free exercise of intelligence; see especially 90 a foll.

8. ἐγγὺς τι τείνει] 'verges pretty closely on the state of death,' Cope. Here Plato marks the vulgar error already referred to in 64 Β. Λήθης γὰρ αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ. The majority have no conception of the philosophic τεθνάναι; if one lives without bodily pleasures, they think he may as well be dead. Such is the judgment of Kallikles, Gorgias 492 e. οἱ λίθῳ γὰρ ἀν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονεστάτων εἰδω. Sokrates retorts that the life of the pleasure-seeker is a πάθου βλετ and afterwards χαράδρων, 494 b. Cf. Philebus 21 c.

9. διὰ τοῦ σώματος] This phrase would indicate that there is no real discrepancy between the doctrine of the Phaedo and of the Philebus on the subject of pleasure. For the preposition διὰ implies 'those pleasures [which the soul feels] by means of the body': see introduction § 4.

14. οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν αἰεὶ θρυλουσίων] e.g. Empedokles 49—53 (Karsten):

άλλ’ ἄγε, ἄδρε παμπαλάμῃ πῇ δήλον ἐκαστον, μήτε τοι’ δήλον ἔχων πιστεί πλέον ἡ κατ’ ἀκούνην, μήτ’ ἀκοὺν ἔριδοστον ὑπέρ τριστίμα ἱπότης, μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων ὅπποι πόροι ἔστι νοῆσαι: γνῶν πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ’ ἡ δήλον ἐκαστον.

Cf. 108:

τίν σὺ νόσο δέρκεις, μηδ’ ὀμμασί δέμη τοῦ τεθητείος, also the line of Epicharmos:

νοῦς ὀργ’ καὶ νοῦς ἀλοίπες τάλλα κωφὰ καὶ τιφλὰ.
μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολὴ αἱ γε ἀλλαὶ πᾶσαι γὰρ ποὺ τοὺτων φαν- λότεραι εἰσὶν ἡ σοὶ οὐ δοκοῦσιν; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πότε οὖν, ἢ δ’ ὦς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπεται; ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σῶματος ἐπιχειρή τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἔξαπατᾶται ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι, εἰπέρ ποὺς ἀλλοθι, κατάδηλον αὐτὴ γένεται τί τῶν οὐσιών; Ναὶ. Λογίζεται δὲ γέ ὅ ποτε τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτή τοὺτων μηδὲν παραλυτῇ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὤψεις μήτε ἄλγηδων μηδὲ τις ἡδονὴ, ἀλλ’ ὁ τὶ μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν γίγνεται ἐσῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ’ ὄσον διώμεται μὴ κοινονοῦσα αὐτῷ μὴ ἀπτομένη ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὄντος. Ἐστὶ ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχῆς μάλιστα ἀτιμάζεται τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει αὖ’ αὐτοῦ, ἤτει δὲ αὐτή καθ’ αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; Φαίνεται. Τί δὲ τῇ τοιάδε, δ’ Σωκράτης; φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν; Φαμέν μέντοι μή Δίᾳ. Καὶ καλὸν γέ τι καὶ ἁγαθὸν; Πῶς δ’ οὖ; ‘Ἡ ὁμοίωσε τοῦτο τεῖ 15 τοῖς τοιοῦτοι τοῖς ὀφθαλμῶις εἰδής; Οὐδαμῶς, δ’ ὦς. Ἀλλ’ ἄλλη τωι ἀισθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήγῳ αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἶνον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ἐν λόγῳ ἀπαντῶν τῆς οὐσίας, ὅ τυγχάνει ἐκαστὸν ὅν ἀρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ αληθεστατὸν θεωρεῖται, ἢ ἃδε ἔχει· ὦς ἄν 20 μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβεστατα παρασκευάσῃ αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὐ σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἄν ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ τοῦ γνῶναι ἐκαστὸν; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ἀρ’ οὖν ἐκείνος ἄν τοῦτο ποιήσει.

1. φανολότερα] Slight is distinguished as the noblest of the senses in Timaeus 47 A δῆλον δὴ κατὰ τῶν ἐμὸν λόγον αἰτία τῆς μεγάλης ὥφθελειας γέγονεν ἡμᾶς: hearing comes next, 47 c, d. Cf. Phaedrus 250 D δῆλον γὰρ ἡμῶν διεξάηθη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφηγοῦ σωμάτων.

7. παραλυτῇ] ‘annoys by its intrusion’: this sense of παρά is not uncommon in Plato: cf. below 66 D παραπατοῦν, Timaeus 50 B παραμεφαινοῦν.

8. μηδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς] This is the reading of the Bodleian, and seems to me right. ἄλγηδων μηδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς all belong to the last μήτε. Z. has μήτε τῆς.

10. ρέγχνησαι] ‘reaches after’.

15. καλὸν γέ τι καὶ ἁγαθὸν] Here the αὐτὸ ἁγαθὸν seems placed on the same level as the other ideas. This however is merely because for the present purpose Plato is not concerned to differentiate it: the criticism of Anaxagoras, 98 C foll., shows that in the Phaedo the αὐτὸ ἁγαθὸν must occupy the same position as in the Republic. In the Republic itself ἁγαθὸν is several times apparently classed with the inferior ideas, e.g. 476 A.

18. μεγέθους πέρι] Here is the first decisive indication that the Phaedo belongs to the middle phase of Platonicism, along with the Republic. For μεγέθος is τῶν πρῶτοι τι, ὦν οὐ φαμέν εἶναι καθ’ αὐτὸ γένος. (Arist. metaph. i ix.)

22. διανοηθῆναι] is opposed to αἰσθάνεσθαι: ‘to apprehend intellectually the essence of each object of his investigation’.
καθαρότατα, ὥστε ὁ τι μᾶλλον αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἰοῦ ἐφ’ ἕκαστον, μήτε τῇν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην αἰσθήσεων ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογομοῦ, ἄλλα αὐτῇ καθ’ 66 αὐτήν εἰλικρινεὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ εἰλικρινῆς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῦ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγεῖς ὁ τι μᾶλλον ἐφ’ ἐλαμβάνει τε καὶ ὡτὸν καὶ ὡς ἐποῦ εἰπέων ἄμφιπορος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς παρατότου καὶ οὐκ ἐώτου τῇν ψυχῆν κτίσασθαι ἀλήθειαν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, ὅταν κοινωνῇ, ἄρ’ οὖν αὐτὸς ἄστιν, ὃ Σιμία, εἰπέρ τις καὶ ἠλλος, ὃ τευχόμενος τοῦ ὄντος; ὃ Περφυῖος, εφή ὃ Σιμίας, 10 ὃς ἀληθῆ λέγει, ὃ Σώκρατες.

XI. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφῃ, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι ὑπὸ νοῦς τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίοις φιλοσόφοις, ὃςτε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλη- λους τοιαῦτα ἀπὰ λέγειν, ὅτι κινδυνεύει τῷ ὑποτε ἀτραπός τις

1. αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ] The distinction of the Republic between νοῦς and διάνοια is not drawn here, since for our present purpose it is unnecessary.

7. ἀληθεῖαν τε καὶ φρόνησιν] ἀλήθεια is objective truth, φρόνησις the mental páthma which apprehends it; cf. Republic 511 B.

13. ὑπερ ἀτραπός] Olympiodoros insists that this refers to a Pythagorean maxim φέργων τὰς λειψάνους, whereby he has largely contributed to the perplexity of this passage. I believe ἀτρα- πός properly means not so much a byway as a short cut: what then is this short cut? We are here drawing an inference ἐκ πάντων τούτων, i.e. from the various considerations which induce the philosopher to withdraw his soul from communion with the body. Now to this state of separation, towards which the philosopher struggles during life by a long and tedious process, there is but one short cut, namely death; which therefore I hold with Schleiermacher is meant by the ἀτραπός. So far then we get a perfectly good sense: the inference which genuine philosophers will draw from the foregoing considerations is this: it seems that death is a short cut to the goal of our life’s endeavour. But what of μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει which in the mss. follow ἐκφέρειν? The unmeaning superfluity and intolerable clumsiness of this addition surely ought not to be laid to the charge of Plato. A glance at the notes of the various editors is enough to show the hopelessness of extracting any sense from the phrase as it stands in the texts. Again, as I think, the acuteness of Schlei- ermacher has solved the difficulty. If, as he proposes, we place the words after ἐξομεν, they are perfectly appropriate and restore the balance of the sentence, which will then run ‘it seems that a kind of short cut brings us to our goal; because, so long as we have the body as a partner with the reason in our search for truth, and our soul is mixed up with this plague, we shall never fully attain the object of our desires’. Cf. 65 § μετὰ τὴν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην αἰσθήσεων ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογομοῦ. As evidence of confusion in the mss. it may be noted that the position of ἡμᾶς varies; on which account Hermann brackets it. Possibly we should translate τοῦ λόγου ‘our theory’, not ‘reason’, because in the latter sense Plato usually says μετὰ λόγου, not μετὰ τοῦ λόγου: cf. Timaeus 28 A, Protagoras 324 B. But in Timaeus 70 A we have τοῦ λόγου κατ’ ἄνθρωπον. I still feel doubtful whether some words have not fallen out:
ēkfrērein ἡμᾶς, ὅτι, ἐως ἃν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, καὶ συμπεφυμένῃ ἡ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή μετὰ τοιοῦτον κακοῦ, οὐ μὴ ποτε κτησώμεθα ἵκανος οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο εὖναι ὁ ἀληθῆς. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν ἁγιολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα. 

καὶ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφὴν ἢτι δὲ ἂν τινες νόσου προσπέσωσιν, 5 ἐμποδίζοντως ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν. ἐφότων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦμι καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίπτοντο ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὡστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ὄντι ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονήσας ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδὲποτε οὐδὲν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἀλλο παρέχει ἡ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ 10 τοῦτον ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτάσθαι διὰ τὸ 15 σῶμα, δουλεύουσε τῇ τούτων θεραπείας καὶ ἐκ τοῦτον ἁγιολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ πάντα ταῦτα. τὸ δὲ ἐσχατον πάντων ὅτι, εάν τις ἡμῶν καὶ σχολῇ γένηται ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ πραπόμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, εν ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις αὐτοῖς πανταχοῦ παραπτυπὸν θόρυβος παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴ καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθοράν τάληθες, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δεδεκαίαν ὅτι, εἰ μελλόμεν ποτὲ καθαρὸς τί εἴσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτὴν τῇ ψυχῇ θεατῶν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα καὶ τότε, ὡς ἐσεῖτο, ἡμῖν 20 ἐσται οὐ ἐπιθυμούμεν τε καὶ φαμὲν ἐρασταὶ εἴναι, φρονίσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ἐξετάζει δὲ νῦν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἶδα τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρός γνῶναι, δυνών θάτερον, η ὁδικά ἐστιν κτήσασθαι τοῦ εἰδέναι τῇ τελευτήσας τότε γὰρ 67 αὐτῇ καθ᾽ αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐσται χορίς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δὲ 25 οὐ. καὶ ἐν ὧν ἡμῶν, ὡς ἐσεῖτο, εὐγνωτὰτο εὐσώμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, εάν τι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνοῦμεν, ὧ τι μὴ πάσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπτυμπλάμεθα τῆς τούτων 

ἀπαραῖος seems to require definition; and possibly the misplaced phrase extruded something like ὁ θάνατος after ἐκφερέων. For the use of ἐκφερέων Heindorf quotes Soph. Al. 7: and somewhat similar is the use of the passive in Cratylus 386 Α. 5. διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφὴν] Compare Timaeus 43 Β.—44 Α. 9. οὐδὲ φρονίσα] This, as indicated by τὸ λεγόμενον, was no doubt a common phrase, to which Plato has given a turn of his own. Wyttchenach observes τὸ νοῦν satis cognitum, ὡς ἀληθῶς et item τῷ ὄντι citatis locis addi'. He might have added that Plato uses these words when he is giving the popular phrase a deeper meaning, as here and in Phaedrus 256 β τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ὃς ἀληθῶς ὅλυμπαισοί. 11. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν] cf. Republic 373 Β. 20. αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα] 'the realities of things', i.e. the ideas. For this use of πράγματα compare 99 D βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα.
φύσεως, ἄλλα καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἐνοχὶ ἢ θεός ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς καὶ ὦτῳ μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σῶματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς το εἰκός, μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι’ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πάν το ἐυλυκρίνει. [τούτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἱσος τὸ ἁλητικός θέσ.] μὴ καθαρῶ γὰρ καθαροὺ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐθεμῶν ζ. τοιαύτα ἄρμα, ὡ Συμμία, ἀναγκαίοις εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθείς· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ὦτῳς; Παντὸς γε μᾶλλον, ὡ Σῶκρατες.

XII. Οὐκοῦν, ἐστὶ οὐκ ἡ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταύτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ ἔταιρε, 10 πολλῇ ἐλπὶς αἰφνιδίως οὐ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ίκανῶς, εἰπέρ που ἄλλως, κτίσουσαν τούτο οὐ ἄνεκα ἢ πολλῇ πραγματεία ἡμῖν εἰς τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέρονε, ὡστε ἢ γε ἀποθημα ἢ νῦν μοι προστατευμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐπιλόδος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ, ὃς ἤγεται οἱ παρεσκεύαζε τὴν διάνοιαν ὄσπερ κεκαθαρμένην.

15 Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐστὶ οὐκ ἡ Συμμία. Καθαραίς δὲ εἶναι ἄρα οὗτο πρὸς ἔμμαθεν, ὡστε πάλαι εἰς τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χορίζειν ὦ τι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν παιναχώθεν ἐκ τοῦ σωμάτος συναγερέσθαι τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυσατόν καὶ εἰς τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑπεταί 20 μόνην καθ’ αὐτὴν, ἐκλυμομένην ὀσπέρ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος; Ὅσπερ οὕτως, οὐκοῦν τούτῳ ζεθανατὸς ὄνομαζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμός ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος; Παινάτασι γε, ἢ δ’ ὡσ. Λύειν δὲ γε αὐτὴν, ὅς φαμεν, προσβοῦσθαι ἐξ’ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦστε ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τούτῳ ἐστὶν τῶν φιλο-

1. θεός] Z. and St. add αὐτός.

2. μετά των τοιούτων] sc. καθαροῖς. I take this to be neuter; i.e. the contents of the ideal world. Cf. Phaedrus 249 c πρὸς γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ἁὲ ἐστὶ μνήμη πρὸς ὃσπέρ ρούθ οὐ μεταφέρω πρὸς τὸν θεῖον ἐστὶ.

3. [τούτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἴσος τὸ άληθες] I have bracketed these words, which I believe to be a mere gloss on εἰςλυκρίνεις, derived from 66 β φαμέν δὲ τούτῳ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθεῖς.

4. μη καθαρω] 'for I doubt it is not lawful for the impure to reach the pure'.

5. μη καθαρω] 'for I doubt it is not lawful for the impure to reach the pure'.

6. 67 π—68 β, c. xii. So then he will meet death with a good heart who has purified his soul by withdrawing her from contact with the body and accustoming her to dwell apart by herself; for death is the consummation of her release from body. Were it not strange if the wise man shrank from that which all his life long he sought; freedom from his foe the body, and fruition of wisdom his love? Shall a man meet death gladly in hope of reunion with some earthly love, and for the sake of his divine love shall he fear to die?

20. ἐκλυμομένην] notice the present: 'working out her deliverance'.

21. ὀσπέρ δεσμῶν] Z. has ἐκ δεσμών.

22. μαλιστα και μόνοι] 'chiefly, nay only, the philosophers'.
9. **τοῦτον δὲ**] mss. δὲ, corr. Madvig. I follow Schanz in adopting δὲ, since the vulgate gives a somewhat ill-balanced sentence: thus we may translate, 'if they are at feud with the body on every issue and desire to keep the soul to herself, then, should they fear and fret on the attainment of this object, were it not the height of perservity, not to go thither with gladness, where on their arrival they hope to possess that which they loved all their life long?" Z. and St. retain δὲ.

21. **ὑπὲρ ἀρτί ἔλεγον**] referring to οὐ πολλὴ ἀν ἀλογία εἴη.

68 b—69 e, c. xiii. Therefore the philosopher alone is truly brave and temperate. The courage and temperance of the multitude is spurious: for they endure evils only to avoid greater evils, they forego pleasures only that they may enjoy greater pleasures; thus fear is the source of their courage, indulgence the source of their temperance. But the fount of all real virtue is wisdom: this is the only true currency; virtues that arise from balancing pleasure against pleasure and pain against pain, apart from wisdom, are worthless and slavish. Virtue is the purification of the soul; the true philosopher is he whose soul is purified and initiated into the holy mysteries of wisdom, and he it is who shall dwell with the gods in the other world. Such is the defence of Sokrates.
ΠΑΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ [69]

68 ἵθη ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλουτα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, οτι οὐκ ἂρ’ ἢν φιλοσοφος, ἀλλὰ τις φιλοσώματος; ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ που οὕτως τυχχάνει ὡν ο καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἤτοι τὰ ἐτέρα τοῦτον ἢ ἀμφότερα. Πάνω, ἐφι, ἔχει οὕτως ὡς λέγεις. Ἄρ’ οὖν, ἐφι, ὁ Συμμία, οὐ καὶ 5 ἡ ὑπομαξομένη ἄνδρεία τοῖς οὕτω διακείμενοι μᾶλλον προσήκει; Πάντως δήσου, ἐφι. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἢν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐνομάξουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τάς ἐπιθυμίας μή ἐπτοθῆσθαι, ἄλλ’ ὀλυγόρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἂρ’ οὐ τοῦτοι μόνοι προσήκει, τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλυγροῦσιν τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν; D 10 Ἀνάγκη, ἐφι. Εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἡ δ’ ὡς, ἐννοοῦσαι τὴν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἄνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι ἄτοπος. Πῶς δή, ὁ Σώκρατες; Οἶζα, ἡ δ’ ὡς, ὥστε τὸν θάνατον ἠγούνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν; Καὶ μάλ’ ἐφι. Οὐκοῦν φόβοι μεζώνων κακῶν ὑπομείνουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἄνδρείοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένων-15 σιν; Ἑστι ταῦτα. Τῷ δεδείναι ἄρα καὶ δεῖ ἄνδρειοι εἰσὶ πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι. καίτοι ἀλογὸν γε δεῖ τινα καὶ δείλια ἄνδρείοι εἶναι. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν; οὐ ταύτων τοῦτο ε πεπόθθασιν ἀκολασίᾳ τινι σώφρονες εἰσιν; καίτοι φαμέν γε αὐτο-νατον εἰναι, ἄλλ’ ὄμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τοῦτο ὄμοιον τὸ πάθος 20 τὸ περὶ ταῦτῃ τὴν εὐθῇ σωφροσύνην φοβοῦμενοι γὰρ ἐτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἑπιθυμοῦντες ἑκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχουσιν ὑπ’ ἄλλων κρατοῦμεν. καίτοι καλοῦσιν γε ἀκολασίαν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν 69 ἡδονῶν ἀρχεῖσθαι ἄλλ’ ὄμως συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατοῦμενοι υφ’ ἡδονῶν κρατεῖσθαι ἄλλων ἡδονῶν. τοῦτο δ’ ὄμοιον ἔστιν ὃ νῦν δὴ 25 ἐλέγετο, τῶ τρόπων τινα δὲ ἀκολασίαν αὐτοῖς σωσφόρονθαι.

"Εοικε γὰρ. Ὡ μακάρε Συμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ ἄυτῃ τῇ ὠρθῇ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγῇ, ἡδονᾶς πρὸς ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβου πρὸς φόβου καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω, ὄσπερ

3. φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος] Cf. 83 c: these correspond to the ἀλγαρυχικός and τμοκρατικός ἄνηρ of Republic ix.

5. ἡ ὑπομαξομένη ἄνδρεία] The philosopher faces death with calmness and abstains from bodily indulgence; therefore he is courageous and temperate even in the popular sense, although his courage and temperance arise from a widely different source to that of the vulgar. τοῖς οὕτω διακείμενοι, i.e. the character described in the preceding chapter, τοῖς τῷ σώματι διαβεβλημένοις.

10. ἐθέλεις] Z. has ἐθελεῖσες.

15. τῷ δεδείναι ἄρα καὶ δεί] Schanz well compares 78 B τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτῳ.

24. ἄλλων ἡδονῶν] Schanz brackets ἄλλων, which, he says, is omitted in the citation of this passage by Iamblichos. I think however it is wanted.

26. πρὸς ἀρετὴν] ‘in respect to virtue’; the preposition is not used in quite the same sense as in the words that follow.
2. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν [‘and that all that is bought for this and with this— that and that alone is in reality, whether it be fortitude or temperance or justice; and in a word that true virtue only exists when accompanied by wisdom’. COPE. μετὰ τοῦτο = ‘along with this’: it is the presence of φύσις which gives all virtue its value. If we press the metaphor too hard, it breaks down; for money is of value only for the sake of what it can buy. Plato however merely means that φύσις is the only true currency; all else is base coin.

4. ἀληθής ἀρετὴ ᾗ] I have followed Schanz, after Heindorf, in adding ᾗ after ἀρετῇ, although it is not in B, and is not absolutely required. But the ᾗ of CD is in favour of it, and it certainly improves the sentence. St. omits it.

5. μετὰ φρονήσεως] The true nature of the philosophic ἀρετὴ can only be understood by studying the latter part of the sixth book of the Republic. φρονήσις is cognition of the truth, that is, of the αὐτὸ ὑγιάδον. Plato found his escape from utilitarianism by identifying the source of morality with the source of existence; his ethics are the outcome of his ontology. All things are good in so far as they are like the idea of the good; therefore to him that would be really good knowledge of the idea is indispensable. With the conception of ἀνδρεία in this passage compare the definition in Republic 442 B καὶ ἀνδρείαν δὴ, οἷς, τούτων τῷ μέρει καλοῦμεν ἕνα ἕκαστον, όταν αὐτῷ τὸ θυμοειδὲς διασώζῃ διὰ τε λυπῶν καὶ ἤσων τὸ ἅπαν τοῦ λόγου παραγεγέλθην δεινοῖ καὶ μη.

7. σκιαγραφία] ‘a rough sketch’. σκιαγραφία was a kind of painting meant to produce its effect at a distance and not to be inspected close at hand: see Theaetetus 202 E ἐπειδὴ ἠγόνωσ ὅπερ σκιαγραφήματα γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, ἠγόνωμι οὐδὲ σμικρὸν ἐως δὲ ἀφετέρην πᾶρρωθεν ἐφαίνετο τι μοι λεγεθαν. Also Parmenides 165 C οἷον ἑκατερομένη ἀποστάται μὲν ἐν πάντα φανερωμενα ταύτων φαίνεσθαι πεποιθηται καὶ δρομα εἶναι. πάνυ γε. προσελθών δὲ δὲ τολλα καὶ έπερα καὶ τοῦ ἐπόρου φαντάσματι ἐπέρα καὶ ἀνάμωμα εἴωτος. Compare Republic 523 B. From Aristotle rhetoric Π ΧΙΙ 1414 a 8 it seems to have been a sort of scene-painting, as Mr COPE translates it: ἦ μὲν οὖν ὁμογορική λέξις καὶ παντελῶς ἐκκεί τῇ σκιαγραφίᾳ. ἄγὼ γὰρ ὅ πλειων ἦ δόξας, πορρωτέρα ἦ θέα, δίδ τὰ ἀκριβεῖ περέλη χεῖρο φαίνεται ἐν ἀμφορεῖοι. Cf. metaph. Δ ΧΧΙ 1014 Β 23 τὰ δὲ ὅτα ἦστι μὲν ὡστα, περὶκε μέντοι σφαίραν ἢ μή οὖν ἔτιν ἢ μή ἦστιν οἷον ἢ σκιαγραφία καὶ τὰ ἔνθινα ταύτα γάρ ἦστι μὲν τι, ἀλλ’ οἷον δὲ ἐπιτείλῃ τήν φαντασίαν. The meaning therefore is that on a superficial view the popular virtue seems identical with the philosophic, but on closer examination is found to fall far short of it.

8. ἀνδραποδόδης] cf. Republic 430 Β δοκεῖσαι μὲ τὴν ὁρίνθη δόξαν πρὶς τῶν αὐτῶν τοίτων ἀνευ παιδείας γεγοναυ τῇ τῆ βραβείᾳ καὶ ἀνδραποδόδῃ οὐτε πάνυ νίκην ἠγελθα λῦκο τῇ ἦ ἀνδρεῖαν καλεῖν. Olympiodoros says καλεῖ δὲ οί Παλίτας τὰς μὲν φυσικὰς ἄρετας ἀνδραποδωδεῖς, ὡς καὶ ἀν-
οὖδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθές ἔχῃ, τὸ δ’ ἀληθές τῷ ὄντι ἢ κάθαρσις τις ὁ τοιοῦτων πάντων, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ αὐτῇ ἡ φρόνιμης μη καθαρμός τις ἢ. καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῶν οὖν καταστήσαντες οὐ φαίλοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ 5 τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰώντεσθαι ὅτι οὐ ἂν ἀμύντος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἀιδοῦν ἀφίκεται, ἐν ναορχώρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἔκεισε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. εἰσίν γὰρ δὴ, ὡς φασίν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετὰς, ναρπηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάρκχοι δὲ τε παῦροι οὖν τοῦ δ’ εἰσίν κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἀλλοι ή οἱ D
10 τεφιλοσοφηκότες ὁρθῶς. ὃν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προοιμηθην ἐγενέσθαι εἰ δ’ ὁρθός προοιμηθην καὶ τὶ ἡμύσμενε, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθάντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα, ἀν θεὸς ἐθέλη, ὄλγον ἔστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ, ἐφη, ὥ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογούμαι, ὡς εἰκότος ὑμᾶς 15 τε ἀπολείπον καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότας οὐ χαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ’ ἀγανακτῶ, ἡγούμενος κάκει οὐδέν ἢττον ἡ ἐνθάδε δεσπόταις τε ἐ ἐγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεθαι καὶ ἐταῖροις [τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀπιστιῶν παρέ-
χει]. εἰ τι οὖν ύμῖν πιθανότερος εἰμὶ ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ή τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι.

Δραπόδοις δυναμένας ὑπάρχειν, τὰς δὲ ἱθικὰς σκηναρίας τὸ ὅτι γὰρ μονούχουν, σκιὰ δὲ τὸ ὅτι τοῦ διότι. The distinction between ἱθικαλ καὶ φυσικαλ however is not made in the present passage. For a discussion of this whole subject of popular virtue see appendix I.

1. οὖδὲν ὑγιές] After this some mss. insert εὑρα, which Schanz retains within brackets. It is obviously wrong and ought not to cumber the text.

2. τὸ δ’ ἀληθές] ‘but the reality is actually a process of purification from all such things, and temperance and justice and wisdom itself are a completed purification’. τῶν τοιοῦτων, i.e. the worldly considerations on which the δημοτικὴ ἄρετη is based. κάθαρσις is explained above in 67 c; καθαρμός is a completed κάθαρσις. τὸ ἀληθὲς is opposed to σκη

3. τὰς τελετὰς] It seems probable, as Stallbaum says, that the Orphic traditions are in Plato’s mind, not the Eleu

4. σίαν mysteries. The line πολλοί μὲν ναρπηκοφόροι βάρκχοι δὲ τε παῦροι is said by Olympiodorus to be Orphic. Plato is fond of borrowing terms of ritual, as in Phaedrus 250 c, Laws 759 c, Timaeus 44 c.


6. ἑν τοῖς μὲν ναρπηκοφόροι βάρκχοι δὲ τε παῦροι is said by Olympiodorus to be Orphic. Plato is fond of borrowing terms of ritual, as in Phaedrus 250 c, Laws 759 c, Timaeus 44 c.

7. τοῖς δὲ πολλοίς ἀπιστιῶν παρέ-
χει] Ast is undoubtedly right in bracket

8. ing these words, which are utterly point-

9. less, and clearly interpolated from 70 A.

10. ἐν τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστιῶν παρέ-
χει] Ast is undoubtedly right in bracketing these words, which are utterly pointless, and clearly interpolated from 70 A.

11. 69 c—70 c, c. xiv. All this were very
well, replies Kebes, if we were sure that death did no more than release the soul from her bodily prison. But how do we know that on quitting the body she does not vanish away like a breath? we need some strong assurance that the soul has a conscious and intelligent existence after death. True, says Sokrates, and no more fitting subject of discourse could be found for one so near to death as I am.

Thus we distinctly see that the question of the immortality of the soul turns up, not as the main subject of the dialogue, but as arising out of the principal thesis.

3. μὴ ἔτειδών Various devices have been resorted to by several editors to avoid the intolerably harsh asyndeton in this sentence. The mildest remedy is that of Heindorf, who puts a comma after τοῦ σώματος, thus joining ἀπαλλαττομένη with the previous clause. But it seems to me that we cannot divorce ἀπαλλαττομένη and ἔκβαλλονσα. Schanz brackets ὡς ἔτειδών...οὐδαμοῦ ἦ, the last words closely resembling οὐδαμοῦ ἦ just above and being repeated verbatim at 84 ε. But this subsequent repetition seems really in their favour, where Sokrates is expressly referring to the apprehension which is uttered here and which then seems to have been lulled to rest. Moreover if these words are omitted the rhythm of the sentence halts lamentably. I agree with Hirschig in suspecting διαφθείρησε τε καὶ ἀπολλύσει to be the intruders: the words are superfluous and suspiciously like a gloss.

12. παραμυθια| 'reassurance'. Cf. 115 D ταῦτα μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλος λέγειν, παραμυθοῦνες ἄμα μὲν ὑμᾶς ἄμα δὲ ἐμαυτῶν. And see En Tycheidem 250 λ, Lawos 720 λ, 773 ε. ὡς ἄντι τε ἢ ψυχήν Note that there are two distinct propositions to be proved, (1) that the soul exists in Hades, (2) that she has faculties and intelligence.

18. κομψότοιοι] Notwithstanding the friendly treatment of Aristophanes in the Symposium we see in Apology 18 β foll. how deeply Plato resented the attacks
made by the comedians upon Socrates:
cf. especially the reference to the Clouds in 19 C.

1. **ἀξιόλεγχος** Eupolis, quoted by Olympiodorus, calls Socrates τὸν πτωχὸν ἀξιόλεγχον, and no doubt it was a favourite epithet with the comic poets. Plato has adopted the word, apparently in sheer defiance; and wherever ἀξιόλεγχος, ἀξιόλεγχης, ἀξιόλεγχα occur in the dialogues, we may be sure the term is applied to the genuine philosopher. A very notable instance is Sophist 225 D, where in seeking the sophist we stumble upon somebody very like Sokrates: compare too Theaetetus 195 B, C, Phaedrus 269 E (where see Dr Thompson’s admirable note), Cratylus 401 B, Parmenides 135 D, Republic 488 E, Politicus 299 B. The strict meaning of the word is fairly given in ὁ περὶ προσηκόντων τὸς λόγου ποιοῦμαι.

70 C—72 D, cc. xv—xvii. Tradition says that the souls of the dead come back from Hades and live again on earth. That this belief is reasonable we may argue in the following way. All nature shows the generation of opposite of opposite; thus greater arises from less, worse from better, swifter from slower. And between each of such pairs of opposites there are two processes, one in either direction; as between greater and less are increase and decrease, and similar processes between every other pair. Therefore since life and death are such a pair of opposites, we shall expect to find two similar processes between the living and the dead. We see one such process take place before our eyes; the living pass over to the dead: if then nature’s work is not here left incomplete, there must be the other process that we do not see, and the dead pass over to the living. A yet stronger confirmation is this: did all things travel in one direction and were there no return, in the end all living things would die and remain dead, and life would be swallowed up in death. But if it be true that souls return again from the dead, they must be somewhere after their departure from the body; for certainly if they perished utterly, they could return again no more.

We have here one half of the first stage of the argument, which is complemented by the inference from reminiscence that follows. It is true, this argument of ἀνταπόδοσις implies the antenatal existence of the soul, but it is used mainly as evidence of her existence after death. Note also that it proves ὃς ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ εὐν “Ἄιδον, not ὡς δόκαμεν καὶ φημίσαμεν ἔχει.

4. **παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος** Herodotus 1123 states that the Egyptians believed in the immortality and transmigration of the soul, and adds: τὸ τῶν τῆς λόγῳ εἰσὶν Ἑλλήνων ἐχθροσυντα, οἱ μὲν πρῶτοι οἱ δὲ ὑστεροί, ὃς λίμῷ ἐννοτῶν ἐως τῶν ἔγω ἐθάνατο τὰ σὺνμάσα ὑπὸ γράφοσι. He doubtless refers, as Grote says, to the Orphic and Pythagorean sects; to whom may be added Empedokles.
5. ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ γένεσιν πάντων καὶ φυτῶν] It is true, as Olympiodorus remarks, that we cannot from this particular sentence infer τῶν Πλάτων πάνω ψυχῆν ἀθανατίσειν. But since Olymp. implies that Plato did not hold all soul to be immortal, it may be as well to point out that he did; cf. Phaedrus 245 c. Moreover a glance at any passage treating of metempsychosis (e.g. Phaedrus 249 b) will show us that Plato was not so irrational as to deny immortality to the souls of beasts, while conceding it to those of men; and Timaeus 77 A foll. proves that he was not so unscientific as to draw a hard and fast line between animal and vegetable life.

In the present passage Plato appeals to the uniformity of nature. If the presence of a given condition in any of the γένεσις is the result of a γένεσις, it must be a γένεσις from the opposite condition, where such an opposite exists: if a thing has become cold it must have been warm and so forth. We observe moreover that in all instances there exist γένεσις in both directions, whence we infer that alternation is a law of nature. And since we see that this law is in force in all cases which fall under our experience, it is fair to assume that it is in force in all cases where our experience fails us. Accordingly when between a pair of opposites we observe one γένεσις occurring, while the other γένεσις is from the nature of things beyond our observation, we may infer that the latter also occurs though we cannot perceive it.

II. τοῦ αὐτῶ ἐναντίον] I see no necessity to read αὐτῶ with Z. from Baiter’s conjecture. [μείζον] The use of the comparative throughout denotes that the condition is the result of a γένεσις. We shall presently see the application of this. The positive, in such terms as μέγα—σμικρὸν, ταχὺ—βραδὺ, though these all express relations, implies no self-regarding relation. We must therefore use the comparative to denote a relation between two successive conditions of the same object. But any positive which necessarily implied a relation of one and the same object to itself in another condition would answer just the same purpose as the comparative. Such a positive we actually find in the word τεθνήκοσ, which logically implies ἃνω as a previous condition of the object. Therefore whatever generalisation we establish between μείζον—ἐλαττὸν, θάττον—βραδυτέρον &c., holds good also of ἃνω and τεθνήκοσ. And since we affirm that between every pair of these comparatives two γένεσεις take place, therefore between ἃνω and τεθνήκοσ, besides the γένεσις that we see, viz. ἀποθνήσκειν, there must be another γένεσις that we do not see, viz. ἀναβιώσκεται;
ποι εξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἐπειτὰ μείζον γνώσθαι; Ναὶ. Ὡς καὶ ἐλάττον γνώστη, ἐκ μείζους ὄντος πρότερον ὑστερον 71 ἐλάττον γνώσθαι; "Egypt οὕτω, ἐφή. Καὶ μὴν εξ ἵσχυροτέρου τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ βαθτόν; Πάνω γε. Τί δὲ; ἂν τι χειρὸν γνώστη, οὐκ εὖ ἀμείνους, καὶ ἂν δικαιότερων, εὐ ἀδικιστήρων; Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; Ἡκανώς οὖν, ἐφη, ἔχομεν τούτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτῳ γνώσται, εὖ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα; Πάνω γε. Τί δ’ αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιοῦδε ἐν αὐτῷ, οἶνον μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυνῶν ὄντων δύο γενέσεως, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ 10 ἑτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἑτέρου, ἀπὸ δ’ αὖ τοῦ ἑτέρου πάλιν ἐπί τὸ ἑτέρου β μείζους μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ αὐξησις καὶ βάλεις, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὐτω τὸ μὲν αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ βάλειν; Ναὶ, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ βεβαιώσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, καὶ εὶ μὴ χρόμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν 15 ἐναχοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐργὴ γοῦν πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον. γίνεσθαι τα αὐτα εὖ ἀλλήλων γενέσιν τε εἶναι εὖ ἑκατέρου εἰς ἀλλήλα; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἥ δ’ ὅς.

XVI. Τί οὖν; ἐφη, τῷ ὡς ἕστι τι ἐναντίων, ὡσπερ τῷ ἐγγερ-ς γορέας τῷ καθέδεις; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Τί; Τὸ τεθνάναι, ἐφη. 20 Οὐκοῦν εὖ ἀλλήλου το γνώσθαι ταῦτα, εἰπέρ ἐναντία ἐστίν, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσίν αὐτοῦ μεταξὺ δύο δυο οὕτως; Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; Τὴν μὲν τοῖν οὐτῶν ἑτέρων συνήγαλον ὅν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγεν ἑγὼ σοι, ἐφη, ἐρῷ, ὦ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις- σοῦ δὲ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν. λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθέδεις, τὸ δὲ ἐγγερορέως, καὶ εἰ τὸ καθέδειν 25 τὸ ἐγγερορέω γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐγγερορέω τὸ καθέδεις, καὶ δὲ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτοῦ τὴν μὲν καταδρασάνεις εἶναι, τὴν δ’ ἀνεγέρ-ρεσθαι. Ἰκανοῦς σοι, ἐφη, ἦ σοι; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Λέγε δέ μοι καὶ σοῦ, ἐφη, οὐτὼ περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ ἐναντίων μὲν φής σῷ τῷ ὧν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι; "Εγὼγε. Γίνεσθαι δὲ εὖ ἀλλήλων; Ναὶ. 30 Ἔξ οὖν τοῦ ζωῶτι τὸ ἑγγομένου; Τὸ τεθνήκος, ἐφη. Τί δὲ,

if we are to suppose that the operation of nature is uniform. The comparatives in fact show under what circumstances γενέσεις take place, i.e. between opposite conditions of the same thing.

14. καὶ εἰ μὴ[ i.e. the processes exist, even in those cases where we have no names to describe them. The argument is that were there no alternation of processes we should have all things at last stationary on one side or the other.

16. ἐξ [ἐκατέρου] Schanz brackets these words: they are not indeed necessary but the pleonasm seems to me Platonic, and their omission seriously impairs the rhythm.

22. ἐγὼ σοι, ἐφη, ἐφώ] Sokrates pursues the same plan in 105 b foll. καὶ μὴ μοι δ ἐν ἑρωτῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μμούσεις εἰμέ.
2. εκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων] It is necessary to remember the exact sense of the two opposites, according to the definition given in 64 c καθέναι, χωρίς μὲν ἀπό τῇ πυρήνῃ ἀπαλλαγμένοι καθ' ἀυτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονότα, χωρίς δὲ τὴν πυρήνην ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγμέναις αὐτήν καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι. ζῶν then is applied to soul and body united, τεθνείσως to soul and body asunder. A very similar use of the word ζῶν is to be found in Soph. Od. Col. 999, οὑς ἐγὼ οὐδὲ τὴν πατρὸς | πυρήνῃ ἀναλαμβάνων ἀντέχων ἑμι. The soul of Laios is certainly not regarded as extinct, therefore ἄνωθεν can only mean 'if it returned to bodily life'.

12. καὶ ταύτῃ] i.e. by demonstration as well as by tradition; cf. 70 c.

14. ἐδόκει] 70 D.

18. ἰδε τοίνυν οὕτως] In this chapter we have a statement of the fundamental principle on which not only the foregoing argument but all Plato's reasoning in favour of immortality is based; viz. that the sum total of spirit is a constant quantity. Plato has seized upon this principle of 'conservation of energy' as the only rational method of defending the indestructibility of soul: he has applied to spirit the axiom which previous philosophers laid down for matter; as Anaxagoras expresses it, γινόμενοι χρήματι πάντα οὐδὲν ἐλάσσον ἐστιν οὐδὲ πλείων. οὗ γὰρ ἀνυπόληπτων πάντων πλέον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐστιν. Similarly the πρόκειται kal ἀράμοις of Anaximenes, the ὅδε ἄνω καλόν κατὰ τῶν Ἡρακλείτων, the σύγκρισις kal διάκρισις of Empedokles, all implied that γένεσις was not creation out of nothing but a passing from one form into another. Cf. Aristotle metafi. K vi 1062b 23 to γὰρ μηθεν ἐκ μη οὕτως γίγνεται πᾶν δ' εξ οὗτος, σχεδὸν πάντων ἐστὶ κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν περὶ φύσεως.

19. εἰ γὰρ μη ἄι[ for if there were not a perpetual correspondence between the two in generation, just as if they re-
volved in a circle'. *Cope*. ἀναποδόθηση is here intransitive, as in Aristotle *meteor.* xi 347b 32 ὃς δ' ἐκεῖ χάλαξα, ἐνατάδα οὐκ ἀναποδόθησα τὸ ἄρωμα. Cf. below 72 b.

1. ἐδεῖδ' τις] This of course implies that the straight line is finite, i.e. there is not an indefinite quantity of soul in existence, nor can fresh souls be created out of nothing. Plato has taken his metaphor from the διάλος ὑδάτων.

4. τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα] compare *Phaedrus* 245 D ἢ πάντα τα ὑδάτων πάσαν τὸ γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στήριζε καὶ μήποτε ἄν κάποιον ὑδάτων χεῖραν κυριεύειν γεγονέτα. Οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων.

8. πάντ' ἂν] I have followed Schanz and others in supplying ἂν. ἀποδείξειν could hardly stand without it, since the subject of φαίνετο is different. Z. omits it.

10. [καθεδέν] This seems to be a gloss, and it was condemned by Dobre: the editors however retain it.

12. ὁμοιόμερη] The ὁμοιόμερη of Anaxagoras, infinite in number and infinitely divisible, were mixed in formless confusion until νοῦς ἔλθων αὐτὰ διεκάδομησεν.

15. ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων] i.e. ἐκ τῶν μὴ τεθνεωτῶν, as Heindorf saw. If τὰ ἥματα were derived from a reserve store of existence which had not passed through life and death, in time this store would be exhausted and all be absorbed in death. The converse is stated in *Republic* 611 A τοῦτο μὲν τάναι, ὡς δ' ἐγὼ, οὕτως ἔχεται, ἐξέλθειν δι' ἀλλικαί τινας ἐκ του ὄρθρου γένοιτο, οὔτω δ' ἐκ τοῦ ὄρθρου γένοιτο καὶ πάντα ἔν εἰς τὴν τελευτάνα ἀδάνατα.
σθαί καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθεότων τοὺς ξάντας γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν
tεθεότων ψυχὰς εἶναι.

E XVIII. Καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβῶν, καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκείνον
γε τὸν λόγον, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθῶς ἔστιν, ὅν σὺ εἴωθας θαρὰ
λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἢ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυχχάνει 5
οὕσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη ποι ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ

1. τῶν τεθεότων ψυχῶν εἶναι]
After these words the ms. have καὶ ταῖς
μὲν γ' (οτ μὲν) ἀγαθαῖς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῖς δὲ
κακαῖς κάκων. The inconsequence of this
stupid interpolation is so glaring that I
have ejected the clause bodily from the
text: its author, whose memory is sounder
than his logic, was doubtless prompted by
δικό άμεινον τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς ἢ τοὺς
κακοὺς. The words are retained by Her-
mann and the Zürich editors, bracketed
by Stallbaum and Schanz.

72 E—76 D, cc. xviii—xxi. Kebes
observes that another line of argument
tends to show that our souls are im-
mortal, the theory that learning is remi-
niscence. If questions are properly put,
the right answers are elicited, showing
that the knowledge sought exists in the
mind of the respondent; as we see in the
case of geometrical truths. For the
satisfaction of Simmias Sokrates adds the
following demonstration. Reminiscence
we define as recalling to mind something
we formerly knew but had forgotten.
For instance, a lover on seeing a lyre
thinks of his beloved who used the lyre;
similarly a picture of a lyre or a horse
may remind us of a man, a picture of
Simmias may remind us of Kebes, or
finally a picture of Simmias may remind
us of Simmias himself: so that we see
reminiscence may be effected either
directly or indirectly. Now if it is effected
directly, that is, if the object we perceive
is similar to that which it calls to our
minds, we cannot fail to notice how far
the resemblance is exact. For example:
we affirm that there is an idea of equality,
which is called to our minds by our per-
ception of sensibles which are equal. That
this idea is something distinct from the

equal sensibles is clear; for the sensibles
may appear equal to one observer, un-
equal to another; but about the idea of
equality no difference of opinion can
exist. Now we are to observe that all
sensible equals appear to us as falling
short of the standard of absolute equality,
which plainly shows that our knowledge
of absolute equality is prior to our per-
ception of the sensibles. And whereas
(1) this sense of deficiency in the sensibles
has been present so long as we have had
any perceptions of them, (2) our percep-
tions of them date from the moment of
our birth, it inevitably follows that our
knowledge of the idea must have been
acquired before our birth (75 C). Now
this of course applies to all ideas as well
as to that of equality. Since then we
have obtained this knowledge, two alter-
 natives are open: either we are born in
full possession of it and retain it through
life, or we lose it at birth and gradually
regain it. The first must be dismissed
on this ground: if a man knows a thing
he can give an account of it, but we see
that men cannot give an account of the
ideas: it follows then that the second
alternative is true; we lose it, and all
learning is but the recovery of it. And
since our souls certainly did not acquire
this knowledge during their human life
they must have gained it before our birth
and at birth lost it.

The argument from ἀνάμνησις proves
the existence of the soul before birth;
thus supplementing ἀνταπόδοσις which is
chiefly used to show her existence after
death. Moreover ἀνάμνησις shows, what
ἀνταπόδοσις did not, that the soul δύναμις
καὶ φύσιν ἔχει apart from the body.

4. ὅν σὺ εἶωδας] This must not be
regarded as true of the historic Sokrates.

7. [έαν τις καλῶς ἐφοτά] Olympiodoros' explanation of καλῶς deserves permutation: ὁρῶς καὶ Πλάτωνικός καὶ ἡ Περιπατητικός καὶ ἡ Βούλωνικός. Plato's views will be best understood by comparing Theaetetus 149 A—151 D with Republic 518 B—D.

9. τοιῇσαι] I have followed Schanz in adopting Hirschig's emendation. I cannot believe in such a construction as οἶο τε τοιῇσθεν, and not a single instance has been adduced in its defence. The fact that κινήσθεν sometimes is followed by the future infinitive is quite irrelevant. Z. and St. have τοιῇσθεν.

ἐπεὶ τοι] So Heindorf for ἐπείσα. This seems absolutely required by the sense: surely the geometrical demonstrations are meant to furnish an instance of what Kebes has just been saying, not an additional piece of evidence for ἀνάμνησις.

H. Schmidt has much to say against Heindorf and for the vulgate; but the cogency of his argument is not proportionate to its length. ἐπείσα is retained by Z. St. and Schanz.

τὰ διαγράμματα] mathematical diagrams. The interrogation of the slave in Meno 82 B foll. is of course a case in point.

10. κατηγορεῖ] Subject the same as of ἔγγ: it has been suggested that κατηγορεῖ is impersonal, but there is not a shadow of authority for such a use.

14. μᾶθειν] mss. μαθεῖν, which is retained by Wohlrab and defended by Schmidt. But μαθεῖν is so much more pointed and the alteration is so slight, that I have followed Schanz and most of the later editors in adopting it. 'I desire personal experience of the very thing we are talking about.'

21. έαν τίς τί [πρότερον] It is possible to defend πρότερον, since the percep-
tion must precede the reminiscence. But there is no point in this, and the word seems to have crept in from προτερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι above.

2. ἀλλά καὶ ἄρων ἐννοήσῃ] This is probably the earliest mention of what has been known since Locke as ‘association of ideas’. Compare Aristotle περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως 11 451b 16, where he refines upon the simple classification of Plato (ἅπ' ὁμοιον καὶ ἀνομοίον) by starting the sequence ἄρ' ὁμοιον καὶ ἐπαντιόν καὶ τοῦ σύνεγγος: he deals too with the process as an act of volition.

13. ἐπιλέξησθαι] Compare the definition in Latius 732 b ἀνάμνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἐπιρροὴ φρονήσεως ἄπολειποῦσης.

16. οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμιάν ἰδόντα] The order in which these illustrations are arranged seems at first sight strange. For instead of working up from the simpler and more direct cases of association to the more complex, we have, as it were, a descending scale: it is surely more remarkable that the picture of a lyre should remind us of some particular human being than that a picture of Simmias should remind us of the living Simmias. But the explanation is simple, if we remember how Plato intends to apply his analogy. The particulars, by which we are reminded of the ideas, stand in much the same relation to the ideas as the painted Simmias to the real Simmias: hence by this arrangement of his examples Plato emphasises exactly the right form of the analogy. This is one of ten thousand proofs of the astonishing carefulness of Plato’s writing. Also it is worth noticing that although the relation between ideas and particulars is in the Phaedo, as in the Republic, still undefined (see 100 d), this passage distinctly foreshadows the doctrine of μνήμης, which is evolved in the Philebus and Timaeus.

19. εἶναι μὲν ἄρ' ὁμοίον] as in the
πόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐκλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοίοτητά εἰτε ὑπὸ ἐκείνου οὐ ἀνεμισθήτη; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Σκόπει δ', ἢ δ' ὄς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἐχεί. φαμέν ποῦ τι εἴναι ἵπποι, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ἔλεος οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ' ἀλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ 5 παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἐτέρων τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἵππο τῷ ὕμεν τὶ εἴναι ἡ μηδὲν: Φῶμεν μένοι μή Δ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε. Ἡ β' καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὁ ἐστιν; Πάνω γε, ἢ δ' ὄς. Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐξ ὤν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἄττα ἰδίοτες ἰσα, ἐκ τοῦτων ἐκείνῳ ἐνενόησαμεν, ἐτέρων ὑπὸ τούτων; ἢ οὖν ἐτέρων σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῆς. ἄρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἵπποι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταύτα ὅταν τῷ μὲν ἵππο φαίνεται, τῷ δ' οὖ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἱσα ἐστὶν

last example of the previous chapter. Reminiscence of the ideas by means of the particulars is ἀνάμνησις ἀφ' ἀμοιλών.

7. λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην] This does not mean that the knowledge of the idea is derived from the particulars, which is in itself impossible and is contradictory to 75 β: but the knowledge that we possess of the idea is awakened by the perception of the particulars. ἐννοεῖν is the more accurate word used later on. Cf. 74 c τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐνενόησακας τε καὶ εἰδης. The simile of the aviary in Theaetetus 197 D would not be unapt here: knowledge of the idea is our possession, but it is not actually in our grasp until awakened by ἀνάμνησις.

10. σκόπει δε καὶ της] The following sentences furnish proof of the independent existence of the idea; in 74 D begins the proof that our knowledge of it must have been prior to our observation of the particulars.

11. τῷ μὲν] So Schanz with β. The ordinary reading is τοτε μὲν τοτε δὲ, which Schleiermacher approves on the ground that the defective equality of the particulars appears in their seeming to the same observer now equal now unequal. Prof. Geddes takes the same view: 'Plato is not reasoning from the variety of judgments among men generally: his argumentation proceeds as if there was but one soul in the universe to hold converse with the outer world.' Surely this is quite unnecessary. The existence of a conflict of opinion is sufficient to establish the difference between the particulars and the idea: in the case of the latter no such conflict does or can exist. τοτε has inferior ms. support and is clumsy after ἐνίοτε.

12. αὐτὰ τὰ ἱσα] This very strange phrase has a parallel in Parmenides 130 β ei μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια τις ἀπεφαινεν ἀνόμοια γεγονόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ἡμοια, τέρας ἢμα, ἡμ. In the present passage various explanations have been given: (1) that of Olympiodorus, that the plural represents the idea as thought by several minds; this is adopted by most commentators: (2) that it represents the idea as exemplified in several sets of equal particulars; to this approximates the view of Schneider, that αὐτὰ τὰ ἱσα means the separate ideas of equal logs, equal stones &c. But who ever heard of the idea of an equal log? (3) Doedellein supposes that αὐτὰ τὰ ἱσα means perfectly equal objects, such as can be conceived but do not exist in nature. But this makes Sokrates ask 'do things, which ex hypothesei seem to you equal, seem to you unequal?' besides there is no point in the introduction of these imaginary equals. (4) Heindorf seems to me to come much nearer the
truth. After quoting the Parmenides he adds ‘multitudinis numerus adhiberi in his potuit, quoniam aerqualitatis vel similitudinis notio non unum continet, sed ad duo certe referitur’. When Plato asks ‘does the idea of equality seem equal or unequal?’ the implied comparison compels him perforce to use the plural; not that he thinks there are more ideas of equality than one, but because to ask whether one thing is equal or unequal is sheer nonsense. He immediately explains the unusual phrase in the following words, ‘I mean, does equality ever appear to you inequality?’ By the time Plato wrote the Parmenides he had got rid of these unfortunate ideas of relations: for in the passage quoted Sokrates is stating the earlier form of the ideal theory: and probably he there used the plural not without the intention of pointing to the contradiction which such ideas involve. Schleiermacher takes αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα to be the particulars; but his explanation is in itself very unsatisfactory and requires an alteration of the text.

2. ταυτά τε τὰ ἴσα] i.e. the equal particulars.

5. ἐννενάδικας τε καὶ ἐλπηφας] ‘you have recalled and gained’; see on 73 c.

6. [οὐκοῦν ἡ ὁμοιὸν ὄντος] From the passage enclosed in brackets I have utterly failed to extract any meaning. Plato has just completed his proof that equal particulars carry back our minds to

an idea of equality which is distinct from the particulars: next he is about to show that our knowledge of the idea must have been prior to our observation of the particulars. But between these two necessary links in his argument we find interposed an irrelevant remark to the effect that the process is called ἀνάμνησις whether the object of perception is like or unlike the object of reminiscence. In the present context the repeated definition of ἀνάμνησις is surely pointless; and worse than pointless is the re-introduction of the ὁμοιὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπον: for the reminiscence of the idea by means of the particulars is necessarily ἀφ’ ὁμοιὸν. I am therefore compelled to treat the words down to πάντα μὲν οὖν as an interpolation: a conclusion at which I find Susenichl and Schmidt have also arrived. Stallbaum has an elaborate defence of the words, which might possibly have been more successful had he understood the difficulty. Prof. Geddes (not however on this passage) suggests that particulars may remind us of other ideas besides that to which they belong. But the whole force of the argument comes from the fact that this kind of reminiscence is ἀφ’ ὁμοιὸν, for in this case alone are we conscious of a defect in the resemblance (74 A); and our consciousness of this defect is our sole warrant for inferring that we must have known the ideas before we perceived the particulars (74 E).
γομέν τοῖς ἵσοις· ἀρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὔτως ἵσα εἰναί ἀστερ ἀυτὸ
nonnull η ἐνδει τί ἐκεῖνῳ τοῦ τοιούτου εἰναι οἰνον τὸ ἵσον, ἡ οὐδέν;
Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἐφη, ἐνδεί. Οὐκοῦν ὀμολογούμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ηδον ἐννοήσῃ, ὅτι βούλεσται μὲν τοῦτο, ὅ νῦν ἐγώ ὡρᾶ, εἰναι οἰνον ἄλλο
5 τι τῶν ὕπτων, ἐνδεί δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιούτοι εἰναι οἰνον ἐκεῖνο. Ἐ
ἀλλ' ἐστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖον που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦτα τυχεῖν
προειδότα ἐκείνῳ ὁ φησιν αὐτὸ προσεικείναι μὲν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ
ἐχει; 'Ἀνάγκη. Τι οὖν; τοιούτων πεπτόμαχε καὶ ημεῖς, ἡ οὖ, περὶ τε τὰ ἵσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἵσον;
Παντάπασι γε. 'Ἀναγκαίον ἀρα
10 ἡμᾶς προειδότα τὸ ἵσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἦ
ἰδόντες τὰ ἵσα ἐννοοῦσαμεν, ὅτι ὁρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἰναι
οἰνον τὸ ἵσον, ἐχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως. Ἐστιν ταῦτα. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν κα
15 τὸδε ὀμολογούμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἰναι ἐννοηῇ ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἄφασθαι ἢ ἐκ τινος ἀλλης
τῶν αἰσθήσεων ταύτων δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω. Ταύτων γὰρ ἐστιν,
ὡ Σόκρατες, πρὸς γε ὃ βουλεῖται δηλώσαι ὁ λόγος. 'Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ
ἐκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεὶ ἐννοῆσαι ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν
ἐκεῖνον τε ὁρέγεται τοῦ ἦ ἐστιν ὑσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεεστέρα ἠστιν ἢ
πῶς λέγομεν; Οὔτως. Πρὸ τοῦ ἀρα ἀρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν κα
20 ἀκούειν καὶ τάλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει ποιεῖν εἰληφότας ἐπιστή-
μην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἵσον ὃ τι ἐστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων
ἴσα ἐκείσε ἀνόλεσεν ὃτι προσμείται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτ' εἰναι οἰνον
ἐκεῖνο, ἐστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα. 'Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων,

1. ἀστερ αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστιν] St. adds ἵσον, which Z. has within brackets: but the word is absent in the best mss.
2. ἢ ἐνδεί τί ἐκεῖνον] 'or does it fall short of the idea, that is of being similar to it'. This is the reading of Schanz, which seems quite satisfactory and is very close to the mss. The common reading is τῷ μὴ τοιούτῳ εἶναι, which is excellent sense, but μὴ is almost destitute of authority. Madvig would read ἐκεῖνῳ τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι, 'does there lack anything to that quality of being like': a specimen of Greek composition which one would not rashly impute to Plato.
5. τοιούτῳ εἶναι] The mss. add ἵσον, which is clearly a gloss. Schanz retains it within brackets.
15. ταύτων δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω] 'I count all these sensations as the same thing': as is shown by the following sentence; not, as Wagner says, 'I say the same of all these'.
17. πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεωι] Since all sensuous perceptions do not remind us of equality, Madvig would insert ἵσα after αἰσθήσεωι, Schanz brackets ἵσον. Against bracketing ἵσον I would urge that it is premature to apply the present argument to all ideas: that is first done in 75 c: while the notion of equals so exclusively engrosses our attention throughout the present chapter that Madvig's insertion seems needless.
22. ὃτι προσμείται ... φαυλότερα] Schanz following Hirschig brackets these words: Mr Jackson independently takes the same view. The objections to them are
ο Σωκράτης. Ούκοιν γενόμενοι ευθὺς ἐσωρῴμεν τε καὶ ἰκονομεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις ἐξχωρεῖν; Πάντως γε. 'Εδει δὲ γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τοῦτων τὴν τοῦ ἱσοῦ ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι; Να. Πρὶν γενεσθαὶ ἀρα, ὅσο ἐσικεῖν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι. 'Εσικεῖν.

XX. Ούκοιν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἔχοντες 5 ἐγενόμεθα, ἡπιστάμεθά καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ἱσοῦ καὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἐλαττὸν ἄλλα καὶ ξύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἱσοῦ νῦν ὃ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ δ ὅσιον καὶ ὑπερ λέγω, περὶ ἀπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ δ ἐστι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτώντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὡστε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν τούτων πάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι. 'Εστι τοιαῦτα. Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε λαβόντες ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιπέλησμεθα, εἰδότας αἰεὶ γήγερσθαι καὶ

(1) that they are irrelevant and inapposite, (2) that the use of προθυμεῖται is most strange. I fully acquiesce in the judgment of these scholars that the clause is an unintelligent gloss upon ἐκεῖος.

3. πρὸ τοὺτων] i.e. before our perceptions of sight, hearing, &c.

5. ούκοιν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες] 'if then, having received this knowledge before birth, we were born in possession of it'. As yet Plato is merely putting the case, without expressing an opinion about it: presently we shall find that we were not born possessing it, except in a dormant state. We now go on to apply the results gained for ἵσον to all the other ideas.

10. ὁπερ λέγω] just above, ξύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.

οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα] 'on which we stamp the character of essence'. ὃ ἐστι is Plato's technical term to denote the essentiality of the ideas. Plato never descends to forms like αὐτόνδιδρωσις, which are common in Aristotle: he would say αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος.

11. ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ... ἀποκρινόμενον] i.e. in our dialectical discussions. The conversational method was as distinctive a peculiarity of the form as the ideal theory was of the substance of Plato's philosophy; and so intimately are the two connected that διαλεκτική, properly 'the science of dialogue', means nothing less than 'the science of ideas'. The Sokratic method of examination was distinctly aimed at obtaining a definition or λόγος of the object in question; and this definition was peculiarly the outcome of the method. Plato, in developing the logical concept into a metaphysical essence, scrupulously preserved the method by which the former was attained.

12. ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν] Z. adds εἶναι with some mss.

14. ἐκάστοτε] i.e. 'and if after receiving it we have not, in every instance of our doing so, forgotten it, we are always born in possession of this knowledge and retain it through life'. I do not think it necessary to insert γεγονόμενον after ἐκάστοτε with Heindorf, although I fully agree with his interpretation. Prof. Geddes' rendering can hardly stand, and he, rather than Heindorf, seems to have mistaken the argument. 'If we have', he says, 'in all the crises of our history, retained this knowledge'. But Plato does not say 'if we have retained', but 'if we have not forgotten': and though it is
sense to say 'if we have retained it in all the crises', it is not sense to say 'if we have not forgotten it in all the crises'; since we have forgotten it once for all, and that, as Heindorf says, at our birth.

I think in fact that ἐκάστοτε is to be taken in close connexion with λαβώντες: 'in every instance of our receiving it, we have not forgotten'. (Prof. Geddes is also scarcely accurate in saying that ἐπιστήμη is ἀνάμνησις: Plato says μάθησις is ἀνάμνησις, which is another thing.) The perfect ἐπιλεξμέθη, as Wohlrab rightly observes, shows that Plato still expresses no opinion.

5. περὶ ταῦτα] This reading seems necessary, although αὐτὰ has stronger ms. authority. ταῦτα means the objects of sense, in antithesis to ἐκέλευς. Wohlrab retains αὐτὰ but does not inform us how he proposes to make sense of it.

7. ὀικεῖον] 'a knowledge that is already ours'.

9. ἐφάνη] in 73 C.

10. ἔτερόν τι ἀπὸ τοῦτου] 'to derive from this a conception of something different that he had forgotten, with which this was associated, whether unlike or like'. COPE. ὁ refers to ἔτερον τι ἐπελεξκόμενον τοῦτο τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦτου. I see no sufficient reason for bracketing the second ὁ with Schanz. Here there is nothing amiss in the introduction of the ὅμοιον and ἀνόμωον, for Plato is expressly repeating the statement in 73 C.

20. δοῦναι λόγον] 'to give an account'; that is an accurate description of the thing defined, marking its logical differentia. A passage quoted by Wohlrab, Republic 534 B, explains the phrase very well: ἡ καὶ διαλεκτικὰ καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστοτε λαμβάνοντα τῆς ὀφθαλμῶν; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ' ὑστερον, μὴ ἔχον τὸν μὴ ἔχον λόγον αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλω διδάσκει, κατὰ τοσοῦτον, καὶ πάντως τοῦτον οὐ οὕσως ἔχον; where we may translate λόγον τῆς ὀφθαλμῶν 'the
principle of its being’. Compare also 531 E. Below, 99 E, there will be more to say about ἔλογος.

2. περὶ τοῦτων] i.e. the ideas.

10. χωρὶς σωμάτων] This does not necessarily follow: Plato however simply means apart from the human bodies in which they now dwell: cf. 114 C, where the purified souls are said to live ἄνεν σωμάτων τὸ παράτατον, although the conditions of their existence are obviously conceived as material. The body from which they are freed by death is the γῆσι τῶν ὁμοίων Phaedrus 246 c. In the following words καὶ φρόνισιν εἶχον Plato marks the additional result he has gained by the appeal to ἀνάμνησις.

12. ἀπόλλυμι δὲ] Simmias suggests that the knowledge may be acquired just at the moment of birth; Socrates replies, it is impossible, for that is the very moment at which we lose it: we cannot gain and lose it simultaneously. Compare Republic 621 a, where the souls that are on the point of returning to earth must drink of the river Ameles. In comparing this passage, as Prof. Geddes does, with Wordsworth’s famous ode, it ought not to be left out of sight that there is a fundamental opposition between them. According to Wordsworth we are born with the antenatal radiance clinging about us and spend our lives in gradually losing it; according to Plato we lose the vision at birth and spend our lives in gradually recovering it.

76 δ—77 β, c. xxii. The outcome of the preceding argument is this: the pre-existence of our souls is inseparably bound up with the existence of ideas and the former stands or falls with the latter. Simmias heartily assents to this and affirms his unshaken conviction that the ideas do exist and consequently that our souls existed before our birth.

19. [ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον] Mr Jack-
son, in the paper before mentioned, maintains that the words from ὑπάρχουσαν to ἀναγκαῖος oūτως are spurious. In this opinion I concur for the following reasons: (1) the clause ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοτες ἡμετέραιν oūτως would seem just the same kind of clumsy misapplication of Plato's phraseology of which we have already seen too much: Plato says (75 ε) that the knowledge of the ideas is our own; but where does he say that the ideas themselves are our own, and what is the sense of saying so? (2) ταύτα ἐκείνη ἀπεικάζομεν is a pointless repetition of ἐκ ταύτην ἀναφέρομεν: (3) ταύτα there means sensibles; presently ταύτα three times refers to the ideas. Wytenbach, on this very ground, proposes to read αὐτή ἐστιν: (4) though the repetition of oūτως may be defended, it certainly sounds very awkward here. Accordingly I have bracketed the words. With this omission the sentence will stand: 'if these ideas exist which are for ever on our lips, absolute beauty and goodness and all other absolute essence, and if it is to this essence that we refer all our sense-perceptions, as this surely exists, so surely did our soul exist before our birth'. oūτai will then depend upon oūτως ἔχει.

2. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταύτα] 'if these ideas do not exist'; not as some take it, 'if this is not so'. Cf. below ἡμετέρην ταύτα τε ἐσται.

5. ἐὰν μὴ ταύτα, οὐδὲ τάδε] i.e. if the ideas do not exist, neither did our souls exist before birth.

6. εἰς καλὸν γε] 'And our argument has found an excellent refuge in the position that the pre-existence of our soul rests on the same assurance as the existence of the ideas'. Wagner should not have supplied καὶ συν with καλὸν, which is explained by the sentence in apposition, εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον εἶναι.

8. ἂν σὺ νῦν λέγεις] νῦν is omitted in some mss. and Schanz brackets it.

11. καὶ, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἵκανως ἀποδείκται] This reading has the best authority, and Schanz defends the parenthetical use of ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ by citing 106 B, Protagoras 314 c, Menexenus 236 B. Z. and St. give ἐμοὶ ἵκανως ἀποδείκται.
on leaving the body may not be dissipated and perish. Kebes agrees that immortality is only half proved. Sokrates replies that the other half is supplied by the argument from alternation of opposites, which proved that the soul must exist after death.

4. *Diaσκεδάνυται*] The indicative can hardly be right here because we have γι in the next clause, and the change of mood would be meaningless. A parallel form is the optative πηγύτο in 118 λ. I do not see on what ground the accentuation *diaσκεδάνυται* (as subjunctive) and πηγύτο can be defended, since the forms are clearly contractions. Z. and St. have *diaσκεδάνυται*.

5. τι γὰρ κολώνα] ‘What reason is there why she should not come into being and union from somewhere or other and exist before she enters a human frame, but when she has entered one and is in act of leaving it, she should not at that moment herself come to an end and perish?’

6. ἀμόδεν ποθέν] This is Bekker's correction of ἄλλοθεν, which is retained by Z. and St.

13. ἐι θέλετε συνθείναι] I do not understand how, in the face of this express statement of Plato’s, some have regarded ἀνταπόδοσις and ἀνάμνησις as two distinct demonstrations of immortality. As he says, they are two halves of a demonstration; one showing the pre-existence, the other the after-existence of the soul.

77 δ—78 β, c. xxiv. Yet, says Sokrates, you and Simmias seem still to have a lurking fear lest the soul on leaving the body be scattered to the winds. Perhaps, replies Kebes, there is a child within us that still needs to be soothed; and soon there will be no man living who can soothe it. Do not despair, says Sokrates; wide is Hellas and wider is the world; you must spare neither pains nor riches to find such a man, not omitting to search among yourselves.
XXIV. "Omoi de mou dokeis sou te kai Simmias ouden an kai to touton diapragmatistes thein ton logos esti mallon, kai dedienai to tov paiidov, metai idiou dein ekbaivousan ek tou somatos diaprou kai diaskedanwn, allou te kai othan tuchis E 5 mi en nepomia alll en megalo tiv pnevmati apothniskon. Kai o Kebhs utesgeliasa 'Ows dediouton, ephi, o Sowrates, peiro anapeitheven mallon de mi idiou dediouton, alli idio en tis kai en idioi paiis, ostita to toiouta ferbeita to touton oin peiroueme peithen mi dedienai ton thanaoton oster to morfolikia. 'Alla 10 xreia, ephi o Sowkrates, epadeive autro ekasths ameras, eidos an ephitapeite. Piothev ouin, ephi, o Sowrates, tois toiouton anathov 78 epoendon lypometha, epeidhi sy, ephi, idiou aplelepsis; Pollar mev 'Ellas, ephi, o Kebhs, eni eneiei ton anathoi andres, polla de kai ta ton barbapron geni, oui pantas xreia diereunasthai xetoountas 15 toiouton epoendon, miote xromatov fiedoumenou miote poivov, ouk ouk estin eis o ti an> anagkaioteron analistiroke xromata. Epitein

2. diapragmatistes theia ton logos esti mallon] I think the misgivings of Simmias and Kebes arise thus. We have indeed seen that the recurrence of soul is a law of nature; but we are not sufficiently acquainted with the laws of nature and the conditions of their interaction to be perfectly sure how they will work in every particular case. So we are still haunted by the doubt that a soul may, under certain circumstances, be dissipated and destroyed; this doubt can only be satisfied by proving that the eternity of soul can be deduced not only from a universal law but from her own inherent nature. Next anamnesis has placed the eternity of soul on the same footing of assurance as the existence of the ideas: but this is done indirectly; we desire to be convinced that soul not only has had cognition of the ideas, but that she possesses such an affinity with their nature as will justify us in believing that she shares their attribute of eternity; see introduction § 2.

4. diaskedanwn] Hirschig would read diaskeusan. But here the indicative is clearly right. What we fear is, not lest the wind should blow the soul away, but lest it is a fact that it does so.

8. en idiou paias] 'there is a child within us'; not of course 'among us'.

11. ephitapeite] 'until you have charmed him out of you'. This reading is due to Heindorf; the old editions and the best mss. have ephitas. Heindorf's admirable emendation is confirmed by one ms.

12. epeidhi sy, ephi] For the repetition of ephi Wohlrab compares 89 c, 103 c, 118 a.

14. ta ton barbapron geni] Plato's travels had caused him to form a more liberal estimate of barbarian possibilities than was usual in his time. Compare Republic 499 c el toin evres eis philotheiai polwvstitis anoigexepimelhinai genovn ev ton aeripon tis pareileuontos chranoi gia kai yin estin ev ton barbapron sito, parrow pou ekto evnti tis hmeteras epoumen, h kai epeita genesthai, peri toinou etimo tis logos diavakchedai, ois genovmen eis eirmenike politeia kai esti kai genesthai ge, othan auti h Moisea poloi genetakagena. Cf. Symposium 209 E.

16. an anagkaioteron] So Schanz with
γ 78] ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.

... δὲ χρή καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ' ἀλλήλων ἵσως γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ῥαδιῶς εὑροῦτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους τούτο ποιεῖν. Ἄλλα ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, ὃς ὕπαρξει, ὁ Κέβης ὅθεν δὲ ἀπελέπομεν ἐπανέλθωμεν, εἰ σοι ἴδο- μένῳ ἐστίν. Ἄλλα μὴν ἱδομένῳ γε τώς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει: Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

XXV. Οὐκοῦν τοιόνδε τι, ἡ δ' ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης, δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐρέσθαι ἑαυτοὺς, τῷ ποιῷ τινὶ ἀρα προσήκει τούτῳ τὸ πάθος πάσχειν τοῦ διασκεδάζοντος, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποιοῦ τινὸς δεδίεναι μὴ πάθη αὐτό, καὶ τῷ ποιῷ τινὶ <οὐ>· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀν ἐπι- σκεφσαί, πάτερον ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστιν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ ἰο δεδιεναι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἰμετέρας ψυχῆς; Ἄληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἀρ' ὁ οὖν τῷ μὲν συνθέσει τε καὶ συνιέσθω ὅντι φύσει προσήκει τούτῳ πάσχειν, διαιρεθήναι τοιῷ ἄπερ συνετέθη· εἰ δὲ τι τυγχάνει ὃν ἀξιώθεν, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἰπερ τῷ...
αλλα; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἐφή, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν ἀπερ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὀσαύτως ἔχει, ταὐτα μᾶλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀξιῶθητα, ἢ δὲ ἄλλοι ἄλλοις καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά, ταὐτὰ δὲ σύνθετα; 'Ἐρωμεν δοκεῖ οὕτως. 'Ἰομεν δὴ, ἐφή, ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ἐφ' ἄπερ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἤς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ Ὁ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτάντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὀσαύτως ἀεὶ ἔχει κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλοις ἄλλοις; αὐτὸ τὸ ἱσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὁ ἕστιν, τὸ ὄν, μὴ ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἡμετανοήν ενδέχεται; ἢ ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἡ ἔστι, μουσεῖδες ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτό, ὀσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει καὶ οὔδεποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοιωσίν οὐδεμιᾶν ενδέχεται; 'Ωσαύτως, ἐφή, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχειν, οulative τερες. Τι δὲ τῶν πολλῶν [καλῶν], οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἱππῶν ἢ ἣματιῶν ἢ ἄλλων ὀντωνον ημιοντων, ἢ ἱσων ἢ ἱκαλῶν ἢ πάντων εν τῶν ἑκεῖνων ὑμονύμων; ἃρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει, ἢ πάν τουνταινον ἐκεῖνοι οὔτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλῆλοις οὔδεποτε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταὐτὰ; Οὕτως, ἐφή ὁ Κέβης οὐδεποτε ὀσαύτως

bility that soul is immortal; and as Kebes afterwards points out, it merely shows that soul should be much more durable than body, not that she is inherently eternal. I consider the chief importance of this part of the dialogue to consist in the opening it gives for the objections of Simmias and Kebes. The former brings in a theory of soul which would be fatal to Plato's view, were it not refuted; the latter necessitates the final investigation, to which I conceive the present argument is merely preliminary. At the same time we are here first endeavouring to establish a direct connexion between the soul's nature and that of the ideas.

1. οὐκοῦν ἀπερ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτά] Change in any object is the result of transposition, compression, or separation of its parts, or of increase or decrease in their number. Consequently that which has no parts cannot suffer change. All material things have parts, therefore the immaterial objects of reason are alone changeless.

5. ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν λόγῳ] τοῦ ἐνα is descriptive genitive after λόγων. Madvig proposes τὸ ἐνα, which Schanz adopts: but ms. authority is entirely against him, and there is no real difficulty in the genitive. Here again we have a marked association of the ideal theory with the conversational method.

12. τῶν πολλῶν [καλῶν] καλῶν is an obvious interpolation: we are not concerned merely with beautiful particulars; and presently we have ἡ ἱσον ἢ καλῶν ἢ πάντων τῶν ἑκεῖνων ὑμονύμων, 'all the particulars which share the name of the ideas'. The particulars are ὑμονύμα as being copies of the ideas: see Sophist 234 Β ἐκεῖνα καὶ ὑμονύμα τῶν ὄντων ἀπεραγῆμεν τῷ γραφή τέχνη. Cf. Timaeus 41 C.

15. οὔτε αὐτά αὐτοῖς] 'they hardly ever preserve any constant relation either to themselves or to each other'. This is one of many passages which show that Plato thoroughly accepted the doctrines of Herakleitos and Protagoras so far as regards the material world.

16. οὕτως, ἐφή ὁ Κέβης] Z. and S. have οὕτως αὐ, ἐφη, ταὐτά, ὁ Κέβης.
79 ἐξεῖ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτων μὲν κἂν ἄφαιο κἂν ἰδοὺς κἂν ταῖς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεωι αἰσθῆσειν οὐκ ἔστω ὅτι
τοῦ ἀλλο̣ ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τοῦ τῆς διανοίας λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ′ ἔστιν ἄειδη τὰ τοιαύτα καὶ οὐχ ὅρατα; Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἀληθὴ λέγει.

XXVI. Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἶδή τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὅρατον, τὸ δὲ ἄειδης; Θῶμεν, ἔφη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄειδης ἢ κατὰ ταύτα ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὅρατον μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν. Φέρε δὴ, ἢ δ′ ὅσ, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχῆ; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ὁμοίοτερον τῷ εἰδεὶ ἡμαῖν ἄν εἶναι καὶ ἐγγυγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα; Παντὶ, ἔφη, τούτῳ γε τὸ δὴ ὅρατον, ὅπερ ἔστιν τὸ ἄειδης. Τί δὲ ἢ ψυχῆ; ὅρατον ἢ ἄειδης; Οὐκ ὑπ’ ἄνθρωπον γε, ο Ὁσκρατεῖς, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὅρατα καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν ἄνθρωπων φύσει λέγομεν ἢ ἄλλη των οἱ. Τῇ τῶν ἄνθρωπων. Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὅρατον ἢ ἄρατον εἶναι; οὐχ ὁρατον. Ἀείδης ἄρα; Ναὶ. Ομοίοτερον ἀρα ψυχής σώματος 15
c ἐστιν τὸ ἄειδης, τὸ δὲ τὸ ὅρατον. Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὡς Σωκρατεῖς.

XXVII. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦτο πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι ἢ ψυχή, ὅταν μὲν τὸ σῶμα προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὅραν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δὲ ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως—τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστιν τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δὲ αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι—, τότε μὲν ἐλκεται υπὸ ἀτοποχίας χρώματος ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐφεστῶν τῶν ὁρατῶν καὶ ἀείδεων.
have nothing stable or sure in them, there is a like want of stability and certainty in her perceptions.

6. καὶ πέπανται τε τοῦ πλάνου] 'she has rest from her wandering, and in dwelling with them is ever constant, since the things that she grasps are constant'. So in Republic 500 c it is said of philosophers, εἰς τεταγμένα ἀτά καὶ κατὰ ταύτα δεῖ εἶχον ὁμοίως καὶ θεωμένους οὖν ἀδίκοιντα οὖν ἀδικοἰομένα ὡς ἀλλή- λων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον εἶχον, ταύτα μικρότατα τε καὶ δ' τι μά- λιστα ἁφομοιοῦσθαι. For πλάνον compare Parmenides 135 E οἷος εἰς ἐν τοῖς ὁμομέναις οὐδὲ περὶ ταύτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπί- σκοπεῖν.

8. τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα] 'this condition of hers is called wisdom'. Olym- piodoros is much exercised as to how φῶνεσις can be a πάθημα, how an activity of the soul can be denoted by a passive term. But Aristotle, for whom cognition was emphatically an ἐνέργεια, says, ὥς ἀνίππη ἐν ἑξαί ὡς τοῦ νοητοῦ ἡ τι τοιοῦτον ἐτερον. I think however that πάθημα here means nothing more than condition; compare Republic 511 D, where the term πάθημα is applied to the four mental states corresponding to the four segments of the line.

12. ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθοδοῦ] 'from this way of approaching the question'. μεθ- όδος is frequently used by Plato for 'scientific method', especially dialectic: cf. Republic 510 B, Politicus 286 D.

13. ὅλω καὶ παντὶ] Prof. Geddes explains 'both in the general and in the particular'; which I think is a needless refinement. It is only a strong expression for 'altogether' and is not uncommon: see Republic 469 C, 527 C (with the article), Laws 779 B, Cratylus 434 A. In Laws 734 E we have the reverse order τῷ παντὶ καὶ ὅλω, and in 944 C we find ὅλω καὶ τῷ πᾶν in precisely the same sense. In Lycis 215 C is the remarkable phrase ἡ ὅλω τῇ ἐσχάτῳ;

16. ὅπα δὲ καὶ τῇδε] After showing that the soul resembles the ideas (1) in her invisibility (2) in her affinity to the changeless, we now come to the last piece of evidence: that she is mistress over the body and uses it as a slave. Cf. Timaeus
80 ψυχή καὶ σώμα, τὸ μὲν δουλεύει καὶ ἀρχεσθαι ἢ φύσις προστάτευε, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὐτὸ πότερον σοι δοκεῖ ὁμοιὸν τῷ θείῳ εἶναι, καὶ πότερον τῷ θυτῷ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μὲν θείου οὐν ἄρχειν ταὶ καὶ ὑγιεμονεῖν πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θυτοῦ ἄρχεσθαι ταὶ καὶ δουλεύειν; "Εμοιγε. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἑοικεί; 5 Δῆλα δή, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχή τῷ θείῳ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θυτῷ. Σκότει δή, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης, εἰκε πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων

Μόνον ἡμῖν ἐξυμβαίνει, τὸ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ οἷος σώματος κατὰ ταῦτα ἐξουσίᾳ ἐποϊόταιν εἰναι ψυχήν, τὸ δὲ ἀνθρωπόν καὶ θυτῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ 10 καὶ ἀνοιχτῷ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτα ἐξουσίᾳ ἐποϊόταιν αὐτὸ εἶναι σῶμα. ἔχομεν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν, ὁ φίλος Κέβης, ἢ οὖν οὗτος ἔχει; Ὁ οὖν ἔχομεν.

XXIX. Τῷ οὖν; τούτων οὗτος ἔχοντων ἂρ' οὐχὶ σῶματε μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσῆκε, ψυχὴ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ παρὰμεσον ἀδιαλύτῳ 15 εἶναι ἢ ἐγχύος τῇ τούτῳ; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Ἐνυνείς οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπειδὰν ἀποτάνῃ ὁ ἀνθρωπός, τὸ μὲν ῥάτων αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ῥάτῳ κείμενον, ὁ δὴ νεκρὸν καλομένει, ὁ δὴ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτει, οὐκ εὑρίσκει τούτων οὐδὲν πέποιθεν, ἀλλ' ἐπεικῶς συχνῶν ἐπιμένει χρόνον, ἐὰν μὲν τις καὶ χαρίζων τοὰ ἐκὼ τὸ σῶμα τελευ-20

34 C γενείς δὲ καὶ ἄρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεβατείραν ψυχὴν σῶματος ὡς δεσπότων καὶ ἀρέστουσαν ἀριστομέρους ἐξεστήσατο.

3. θείῳ...θυτῷ] Below, 80 b, we have the contrast θείῳ-ἀνθρωπίνῳ: but the antithesis θείου-θυτοῦ occurs Timaeus 69 c and d.

10. ὁμοίωταν εἶναι ψυχῆν] I have adopted this reading notwithstanding that there is much stronger ms. authority for ψυχή, which Schanz Z. and St. retain. ψυχή can only be construed by supplying ἐξυμβαίνει again, which is intolerably harsh. Such instances as Philebus 55 A πολλῇ τις ἀλογία ἐξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι are nothing to the point: such a construction is common enough, but here we have τάδε as the subject of ἐξυμβαίνει.

11. άνοιχτῷ] i.e. 'not the object of intelligence': a sense which, I believe, ἀνόφρος bears nowhere else; it is however placed beyond doubt by νοητῷ in the opposite catalogue, by which Olympiodoro...
94

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ [80

τήσθη καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὀρᾷ, καὶ πάνω μάλα. συμπεσόν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταραχεθέν, ὀσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταραχευθέντες, ὁλίγον ὄλον μένει ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον. ἔνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἄν διὰ σαπῆ, ὅστα τε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὄμως ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀθανάτα ἐστίν ἢ οὔ; Ναί. Ἡ δὲ ψυχή ᾧρα, τὸ άείδες, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἔτερον οἰκόμενον γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ άείδη, εἰς "Ἀδιοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἱ ἀν θεὸς ἐθέλη, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἱτέον, αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκὸν ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὑρθεὶς διά-10 τεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὡς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀνθρωποί; πολλοῦ γε δει, ὦ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Συμία, ἀλλὰ πολλὸ μᾶλλον ὡδὲ ἐξεῖν ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν-φέλουσα, ἢτε οὐδὲν κοινωνύσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἱκούσα εἰναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ συνηθροιμένη [αὐτῇ εἰς αὐτήν], ἢτε 15 μελετῶσα ἂει τούτῳ—τούτῳ δὲ οὐδέν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἡ ὁρθὸς φιλοσο-

means ‘having his body in a good state’, and to this τοιαύτη refers. If the body were in a healthy condition at death and at a healthy age, it would hold out longer, says Plato, against decomposition. Mr Cope, I think, is quite correct in translating: ‘if a man die with his body in a vigorous state and at a vigorous period of his life, a very considerable time indeed’. The following sentence συμπεσόν ...χρόνων is bracketed by Schanz after Ast. I see no sufficient reason for doing so; the γὰρ is certainly not very obvious, but may be explained thus, ‘(nor is this the strongest case,) for if a body is embalmed, it remains nearly whole for an incredible time’. Hirschig brackets ὀσπερ...ταρα-χευθέντες: very superfluously. Plato says (1) the body of a healthy man who dies in the prime of life lasts a good while, (2) an Egyptian mummy lasts an indefinite time, (3) even without this some parts of the human frame are almost indestructible.

3. καὶ ἄν σαπῆ] i.e. τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα.
7. εἰς "Ἀδιοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς] To Hades rightly named, the abode of the unseen. Cf. Gorgias 493 B.
80 E—81 E, CCC. xxix, xxx. We cannot then believe that the soul when she leaves the body is scattered and dispersed; no, if she departs pure and untainted of the body, because she has never willingly held communion with it during life, she is freed from its follies and passions and reaches the abode of the invisible, where she dwells with the gods for ever. But if she has been the companion of the body, sharing its pleasures and desires and thinking that alone to be real which she can apprehend by it, then she departs tainted and clogged with the material; and in fear of the viewless region, weighed down by her earthy load, she flits about the visible world. Hence it is that ghosts are seen about places of burial; they are such gross spirits as cannot rise from earth, but wander about it, until for their love of the material they once more enter a bodily form.

14. καὶ συνηθροιμένη] Schanz brackets these words, but they are in the best mss., and I see nothing against them. He omits αὕτη εἰς αὐτήν, which words have much slighter ms. support. I have thought it sufficient to bracket them.
81 φῶσα καὶ τὸ ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα [μαθίων] ἢ οὐ ὑντὶ ἄν εἰῃ μελέτη βανίτων; Παντάπασι γε. Οὐκοῦν οὗτο μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὄμοιον αὐτῇ τοὶ ἀείδες ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖον τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἱ ἀφικομένη ὑπάρχει αὑτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φάβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἔρωται καὶ τὸν ἄλλον κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπεῖων ἀπαλλαγμένη, ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμνημένων, ὥς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διαγούση; οὕτω φάμεν, ὁ Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως;

Β XXX. Οὕτω νὴ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. 'Εάν δὲ γε οἶμαι μεμυασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἄτε τὸ σώματι ἀτεῖ ξυνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ γεγονευμένη ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἑπιθυμίων καὶ ἴδιων, ὡστε μὴ δέν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθῆς ἀλλ’ ὅ το σωματειδής, οὐ τις ἄν ἄφαιτο καὶ ιδιοὶ καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρός τα ἀφροδίσια χρήσατο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὑμμαστὶ σκοτώδεις καὶ ἀείδες, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία αἵρετον, τοῦ τοῦτο δὲ εὐθυσμένη μισεῖ τε καὶ τρέμει καὶ φεύγει καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐξουσάν οἰεί πυχῆν αὐτῆς καὶ θα’ αὐτὴν εἰκόνω τα ἀπαλλάξεσθαι; Ὑπ’ ὅπωστιον, ἔφη. 'Αλλὰ καὶ διειλημμένη γε οἶμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματειδῶς, ὅ αὐτὴ ἡ ὁμίλια τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ ἀτεῖ ξυνεῖται καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε ἐξέμφυτον

I. μαθίων savours of the margin, and I have followed Schanz and Hirschig in bracketing it.


7. diaphos] I have ventured to follow Heindorf and Hirschig in reading thus. The mss. all have διάγωσα, which most editors retain, but which I cannot believe that Plato wrote. It is idle to quote Thucydides vii 42 § 2: for in the first place it is rash to argue that a construction found in Thucydides is therefore possible in Plato; secondly, it is not a parallel case. When Thucydides says ἐφακοσίως κατάπληξις ἐγένετο, and after a subordinate clause resumes with ὁρῶντες, the shock is not very great; but that after the regular datives εἰδαίμονι, ἀπαλλαγμένη Plato should end with this ungrammatical διάγωσα is quite a different thing. More to the purpose is Prof. Geddes’ citation of Phaedrus 241 D, where however Schanz reads λέγονθι for λέγων. Not one of the constructions given in Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 271 foll., at all justifies this, which is not an anacoluthon but a solecism. It has been suggested to connect διάγωσα with ἀπερχεται, but I think this is hardly possible.


18. διειλημμένην] ‘interpenetrated’. The notion of this word is the mixture of two substances so that the particles of one are held apart by those of the other. The soul’s substance is as it were adulterated by a material alloy. Z. and St. omit καί, which is however in the best mss.

20. [ἐξέμφυτον] ‘ingrained’. The soul’s perpetual communion with the body has so inseparably blended the material and
the spiritual that they become virtually one nature; hence even when separated from the body she is not yet freed from matter.


5. *perí à dê kai òfhth*] This is an interesting illustration of the manner in which Plato will take some popular belief, as he often takes some popular expression, and fill it with a deeper meaning of his own. In *Laws* 865 D we find another current opinion about ghosts, here however without any special Platonic turn: that if one man killed another the spirit of the slain wandered about his accustomed haunts, terrifying and tormenting the household so long as he remained there.

11. *throbhs*] ‘mode of life’.

12. *èv*] ‘until by craving after that bodily nature which is their companion they are again confined in a body’. The presence of this material alloy is sufficient to inspire the soul with bodily desires but cannot afford means to gratify them: so that the longing grows more and more intense until the soul is once more confined in her earthy prison.

81 E—82 B, c. xxxi. These souls pass into the bodies of animals whose habits are like to their former way of life; the sensual into asses, the cruel into wolves and hawks; while they that have lacked philosophy but led humane and harmless lives pass into bees and wasps and ants, or even into the human form again.

With this chapter should be compared the remarkable passage *Timaeus* 91 D foll. The other principal statements of Plato on metempsychosis are in *Timaeus* 41 E—42 D, *Republic* 618 A—620 C, *Phaedrus* 249 B. Wytenbach has a long and learned note on the subject, dealing chiefly with neoplatonic views.

17. *thelabherous*] ‘who have not taken heed to their ways’.
καὶ ἀρπαγάς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἱεράκων ἱερέων ἡ ποι ἀν ἄλλοσε φαμε καὶ τοιαύτα ἡ λέναι; Ἀμέλει, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαύτα. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δὲ ὡς, ἰδία δὲ καὶ πάλλα, ὦ ἄν ἔκαστα ἵοι, κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοίωτητας τὰς μελέτης; Τῇ δὲ ὥς ἐφη πῶς δὲ ὡς; Οὐκοῦν εὑρίσκονται, ἐφη, καὶ τούτων εἰς τὰ καὶ εῖς βελτιστῶν τῶν ἱντικές ὦντες οἰ τὴ ν μηνικήν καὶ πολιτικήν ἣ ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετιμηδενόκες, ἦν δὲ καλοῦσε σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιο-
σύνην, ἐρι θνους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγοναί καὶ ἰε φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ
νοῦ; Πῦ δὲ ὢς εὑρίσκονται, Τῇ; οὗ τούτων εἰκός ἔστιν εἰς
tούτοις πάλιν ἁφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικῶς τε καὶ ἰμερον γένος, ἦ ποῖo ἰ
μελιτῶν ἢ σφικῶν ἢ μυρμήκων, ἢ καὶ εἰς ταῦτα γα τῶν τὸ
ἀνθρώπων γένος, και γέγονεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἁνδρέας μετρίους. Εἰκός.
XXXII. Εἰς δὲ γε τῆς γένους μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς
καθαρῶ ἀπίνοτι οὐ τέμεως ἁφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τῷ φιλομαθεί. ἀλλὰ

2. φαμεν] So Schanz with the best

4. κατὰ τὰς αὐτών ὁμοιότητας ‘according
to the peculiar affinities of their
pursuits’. Cf. Τίμακοι 42 ἐφὶ κατὰ τὴν
ὁμοιότητα τῆς τῶν τρόπων γενεσεως.

6. δημοκρίτη καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴν]
As to this popular and social virtue see
on 69 b and appendix I. In Republ hic we
find that this class of people are in
great danger of making a bad choice at
the ἀρίστης βίων. One who chose a tyr-
rant’s life was τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ὀφεινοῦ ἦκότων,
ἐν τεταγμένη πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ
βεβηκότα, ἔθη ἀνεφοινοφίας ἀρετῆς
μεταλθησάται. ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν ἐώς κλάτων
ἐιναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτως ἀποκείμενοι τοῖς ἐκ
τοῦ ὀφεινοῦ ἦκότας, ἄτε πόρων ἀγκυρο-
τος.

9. τῇ; οὗ τούτων] So Schanz: B has
ὅτι οὐ. St. and Z. give ὅτι τοῦτος.

εἰς τοιοῦτον ‘to another social and
gentle race like themselves’. In Τί-
μακοι 91 ἐφὶ we have another class of
harmless but unphilosophic men with a
different destination: τῷ δὲ τῶν ὄρεων
φέλων μετερωμεῖτο, ἀνῆτα τριχῶν περα
φίων, ἐκ τῶν ἀκάκων ἀνδρῶν κοίτων δὲ,
καὶ μετεωρολογικῶν μέν, ἡγούμενον δὲ δὲ ὡςο
τὰς περὶ τοιούτων ἀποδείξεις βεβαιωτάτας εἶναι

δὲ εὐθείαν. Who these are we learn in
Republic 539 A—550 C: viz. astronomers
who fancy that observation of the heavenly
bodies is in itself important, apart from its
bearing on philosophy.

12. ἀνδράς μετρίους ‘worthy citizens’;
men who practise δημοκρίτη καὶ πολιτικὴ
ἀρετὴ and discharge their social and
domestic duties creditably. They belong
to a decidedly higher grade than the
character described in Republic 554.

82 c, 11, c. xxxii. But to the company
of the gods only the true philosopher can
come. For this cause he keeps himself
pure from vice, not from the worldly
motives that govern the vulgar, but be-
cause he will not resist philosophy when
she offers freedom and purification to his
soul.

13. εἰς δὲ γε τῆς γένους ‘but to the
company of the gods none may approach
who has not sought wisdom and departed
in perfect purity; none but the lover of
learning’. The words ἀλλ’ ἡ τῷ φιλο-
μαθεί are appended as though μὴ φιλο-
sофήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῶ ἀπίνοντι
had not preceded: they are certainly
pleonastic, but perfectly natural and in-
telligible. I see no cause to insert ἀλλ’,
far less to adopt such a violent transposi-
tion as Wytenbach suggests. φιλομαθής
and filosófous are frequently identified by Plato, especially in the passage quoted by Heindorf, República 376 B to γε filo-

máthei καὶ filósophon taíth. St. gives ἀλλα ἓ.

9. σωµά τι πλάττοντες] Literally 'moulding a body', i.e. spending all

their care on tending the body. Cf. θη

mai 88 ε σώµα ἐπιµελῶς πλάττοντα τᾶς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνταποδοτῶν κυ

νήσεις. Also República 377 C καὶ πλάτ-

τεων τάς ψυχὰς τοῖς µίθοις πολὺ µᾶλλον

ν τὰ σώµατα ταῖς χερσίν. The usage of

the word in the present context easily arises from that in the two passages quoted, where it signifies the develop-

ment of the body by nourishment and training and in each case is opposed to the

culture of the soul. The reading of

BCD is σωµατι, whence Fischer sug-

gested σώµα τι, which with the Zürich

editors I have adopted; the τι seems to add a touch of contempt. ἔ has σώµατα,

retained by Stallbaum. Ast's σώµατι πράττοντες, 'working for the body', is a very strange expression, by no means

justified by the use of πράσσων in Thucy-
dides. Schanz adopts Heindorf's bold

alteration λατρείοντες, which I cannot

approve; far less Madvig's coinage πελα-

tείοντες.

82 D—84 B, cc. xxxiii, xxxiv. Philoso-

phy, finding the soul a prisoner in her

bodily abode, strives by persuasive admo-
nition to set her free; telling her that

she is deluded by the body and its sen-
sations: from such she should withdraw

erself and trust to herself alone; for

she alone can behold the invisible and

apprehend the true. And the soul that is

discreet listens to the voice of philosophy,

for she sees that indulgence of bodily pas-
sions has this fatal result. Whatsoever

awakes in us the strongest pleasure or

pain, fear or desire, this we think to be

most surely true. So if she share the

body's pleasures and pains, she will also

share its beliefs concerning truth; and

being the body's close companion through

life will leave it at death contaminated by

its nature: therefore she will never reach

her home in the invisible but must

enter again into another body. For this

reason the philosopher is virtuous; not

from any common motive; but because,

when philosophy is delivering his soul,

he will not undo her work by indulging

the body's appetites. So his soul has

peace from its troubling and lives apart

from it; and at death she returns to her

divine abode, fearing not at all lest as

she departs she be scattered by the

winds and exist no more.
XXXIII. Πώς, ὁ Σώκρατες; Ἐγὼ ἐρώτημα, ἐφη. γνωστόκοινον γάρ, ἢ δ’ ὅσ, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι παραλαμβάνειν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ Εἰς φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνώς διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην, ἀναγκαζόμενην δὲ ὡσπερ διὰ ἐρήμου διὰ τούτου σκοπέσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὴν δι’ αὐτής, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλιν-5 δουμενην, καὶ τοῦ εἰρήμου τὴν δεινοτήτα κατιδούσα ὅτι δι’ ἑπιθυμιάς ἐστὶν, ὥς ἂν μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος ξυλλήπτωρ εἰς τῷ 83 δεδεσθαι,—ἐπεὶ οὖν λέγω, γνωστόκοινον οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὐτοὶ παραλαμβάνουσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔχονταυ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἤρεμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λὺνει ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἐνδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπαύγης, μὲν 10 μεστῇ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὑμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπαύγης δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῦς χρῆσθαι, αὐτὴς δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐξελέγεσθαι καὶ ἀδραίοθεται παρακελευμένη, πιστεύει δὲ μηδεὶς ἄλλο ἄλλ’ ἢ αὐτὴν αὐτὴν, ὅ τι ἐν νοησίᾳ αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ τῶν 15 ὄντων” ὃ τι δ’ ἂν δι’ ἄλλων σκοπῆ ἐν ἄλλως ὅν ἄλλο, μηδεν ἡγεῖσθαι ἀληθεῖς εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητὸν τε καὶ ὀρατόν,

4. διὰ εἰρήμου] ‘through the bars of her prison’. She can indeed see τὰ ὄντα, but only in the material symbols by which alone they reveal themselves to the senses.

5. κυλινδουμένην] ‘wallowing in utter ignorance’. Stallbaum compares Politicus 390 Λ, Theadetus 372 Β.

6. ὃτι δ’ ἑπιθυμιάς ἐστὶν] I take the literal translation of this sentence to be as follows: ‘that it (the prison) exists by means of lust; just the way in which the captive is most apt to aid and abet his own incarceration’; in other words, the prison is the dungeon of lust, wherein the prisoners are accomplices in their own imprisonment—ὡς I understand as a simple relative, ‘in which way’. The phrase δι’ ἑπιθυμίας ἐστὶν understood by Stallbaum as a periphrasis for ἑπιθυμίας, by Heindorf as ἑπιθυμίας. The former makes the clause ὡς ἂν μᾶλλον express the object of the ἑπιθυμίαν, which comes to this: the prison (i.e. the body) desires to find out how the soul may most aid her own imprisonment. But this is downright nonsense. Heindorf rightly interprets the ὡς ἂν μᾶλλον clause, except that he makes ὡς = ὡστε. But δι’ ἑπιθυμίας ἐστὶν = ἑπιθυμίας is surely very questionable; moreover it is not the body but bodily pleasures which the embodied soul desires. The interpretation I have suggested precisely agrees with 83 δ: the prison of lust is just that very one of which the soul shuts the doors upon herself: for each act of indulgence is the shooting of a fresh bolt. The translator in the Engelmann series alone takes the same view: ‘weil er auf der Sinnenlust beruht, auf welche Weise der Gefangene selbst hauptsächlich Helfer seiner Gefangenschaft sein muss’.

7. τῷ δεδεσθαι] So all the mss. Schanz and Z. after Heindorf’s conjecture read τῶν. But since συλλαμβάνειν continually takes a dative there is no reason why the verbal συλλήπτωρ should not be followed by the same case: the alteration seems gratuitous.

8. οὕτω goes with ἔχοντα.

16. δι’ ἄλλων] i.e. τῶν διὰ σώματος αἰσθήσεων. ἐν ἄλλως ὅν ἄλλο, ‘varying with varying conditions’.
4. λογιζομένη] The soul reflects that vehement passions of pleasure, pain, fear, or desire so absorb the attention that nothing seems so real as the object inspiring them. Therefore if she is strongly excited by bodily affections of this kind she will be forced to think nothing so real as these material things: so that instead of seeking truth in the changeless verities of the intelligible she will look for it in the everchanging flux of phenomena.

ησθη ἡ φοβηθη] Z. and St. add η λυπηθη, but these words are not in BCD, and the other mss. are not agreed as to their position.

5. οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον] ‘not on the scale that one might suppose’. For τοσοῦτον virtually = ‘so little’ compare Kephale 608 β μέγας γάρ, ἐφην, ὁ ἀγὼν, ὁ φίλε Γλαῦκων, μέγας, οὐχ ὅσον δοκεῖ. Schanz, against the mss., writes ὅτε αὐτὸν: but ἄπα may equally be said; ‘arising from them’.

6. οἶνον ἡ νοσήσας] the considerations on which the δημοτικὴ ἄρετη is based.

7. ὅτι ψυχή] ‘that the soul of every man in the act of feeling some vehement pleasure or pain is at the same time constrained to believe that whatsoever most strongly excites such feelings, this is most vivid and true; whereas it is not so’.

12. τὰ ὄρατα] Heindorf supplied τά, which is missing in the mss.


17. ὁμότροπος τε καὶ ὁμότροφος] ‘like it in her ways and nurture’.
XXXIV. Toūτων τῶν ἕνεκα, ὥς Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλο-
μαθεῖς κόσμιοι εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ δὲν οἱ πολλοὶ ἕνεκα φασὶν ᾧ
σύ οἰεῖ; Οὐ δήτα ἔγαγε. Οὐ γὰρ ἀλλ' οὕτω λογίσατ' ἀν ψυχή
ἀνδρῶς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰηθεὶς τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι
ἐαυτὴν λύειν, λυνύσῃ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτὴν παραδίδονα ταῖς ἴδιοις 5
καὶ λύπαις ἐαυτὴν πάλιν αὐ γεγαταδεῖ καὶ ἀνύπνον ἔργον πρά-
tευ, Πηνελόπης των ἑαυτιώς ἰστὸν μεταχειριζομένην ἀλλ' γα-
λήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἐπομένη τὸ λογισμὸ καὶ αἰὲ ἐν
τούτῳ οὐδά, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη καὶ
Β ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη, ζῆν τε οἰεταί οὕτω δείν, ἔσοι ἂν ἤξ, καὶ ἰο
ἐπείδαν τελευτῆση, εἰς τὸ ξυγγενές καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιούτον ἀφικομένη
ἀπηλλάξαι τῶν ἀνδρωτών κακῶν. ἐκ δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς
οὐδὲν δεινὸν μη φορηθῆ, ταῦτα γ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα, ὡ Σιμμία τε καὶ

2. οὖχ δὲν οἱ πολλοὶ ἕνεκα φασίν] 'not for the reasons which the many as-
sign for being so'. Schanz brackets φασίν, and Heindorf proposes φαίνονται, both,
as I think, needlessly. Stallbaum rightly supplies κόσμωι εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι.

3. οὐ γὰρ ἀλλ' οὕτω] This punctuation is clearly right here as in Phaedrus
276 D. οὐ γὰρ ἀλλὰ gives just the wrong sense.

5. λυνύσῃ δ' ἐκείνης] 'and while philosophy is loosing her to give herself
up to pleasures and pains that they may
bind her fast'. The appended infinitive ἐγκαταθεῖν is a very common idiom, and
why Madvig should wish to expunge
παραδίδονα I cannot see. Schanz how-
ever brackets it.

7. μεταχειριζομένην] This is doubtless the right reading, although the mss.
are stronger in favour of μεταχειριζομένης:
the genitive is however, as Prof. Geddes
says, easily accounted for by the proximity
of Πηνελόπη. The soul works at a kind
of Penelope's web, only in the opposite
way. Penelope, to preserve her virtue, undid
at night the work she wove by day;
the soul weaves again the web of
lusts which philosophy has been unravel-
ling to set her free. Prof. Geddes would
govern Πηνελόπη by ἐναντίον: but I
believe Plato never uses the genitive with

this adverb; for in 112 E, to which Prof.
Geddes refers, τοῦτον is governed by
καταντικρ. St. has μεταχειριζομένης.

8. τοιούτων] Sc. ἰδονίων καὶ λυπών.
ἐν τούτῳ] See on 59 A.

10. ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη] Compare
Phaedrus 248 B οὐ δ' ἐνεχ' ἢ πολλή στοιχή
το αἰσθήτια ἰδεῖν πείθεν οὐ ἐστίν, ἢ τε δὴ
προσήκουσα ψυχής τῷ ἀρίστῳ νομῇ ἢ τῶν
ἐκεί λεμάνω τυρχάνει οὐσία, ἢ τε τοῦ
πτεροῦ φύσις, ξυρχήσκεται, τοῦτο
πρέπεται. The souls which cannot reach
the plain of truth τροφῆς δοξαστή χρῶναι.
Compare the still more striking meta-
phor in Timaeus 90 Α ἐκείδεν γὰρ, ὅθεν
ἡ πρώτη τῆς ψυχῆς γένεσις ἐφ' ὑμῖν,
το θείῳ τῷ κεφαλήν καὶ μίζεν ἡμῶν
ἀνάκρεμανὸν ὄρθιον παῦ τὸ σώμα.

11. τοιούτων] Sc. ἀληθὲς καὶ θείον καὶ
ἀδόξαστον.

13. οὐδὲν δεινὸν μη φοβηθῆ] For this
unusual phrase compare République 462 B,
Apology 28 B, Gorgias 520 D. Also Aris-
tophanes Ecclesiazusae 650 οὐχί δέοι μή σὲ
φελήσῃ.

ταῦτα γ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα] mss. ταῦτα δ'.
Many editors, beginning with Forster,
have regarded these words as a gloss
upon ἢ τοιαύτῃ τροφῆς, and Schanz
brackets them. This view may be right;
but I think there is hardly sufficient evi-
dence for bracketing. If the words are
Genuine, δὲ needs correction. Wytenbach has ταύτα τί.

At first sight the concluding words of the chapter seem to imply that a soul that is pure is less likely to perish than the impure. But since this is not the case, we must understand Plato to mean that the pure soul alone is exempt from fear. The impure soul, having cast in her lot with the body and having no conception of existence apart from it, may well suppose that corporeal life is a condition of her being: but the pure soul, who has lived apart from the body so far as she may and feels her own independent power, has no misgivings lest the company of her slave be necessary to her existence: the body may dread dissolution, but she is secure.

84 c—85 d, c. xxxv. Silence ensues as Sokrates ceases: but presently Simmias and Kebes are heard conversing apart. Are you discussing any doubtful matters in the argument? asks Sokrates, for there must be many remaining. Simmias: There are points on which we should like further satisfaction; but we shrink from troubling you at so sad a time. Sokrates: If I cannot convince you that I do not consider my present situation sad, I shall find it hard indeed to persuade the rest of mankind. You think I am more foolish than the swans; for they sing sweetest just before they die; not, as men say, that they are lamenting their approaching death, but because they are Apollo’s birds and know the good things that are in Hades; whereas they sing in gladness of heart. I too am the servant of Apollo, and I depart this life no less cheerfully than they: speak then, if you have anything to ask. Simmias: I will speak: the truth of the matters we have been discussing is hard to discover, nevertheless it were fainthearted to abandon the search. So in default of some divine word we must strive by all means to find the surest theory that human reason can furnish, as it were a raft to bear us over the sea of life. Therefore, I tell you, Sokrates, that the foregoing proof does not seem to me complete.

5. πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ] ‘was absorbed in the foregoing discourse’.

12. βέλτιον ἀν λεχθήναι] The insertion of ἀν, which could easily drop out after βέλτιον, seems to me necessary. Prof. Geldes observes that verbs of thinking often take a bare infinitive, to express duty. This is true: but φαίνεται is not a verb of thinking.
σοι ἔρω. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκάτεροι ἀπορῶν τὸν ἐτερον προωθεῖ καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκούσαι, ὡκεῖν δὲ ὠχλον παρέχειν, μὴ σοι ἀνήδες ἢ διὰ τὴν παρούσαν συμφοράν. καὶ ὅσ ἀκούσας ἐγέλασεν τε ἡρέμα καὶ φησίν, Βασί, ὡ Σήμια: ἢ τον Ε χαλεπτώς ἄν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους πείσαιμι ὅσ οὐ συμφοράν τὴν παρούσαν τύχην, ὅτε γε μηδὲ ύμᾶς δύναμαι πεῖθεν, ἀλλὰ φοβείσθη, μὴ δυσκολῶτερον τι νῦν διάκειμαι ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίω καὶ, ὅσ ἐσικε, τῶν κύκων δοκῶ φαύλωτερος ύμῖν εἶναι τὴν μαντικὴν, ὅτι ἐπεθαύνατε ὅτι δει αὐτοὺς ἀποδανεῖν, ἄδοντες δὲ εἰ τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, τότε δὴ πλείστα καὶ μάλιστα ἀδυνά, ἰο γεγρηθῶτες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀπείνα, οὐπερ εἰσὶν θεράποντες. οἱ δὲ ἀνθρωποὶ διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκων καταφείλονται, καὶ φασιν αὐτοὺς θρηνοῦντας τὸν θανάτον ύπὸ λύπης ἐξειδεῖν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄρεων ἢδει, ὅταν πεινῇ ἢ ρίγῳ ἢ τινα ἄλλην λύπην λυπήται, οὐδὲ αὐτή ἢ τε ἀνήδων 15 καὶ κελῶν καὶ ὁ ἐπτός, ἢ δὴ φασὶ διὰ λύπην θρηνοῦντα ἢδεῖν ἀλλ' οὐτε ταῦτα μοι φαίνεται λυπούμενα ἢδεῖν οὐτε οἱ κύκων, ἀλλ' ἤτε οἴμαι τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄντες μαντικοί τε εἰςι καὶ προειδότες τα ἐν "Αἰδον ἀγαθὰ ἀδούσι καὶ τερποῦνται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφεροῦτος ἢ εν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς πο οἴμαι 20 ὀμόδουλος τε εἰναι τῶν κύκων καὶ ἱέρως τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ κελῶν ἐκείνου τὴν μαντικὴν ἢχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐδὲ δυσθυ- μότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τοῦτον γ' ἐνεκα λέγειν τε χρῆ καὶ ἐρωτάν ὁ τι ἄν βούλησθε ἐως Ἀθηναίον ἐδειν ἀνδρεῖς ἑνδεικ. Καλῶς, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὡ Σήμιας· καὶ ἐγὼ τέ σοι ἔρωτ 25 καὶ ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὐ ὧδε, ἢ οὐκ ἀποδέχεσαι τα εἰρημένα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ

7. διάκειμαι] Heindorf takes this for a subjunctive, and Hirschig reads διάκέιμαι: but, even if διάκειμαι could be a subjunctive, that mood would be positively wrong here. Sokrates says 'you are afraid (not lest I should be, but) lest I am more peevish than heretofore'. Contrast this with the words of Simmias, μή σοι ἀνήδες ἢ, where the subjunctive has its proper reference to the future.

10. καὶ μάλιστα] Schanz reads καλιστα, after Blomfield's conjecture. I have reverted to the reading of the mss.

23. τούτον γε ἐνεκα] 'so far as this is concerned'.

24. ἐως Ἀθηναῖον] Cobet proposes ἐως ἄν οἱ ἑνδεικ ἐδοκει. I do not conceive that any person who has ears to hear will prefer Cobet's sentence to Plato's: nor, apart from this, would one willingly sacrifice the grave courtesy of Sokrates' language. I regret that Schanz determines to bracket the clause; still omission is preferable to mutilation. Prof. Geddes justly says ἀνδρεῖς ἑνδεικ is to be regarded as one expression, and compares 69 Ε τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοι δικασταί. The common reading is ἐως ἂν οἱ, but ἂν οἱ are wanting in the best mss.
4. καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι] Hirschig wrongly brackets μη. The words παντὶ ...προαφίστασθαι are all qualified by μη φωνῆι: or as Heindorf puts it, we may regard καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι as equivalent to μὴ προαφισταμένους. We have here a very strong case of μη ou after a word which only implies negation: cf. Sympos. 210 Β πολλὴ ἁμαρτία μη ωχὶ ἐν τε καὶ ταύτῃ ἠγέρθασαι.

6. ἡ μαθείᾳ i. e. either to learn from another or to discover by our own researches: cf. 99 Β. Hesiod says, Works and Days 291, οὐτὸς μὲν πανάριστος, ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοῦν. | ἐσθλὸς δ᾽ αὐ κάκεινος, ὃς εὖ εἰσὶντι πλήθησα.

10. λόγον θελοῦ 'a divine doctrine'; such as the Orphic traditions. The Pythagorean Simmias, whose mystical tendencies are well contrasted with the clear and acute intellect of Kebes, naturally gives a θεῖος λόγος the preference over dialectical demonstration. Cf. 107 Α. Olympiodorus explains it, αὐτοπτικὸς νοῦς ὁ θεῖο τῷ ὑπὲρ αὐνῶν. But the other interpretation is more natural and more dramatically appropriate. The mss. have ἡ λόγον, Schanz brackets ἡ: I have followed Heindorf in omitting it. That ἡ is ever explanatory I do not believe: it certainly is not so in the passages cited by Prof. Geddes. Plato would have used καὶ. St. retains ἡ.

85 ε—86 δ, c. xxxvi. Simmias states his objection. All the terms that have been applied to soul and body may be transferred to harmony and the lyre. The harmony is invisible, immaterial, beautiful, divine; the lyre is material, composite, earthly, permissible. Might we not then on the same principle maintain that the harmony must survive the destruction of the lyre? yet we know it does not. Now suppose the doctrine to be true, that the soul is a harmony of the body, arising from the due proportion and temperament of its parts; will she not, let her be ever so divine, vanish away if these bodily conditions cease? will she not, like other harmonies, cease to be, long before the body itself suffers dissolution?

As I have pointed out in the introduction, the refutation of this theory does not constitute an argument for immortality. To refute a doctrine which would
be fatal to mortality is not the same as to prove immortality. Plato justly considered that a view so widely entertained and so hostile to his own, must be disposed of; but its overthrow leaves the argument precisely where it was at δ1 A.

2. ἡ δὴ So Forster for ἡ.

7. διατέμπῃ Schanz brackets this word: needlessly, I think.

εἰ τις διασχιρίζοντο] The apodosis never comes. Prof. Geddes finds it in ὅρα ὅν, 86 δ. This is not strictly accurate; for the subject of διασχιρίζοντο is supposed to maintain that the harmony survives the lyre, while the subject of ἐὰν τις ἄξιος maintains that the soul is the first to perish. In fact the protasis ἐὰν τις ἄξιος is substituted for the original protasis.

10. διερρωγιών τῶν χρωδών is bracketed by Hirschig, whom Schanz follows: again I see no reason.

16. ὑπολαμβάνομεν] The use of the first person by Simmias would seem to imply that this doctrine was Pythagorean. But there is little or no evidence to that effect, and it is irreconcilable with the Pythagorean dogma of transmigration. Aristotle de anima 1 iv 407b27 mentions the theory as πίσιν πολλάς, but without assigning it to any particular school or thinker. Macrobius ascribes it to Pythagoras and Philolaos; but the testimony of so late a writer is worthless. Prof. Geddes remarks that it seems more Eleatic than Pythagorean: and there certainly is some resemblance between this ἀρμονία and the conception of ψυχή as a κράμα attributed to Zeno by Diogenes Laertius ix 29. The view of Parmenides is expounded by Theophrastos de sensu §§ 3, 4: it is however merely a theory of perception. The opinion that soul is a harmony was certainly held by Aristoxenos the musician, as we learn from Cicero Tusc. 1 10: and Lucretius in controversy the theory (III 94 foll.) evidently had him chiefly in his mind; cf. III 131 reddet harmoniai Nomen ad organicos alto delatum Heliconi. But Aristoxenos was a pupil of Aristotle, not a Pythagorean. On the whole then it seems probable that Simmias is not speaking as a Pythagorean, but making himself the exponent of a widely received opinion. Kebes, who is equally a Py-
that theorean, professes his disbelief in the doctrine, 87 A: but on the other hand it is a favourite theory with Echekrates, 88 D.

2. κράσιν] 'a temperament'. Compare the lines of Parmenides quoted by Theophrastos l. l. (Karsten 145 foll.) :

ός γάρ ἐκάστῳ ἔχει κράσις μελέων πολυπλάγκτων,

τὸς νῦς ἀνθρώπωσι παράστηκεν· τὸ γάρ

αιτὸ

ἐστὶν ὅπερ φρονεῖ μελέων φύσεως ἀνθρώπωσι καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντὶ· τὸ γάρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα.

That is to say, the character of the perception is dominated by the preponderating elements of the percipient. As Theophr, remarks, Parmenides does not distinguish between φρονεῖν and αἰσθάνεσθαι.

The word ἀρμονία is generally used to denote a succession of musical tones, not their simultaneous accord, for which συμφωνία is the ordinary term. The former meaning is however here clearly unsuitable; and in fact ἀρμονία is a general term expressing the relation between musical sounds, in itself signifying neither succession nor accord.


IX 29 ψυχήν κράμα ὑπάρχειν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, κατὰ μηδενὸς τούτων εἰκράτησιν.

10. παραμένειν] 'remain with us'. Cf. 62 E. The word occurs again and again in this sense; yet Hirschig must needs alter it to ἐπιμένειν.

86 D—88 B, c. xxxvii. Sokrates defers his reply to Simmias until he has heard the objection of Kebes, which the latter states as follows. I think our argument is no further on than it was: I admit that the antenatal existence of the soul has been fairly proved, but the evidence of her existence after death seems still insufficient. Not that I agree with the objection of Simmias; but all that has yet been proved is that the soul is more lasting than the body. Suppose a weaver were in the habit of making his own coats; in the course of his life he would wear out many coats; but when his time came to die, the last coat would exist after him; yet we do not deny that the weaver is more durable than the coat. Similarly the soul in the course of a man's life may wear out many bodies: that is, so fast as the body wastes, she may renew it like a garment that needs mending; but when the time of her dissolution comes, she perishes and the body as last renewed by her exists after her.
Or to grant you even more: let us suppose that she wears out many bodies, not only in the span of one life, but in many lives; and that at the separation she continues to exist in Hades; yet we have no assurance that this goes on for ever; after repeated incarnations she may gradually be wearied out, and some one of them will be her last. Therefore it is not enough to show that the soul is ever so much stronger and more lasting than the body: you must show that in her own nature she is altogether indissoluble and eternal; else our hope of immortality is but foolishness.

1. διαβλέψας 'with a piercing glance'. This rare word well describes the penetrating gaze of Sokrates' prominent eyes (Theaetetus 143 E) from under the gathered eyebrows: much the same is expressed by ταυρηδόν ὑποβλέψας in 117 B. The preposition seems to have the same force as in one usage of διαβάω—i.e. with eyelids far apart: cf. Aristotle de insomniis 462a13 ἐνίοις γὰρ τῶν νευτέρων καὶ πάμ- παν διαβλέποντοι (with eyes wide open), ἐὰν τὴ σκότος, φαίνονται εἴδωλα πολλὰ κινούμενα, ὡς τ' ἐγκαλύτερθαι πολλάκις φασθούμενοι. Compare Xenophon Sym-
τερον Ψυχή σώματος, οὐ ξυγχωρώ τῇ Σιμμίου ἀνυλάησει δοκεί
γάρ μοι πᾶσι τούτοις πάνω πολύ διαφέρειν. τί οὖν ἂν φαίη ὁ
λόγος ἐπὶ ἀπίστεις, ἐπειδὴ ὅρμη ἀποσκανύτος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ γε
ἀσθενέστερον ἐτί ὃν; τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιστέρον οὐ δοκεί σοι ἂναγκαίον ὃ
εἶναι ἐτί σφοξεθαί ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ; πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ τάδε ἐπι-
σκεφάν, εἴ τι λέγον εἰκόνος γάρ τινος, ὡς ἔοικεν, κάγῳ ὡστερ
Σιμμίας δέομαι. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ταῦτα, ὠσπερ ἂν
τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου υφάντον προσβούτον ἀποσκανύτος λέον τούτον
τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλολεν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἀλλ' ἐστὶ ποὺ σῶς, τεκ-

μήριον δὲ παρέχοιτο θομάτιον ὁ ἰμπεχέθη αὐτὸς υφήγαμεσος, ὃτι
ἐστὶ σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλολεν, καὶ εἴ τις ἀπιστοτις αὐτῶ, ἀνερωτη-
πότερον πολυχρονιστέρον ἐστὶ τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ὁ ἰματίον ἐν σ
χρεία τε ὄντος καὶ φορομένου, ἀποκριμανέου δὲ τινος ὃτι πολὺ τὸ
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἴσοτο ἀποδεδειχθαὶ ὃτι παντὸς ἁρα μᾶλλον ὁ γε

τὸ δ' οἴμαι, οὐ Σιμμία, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει σκέπτει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ἢ λέγω.
πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ὑπολαβόητοι ὃτι εὐθεῖας λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων ὃ γὰρ
υφάντες όντος πολλὰ κατατρίξαι τοιαύτα ἰματία καὶ υφηγάμενος
ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὑστερος ἀπόλολεν πολλῶν ὄντως, τοῦ δὲ τελευταῖον δ
οίμαι πρότερον, καὶ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον τούτον ἐνεκα ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν
ἰματίον φαυλότερον οὖδ' ἀσθενέστερον. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ οἴμαι εἰκόνα
δὲξαι ἂν ψυχή πρὸς σώμα, καὶ τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν

1. οὐ ξυγχωρῶ] Again we may ob-
serve the superior acuteness of Kebes. The objection of Simmias is ingenious and plausible, but somewhat flimsy: it crumbles away at the first touch of the elenclus: moreover its refutation adds nothing to the argument. That of Kebes goes straight to the root of the matter, and obliges Sokrates to put forth his whole argumentative strength; while its disproof constitutes the crowning argument of the dialogue.

dokei γαρ] 'for I think soul is far superior in all these respects'.

7. ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι] 'for I think your argument is exactly parallel to the assertion one might make about a weaver who died at an advanced age'. Heindorf would insert ei, but this is not necessary.

9. ἐστι ποὺ σῶς] I adopt without hesitation Forster's admirable emendation, which by a very slight change materially improves the sense. ἔστι seems to me quite inappropriate, notwithstanding Heindorf's defence of it and its re-
tention by Z. and St.

10. αὐτὸς υφήγαμενος] The weaver is chosen as the closest parallel to the soul, who is perpetually renewing the body that is her vesture.

11. ἀπιστοῖς] mss. ἀπιστῶν which cannot stand, since the question would be pointless in the mouth of an opponent. The ὃ which belongs to λέγει also does duty for παρέχοντα, ἀνερωτηπότις, and εἰσερχοντα.

16. τὸ δὲ] 'but in fact this is not the case'. Cf. Theaetetus 157 B, Sophist 244 A, Laws 642 A.
μέτρι ἀν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὡς ἢ μὲν ψυχῇ πολυχρώμιον ἔστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενεστέρον καὶ ὄλγοχρωμότερον. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίνῃ ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν, ἀλλος τε καὶ εἰ πολλὰ ἐτή βίοι· εἰ γὰρ ἰέω τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλυότο ἐτί ζῶντος ἐ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχῇ ἀεὶ τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφάινοι, 5 ἀναγκαῖοι μεντάν ἐν, ὡπότε ἀπολλυότο ἡ ψυχή, τὸ τελευταῖον ὑφασμα τυχεῖν αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν καὶ τούτῳ μόνον προτέραν ἀπόλυ- λυσθαι, ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸτ' ἕδη τὴν φύσιν τῆς άσθε- νείας ἐπιδεικνύοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταχῦ σαπεῖν διοίκοιτο. ὡστε τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὕτω ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα βαρθεῖν, ὡς, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθά- 10 88 νομεν, ἐτί που ἴμων ἡ ψυχῇ ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ πλέον ἐτί τῷ λέγοντι [ἡ] αὐτῷ λέγεις συγχωρήσειν, δοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρίν καὶ γενέσθαι ἴμασ χρόνῳ εἶναι ἴμων τὰς ψυχὰς, ἀλλα μηδὲν κολύσειν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐνών ἐτί εἶναι καὶ ἐσεθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενήσθαι καὶ ἀποβανέσθαι αὐτὶς· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει 15 ἵσχυρὸν εἶναι, ὡστε πολλάκις γενομένην ψυχὴν ἀντέχειν δοὺς δὲ ταύτα ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωρῶι, μη οὐ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς

3. πολλά σώματα κατατρίβειν] i.e. within the limits of a single human life. Kebes puts his case in two forms: the superior durability of the soul is consistent with the supposition (1) that during the ordinary span of human life she wears out many bodies, perpetually restoring them as they suffer waste; (2) that after separation from one body she may survive and enter into another and another. Yet in the first case she may become extinct on separating from the body; in the second she may after several incarnations be worn out by her labours and at some one separation perish utterly. Therefore we cannot argue that because the soul outlasts the body she is necessarily immortal.

9. ἐπιδεικνύοι] Prof. Geddes is not, I think, right in referring this optative to indirect speech, though Soph. Phil. 617 would justify it (not the other passage he cites). As Stallbaum points out ἄν is easily carried on from above, ἀναγκαίων μεντάν.

11. ἡ ψυχὴ ἔστιν] Schanz adopts ἔστιν from Hirschig, for which I see no sufficient reason, since ἔστι is general. Note that Kebes treats the whole of chapters 25—29 as intended to supplement ἀνάμνησις by showing the after-existence of the soul: he recurs to the objection he made at 77 c, against which Socrates appeals to ἀναπλάθεσις, but nevertheless proceeds to bring fresh evidence.

τῷ λέγοντι [ἡ] Madvig proposed to strike out ἡ, and Schanz seems right in bracketing it. For (1) τῷ λέγοντι wants an object, (2) Kebes offers to grant not more than what Socrates says, but more than he has himself just said. He will grant not only that the soul may have existed before birth and may wear out many bodies in this life before perishing, but also that she may survive the severance once or many times before she herself succumbs.

15. οὕτω γὰρ αὐτῷ αὐτῷ, referring to ψυχήν, seems to be attracted into the gender of ἵσχυρόν. Prof. Geddes compares 109 Λ πάμεγα τι εἶναι αὐτῷ, sc. την γην.
2. τούτον δὲ τῶν βανάτων] Since no one knows how often his soul has already been incarnate, he cannot tell whether or not she may survive the termination of his present life.

4. εἰ δὲ τούτο οὕτως ἔχει] ‘if the hypothesis I suggest be true’. Few who have read through this forcibly stated argument will agree with Wagner that ‘it gives the reader the impression that Kebes is represented as an awkward speaker, because he is not a clear thinker’.

88 c—89 c, €. xxxviii. Phaedo pauses to describe the effect of these objections upon the audience: how their confidence is shattered in the argument and in their own judgment. Echekrates sympathises, adding that the conception of soul as a harmony has always had a strong attraction for him. He desires to know how Sokrates behaved. Never, replies Phaedo, did Sokrates appear to greater advantage: he showed neither irritation nor dismay; he cheered and encouraged us, as a general rallies his broken forces. In illustration thereof Phaedo narrates a little by-play which passed between Sokrates and himself.

By interposing this interlude Plato desires to mark in the most emphatic manner that an acute crisis has arrived in the discussion. The whole position has to be reconsidered, and the argument, as Echekrates says, started again almost from the beginning. The exact situation of the argument at this point is dealt with in the introduction § 2, where I have tried to show as clearly as possible the relation between the earlier and the later part of the demonstration. A short dialogue between Phaedo and Echekrates is similarly introduced at 102 λ to mark the completion of an important step.

13. τόσο προερημένους λόγους] governed by ἀπαρτίαν.

15. ἐπιστα ἤ] Schanz, following Heindorf, reads εἶναί against the mss. But the change of mood is nothing remarkable, as the instances cited by Stallbaum will show. The subjunctive represents a more vivid conception of the contingency: see Prof. Goodwin’s excellent article in the Journal of Philology, vol. viii p. 18. For εἰμέν BCD corruptly give ἦμεν.
γὰρ αὐτὸν μὲν ἴνα ἀκούσαντα σου τοιοῦτον τι λέγειν πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν
ἀπέφρεται τίνι οὖν ἔτι πιστεύομεν λόγῳ; ὥς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ἦν, ὅ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, οὖν εἰς ἀπιστιὰν καταπέττωκεν.

θαυμαστῶς γὰρ μοι ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ ἂν,
τὸ ἀφομιναί τινὰ ἢμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπέμνησέν 5
με ῥήθησι οὗ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προέδεικτο· καὶ πάνω δέομαι
πάλιν ὥσπερ ἔξ ἀρχῆς ἀλλ' ἄλλον τινὸς λόγον, οὗ με πείσει ὡς τοῦ
ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναπαθήσεικεν ἡ ψυχὴ. λέγε ὦν πρὸς Δίος, τῇ
Ε ὁ Σωκράτης μετηλθεῖ τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον κακεῖνος, ὥσπερ ὡρᾶς
φής, ἔνδηλος τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πράος ἔβοιθεν 10
τῷ λόγῳ; καὶ ίκανὸς ἐβοηθήσεν ἢ ἐνδεώς; πάντα ἢμῖν δίελθε ὡς
dίσκαι ἀκριβέστατα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν, ὁ 'Εχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη
89 οὐ πῶς ποτὲ μᾶλλον ἡγάσθην ἡ τότε παραγευμένοις. τὸ μὲν οὖν
ἐξειν 'ο τι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος ἴσως οὔδεν ἄτοπον ἀλλὰ ἐγὼ μάλιστα 15
ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὥς ἴδεσι καὶ εὔμνεος καὶ
ἀγαμένος τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἐπειτα ἢμῶν ὥς
ὁξεῖς ἡσθετο ὁ πεπόνθευμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἐπειτα ὥς ἐν ἢμᾶς
λάσατο καὶ ὥσπερ πεφευγότας καὶ ἡττημένους ἀνεκάλεσατο καὶ
προύτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαι τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον. 20

EX. Πῶς δὴ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ ἔρω. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιά αὐτοῦ καθήμενος
B παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός, ὅ ὦ ἐπὶ πολὺ ψυχοτέρου
ἡ ἐγὼ. καταψηφίσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπιέσας τὰς ἐπὶ
τῶν αὐχεν τρίχας· εἰδὼθε γὰρ, ὡτὲ τύχοι, παῖξεν μου εἰς τὰς 25
τρίχας—Αὐρίον δὴ, ἐφή, ἵσος, ὁ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς κόμας ἀπο-
κερεῖ. Ἐοικέν, ἢν δ' ἔγω, ὁ Σωκράτης. Οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ.
Ἀλλὰ τῇ; ἢν δ' ἐγὼ. Τῇμερον, ἐφή, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας,
εἶντερ γε ἢμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ διυνόμεθα αὐτόν ἀνα-

2. ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα] 'for how strongly
persuasive was that theory which Sokrates
maintained, and yet it has now fallen into
discredit'.

4. ἀντιλαμβάνεται] 'has a wonderfully
firm grasp of me'. It never seems
to have occurred to Echekrates that his
favourite theory was fatal to the soul's
immortality and to metempsychosis.

10. ἐνδηλός τι] Heindorf rightly says
that τι belongs to ἀχθόμενος.

15. ὁ τι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος] The subject is
placed in the relative instead of the main
clause.

17. ὡς οξεῖς ἡσθετο] as is shown by
his admonition against 'misology' in the
next chapter.

26. τὰς καλὰς κόμας] Z. and St.
with some mss. have τὰς καλὰς ταύτας
κόμας.

29. ἀναβιώσασθαι] This transitive
use of the word occurs again Crito 48 c.
2. ὡσπερ Ἀργείων] referring to the story told by Herodotus I 82. The Argives, foiled in their attempt to recover Thryaei from the Spartans, vowed not to let their hair grow till they reconquered it. Prof. Geddes remarks that the Romans on the contrary showed grief by letting their hair grow long.

3. ἀναμαχόμενοι] ‘renewing the battle’.

4. οὐδ’ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς] We find the legend in Euthydæmus 297 c. Herakles, while fighting the hydra, was assailed by a big crab, against which he called in the aid of Iolas. Cf. Laos 919 b. Presently Schanz after Cobet brackets τῶν Ἡρακλῆς.

5. ἦσσ ἐτὶ φῶς ἐστίν] because at sunset he must drink the poison.

89 D—90 D, c. xxxix. Sokrates continues: we must beware lest we become haters of arguments as some become haters of mankind. For when one has been repeatedly deceived in others, whom he believed to be good and true men, he falls sometimes into distrust and dislike of the whole human race. But this is owing to his ignorance of human nature: he does not reflect that extremes are rare, and that the very good and very bad are equally few in number. It is the same with arguments: if we have come rightly or wrongly to distrust one argument after another, we must not hastily conclude that no valid argument is to be found; it is our own want of skill that we should rather blame. We ought to take warning by those contentious disputants, who assert that there is no stable truth in anything, and fancy themselves prodigiously clever to have found this out. Yet it were sad indeed, supposing there is such a thing as truth, and that we might discover it, if, instead of laying the fault where it is really due, we quarrelled with philosophy and thus deprived ourselves of all chance of attaining truth.

11. ὁ λόγος μυθήσασ] ‘than by conceiving a hatred for arguments’; explanatory of τοῦτον.
οὔδεν ὑγίες εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἦν οὖκ ἔσθησαι σὺ τούτῳ γνωρίμενον; Πάνω γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ’ ὦς, αἰσχρόν, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἀνευ τέχνης τής περὶ τάνθρωπεια τοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; εἰ γὰρ ποιμέν τῆς τέχνης ἐχρήστο, ὁστερ ἔχει, οὕτως ἀν 90 ἡγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι 5 ἐκατέρως, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλεῖστοις. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐφην ἐγώ. Ὡσπέρ, ἦ δ’ ὦς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων οὐει τι σπανιότερον εἶναι ἡ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα μικρόν ἐξευρέοι ἀνθρώπον ἢ κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὀτιοῦν; ἢ αὐ ταχὺν ἢ βραδὺν ἢ ἀἰσχρόν ἢ καλὸν, ἢ λευκόν ἢ μέλαινα; ἦ οὐκ ἔσθησαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοι-10 ὦτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἔσχατων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἄφθονα καὶ πολλὰ; Πάνω γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν οὐει, ἐφη, εἰ 5 πονηρίας ἄγων προτεθεῖ, πάνω ἄν ὀλίγους καὶ ἑνταῦθα τοὺς πρῶτους φανῆραι; Εἰκὸς γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. Εἰκὸς γὰρ, ἐφη ἀλλὰ ταύτη μὲν οὐκ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νῦν δὴ 15 προαόγους ἐγὼ ἐφεστώμην, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη, ἦ, ἐπειδὰν τις πιστεύῃ λόγῳ του ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἀνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κάπετα ὀλίγον ὑπερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδῆς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὄν, ἐνίοτε δ’ οὐκ ὄν, καὶ ἀνθίς ἔτερος καὶ ἐτερος καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς

οὐς ἄν ἡγήσατο] 'whom he would naturally think'. ἄν of course belongs to ἡγήσατο.
1. ἔσθησαι σὺ τούτῳ] Z. has οὖτω τούτῳ. St. οὖτω πως τούτῳ.
2. αἰσχρόν is bracketed by Schanz. ἀνευ τέχνης i.e. without a knowledge of mankind.
3. τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα] Although the order of the words inclines us to take σφόδρα with ὀλίγους, I think the sense requires that it should be joined with χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς. Heindorf would double σφόδρα; but it is not really wanted with ὀλίγους.
4. τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἔσχατων] 'the extremes in both directions'. The ἔσχατα are the two opposite qualities, ἄκρα the extremes of these. Thus if we conceive λευκὸν and μέλαιν to be represented by a straight line, the central portion is occupied by shades of grey; the ἔσχατα, or parts remote from the centre, by white and black; and the ἄκρα or ends of the line by the highest degree of each.
5. ἀλλὰ ταύτη μὲν] Sokrates has been led by the question of Phaedo into a digression upon the nature of the ἄτεχνα shown by misanthropes, which consists in their forgetting that extremes are seldom met with. But this does not constitute the analogy between μετανθρωπία and μυσολογία. The real analogy is that when we have been several times disappointed in a λόγος we jump to the conclusion that all λόγοι are worthless, without stopping to consider whether the fault may not lie in our unscientific treatment.
6. ἐπειδὰν τις πιστεύῃ] The apophasis never comes: Plato finishes the sentence as if he had not written ἦ, which Schanz, at Madvig's suggestion, omits.
7. οἱ περὶ τοὺς αὐτολογικοὺς λόγους] Plato may refer to the Ephesian school, οἱ ἰδεώτες of the Theaetetus: perhaps also to sophists of the type of Dionysodoros and Euthydemos, such as he seems to have in view at 101 E; and to the Cynics.

P.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

114

ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρέχουσας οὗθεν ὅτι τελευτῶντες οὖνται σοφώτατοι γεγονόνται τε καὶ κατανεοηκέναι μόνοι ὅτι ὧντε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενος οὐδὲν ὑπαιε βέβαιον οὕτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀτεχνώς ὄσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω καὶ κάτω τρέφονται καὶ χρόνου οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὲ μένει. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἐφη ἐγώ, ἀληθὴ λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν, ὥς Φαίδων ἐφη, οἰκτρόν ἄν ἐίῃ τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὅντος δὴ τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βέβαιον λόγῳ καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι, ἔστειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιοῦτοι τις λόγοις ὅ τοις αὐτοῖς τοτε μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτε δὲ μὴ, μὴ ἕαυτὸν τις αὐτῷ μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἁλγεῖν ἀσμενος ἐπὶ τὸν λόγους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αὐτίαν ἀπώσαστο καὶ ἦδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίων μισὸν τε καὶ λοιδορῶν διατελοὶ, τῶν δὲ ὅντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστῆμης στερηθείν. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἢν ὦ ἐγώ, οἰκτρόν δῆτα.

15

XL. Πρῶτον μὲν τόλμων, ἐφη, τούτο ἐνλαβηθόμεν, καὶ μὴ παρίσσειν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡς τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ὑπαίες ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὖσαν ὑμῶς ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀνδρεστέον καὶ προνεμένου ὑμῶς ἔχοιν, σοι μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἐπείτα βίου παντός ἑνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἑνεκα τοῦ θαινότου ὡς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγεν ἐν τῷ παροντὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτον οὐ 91


3. ἐνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται] Compare the invective of Theodoros against the Ephesians, Theaetetus 179 E foll. Besides these Heraleiteans (with whom Plato had really little or no quarrel, so far as regards the phenomenal world), the principal ἀντιλογικοὶ were Antisthenes with his school, and some later Sophists, who had caught up the trick of the Socrates method of question and answer and used it to force on the unwary the acceptance of the most preposterous paradoxes. Their habits are admirably described in the Euthydemos. These men, whose only object was to make a sensation, must be classed apart from disputants of the Cynic and Megarian schools, whose paradoxes rested upon logical and metaphysical errors which were genuine difficulties at the time; which in fact required all Plato’s genius to clear away.

90 d—91 c, e. xl. Let us beware then, says Sokrates, lest we rashly charge our argument with being faulty, when the fault is our own. The question is of deep interest to us all, and to me especially: indeed I feel less like a philosopher than like those who argue not for truth’s sake but merely that their opinion may prevail; only I am more anxious to persuade myself than you. However, if my belief is true, it is well; if not, it will at least make me better company for you while I am with you. For your part, you must think more of the truth than of Sokrates; and you must not accept my reasoning.
until you have fully tested it; lest I depart like a bee leaving my sting behind.

1. οἱ πάντες ἀπαλείης] The language suggests the Cynics; cf. Theaetetus 155 E εἰλαγάρ, ὁ παῖ, μᾶλ' εἴ ἄμως; cf. Sophist 246 δ, and Arist. metaph. Η iii 1043b 24 οὐς Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ όντως ἀπαλείης. Sophists of the eristic type are no doubt included.

6. εἰ μὴ εἴῃ παρέργον] 'unless it were merely by the way'. It is surprising that Prof. Geddes has adopted against all the mss. Hermann's most felicitous conjecture εἰ μὴ εἴῃ παρέργον. Had εἰ been found in the texts, one would have felt strongly inclined to alter it to ἐὰς.

8. λογίζομαι γὰρ] 'for I am reasoning, my dear companion — see how selfishly'. All this is Sokratic εἰρωνεία: Sokrates and Plato were the last men to persuade themselves that a belief was true, because it was pleasant.

11. ἦττον τοῖς παρούσι] 'I shall be less likely to annoy the company with lamentation'. ἦττον of course qualifies all the words that follow: it will less be the case that I shall annoy them by lamenting. The passage would not have required a note but for the strange misconception of Wagner, who seems to think that ἦ is wanted before ἐρωμένος.

12. ἦ δὲ ἄγνωσ] Sokrates means that one way or another his doubts will be cleared away; he will not go on existing in doubt whether his existence will continue. For at death he will either find assurance of immortality or he will cease to be, and in neither case is he subject to ἄγνωσ. ἄγνωσ ἐστιν means shortly after the present moment, not after death. ἦ ἄγνωσ is Fischer's suggestion for διάσως, which is the reading of the best mss.: the rest have ἂνα.


17. ὅπως μὴ] The editions generally have εἰλαβόμενοι ὅπως: but the participle is absent in BCD and omitted by Schanz.
ἐμαυτόν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλεῖπων οἰχήσομαι.

XLI. Ἄλλα ἵτεόν, ἔφη, πρῶτον μὲ ὑπομνήσατε ἢ ἐλέγετε, ἡν μὴ φαίνομαι μεμνημένος. Σύμμιας μὲν γὰρ, ὡς ἐγγορμα, ἀπεσεῖ 5 τε καὶ φοβείτα, μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅμως καὶ θεότερον καὶ κάλλιον ὅν τοῦ σώματος προανεύονται ἐν ἀρμονίας εἰδει οὖσα: Κέβης δὲ μοι ἔδοξε τοῦτό μὲν ἐμὸν συγχωρείν, πολυχρονιστοῖς γε εἶναι ψυχῆς σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἀδηλον παντὶ, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχή τοῦ τελευταίου σώμα καταλιπ-10 ποῦσα νῦν αὐτή ἀπολλύονται, καὶ ἣ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὅλθος, ἐτεί σώμα τε καὶ Κέβης, ἢ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι; Συμμομολογεῖτιν δὴ ταῦτ' εἶναι ἀμφότερος. Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, πάντας ἑ τοὺς ἐμπροσθείς λόγους οὖς ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μὲν, τοὺς δ' οὐ; 15 Τοὺς μὲν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ' οὐ. Τι οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅσ, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε, ἐν δ' ἐφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμμησιν εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτον οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἀλλοτρία πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεχθῇμαι; Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, 92 καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ἦς ἐπείδηθ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς 20 οὐδὲν λόγον. Καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Συμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάντα ἐν θαυμάζωμι, εἴ μοι περὶ γε τοῦτον ἄλλα ποτὲ δόξεων. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἄλλα ἀνάγκης σοι, ἔφη, ὃ ξένε ᵐηθαιες, ἄλλα

1. ἐμαυτόν] This reading has the best authority: Z. and St. give αὐτόν.

ὥσπερ μέλιττα] The commentators think this is borrowed from the line of Eupolis concerning Perikles, τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλεῖπε τοῖς ἀκρουμένοις. The expression seems likely to have been proverbial.

91 c—92 D, s. xli. Sokrates briefly restates the objections of Simmias and Keubes: he then points out to the former that he must make his choice between the doctrine that soul is a harmony and the doctrine that learning is reminiscence. The theory of reminiscence presupposes that the soul existed before the body; but a harmony comes into existence after that which produces it: either therefore soul is not a harmony or she has had no precognition of the ideas. Simmias admits this and declares without hesitation in favour of reminiscence, which he affirms to be a rational hypothesis, while the other is merely a plausible analogy.

The first refutation is addressed to believers in ἀνάμμησις and pre-existence of the soul; it appeals therefore only to Platonists or Pythagoreans.

6. ἐν ἀρμονίας εἰδεί] Cf. Timaeus 30 c τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν μέροις εἰδεί μηδενὶ καταξιώσω-μεν. Also Republic 389 b; Cratylus 394 D.

8. πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις] We might take πολλὰ to refer to the exhaustion of many bodies during our human life, and πολλάκις to the repeated incarnations of the soul; the two cases put by Keubes. But the following words καὶ ἦ...πανεῖται seem to show that Sokrates had the first case only in view; and for the purposes of his argument there is no difference between them.

22. ἄλλα δοξαί] So Stallbaum and Schanz; Z. has δοξάσω with the ms.
δόξα, ἐάντερ μείνη ἤδε ἡ οὐσία, τὸ ἄρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πρᾶγμα, ψυχήν δὲ ἄρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων συγκείσθαι. οὐ γάρ που ἀποδέξει γε αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, ὡς πρότερον ἤνι ἄρμονία συγκείσθη, πρὶν ἐκείνα εἶναι ἕξ ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν συντεθῆναι ἂ ἀποδέξει; Οὐδαμῶς, ἐφή, ὁ Σῶκρατες. Αἰσθάνει οὖν, ἢ δ’ ὦς, ὅτι ταῦτα σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν, ὅταν φῆς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπων εἶδός τε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ αὐτὴν συγκείσθη ἐκ τῶν συνεπῶν ὄντων; οὐ γάρ δὴ ἄρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτον ἔστιν ὁ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι ἔτι ἀνάρμοστοι ὄντες γίγνονται, τὸ τελευταίον δὲ πάντων ξυνίσταται ἡ ἄρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλυται. οὕτως οὖν σοὶ ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς ξυνάσσεται; Οὐδαμῶς, ἐφή ὁ Σιμμίας. Καί μήν, ἢ δ’ ὦς, πρέπει γε εὑπὲρ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ξυνοδῷ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἄρμονίας. Πρέπει γάρ, ἐφή ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὕτως τοίνυν, ἐφή, σοὶ οὖ ξυνοδός, ἀλλὰ ὅρα: πότερον άρεῖ τῶν 15 λόγων, τὴν μᾶθησιν ἀνάμφησιν εἶναι ἡ ψυχήν ἄρμονίαν; Πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐφή, ἐκείνῳ, ὁ Σῶκρατες. ὰδε μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ δ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότους τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπέςς, ὀθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώπως ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων ταῖς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις ξύνοιδα οὕσιν ἀλαξόσιν, καὶ ἂν τις αὐτοῦς μὴ 20 φιλάττηται, εὕ μαλα ἐξαπατώσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοίς ἀπασιν. ὦ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγοις δὶ ὑποθέσεως αξίας ἀποδείξει τις εὐρηται. ἐρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως

6. ταῦτα σοι συμβαίνει] 'this is what your statement amounts to'. Schmidt proposes οὐ ταῦτα, i.e. you make contradictory statements. This would do well enough, had it ms. authority; but the ms. reading is equally good sense. ταῦτα =πρότερον...συντεθήραι.

9. ὁ ἀπεικάζεις] 'harmony is not what you represent it', i.e. it is not such a thing as soul. This is the reading of the best mss. and gives a simpler construction than the ordinary ὁ.

10. οἱ φθόγγοι] i.e. the tones of the several strings before they are combined into harmony.

18. μετὰ εἰκότως τινός] 'through a certain analogy and plausibility'.

τοῖς πολλοῖς] Another indication that this was a widely spread popular opinion, not distinctively Pythagorean.

23. ἐρρήθη γάρ που] 'for we said, I think, that the existence of our soul before she entered the body rested on the same assurance as that of the very substance that has the title of absolute essence'. I have followed Schanz in adopting the emendation of Mudge, αὐτῇ for αὐτὴν. Retaining αὐτῆς we make Plato affirm that the pre-existence of the soul is assured inasmuch as her substance is absolute existence. But Plato never said anything of the sort: he merely said, as surely as the ideas exist, so surely did the soul, 76 ε. Heindorf in an acute note defends the vulgate, taking αὐτῆς as possessive; 'as surely as absolute existence belongs to her', i.e. was cognised by her; referring to the words in 76 ε
ύπάρχωσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἠμετέ-ραν οὖσαν. But (1) this interpretation supposes a very awkward ellipse of εἰσὶν in a relative clause, (2) the sense of αὐτῆς is severely strained: could Plato say ‘absolute existence is hers’, meaning ‘absolute existence is cognised by her’? (3) we have already seen reason to doubt the genuineness of the words in 76 ε. Hirschig also adopts αὐτῇ.

3. ἰκανῶς] ‘on adequate proof’.

92 E—94 B, c. xlii. Again a harmony must conform to the conditions of the materials which produce it; consequently the completeness of the harmony is in exact proportion to the completeness with which these are brought into tune. It follows then that there are degrees in harmony, corresponding with the conditions of the materials. But in soul there are no degrees; each soul is just as completely soul as every other. Furthermore we say some souls are virtuous, others vicious; and we define virtue to be a harmony, vice a discord of the soul. Now supposing that souls are harmonies, they are harmonies which admit of no difference in degree, since we have admitted that there are no degrees of soul. But a virtuous soul, being a harmony, has in her another harmony, while a vicious soul has a discord; therefore the virtuous soul is more of a harmony, that is, more of a soul, than the vicious. But this being contrary to our premisses, we are forced to conclude that no soul is more virtuous or vicious than another; or rather that all souls, being complete harmonies, are completely virtuous: a reduction ad absurdum.

The second argument will reach those who accept neither ἀνδρομήνιος nor the ideal theory, but who do accept the view that virtue is a harmonious state of the soul. It is to be observed (1) that the premiss in 93 A πολλοῦ ἃρα δεῖ κ.τ.λ., of which a different use is made in the next chapter, here is simply brought in to show that the perfection of the harmony depends upon the tuning of the strings &c., and consequently that as these may be more or less in tune, the harmony admits corresponding degrees of completeness: (2) the argument might seem to be complete in 93 B, where it is allowed that, while harmony admits degrees, soul does not. But we should regard all the earlier part of the chapter as collecting the materials for the refutation which proceeds consecutively from 93 D: moreover Plato had to guard against the rejoinder that, although harmony, as such, admits of degrees, there may yet be particular kinds of harmony, whereof soul is one, which do not admit of degrees.

11. ἐναντία γε ἀρμονία] ἐναντία is of course accusative plural. Plato means that the harmony is entirely the outcome of its constituents and is conditioned by
them, having no independent existence: as you tighten the string the tone rises. On this ground it would be impossible for a soul to be in a harmonious state, i.e. virtue, independently of the physical conditions of which she herself is the result.

4. μᾶλλον ἄρμοσθη καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον! There must be some distinction between μᾶλλον and ἐπὶ πλέον. I think μᾶλλον may apply to the degree of completeness in which the σύνθεσις is accomplished, and ἐπὶ πλέον to the character of the σύνθεσις itself. To take an illustration from music (1) the two notes forming an octave may be more or less in tune; (2) the octave and the fifth are more perfect concords than the fourth and third. This view, I find, is in a manner supported by Olympiodorus: ἐστι θεότητι μὴ εἶναι ἄρμονιας ἄρμονιας πλεῖον μηδὲ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἢττον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον περὶ τὴν ποιότητα τῶν διαστημάτων καὶ τῶν συστημάτων ἢ γὰρ διὰ τεσσάρων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ὅπερ ἐν πλεῖον ὅπερ ἐν ἐλάττω; τὸ δὲ δεύτερον περὶ τὴν άνως καὶ τὴν ἐπίτασιν κατ’ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ εἶδος οὐδεμιὰ ἄρμονια ὅπερ ἂνεται ὅπερ ἐπιτείνετο.

That is, a particular harmony, e.g. the fourth, cannot be harmonised ἐπὶ πλέον or μᾶλλον: since (1) it cannot comprehend more than a fixed number of tones, (2) it cannot (if it is to be a true fourth) admit any tampering with the pitch, κατὰ τῶν ἄρμονικῶν λόγων. The Pythagoreans, he says, συνάβαλε μὲν καλοστὶ τὴν διὰ τεσσάρων ἄρμονιαν ὡς ἁκοῦσα ἄρμονιαν κατακορυφασθῆνεν τὴν διὰ παρὰν ὡς μᾶλλον. As to the μᾶλλον καὶ ἢττον he remarks ἔχει γὰρ ἐκάστη ἄρμονία πλάτος τι κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν, οὐ μὴν κατὰ τῶν ἄρμονικῶν λόγων: that is to say, although one precise ratio alone constitutes a true octave, there is a certain margin of variation within which the ear will accept the interval as an octave.

7. μᾶλλον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας] I have retained μᾶλλον with all the mss. It is bracketed by Schanz and expunged by the Zürich editors. μᾶλλον however is not seldom used by Plato to strengthen another comparative; cf. Timaeus 87 c δικαίατερον γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν περὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κακῶν ἰσχεν λόγων. Politicus 259 c τῆς δὲ γνωστικῆς μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς χειροτεχνικῆς καὶ διὸς πρακτικῆς βοήλε τῶν βασιλέα φῶμεν οἰκείατέρον εἶναι; Gorgias 487 b οἰκείοντες τὰς μᾶλλον τῶν δεόντων. The present case is, it is true, a stronger one, since the word μᾶλλον is actually repeated; but this is softened by the interposition of ἐπὶ πλέον, and the pleonasm seems to me unnatural. Some editors would insert ψυχήν before ψυχῆς: but, as Schmidt observes, this is superfluous on account of the preceding words ἢ ὥν ἑστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχῆν.
2. ἀρμονίαν αὖ τινα ἄλλην] The conception of virtue as a harmonious condition of the soul is peculiarly Platonic. Compare the description of δικαιοσύνη in Republic 443 D where ἤδασαν τὰ λόγια πράττειν ἐκαστὸν ἐν αὐτῷ μὴν πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένε, ἀλλὰ τῷ δυντὶ τὰ ὀφειλέν δὲ γέρων καὶ ἁρμαντα αὐτῶν αὐτῶν καὶ κοιμήσαντα καὶ φέρεσθαι γενόμενον ἐαυτῷ καὶ ξυναρμολογήσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὡσπερ δρόνος τρεῖς ἀρμονίας ἀπεχθώσων, νεάνια τε καὶ νυτάσσας καὶ μεθαίσιν. And in Sophist 228 B we hear that vice is a στόιχειον of the soul.

8. τοῦτο δ' ἐστι τὸ ὀρολόγημα] 'the admission amounts to this, that (in saying one soul is not more soul than another) you affirm that one harmony is not more a harmony than another'. Schanz, following Madvig and Schmidt, brackets ἀρμονίας, so that we must understand ψυχήν ψυχήν in agreement with ἐτέραν ἐτέρας. But this prematurely anticipates the conclusion in ὁ ὅθον ὁμοιότητι...ὑμνοστα. The train of reasoning is thus. We agree that one soul is as much soul as any other. Assuming soul to be a harmony, this amounts to saying that all these harmonies, which we call souls, are equally harmonies. Now equal harmonies are equally harmonised and have an equal portion of harmony. Therefore souls, being harmonies, are equally harmonised. In other words, if souls are harmonies, they are equal harmonies; but equal harmonies cannot be more or less harmonised one than another; neither therefore can souls. There is no difficulty about ἀρμονίας, if we understand 'that particular harmony which is soul'.

21. παντελῶς] Soul is complete and
perfect soul, as such; therefore complete and perfect harmony: no discord then, and consequently no vice, can exist in her.

4. ψυχαί περίκασσων] Schanz brackets ψυχαί, following Heidorn. But the clause is of general application: ‘seeing that it is the nature of souls to be this precise thing, namely souls, in the same degree’.

5. ή καὶ καλῶς] ‘do you think this is a worthy conclusion? or that our theory would have been in such a predicament, had our premiss been correct, that soul is a harmony?’

6. πάσχειν ἄν] The mss. omit ἄν, which however occurs in the citation of Stobæus. It is certainly necessary, since el...ἐπ = ‘if our premiss had been correct’: which it is not.

94 B—95 A, c. xliii. Lastly we see that the soul rules the body, often thwarting its desires and controlling its affections; whereas we saw that a harmony could not act in opposition to its constituent elements. Soul therefore cannot be a harmony.

The last argument rests neither upon the ideal theory nor upon the doctrine that virtue is harmony: it is simply an appeal to common sense. Aristotle’s views on the subject will be found in de anima i iv §§ 2—9. In the lost dialogue Eudemos he argued against harmony, (1) that harmony has an opposite, viz. ἀναρμοστία, but soul has no opposite—an obvious petitio principii; (2) that the opposite of ἀρμοστία σώματος is ἀναρμοστία σώματος: the ἀναρμοστία is disease, weakness, and deformity, therefore the ἀρμοστία is health, strength, and beauty; none of which is soul. See Bernays, Dialogue des Aristoteles p. 26.

11. τόπερον συγχρωσύναν] The mss. are in confusion here. Schanz gives τόπερον [συγχρωσύσαν] τοὺς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθειν ἐναρμοστένην [παθήμασι]; which, omitting the brackets, is the reading of BCD. Schanz considers that the confusion arose because the copyist was puzzled by the use of τόπερον with a single interrogative. The sentence, as he reads it, seems to me however somewhat bare; and I have reverted to the text of Z. and St. In the next sentence ὡς el is found in B, ὡςει in cd. ὡςον is in Stobæus and many inferior mss. ὡς is in the margin of B, and was approved by Schanz N.C. p. 150, though he now prints ἡσε. St. and Z. give ὡςον.

εσθήσει, καὶ ἀλλὰ μνία που ὁρῶμεν ἐναντιουμένην τὴν ψυχήν τοῦ C κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἤ οὖν; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ὅγκον οὐ ἀμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μήποτ᾿ ἄν αὐτήν, ἀρμονίαν γε οὖσαν, ἐναντία ἄδειν, οἷς ἐπιτείνωτο καὶ χαλῶτο καὶ πάλλοικο καὶ ἄλλο ὅτι οὖν πάθος 5 πάσχοι ἐκεῖνα ἢ ὅν τυχάνα φίλα, ἀλλ’ ἐπεσθαὶ ἐκεῖνοι καὶ οὔποτ’ ἄν ἠγεμονεύειν; Ὅμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη πῶς ἐκρ ὦν; Τῇ οὖν; νῦν οὖ πάν τούναιτί ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργασμένη, ἠγεμονεύσα τ' ἐκεῖνων πάντων ἢ ὅν φησὶ τις αὐτήν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιουμένη ὅλην πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπόζονα πάντας D τοῖς, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ’ ἀλληδῷν, τὰ τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἱατρικὴν, τὰ δὲ πραότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, τάς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ὁργάς καὶ φόβοις ἢ ἀλλη οὖσα ἀλλο πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οἷον που καὶ Ὁμήρος ἐν Ὡδυσσέα πεποίηκεν, οὐ λέγει τὸν Ὁδυσσέα 15 στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἥνιπτα τυρφ' τέλαθι δή, κραδίη καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ’ ἔτης. Ἐ ἄρ’ οίει αὐτὸν ταῦτα πούσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἁρμονίας αὐτῆς οὖσης καὶ οἶας ἄγεσαι ὑπὸ τῶν σώματος παθῶν, ἀλλ’ οὖχ οἷας ἄγειν ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ οὐσῆς αὐτῆς πολύ θεωτέρον 20 τινὸς πράγματος ἧ καθ’ ἁρμονίαν; Νὴ Δία, οὗ Σώκρατες, ἔμοι γε δοκει. Ὁ γὰρ, ὁ ἄριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμὴ καλὸς ἔχειν ψυχῆν ἁρμονίαν τινὰ φάναι εἶναι οὔτε γὰρ ἄν, ὡς οὐκείν, Ὁμήρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ 95 ὄμολογοίμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοίς. Ἐχει οὔτως, ἔφη.

3. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν [93 Α. St. and Z. give ἐμπρόσθεν.]
4. οἷς ἐπετείνοιτο] i.e. ἐκεῖνος ἄ, cognate accusative, 'it can never give a sound contrary to the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and all the other conditions of the materials from which it arises'.
12. τοῖς ἐπιθυμίαις] The construction is usually regarded as following ἀπειλοῦσα rather than νουθετοῦσα. Heindorf compares Isocrates Aresp. 149 c (§ 48) and Lysias against Andokides § 33. But it is surely evident that ἐπιθυμίαις κ.τ.λ. depends on διαλεγομένη, as Schleiermacher takes it.
15. στήθος δὲ πλήξας] Odyssey xx 17. The passage is quoted also in Republic 390 D, 441 B.
22. Ὁμήρῳ] In the same half-serious manner Plato professes to trace the doctrine πάντα μὲν back to Homer: Theaeetetus 152 B εἰτῶν γὰρ Ὡμέρον τοις ἱεροῖς ἐξέσει καὶ μητῆρα Θησέων, πάντα ἐφρηκεν ἐγγονα ὤς τε καὶ κυνήσεως. Cf. 153 C.
95 A—Ε, c. xlv. Having thus disposed of the theory of harmony, Sokrates proceeds to deal with the objection of Kebses, which he first recapitulates. If the philosopher is to feel any reasonable confidence that his life in Hades will be the happier for his devotion to philosophy on earth, we must prove that the soul is absolutely indestructible. It is not enough that she is strong and godlike, nor that for ages before our birth she enjoyed an
intelligent existence. This does not prove her immortality: the very incarnation in a human body may be the first symptom of her coming dissolution; it matters not whether she undergo one or many such incarnations; if we cannot show that she is actually imperishable, our hope of a future life is vanity.

1. τα μεν ’Αρμονίας] Sokrates playfully personifies the theory of his Theban friend as Harmonia the Theban heroine. She had threatened the argument with destruction, but the persuasive tongue of Sokrates has propitiated her. Harmonia naturally suggests Kadmos, who is made to personify the objection of Kebes. Many and marvellous are the interpretations which various commentators have forced upon this simple piece of pleasantry, which ill deserves such treatment. But even the laboured absurdity of Olympiodorus compares favourably with such trifling as Stallbaum’s ‘ Simmiae ratio facillior, Cebetis difficillor ad refellendum fuit. quamobrem facile illa uxori haece marito tribuitur’. Supposing the ‘ratio’ of Simmias had been ten times more difficult than that of Kebes, to whom but Harmonia could it have been assigned? Heindorf sensibly says ‘hinc ad alteram illam Cebetis itidem Thebani transituro sponte se Cadmi offerebat mentio’. Mr Jackson has suggested to me that ἡμῖν conveys the notion of ‘bidding farewell’, ἰδοὺ having the same sense addressed to a deity as χαίρε addressed to a mortal: this view he supports by Cicero de natura deorum 1 § 124 deinde si maxime talis est deus, ut nulla gratia, nulla hominum caritate teneatur, valeat; quid enim dicam ‘propitius sit?’ This seems to me very probable: ἰδοὺ certainly is a form of farewell in Theokr. xv 143, where the lady ends her song with ἰδοὺ νῦν φίλη ‘Ἄδην, καὶ ἐν νέοτ’ εὑρήκασιν. Compare Apollonius Rhodius iv 1773 ἰδοὺ ἀριστήμων μακάρων γένος: the poet is taking leave of his heroes.

6. ὦ τι ἡπόρει] So Schanz after Forster. I have adopted ὦ τι mainly because λέγοντο seems to want an object. If ἐστι be retained we must translate: ‘while Simmias was speaking, at the time he was stating his difficulty’. Kebes did not agree with the theory of Simmias, but apparently did not see his way to refute it.

10. βασκανία] ‘lest some malign influence should put to confusion our discourse that is to come’. βασκανία expresses the prevalent superstition that over-confidence on the part of man drew down on him the resentment of superhuman powers. Cf. Verg. Ec. vii 27 aut, si ultra placitum laudarit, bacchare frontem Cingite, ne vati noceat mala lingua futuro. The ‘mala lingua’ of Codrus vents its malice, not in abuse, but in extravagant praise exciting super- nal wrath. This feeling has found its
most perfect expression in Caliban upon Sichos, e.g. 'Meanwhile the best way to escape His ire Is, not to seem too happy. 'Sees, himself, Vonder two flies, with purple films and pink, Bask on the pompinball above: kills both'. Plato however, when speaking seriously, is careful to repudiate the popular notion of θεῶν φόβον; cf. Timaeus 29 ε ἀγαθὸν ἢν [sc. ο θῶθ τὸ πάν εὐνυτᾶς], ἀγαθὸς δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε εὔγγειρεται φόβον. See too Phaedrus 247 Α φόβον γὰρ ἔξω θεῶν χοροῦ ἱσταται. Aristotle also denies it, metafì. 1 i 983a 2. ἡμῖν is Heindorf's correction for ἰμών, which seems too far removed from τὸν λόγον.

1. ἔσθια seems suspicious, and is bracketed by Schanz. As it has strong ms. support however I have retained it. Λέγεσθαι has hardly any authority.

2. Ὀμηρικώς] Prof. Geddes rightly translates, 'as Homer's heroes do': not, as Wagner, 'in Homeric phrase'.

3. ἐν φίλοσοφος ἀνήρ] Note that Plato once more carefully marks the proof of immortality as merely subordinate to this main thesis.

6. ἐν ἄλλω βίω i.e. ἐν βίω μὴ φίλοσόφω.

7. τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν] 'but as for proving that the soul is a strong and godlike thing and that she existed even before we were born as men—there is nothing, you say, to prevent all this from showing, not indeed her immortality, but that she is long-lived, &c.' That is to say, Kebs does not object to the reasoning of Sokrates, so far as it merely shows that the soul is very durable; but it is none the nearer to showing that she is immortal.

13. ἄρχῃ ἢν αὐτὴν ἀλέθρου] Kebs did not put it quite in this way; Sokrates amplifies his expression in 88 Α πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαίς γενέσει.

14. ἴππη] The change of mood is readily understood if we transfer the words from reported to direct speech. The two imperfects would naturally be used by Kebs in making his statement: 'for all your reasoning, she was none the more immortal' (ἵππ = ἵππ ἀπα); 'the incarnation was the beginning of her dissolution': while the two optatives would in his mouth be present indicative; ἴππ and ἀπόλλυται. As Ast says, the construction follows ὅτι: cf. 96 ii, where ὅτι is never actually expressed.
σώμα ἔρχεται εἴτε πολλάκις, πρὸς γε τὸ ἐκαστὸν ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι: προσήκει γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος ἔσῃ, τῷ μῇ εἰδότε μηδὲ ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι, ὡς ἀθανάτον ἔστι. τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἕστιν οὖμαι, ἐδ' Κέβης, ἀ λέγεις; καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μὴ τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἰ τε τι βούλει, προσῆξη ἢ ἀφέλψης. καὶ ὁ Κέβης, 5 Ἀλλ' οὖν ἐγών ἐγὼν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἐφι, οὔτε ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι: ἐστι δὲ ταῦτα ἀ λέγων.

XLV. Ὅ οὖν Ὀωκράτης συχνῶν χρόνων ἐπισχῶν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τι σκεψάμενος, ὃ πρότυπον πράγμα, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, ἔστεις: ἄλος γὰρ δεὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αὐτίαν διαπραγματεύει- 10 96 σασθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δείεμι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰν ἁγών, τά γε ἐμα

4. πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω] This extreme care in preparing the indictment serves to remind us of the vital importance of the coming struggle. All that precedes has been, so to speak, mere skirmishing: from this point the main battle begins; the whole strength of the ideal theory must be put forth to secure the victory.

95 ὡ-97 Ῥ, c. xliv. This demands an investigation into the causes of generation and decay, on which subject Sokrates proposes to relate his own experiences. In his youth he was strongly fascinated by the old physical philosophy; he inquired whether heat and cold were the universal generative forces; whether the blood were the source of intelligence, or fire, or air, or the brain. But finally he came to the conclusion that he had no aptitude for such speculations, and even lost his faith in the knowledge he before supposed himself to possess. Formerly he rested comfortably in the belief that eating and drinking were the cause of growth; nor did he shrink from saying that one man was taller than another by the head, and that ten are more than eight because of the addition of two. But now he cannot satisfy himself that the mere juxtaposition of separate units is a sufficient cause for their being two; all the less because the same result is produced by the precisely opposite process of division; nor can he even tell why one is one; but he is forced to reject the physical method as affording no real explanation of anything.

10. ἄλος γὰρ] The ἀπορία of Kebe necessarily raises the question propounded in Timaeus 27 Ῥ τὸ ἐν ἀεὶ γένεσιν ὥσ ὅν ἐχον, καὶ τὸ ἐν γεγορόμενον μὲν ὁν ὡς ὠνδίστορ: The immortality of the soul can only be proved by means of the theory of ideas; and in order that we may fully understand the bearing of that theory, it is put in sharp contrast with the ἀιτία of previous philosophies.

11. τά γε ἐμα πάθη] It has been maintained that we have here a piece of actual history; that the mental development of the real Sokrates is here described. This is however highly improbable. We know from Xenophon (Mem. i 11—15) that Sokrates had the utmost distaste for physical speculation; nor do Xenophon say one word which leads us to suppose this was the result of fruitless study. Such inquiries must have been always alien to the strongly practical genius of Sokrates. Plato may be merely describing in its supposed effect on an individual mind the development of philosophy to the theory of ideas; but it is not impossible that he is recounting his own experience. Nothing can be more probable than that a mind so insatiably thirsting for knowledge should have
πάθη· ἐπειτὰ ἄν τι σοι χρήσιμον φαίνηται ὅν ἄν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ περὶ ὅν ἄν λέγης χρῆσθαι. 'Αλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, Βαύλομαί γε. Ἀκούει τοιών ὡς ἐροῦντος. ἐγώ γάρ, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης, νέος ἄν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας, ἦν δὴ 5 καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν. ὑπερήφανος ἦπερ μοι εἴδοκε εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου, διὰ τι γίγνεται ἐκαστὸν καὶ διὰ τι ἀπόλυται καὶ διὰ τι ἔστι καὶ πολλάκις ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶ τὰ τοιάδε, ἀρ' ἐπεδιάν τὸ θερμῶν καὶ τὸ ψυχρῶν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ, ὡς τινὲς ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ἡξόα συνιστρέφεται 10 καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμα ἑστίν ὧ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἄρπ ἢ τὸ τὺρ, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὃ ὁ ἐγκέφαλος ἑστιν ὃ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ

already sought it from every existing source, and that when he met Sokrates his disappointment in all should fast be leading him to philosophic scepticism. But in the lack of direct evidence it would be rash to speak positively.

2. ὃν ἄν λέγῃς] i.e. whatever you may have to say after hearing my reply. ὃν λέγεις would refer to the statement already made by Kebes; but this has less ms. authority.

8. τὸ θερμῶν καὶ τὸ ψυχρῶν] This was held by several philosophers, first perhaps by Anaximandros, of whose ἄπερον, according to Plutarch and Sto-baeus, the first determinations were those. Simplicios assigns to him other ἐναντιώτητες among the first determinations, such as ἐργῶν and ὑγρῶν. To Anaxagoras this classification is attributed by Theophrastos de sensu 59; and to Archelaos by Diogenes Laertius 11 16. Compare Aristotle de gen. et corr. 11 i 320b24 θερμῶν δὲ καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ ἐργῶν τὰ μὲν τῷ ποιητικῷ εἶναι τὰ δὲ τῷ παθητικῷ λέγεται. Schanz gives τὸ θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν.


10. τὸ αἷμα] See Empedokles 315 (Karsten):

αἷματος ἐν πελάγεσσι τεθραμμένη ἁμ-φιδρόωντος,

τῇ τε νόημα μᾶλλον κυκλίσκεται ἀνθρώποισιν·

αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώπους περικάρδιον ἔστι νόημα.

ὁ ἄρπ] This too was the view of more than one philosopher. Air was the ἄρχη of Anaximenes. Diogenes of Apollonia said the soul was dry hot air; as in a passage quoted by Simplicios, καὶ πώντων τῶν ἔρων δὲ ἡ ψυχή τὸ αὐτό ἑστιν, ἄρη βερύστεροι μὲν τὸν ἕξω, ἐν ὧ εἰμέν, τοῦ μέντοι παρὰ τοῦ ἕλεον πολλῶν ψυχότερον: and again ἄνθρωπος γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἀλλά ἑξά ἀπαντῶντα ἤζει τῷ ἀέρι, καὶ τούτο αἰτοῦσι καὶ ψυχή ἑστι καὶ νόησι.

 Cf. Theophrastos de sensu 39—45.

τὸ πῦρ] This was held by Herakleitos, who considered the soul as a ἔγχορ αναθυμασίας. Cf. Arist. de anima 1 ii.

11. ὃ δ’ ἐγκέφαλος] It is very doubtful to whom this doctrine must be assigned. Possibly it was merely a popular opinion, as Wyntenbach thinks. It has been ascribed to the Pythagoreans; but this rests only on a statement of Diogenes Laertius (viii 30), which has a suspiciously post-platonic appearance. R. Hirsch (Hermes, vol. xi p. 240) endeavours to trace it to Alkmaion of Krotona; but his evidence
hardly amounts to proof. Theophrastos de sensu 26 does indeed say of him that he affirmed ἀπάσας τὰς αἰσθήσεις συνηρτήσατι πως πρὸς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον, but this is not very definite. It may be observed that the brain is not ψ ψρονοβίης, but ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων: and the view of Hippocrates is not far off this. In a passage quoted by Heindorf, de nat. sacri 17, he says of the brain, ὁ τῶν ἡμῶν ὑπὸ ἀπò τοῦ ἡρόν γενομένων ἑρμηνεύει, ὅν γενεσίαν τυχόντα τὴν ὁ πνεύμαν ἀντίκε ὁ ἀ�� παρέχεται. Thus Hippocrates may be said to have held that air is ψ ψρονοβίης and the brain is the τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων. Still as the brain is introduced as an alternative to air, not as supplementary, probably no special reference to Hippocrates is intended. Plato's own view is that the brain and spinal marrow form the medium through which the soul acts on the body: Ἐνεκαις τῆς ἁλμής ἕτος τῆς ἁλμής. Also Aristotile anal. post. II xix 1018 3 ε ὅμεν οὖν αἰσθάσεως γίνεται μνήμη, ὡσπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γεγομένης ἐμπείρεια. ἀλλά γὰρ πολλαὶ μνήμαι τῷ ἀρίθμῳ ἐμπείρεια ἐστίν, ἐκ δὲ ἐμπείρειας ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἡρμηνευόμενον τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἐνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὅ ἐν ἄποισιν ἐν ἐνή ἔκλεινο τῷ αὐτῷ, τέχνης ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἶναι μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, εἰναι δὲ περὶ τὸ ἄν, ἐπιστήμης. See also metaph. I i 980 b 28. To Plato the difference between ὁμοιον καὶ ἐπιστήμης was fundamental, the one dealing with γεγομένη, the other with ὅντα.

5. ἄφυής εἶναι] 'nothing in the world could be more stupid in such studies than myself'. Cope.

6. ἀ καὶ πρότερον] There are three stages to be discriminated in the πάθη of Sokrates: (1) the period when he was content with the ordinary beliefs of the unreflecting many concerning γένεσις καὶ φθορά, (2) when he sought some more scientific theory in the speculations of the physicists, (3) when, disappointed in this and failing in his search for the ultimate aitia itself, he fell back upon his system of λόγος.

11. ταὶς μὲν σαρῆι σάρκες] This is commonly understood as alluding to the theory of Anaxagoras. But I cannot imagine that any such reference is meant. Sokrates says that his physical studies
γένονται, τοῖς δὲ ὀστέοις ὀστᾷ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτῶν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεία ἐκάστοις προσγένεται, τὸτε δὴ τὸν ὀλίγον ὄγκον ὑπατηροῦν πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γέγονεν ἐκ τὸν σμικρὸν ἀνθρωποῦ μέγαν ὀὕτως τότε φωνὴ οὐ δοκῶ σοι 5 μετρίως; Ἐμούγη, ἐφη ο Κέβης. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἐτε. φωνὴ γὰρ ἱκανὸς μου δοκεῖν, ὅποτε τις φαύνετο ἀνθρώπος παραστάς μέγας σμικρά, μεῖζων εἶναι αὐτῶν τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ὕππος ὕππον καὶ ἐτε για τοῦτον ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι εἶδοκε τῶν ὡκτὼ πλέονα Ε ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτῶν προστεθεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίπτυχον τοῦ πνευματοῦ 10 μεῖζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμείς αὐτῶν ὑπέρεχειν. Νῦν δὲ δή, ἐφη ο Κέβης, τί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν; Πόρρω ποι, ἐφη, νῦ Δία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ ὀεῖσθαι περὶ τοῦτον τοῦ τῆς αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὡς γε οὐκ ἀποδείχωμαι ἐμαυτῷ οὐδὲ ὡς, ἐπειδὰν ἐνί τις προσθῇ ἐν, ἢ τὸ ἐν φ' προστεθῇ δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τὸ προστεθέν καὶ φ' προστεθῇ διὰ τὴν 97 πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου τῷ ἑτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο: διαμάζω γὰρ ἐν, ὅτε μὲν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν χορὶς ἄλληλων ἢ, ἐν ὡρα ἑκάτερον ἢ καὶ οὐκ ἡσυχὴν τότε δύο, ἐπειδ' ἐπέλθησαν ἄλληλοι, αὐτ' ἄρα αἰτία αὐτῶς ἐγένετο δύο γενέσθαι, ἢ ξύνοδος τοῦ πληροῦν ἄλληλον τεθῆναι. οὐδὲ γε ὡς, εάν τις ἐν διασχίσῃ, δύναμιν ἔτι πείθεσθαι 20 ὡς αὐτή αὐτ' αἰτία γέγονεν, ἢ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι: ἐναντία γὰρ not only brought him no fresh knowledge but made him sceptical of that which he fancied he already possessed. This belief therefore is one that he held, not only before he made acquaintance with the works of Anaxagoras, but before he entered upon any physical speculations whatsoever. It is probably the view of popular common sense, that the human frame is composed of the food consumed, without any reference to the ωμομορφή.

7. μεῖζων ἀναίναι αὐτοῦ] The mss. have αὐτῇ. I have accepted Wyttenbach’s correction (1) because the following words, καὶ ἵππος ἵππον, seem to require that the object of comparison should be expressed here also, (2) because αὐτῇ seems superfluous with τῇ κεφαλῇ. If we retain αὐτῇ, we must translate ‘just by the head’. Cf. 101 λ.

14. ἢ τὸ προστεθήν] Wyttenbach writes these words twice over, arguing that the question should be put thus; if B be added to A, has A become two, or B, or are A + B two because of their juxtaposition? Schanz follows him. I cannot see that Plato is bound to express this in full, and therefore I have reverted to the ms. reading.

18. ἢ ξύνοδος] ‘the juxtaposition caused by their approximation’. τοῦ πληροῦν ἄλληλον τεθῆναι is explanatory genitive after ξύνοδος: compare Timaeus 58 B ἢ δὴ τῆς πλήσεως ἔνδοθος. The right explanation, according to Plato, is not juxtaposition but participation in the idea of duality: it is irrational to speak as if the mere approximation of two objects one to the other had anything to do with the question.

20. ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται] The fact that two opposite processes produce the same result shows that neither of them can really be the explanation of the result; they are οὐνάτη, not αἰτία.
5. κατά τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον] i.e. the method of physical speculation.

6. αὐτὸς εἰκῆ φύρω] 'I mix up everything at random according to another method of my own'. Such is the literal translation of this difficult phrase, but the meaning is not so easily fixed. Wytenbach, saying that the ideal theory cannot possibly be meant, takes φύρω as virtually a past tense, and explains 'alium modum ex male intellecto Anaxagorae susceptum commentum sum'. Prof. Geddes translates 'it so chances that I form to myself another method'. He says φύρω is 'I work up', like dough, and quotes Aristoph. Birds 482 προσεφύρασα λόγος εἰς μοι: and so Heindorf takes it. But φύρω is not the same as φυρᾶ: Plato always uses the former word in the sense of 'confusing', see below 101 D, Gorgias 465 D &c. For 'kneading' he uses the proper word φυρᾶ, cf. Timaeus 73 E, Theaetetus 147 C. The exact phrase occurs in Aeschylus Prometheus 450 ἐφυρον εἰκῆ πάντα. Wytenbach's explanation will not do; we have the present tense running through the whole passage. Nor does Sokrates represent his view as arising from that of Anaxagoras. I believe Sokrates is speaking half ironically, half in earnest. We must remember that the Platonic Sokrates took refuge, not in the theory of ideas, which he failed to reach, but in the method of λόγον, cf. 99 E. This method is then what he means by τῷ ἄλλον τρόπον. In 101 C he advises Kebeus to leave divisions and additions and such subtleties to those who are cleverer than he. There the irony is obvious; and here with the same irony he says that being unable to follow any of the infallible methods of the physicists he was forced to blunder on after a fashion of his own. And although he does not seriously mean to disparage his own method in comparison with theirs, perhaps he does hint some dissatisfaction that he is still unable to work on the more perfect principle.

97 v—98 b, c. xlvi. Afterwards Sokrates hears a passage of Anaxagoras, wherein that philosopher declares that mind is the universal cause. His hopes are thereby raised to the highest pitch; a system which takes mind for its principle cannot, he thinks, be otherwise than teleological. Anaxagoras will surely point out that mind must order all things for the best, and he will seek no other cause why each thing is as it is, but that it is best so. He will first inform us of the shape and position of the earth and then explain how that shape and position were the best; and similarly with all other natural phenomena, assigning as the cause the best for each and all. So he read the book with eager anticipation.

8. ἄλλ' ἄκουσα] 'but once when I heard a man reading from a book, as he said, of Anaxagoras.'
1. τρόπων τυπά] 'in a certain way', but not, as we presently see, in the way of Anaxagoras.

2. πάντα [κοσμεῖν]. Hermann is probably right in bracketing κοσμεῖν. Translate: 'if mind orders all things, it places each thing severally as is best', i.e. we must not, as Anaxagoras did, assign ἄρεις and αἰθήρεις as causes of various phenomena, if we assign νοῦς as the cause of the whole.

7. περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου] So the best mss. Schanz brackets αὐτοῦ, Z. and St. give αὑτοῦ, omitting ἐκείνου. I think the ms. reading will stand: it refers to the ἐκάστον above; 'he will seek this cause both for the particular object of his inquiry and for everything else'.

12. κατά νοῦν ἔμαυτῷ] As Wytenbach points out there is a play on νοῦν:

'κατὰ νοῦν, secundum mentem, Anaxagorae placitum significent, et vulgo usurpatur, gratum, ex animi nostri sententia'.

13. πλατεία ἐστὶν ἢ στρογγύλη] For various views on this subject see Aristotle de caelo 11 xiii 291a 29. Thales thought the earth floated like a piece of wood; Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Demokritos said it was flat. The Pythagoreans held that it was a sphere.

15. εἰ ἐν μέσῳ] Aristotle de caelo 293a 15. This view was almost universal: the Pythagoreans seem to have been the only exception. They believed the earth to revolve round the central fire.

21. πῇ ποτε ταῦτ' ἄμενον] The final cause of the movements of the heavenly bodies is declared in the Timaeus, see especially 39 b foll.

22. φάσκοντα γε ὑπὸ νοῦ] If an in-
telligent cause ordered the universe, it is inconceivable that it should not design the best in all things: and this is our proper object of investigation, not the mere physical agencies which immediately produce the phenomena. Plato's own system is perfectly consistent with this principle: by making the aitò ágathò the ultimate cause he keeps his ontology strictly teleological; and again his teleology is strictly ontological. The cause of each thing is its indwelling idea; this idea is a form of the ágathò, therefore the ágathò is the cause why each thing is as it is. The bélioston is not merely the design of a creative intelligence; it is the very idea which is symbolized in the particular. In the Timaeus Plato teaches that the entire universe is the self-evolution of absolute intelligence, which is the same as absolute good. This is differentiated into finite intelligences, subject, through their limitation, to the conditions of space and time. Sensible perceptions are the finite intellect's apprehension, within these conditions, of the idea as existing in absolute intelligence. Thus the perception is the idea, as existing under the form of space. Therefore the idea, which is a form of the good, is the cause of the perception's existence: that is, as was said above, the ágathò is the ultimate aitia of each thing. But only the first-beginnings of this theory are to be found in the Phaedo.

98 B—99 D, c. xlvii. Bitter was his disappointment when he found that Anaxagoras did not really use mind as a cause, but accounted for phenomena by the agency of merely physical forces. Exactly similar would be the conduct of one who, after saying that Sokrates acted by intelligence, should maintain that he sat there in prison because he had muscles and sinews and joints which enabled him to do so; instead of assigning the real cause, that he thought it right to submit to the judgment of the Athenian people. So far as his bones and muscles are concerned, he might have been at Megara by this time; only he thought it his duty to remain. To call such things causes is folly; although they may be termed instruments without which the cause would not produce its effect. But just this confusion of cause and instrument is made by those who suppose a vortex or some other physical force is what keeps the earth in the centre, instead of the true cause, that it is best for it to be there. About this supreme cause, the good, Sokrates would gladly have learnt, could he have found a teacher: as it is he was obliged to content himself with the second best method.

8. ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ὃ ἑταίρη, ψχόμην φερό-

9—2
γόρας τε γάρ μηχανή χρήται τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὴν κοσμοπολιάν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ δα τιν’ αἰτίαν εἰς ἀνάγκης ἕστι, τότε παρέλκει αὐτοὺς, εἰ δὲ τοῦ ἄλλου πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτία τὰ τῶν γεγονόμενων ἦν νόσον: compare Lat. et al. C. Schanz brackets καὶ before ἀναγιγνώσκος, but this causes a harsh collision between the two participle.

2. οὐδὲ τινάς αἰτίας ἐπαιτώμενον] I concur with Mr Jackson in regarding these words as an unmeaning interpolation. The sole complaint Plato has against Anaxagoras is that he made no use of νοῦς: what then are these αἰτίαι that he ought to have introduced? We cannot understand it as an explanatory of τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενων, 'making no use of mind, that is alleging no real (primary) causes', (1) because the distinction between primary and secondary causes has not yet been made, so that a reference to it would be unintelligible, (2) the plural is fatal to such a rendering; there is but one real cause, that is νοῦς.

9. διαφάνεις ἐξι μεταλλισάς ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων] 'Joints to separate them one from another', and so render the limbs flexible. διαφάνη and ἀρθρον regard the joints from opposite points of view; the former as breaking the continuity of the bones, the latter as knitting the frame together.

νεῦρα here, as always in Plato, mean sinews or muscles, not nerves. Of the nerves he had no knowledge. Cf. Timaeus 74 D.

19. ἦν ἀν κελεύσωσιν] Hirschig most unnecessarily brackets these words. It is true there is now no doubt what the sentence is; but Sokrates expresses in general terms that he deems it best to submit to whatever may be the judgment of the Athenians: compare ἔτη τῶν τάγματων below.

20. πάλαι ἂν ταῦτα] The bones and muscles cannot be the cause; for they
would have acted in a precisely opposite way had a different δίξα τοῦ βελτίστου prompted them.  

1. ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα] Prof. Geddes justly remarks that it is δόξα not ἐπιστήμη τοῦ βελτίστου that could urge Sokrates to escape.  

3. ἀλλ’ αὕτη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα] Cf. Timaicus 46 C ταῦτ’ ὅν πάντ’ ἦστι τὸν ξυναίτων ὁς θεός ὑπερτεροῦσι χρήσα τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου κατὰ τὸ δύνατον ἱδέαν ἀποτελῶν· δοξάζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων οὐ ξυναίτια ἀλλ’ αὕτη εἶναι τῶν πάντων, ψυχώνα καὶ θερμαλών την καθ’ ἀλλὰ ἄλλα τοιαύτα ἀπεραγμένα. Λόγον δὲ οἰδ’ οὴν οὐδὲν οἰδ’ οὐδέν δύνατα ἔχειν ἐστὶν. Presently he distinguishes these two classes as πράτται and δευτέραι αὕτη. In 46 E he says τὰ μὲν ὄνων ὑμιστείν ζυμομακρινά πρὸς τὸ ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν, ἢν οὐ πρόκειτο ἐν τῷ ἔχειν τοῦ ἀριστοῦ, διὸ οὐδ’ ὑμῖν δεδώρησα, μετὰ τοῦτο λεκτέων.  

7. καὶ ταῦτα νῦν πράττων] So Schanz after Heindorf. The ms. have πράττω, which may be thus rendered: ‘to say that it is because of these that I do what I do, and at the same time that I do it by intelligence, is an extremely slovenly mode of speaking’; i.e. to assert simultaneously that Sokrates acts thus because of these subsidiary causes and also through intelligence, is a very confused statement. But though the ms. reading can be defended, I think it probable that Heindorf’s neat and simple emendation restores what Plato wrote. Z. and St. have ταῦτα νῦν πράττω.  

8. τὸ γάρ μὴ διελήτθαι] The construction is either an anacoluthon or an indignant apophesis. Cf. Symposium 177 C τὸ ὄνω πολλῶν μὲν πέρι πολλῆς σπουδῆς ποιῆσαι, Ἐρωτά δὲ μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων τετυλικίσκει ἐδαπατρώς μὴ θάνατον την ἡμέραν ἠξιον μονής, ἀλλ’ οὕτως ἤμελκεν νυκτὸς θεός; Similarly Xen. memb. 1 iv 12, iv iii 5. Wytenbach suggests τὸ δ’ ἢν μὴ διελθάτω, which is neat; but no change is needed.  

10. δ’ ὅτι γὰρ φάλλονται] ‘this is what they seem to be handling blindly, as if in the dark’; ὅτι τὸ ἐπίστευς. ἀλλατρίῳ νόμιμεν, they call it by a name which does not belong to it, i.e. αἰτίων. The reading ἐμπορία is quite out of place.  

12. ὰ μέν τις διήνη Ἐμπεδόκλης conceived the earth to be kept in its place by the rapid rotation of the universe, as, when a cup of water is whirled swiftly round, the water is retained in the cup; so Aristotle explains, de caelo ii xiii 295 a 16, οἷ ὁ ὅπερ Ἐμπεδόκλης, τὴν τοῦ υφαίστου φορὰν κύκλῳ περιεέγειν καὶ τότεν φερόμενον τῇ τῆς γῆς φορὰν κυλεῖν, καθήκοντες τῷ ὕποι κυλοῦντος ὕδατος καὶ γάρ τοῦτο κύκλῳ τοῦ κυλοῦντος φερομένου πολλάκις κάτω τοῦ χαλκοῦ γειμόμενον ὅμως οὐ φέρεται κάτω
περιφέρεια γίνεται της άλλων μένειν δέ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὅ δὲ ὁσπερ καρδότωφπλατεία βάθρων τὸν ἀέρα ὑπερεῖδει τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν ἐκεῖθα διαφοραίοι οὐτέ τινα οὐκετία διαμοίραν ἵσχυν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἤγγονται τούτων Ἀθλαντα ἂν ποτὲ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἄπαντα συνεχότα ἐξευρέτως καὶ ὁς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον ἴσωδει καὶ συνέχει οὐδὲν οὕτως.

πως μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης ἀιτίας, ὅπτε ποτὲ ἔχει, μαθητής ὦτονον ἔδιστ' ἂν γενολήμερη ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστέρηθην καὶ οὗτ' αὐτός ἐνεργεῖ οὕτε παρ' ἀλλοι μαθεῖν ὄντε τε ἐγενόμην, τῶν δεύτερων πλοίων ὁ

1. τὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχον should be connected with μένειν.
2. ὁ δὲ ὁσπερ καρδότωφπ λατεία βάθρων τὸν ἀέρα ὑπερεῖδει τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν ἐκεῖθα διαφοραίοι οὐτέ τινα οὐκετία διαμοίραν ἵσχυν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἤγγονται τούτων Ἀθλαντα ἂν ποτὲ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἄπαντα συνεχότα ἐξευρέτως καὶ ὁς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον ἴσωδει καὶ συνέχει οὐδὲν οὕτως.

3. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστατα] Ἀς Ἱενδόρφῳ λέγεται τὸ πλοῖον δέ οὐτός οὐκ ἂν αὐτὰ κείσθαι οὐκ οἴνον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα κείσθαι. Καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὁς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα1. τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον] ‘the good and the binding’. There is a play on the double sense of δέον: cf. Cratylus 418 έ ἀγαθοο γάρ ιδέα οὖσα τὸ δέον φανεται δεσμός έσαι καὶ κάλυμα φορέσ. All this critique of Anaxagoras is a propaedeutic to the ideal theory. The main fault of Anaxagoras is that ‘the good’ is not the ultimate cause in his system. Plato supplies his defects (in the Republic first and still more in the later dialogues) (1) by making τὸ ἀγαθὸν the principle of all existence, so that such thing really exists in proportion as it is perfect; (2) that νοῦς, instead of being a merely external motive power, is actually the universe: causation is ultimately identity.

9. ἡπαθδι δε ταύτης ἐστερήθην] Sokrates here expressly confesses that he has not succeeded in tracing the genesis of the universe to the idea of the good : and it is most important to bear in mind that what follows is only a description of the δεύτερος πλοῖος. In the Republic Plato is bolder and sets forth under a similitude the relation between the ἀγαθον and the ideal and material worlds; but not until the Philebus and especially his crowning achievement, the Timaeus, does he attempt fully to expound the supremacy of the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν.

10. τὸν δεύτερον πλοίον] i.e. the next best course. The origin of this proverb is shown by a passage of Menander which Wagner quotes: ο δεύτερος πλοῖος ἄτι δήπου λέγόμενος, ἐν ἀποτύχῃ τι πρῶτον ἐν κώμαι πλείων. Heindorf quotes Eustathius: δεύτερος πλοῖος λέγεται, ὅτε ἄπο-
XLVIII. "Eodoxe toiswn mou, h o's, meta tauta, epeidei apellonka ta oina skopow, dein eulabhsinai, mui padoimi eperei ton 5 "hino ekleiponta teorountes kai skopoumenoi" diaphereoun haper ton evnoi ta ommata, ean mui en ydai h tina toinw skopounai E thn ekouna autou. Tous touton ti kai engk dieunoudia, kai edieisa, mui pantaipasei thn psikheivn typhlomegaivn blepwn prs ton pragmata tous ommasi kai ekasth tou aisthsesein epixeirhain apetesbhai auton. 10 eodoxe di mou xrhmain eis tous logous katafugonta ev ekeinous

tuxon tis oirwn kaptas plej katara Paun

Plato uses it again, Politicus 300 c, Philebus 19 c. Compare Aristotle Nic. Eth. II ix 4 etei oin ton meou tuceiv akroos xalaspin, katov ton deuterov, faiei, plouin ta elaxiata leptenw twn kakh.

Also politics 111 viii 6 (Susenihl) 1284b19.

99 D—100 a, c. xlviii. Since then, continues Sokrates, I have been forced to abandon the search for the true cause, and fearing lest, as those who rashly take observations by gazing on the sun himself, instead of his reflection in the water, are bereft of their bodily vision, my soul should be blinded in the endeavour to behold truth herself, I bethought me of contemplating her image, by which I mean definitions or notions. And yet this comparison is scarcely fair: for he that investigates truth in notions certainly does not see her in a similitude more than he who observes sensible objects. Anyhow this was the course I took: assuming the best definition I could form, I regard whatever agrees with that as true, and whatever does not I reject as false. I will presently explain my method more clearly.

From the foregoing analysis it will be seen that my interpretation of this extremely difficult passage differs widely from that of other editors. My objections to their views and defence of my own will be found in appendix II, as requiring too much space for a note.

5. ta oina] 'realities'; i.e. from Plato's point of view the true causes, tagnobh kai devon.


9. thn psikheivn typhlomegaivn] Compare the metaphor in Republic 527 v to 6' estin ou panw phalno, alla xalaspin susteisai, oti en toutous tous mathmasen ekastov organon th psikheis ekkathartetai te kai anaxwtnretai apollumeno kai typhloymeno upo ton allon episthmevaton, kreihten en symbhrai myrwn ommatow men yap autw aletheia oratai.

pros ta pragmata] i.e. the ideas themselves. Cf. 66 d autw thn psikhe beateov auta ta pragmata. The idea is called pragmata in virtue of the antithesis between 'thing' and 'shadow'.

10. ekasth twn aisthsesewn] This is of course metaphorical, like blepton, with all the powers of the soul. But with respect to this clause see appendix II sub fin.

11. eis tous logous] The meaning of this can be fully understood only after a very careful study of Republic 506—518. Briefly however it is this. The Sokratic method of definition was, by comparison of a number of particulars which we designate by the same name, to ascertain what attributes were merely accidental in various particulars, and what were es-
sentential to the class: thus in defining a horse we must distinguish between those qualities which some horses possess and others do not, and those without which the animal would not be a horse. The definition thus formed is the λόγος, the concept or general notion. Now in the earlier stage of the ideal theory, wherever there is such a λόγος, there is also an idea, corresponding to every group of particulars called by the same name (Republic 596 Α). The principal difference between the λόγος and the ἰδέα is (1) the λόγος is a mental concept, having no existence but in our thought; the ἰδέα is a self-existing essence, independent of our thought: (2) the λόγος includes all that we can discover about the class by observation; the ἰδέα includes all that there is to be known about it. Therefore from the Platonic point of view the λόγος is our conception of the ἰδέα, the reflection of it in our mind; which reflection only imperfectly represents it, inasmuch as it is derived from an imperfect apprehension of particulars, which themselves are only imperfect likenesses of the idea. In this sense it is that Plato regards the λόγος as εἰκών τοῦ ὄντος. This matter has been admirably cleared up by Mr Jackson, Journal of Philology vol. x p. 132 foll. See introduction § 5. There is an interesting use of λόγος in Latus 895 D, where the Athenian says ἄρ' ὄνω ἀν ἑθλοῖς περὶ ἐκαστὸν τρία νοεῖν...ἐν μέν τῆς ὥσιας, ἐν δὲ τῆς ὥσιας τὸν λόγον, ἐν δὲ τὸ ὄνομα.

The approximation of ὀσία to the Aristotelian sense is also notable.

1. [ὡς μὲν οὖν ἡ] Sokrates stops to guard himself against conceding too much. The λόγοι are indeed only ἐκώνες, but so also are the sensible particulars; and the latter are the less trustworthy. He then who seeks truth ἐν τοῖς λόγοι does not deal with images any more than the physicist who investigates natural phenomena. For ὃ βεβηγεῖστατο ὃσία, which perhaps should be retained.

3. τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἐργαῖς ἐργα here = the particulars. The word is used because of the familiar antithesis with λόγοι: not, I think, with a view of denoting the particulars as works or products of the ideas whence they derive their existence.

4. ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ] 'however that may be'. Sokrates does not propose here to debate the issue raised in the preceding sentence.

υπόθέτονον] The method is more fully explained in the next chapter. For example, Sokrates by examining a number of instances of δίκαιον forms his υπόθεσις as to the nature of δικαιοσύνη. This υπόθεσις is his conception of the αὗτο δίκαιον. Then he compares with this υπόθεσις particular δίκαιον, or whatever professes to be such, and admits or rejects each in so far as it agrees or disagrees with the υπόθεσις.
and by means of this theory I hope to prove the soul's immortality. Starting from the assumption that there are ideas of beautiful and just and great &c., I simply affirm that all particulars possessing these qualities possess them through the idea, whether by participation, presence, or communion, or however you may define the connexion. All other causes are beyond my comprehension; I cling simply to my safe reply, that the idea of the beautiful is the cause of beauty. If you accept this, you will never consent to say that one man is greater or less than another by a head, but by greatness or smallness; nor that ten are more than eight by two, but by multitude. Similarly when one is added to one, or divided, the cause why the two are two is not addition or division, but the idea of duality; all other causes you would leave to wiser heads than yours. Again if you were forced to give an account of your hypothesis, you would proceed to a higher generalisation, and again to another; ascending till you reached one that was adequate: and you would beware of falling into the confusions of thought, of which sham philosophers are guilty. Here Echekrates interrupts to express his admiration of Sokrates' clear exposition.

The upshot of this chapter is that universals alone can be known. For the present however these universals are in the form of λόγοι or υπόθεσεις, which are not objects of νοος proper. When dialectic is made perfect λόγος will be exchanged for ἱδεα, υπόθεσεις for ἀρχαι.

2. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν] As Heindorf observes ἐπιχειρῶν επιδείξασθαι has virtually a future force, whence it takes the place of ἐπιδείξομενος, which would be the ordinary construction. Cf. Theaetetus 180 c ὅπερ ἦν ἔρων.

8. οὐκ ἄν φθάνοις] 'you cannot be too quick in proceeding to the end'. This is not an uncommon formula. Cf. Symposium 185 E, Eurip. Iph. Taur. 245, Xen. mem. ii iii 11.

13. τῶς σοφᾶς σαύτας] i.e. the causes of the physicists.

17. ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ] This is the passage referred to by Aristotle de gen. et corr. ii ix 335 b 9 ἄλλ' οι μὲν ἱκανῶν
there seems no obvious reason for its corruption into -η. A very similar use of ὅη καὶ ὅπως is found in Laws 899β theος αὐτά εἰναι φήσωμεν, εἶτε ἐν σώμασιν ἐνοίκασα, ἕτοι ἔντα, κοισμοῦσι πώντα ὀφραν, εἰτε ὅη τε καὶ ὅπως. I should add that Olympiodoros in quoting this passage omits προσγενομένη.

2. ὅη γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτο] ‘for I do not proceed to insist upon that point’, i.e. all he insists upon is that the idea is the cause; he does not specify the mode of its operation. This phrase is an indication that Plato at this period did not entertain a view of the relation between ideas and particulars definitely distinct from that expounded in his later writings; but that he had not as yet applied himself to working out the question. In the later dialogues he does not so much alter his view as define it; the definition however necessarily leads to important modifications in the theory of ideas, and to the decisive rejection of the doctrine of παρουσία, towards which he had hitherto chiefly inclined: see on 73ε: compare Parmenides 133δ τὰ παρ’ ἑνάλε ἐτε ἐνοίκωμα ἡτε ὅη δὴ τις αὐτά τίθεται.

7. μεγάλα ἀρα] The words μέγεθος and σμικρότης are synonymous with μείζον and ἐλάττων in 75ε.

9. τῇ κεφαλῇ] Plato here clears up a logical confusion. The fact that the dative is used to express both cause and manner gives the ἀντιλογικός his opportunity. If Α is said to be taller by a head than Β, he insists upon understand-
why, is a rose beautiful? we shall not
by the head' as denoting the cause,
just as in the phrase: Socrates acts by
ignorance, not by virtue.
A: which is therefore the cause of
tallness and shortness: (3) the head is
not the cause of the rose's beauty; the
beauty, which is the cause of the rose's
beauty, the rose is not the cause of the
beauty, for it is of course

we shall say it is because the rose takes
of the petals, and such rules
we have formed by generalisation of the idea

Only when we know the

The method may be traced to Socrates.
The difficulty of retaining έχοντο in the sense of ‘attack’ has been perceived by most editors, and Madvig proposes to read έφοιτο, which Schanz adopts. But the objections to the passage are by no means thus exhausted. A discussion of them will be found in the article of Mr. Jackson’s before mentioned, Journal of Philology vol. x p. 148. I shall state them as follows: (1) έχοντο in a sense entirely unparalleled following immediately upon the ordinary use. Wagner indeed finds ‘a certain acumen’ in this; but wherein it consists he fails to inform us. (2) If we acquiesce in έχοντο or accept έφοιτο, the words εἰ δὲ τις...έχοντο are a clumsy and tautological anticipation of έπειδὴ δὲ έκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον. Ast, seeing this, most ingeniously suggests εἰ δὲ τις ἄλλης ὑπόθεσες έχοντο. But, as Mr. Jackson observes, there is grave difficulty in applying the term ὑπόθεσις, which is throughout reserved for the Sokratic method, to the principle of an opponent, who would doubtless term it αἰτία. Moreover the introduction of a rival method is here irrelevant. Finally Ast’s emendation does not meet the most serious objection of all, which is (3) that the words εἰς ἄν...διαφορεῖ are inconstant with the method indicated in ὄσα ἄγαν ἄν διδοίη κ.τ.λ. and are in themselves sheer nonsense. If a hypothesis is proposed to account for a given set of facts, we proceed to observe, not whether the facts are consistent with one another, but whether they are consistent with the hypothesis; and this is precisely what Sokrates professes to do in 100 Αδὲ μὲν ἢ δοκῇ τὸύτῳ ξυμφωνεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀλῆθεν ὥστα, where he is supposing the truth of his hypothesis established. And presently we see that the validity of a doubtful hypothesis is tested, not by examination of particulars, but by the ascent to a more general hypothesis. The word ὑμηρησία too strikes me as betraying a writer who had no sense of the difference between aorist and perfect participles: below we have ἡμηρησίας. On these grounds I fully agree with Mr. Jackson in regarding the passage εἰ δὲ τις...διαφορεῖ as an interpolation; probably, as he suggests, by the same hand that inserted ταῖς μὲν γ’ ἀγαθαῖς κ.τ.λ. in 72 Π. 4. ὑπάναστως ἀν διδοίης i.e. as when we are asked to explain a group of particulars we form by generalisation a concept or definition, ὑπόθεσις, which includes them all, so if we have to explain our ὑπόθεσις we form a wider generalisation which includes that and other ὑπόθεσις corresponding to other groups of particulars. We proceed from particulars to species, from species to genus, from genus to a more comprehensive genus, and so ascend step by step until we arrive at one that will satisfy our needs. 5. ήτις τῶν ἄνωθεν] ‘whichever of the higher generalisations seems most adequate’. τῶν ἄνωθεν means the more comprehensive ὑπόθεσις, farther removed

1. ἐστὶ τι ικανὸν ἠλθοι) I agree with Prof. Geddes, though for very different reasons, in holding that ικανὸν does not mean the αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν. In this passage Socrates is avowedly setting forth his δεύτερος πλοῦς: he has declared his inability (99 d) to attain to the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. Now if ικανὸν means the αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν, we have here described no δεύτερος πλοῦς, but the perfect dialectic of which Socrates at present despairs; and we ought to exchange the term ὑπόθεσις for ἀρχή. By the superior method, we use our ὑπόθεσεις merely as steps to the αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν: having reached this we are enabled to descend step by step, verifying every one of the ὑπόθεσεις by which we ascended: so that the knowledge of the αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν is essential to the real knowledge of all our generalisations from the highest to the lowest. But since the inferior method only is attempted here, ικανὸν must merely mean a ὑπόθεσις comprehensive enough to satisfy the antagonist or our own doubts. Olympiodorus, though his phraseology is sadly confused, means rightly when he says ἄριστον δὲ, τὸ δὲ ἀμφιλογούμενον φάναι καὶ τοὺς αὐτοπίστους ὑπόθεσεις τε καὶ ἀρχὰς.

ἀμα δὲ οὐκ ἰν φύρως] i.e. you would not make a confusion between arguments intended to prove your ὑπόθεσις and arguments applicable to deductions therefrom: e.g. in the case that follows, you would not confuse a demonstration of the ideal theory with a demonstration of the immortality of the soul, which is a corollary from the former. In other words the processes which are not to be confused are (1) the establishment of the ὑπόθεσεις, (2) the comparison of the ὀρμημένα with the ὑπόθεσις, cf. 100 λ. As Grote says, 'during this debate [on the ὀρμημένα] Plato would require his opponent to admit the truth of the fundamental hypothesis provisionally. If the opponent chose to impugn the latter, he must open a distinct debate on that express subject. Plato insists that the discussion of the consequences flowing from the hypothesis shall be kept quite apart from the discussion on the credibility of the hypothesis itself'. In the sarcastic remarks that follow Plato indicates the difference between the aim of the φιλοσοφία and that of the ἀντιλογικόν: the former seek τῶν ὄντων τι εὑρέων, the latter αὐτοῦ αὐτοῦς ἀρέσκειν. This spirit of self-satisfaction is exercised by dialectic; cf. Theaetetus 177 b. φύρω is Madvig's correction for φύρω, which is retained by Z. and St. οὐκ ἰν φύρω means 'you would not get muddled', but the active gives a preciser sense.

102 λ. Plato brings in this brief interlude with his usual skill. The emphatic approval expressed by Echekrates of the principles just laid down serves to impress us that by them we must stand or fall. We have staked all upon this last effort; we have chosen our own
battle-ground, on which alone we can hope for victory. Nothing could better mark the gravity of the crisis than this momentary pause in the narrative.

102 Α—103 Α, ε. 1. Assuming then that ideas exist corresponding to the hypotheses, and that by participation in them particulars possess their attributes, Sokrates proceeds thus. When we say Simmias is bigger than Sokrates and less than Phaedo, we are speaking loosely: in reality Simmias partakes of the ideas of great and small; and it is greatness in him which is bigger than smallness in Sokrates, and smallness in him that is less than greatness in Phaedo. For it has nothing to do with the personality of Simmias Sokrates and Phaedo, as such, that one is greater or less than another. We observe then that (1) two opposite ideas can coexist in the same subject, although (2) such opposite ideas cannot combine with each other, either (3) as they exist absolutely in nature, or (4) as they are manifested in concrete particulars. And this incapacity of one opposite idea to take upon it the nature of the other is true of all pairs of opposite ideas as well as great and small.

Setting aside the metaphysical objections to the doctrine of ideas of relation, which we have here in its most pronounced form, it inevitably serves Plato's purpose to show that in particulars contradictory ideas may coexist. In 103 Β we pass on to the next stage. We are here dealing with the participation by particulars in ideas which are not essential to their nature. Greatness and smallness are not essential to a man as heat is essential to fire and cold to snow. With this chapter it is well to contrast Parmenides 150 Α foll.

7. ἐπει αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη] Sokrates now assumes the existence of the ideas, though at present he is unable to attain cognition of them: that is, he assumes that his ὑποθέσεις more or less faithfully represent the substantial realities. Taking then the ideas as the true αἰτία περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, it remains to examine whether the immortality of the soul is a legitimate deduction from this theory.

8. τάλλα] i.e. concrete existence. τάλλα is constantly used thus in the Parmenides.

11. λέγεις τότε εἶναι] The ideas are the cause of comparison, as of everything else. It is through partaking of the ideas of great and small that Simmias is comparable in point of size with other men.

13. τὸ τὸν Σμμιᾶν ὑπερέχειν] 'as to Simmias being bigger than Sokrates, you
admit the truth is not as expressed in the words'. Strictly speaking Simmias is not bigger than Sokrates, for the personality of two men cannot be compared in respect of size. The only things that can be so compared are great and small: therefore it is the greatness in Simmias which we compare with the smallness that is in Sokrates. But to say that Simmias qua Simmias is greater or less than Sokrates qua Sokrates, would be nonsense.

8. ἐπωνυμῶν ἔχει] because he participates in the two opposite ideas. This predication of opposite attributes exhibits particulars in sharp contrast to the ideas, of which no such contrary predication is, to the Sokrates of the Phaedo, possible: cf. Parmenides 129 β εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα τις ἀπέφανεν ἄνωθεν γεγομέναν ἢ τὰ ἀπόκρυπτα ἄριστα, τέρας ἂν, οἵμα τιν' εἰ δὲ τὰ τοῖτων μετέχοντα ἀμφότερα ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεποιθότα, οὐδὲν ἐπισχέ, οὕτω ζήσει, ἄτοπον δικέ εἶναι. The whole passage 129 λ—130 Α should be compared, where Sokrates is stating the earlier Platonic doctrine, which in the latter part of the dialogue Plato criticises with a view to its modification.

9. τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων] This reading is due to Madvig, who thus renders the sentence: 'alterius magnitudinis exiguitatem suam superandam subminis-

trans, alteri magnitudinem exiguitatem superan tem praebens'; i.e. Simmias submits his smallness to be exceeded by the greatness of Phaedo and presents his greatness to exceed the smallness of Sokrates. On the whole this seems the best attempt to disentangle this troublesome sentence that has yet been made. The ordinary reading is ὑπέρχων, which is thus translated by Mr Cope: 'exceeding the shortness of the one by excess of height, and lending to the other by comparison a size exceeding his own shortness'. The grave objection to this reading and interpretation is that in the first clause ὑπέρχων is followed by the accusative, in the second ὑπέρχον by the genitive. The verb may, it is true, take either case; but surely Plato would not use both constructions in the same breath. Wytenbach, Heindorf, and Ast reconstruct the passage each in his own way: Madvig's remedy is however the simplest.

11. ἐξυγγραφικὸς ἐρείν] 'it seems I am going to talk in the style of an indenture'. ἐξυγγραφή is the regular term for a legal document, especially a bond or covenant. Sokrates makes fun of the clumsy sentence he has just uttered, which he compares to the cumbrous pedantry of legal phraseology.
1. οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος] According to the earlier Platonism, the idea exists (1) absolutely apart from the sensible world, χωρίστη, (2) inherent in phenomena, to which it imparts its attributes. Not only are opposite ideas incapable of communion, as existing apart by themselves, but also as informing particulars. The importance of this point becomes manifest when the argument is applied to ψυχή.

4. ἡ φεύγων καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν] If any object that was great becomes small, the idea of greatness either withdraws from it and goes elsewhere or is extinguished; and the idea of smallness takes its place. But under no circumstances can the idea of greatness remain in the object and accept the attribute of smallness, thus contradicting its own nature.

6. ὑπομένων] Schanz has adopted Hirschg's ὑπομεῖναι, against all authority. The change of tense is however perfectly proper. Awaiting the approach of the other idea is a prolonged process, accepting it is an act performed once for all. In the next sentence ὑπομεῖνας denotes the actual completion of the process in a specified instance.

οὐκ ἐθέλων] 'it will not consent to abide and accept smallness and thus become different from what it was, in the way that I accept and abide smallness and still remaining the man I am, without losing my identity am small; whereas it has never submitted, while remaining great, to be small'. That is to say, if Sokrates δέχεται σμικρότητα, we have a small Sokrates, which involves no incongruity nor loss of identity; but if greatness δέχεται σμικρότητα, we have small greatness, which is incongruous and impossible. Schmidt (krit. Comm. π. 41) discusses this passage at great length: he would read οὐκ ἐθέλων εἶναι έτι ὅπερ ἦν, comparing 103 Ε δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα έτι εἶναι έτι ὅπερ ἦν, πιῦ καὶ ψυχρῶν. There is much to be said for this; but I think the vulgate may be defended, as indicating that in the one case a change of identity is involved but not in the other: the incongruity in fact lies in the supposed retention of its identity by the idea under circumstances which render its retention impossible. σμικρὸν μέγεθος would remain μέγεθος but yet be ἄτερον. Moreover Schmidt's reading anticipates the point made in μέγα ἐν σμικρῶν εἶναι. On the whole therefore it is better to make no change.

8. οὕτως οὗ αὐτῶς σμικρός εἰμ] 'I, this same Sokrates, am small'.

9. τετάλμηκε] as in 103 ο ετολμήσεων. The perfect expresses the fixed constitution of the idea: it has been ordained by nature not to endure smallness.
103 τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπὸλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι. Παντάπασιν, ἐφη ο Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνεται μοι.

Λ1. Καὶ τις ἐπὶ τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—όστις δ' ἦν, οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι—Πρὸς θεών, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυν λεγομένων ὁμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττονος τὸ 5 μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μεῖζονος τὸ ἐλάττον, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὐτὴ εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων; νῦν δὲ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραμελῶν τὴν κεφαλήν καὶ ἀκούσας, Ἀνδρικῶς, ἐφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. 10 τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πράγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὁ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἑξῶντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζουσε αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ὡς ἐνόητων 15

1. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι] ι.ε. ἐν τῷ προσέκαμα αὐτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον.

103 Α—C, c. Λ1. One of the company suggests that this doctrine is inconsistent with our former theory of generation from opposites (70 c foll.). Sokrates replies that then we were speaking of particulars possessing the attributes of such opposites, but now we deal with the absolute opposites themselves. The former can pass from one to the other of two opposite conditions; but the opposite itself can never put on the nature of its opposite.

8. παραθαλάν τὴν κεφαλήν] 'bending his head to listen'. As Heindorf suggests, the objector probably spoke in a low voice through diffidence.

9. Ἀνδρικωσ] Sokrates is never without a word of praise for any mark of interest or intelligence in his listeners. Plato is fond of the word ἀνδρικωσ and its cognates to express staunchness in argument; cf. Theaetetus 204 ε, Phaedrus 265 A, Republic 434 B, Laws 752 B; in the last two instances ironically.

10. οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον] The distinction is clear enough. The concrete particular is not in itself opposed to either of the opposites, therefore it can admit either of such opposites without contradicting itself; but the opposites themselves are so mutually exclusive that neither can admit the other without self-contradiction. Hot water can become cold, because water is not itself opposite to hot or cold, nor is any attribute essential to it which is opposed to either. But hot cannot become cold without manifest contradiction of its own nature. Similarly, when we generated ἄδεια with τεθνυκάς, we did not mean that death became life, but simply that things that live have passed over from a state of death into a state of life. In the next chapter however we shall see that a further refinement must be made.

13. οὖτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν] Simmius can be small and great by participation in the ideas of small and great; but the idea of greatness in him can never have the quality of smallness, so that Simmius should be small by virtue of its immanence. For ἐν τῇ φύσει compare Parmenides 132 D τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὡσπερ παραδείγματα ἔστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει.

15. τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ] Here Plato propounds a theory of predication. When we say that Sokrates is small, we do not
mean that Sokrates and small are the same thing, but we call Sokrates after the
name of the idea whose attribute he posses
sees. To mark this point was necessary
because of the confusion into which Anti
thenes and others had fallen in the matter
of predication. The difference between Plato's treatment of the subject in the
Phaedo and in the Sophist has been
dealt with in the introduction § 5.

4. οὐκ ἄδικον] 'no, not this time'. The
mss. are corrupt here: I have adopted the
text of Schanz, except that he brackets
ὁ Κέβης. Z. and St. have οὐκ ἄδικον, ἔφη ὁ
Κέβης.

103 c—104 c, c. lii. The mutually ex
clusive opposites, hot and cold, are not
identical with fire and snow; yet we see
that fire will not admit cold, nor snow
heat. Whence we infer that there may be
an idea which is not one of a pair of
opposites, but which may exclude one of
such opposites. For instance, the idea of
odd is opposite to that of even, and ex
dclusive of it. Also the idea of three,
though not opposite to even, excludes it,
because the idea of three necessarily carries
with it the idea of odd. Similarly the idea
of even and the idea of two exclude the
idea of odd. Thus it appears that there
are (1) opposite ideas which are mutually
exclusive, (2) other ideas, not identical
with any such opposite but necessarily
partaking of it, which, equally with that
opposite, exclude the other opposite.

After establishing in the fiftieth chapter
that opposite ideas cannot enter into com
munion, Plato's next task is to show that
this incomunicability extends to other
ideas, which, though not themselves op
posite to anything, are inseparably com
bined with one of such opposites and there
fore necessarily exclude the other.

9. ὅπερ χίώνα καὶ πῦρ] Plato at first
speaks of hot, cold, fire, snow, without
distinctly specifying whether he means
ideas or particulars: presently however he
gives a precise statement: we have in
104 A (1) περιττόν, the idea of odd, (2)
τρίας, the idea of three, (3) τρία, the three
particulars informed by the τρίας.

12. χίώνα οὖσαν] Schanz writes χίώνα
twice, which is far from euphonious and
surely unnecessary, the subject being
readily supplied from the preceding sen
tence.

ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν] 101 E.

13. χίώνα καὶ θερμῶν] 'at once snow
and hot'. The sense is perfectly right,
and I cannot understand why Schanz
should bracket καὶ θερμῶν, as he does καὶ
ψυχρᾶν in E. For the phrase χίώνα καὶ
103]

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.

147

τερμοῦ ἡ ὑπεκχωρήσειν [αὐτῷ] ἡ ἀπολείπον. Πάντα γε. Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὐς προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἡ ὑπεξεῖναι ἡ ἀπολείπον, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ τολμήσειν δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἐτι εἶναι ὑπὲρ ἐ ἡν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρὸν. 'Ἀλλὰ, ἔφη, λέγεις. 'Εστιν ἄρα, ἢ δ' ὡς, περὶ ἕνω τῶν τοιοῦτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτῷ τὸ εἴδος ἀξιώσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄνοματος εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὅ ἐστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἕξει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν ἀεὶ ὑπαντήρ γ. ἐτι δὲ ἐν τοίοσδε ὅσως ἑπταὶ σαφέστερον δ' ἔλεγο. τὸ γὰρ περὶτῶν ἀεὶ που δεῖ τοῦτον τοῦ ὄνοματος τυγχάνειν, ὑπὲρ μὲν λέγομεν· ἢ οὐ; Πάνω γε. Ἀρα μόνον τῶν ἄνωτων, τοῦτο γὰρ ἔρωτϊ, ἡ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὁ 10

1. ἀπολείπον] That which ἀπὸλ.

λύται is of course not the idea, which is as imperishable existing ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ as existing ἐν τῇ φύσει: what perishes is the quality of snow which the particular posses-

s by the immanence of the idea of snow—the sensible form of snow, such as those described in Timaeus 50 c as εἰς ὡστα καὶ ἐξ ἡπόστα: this however is to explain Plato's words by means of an analysis which he had not yet made.

4. ἐστιν ἄρα, ἢ δ' ὡς] 'it is the case then with some ideas of this kind that not only do we recognize the right of this idea itself to the same name in perpetuity, but also that of some other idea, not being identical with it, which, whenever it exists, always possesses the form of the other'. For the construction ἐστιν ὡστε cf. 93 b.

6. τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄνοματος] So Schanz: rightly, it would seem; cf. below, τὸ γὰρ περιτῶν ἀεὶ που ἀεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ὄνοματος τυγχάνειν. In support of ἀειτῶν Prof. Geddes refers to 104 A μετὰ τοῦ ἀειτῶν ὄνοματος. But there, as well as in τῷ ἀντὶς ὄνοματι below, a comparison is involved which is absent here. Z. and St. give ἀειτῶν.

7. τῆς ἐκείνου μορφῆν] On this Wytenbach observes 'notatur alias ver-

borum usus: quo εἴδος ut universalius habetur, μορφή minus universale et quasi communio τοῦ εἴδους: veluti numerus im-

par εἴδος dicitur, trina antem illius μορφῆν habere'. But this distinction cannot be maintained; for, as Wytenbach himself points out, in 104 D Plato says ἡ ἐναντία ἱδέα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ ὅ ἄν τοῦτο ἀνεργάζηται, where μορφή = τῇ περιτῇ. In fact μορφῆ, εἴδος, and ἱδέα are in the present passage interchangeable words. 'The species has the μορφῆ of the genus present, with whatever else that μορφή may be combined', says Prof. Geddes, rightly.

ἐτι δὲ ἐν τοῖοσι] No fresh point is introduced here: Plato is merely illus-

trating his proposition more fully. From his second example he again draws the inference stated in 103 ἐ, which he gives in a more complete form in 104 β.

80. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτᾶ] 'for this is the point of my question'. These words direct the attention of the hearer to the proposition on which most stress is laid: viz. that there are ideas which are not logically opposite to anything, but which nevertheless contain the principle of some opposite and therefore refuse to combine with the rival opposite. The vital importance of this we shall presently see.

10—2
essler µεν ὅχε ὀπερ τὸ περίττον, ὅμως δὲ δεὶ αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὅνοματος καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν ἀεί, διὰ τὸ οὕτω πεφυκέναι, ὥστε τοῦ περίττου μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οἷον καὶ ἡ τριάς πέποιησε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. σκότει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος ἀρα ὅτι dukει σοι τῷ τε αὐτής ὅνοματι αἱ προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περίττου, ὅντος ὅχε οὕτπερ τῆς τριάδος; ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτω πως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριάς καὶ ἡ περίττας καὶ ὁ ἡμισὺς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἄπας, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ὀπερ τὸ περίττον ἀεὶ ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν ἔστι περίττος; καὶ αὖ τὰ δῦο καὶ τὰ τέτταρα καὶ ἄπας ὁ ἔτερος αὕτω στίχος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὀπερ τὸ ἀρτιον ὅμως ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν ἀρτιὸς ἐστιν αἰὲν συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὐ; Πῶς ἡμᾶς οὖν; ἐφη. 'Ὁ τοῖνυν, ἐφη, βούλομαι δηλώσαι, ἄθρει. ἐστιν δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκείνα τὰ ἑαυτία ἀλλήλα τούτοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁσα οὐκ ὁντ' ἀλλήλοις ἑαυτία ἐχει ἄει τὰναυτία, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἐοικε διεχόμενης ἐκείνην τὴν ἰδέαν ἢ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὅσῃ ἑαυτία ἢ, ἀλλ' ἐπιούσῃς αὐτῆς ἤτοι ἀπολύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἢ οὐ φίλομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπο- 2. καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν] sc. περιττόν. 7. ὁ ἡμισὺς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἄπας] 'the entire half of the set of numbers' COPE. For the construction cf. Thucydides VIII 8 τὰς ἡμισιὰς τῶν νεῶν. πολὺς is similarly used, Thuc. 1 5 τῶν πλείτων τοῦ βιών: and other like idioms are given in Wagner's note. 12. οὐ μόνον ἐκείνα τὰ ἑαυτία] 'not only those original opposites refuse to admit each other, but also those, which, though not opposite one to another, always contain the opposites, seem no more likely to admit the idea which is opposite to the idea they contain, but on its approach they either perish or withdraw'. That is to say τριάς is not opposite to δύο, but it contains an opposite, περιττόν, to the idea, ἀρτιον, contained in δύο. Therefore τριάς equally with περιττόν excludes ἀρτιον and δύο excludes περιττόν. 16. ἀπολύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα] As Ast says, the construction is as though φαίνεται had been written instead of ἐοικε. 104 C—105 B, c. liii. Let us define these ideas more closely. Such an idea is not itself one of two opposite ideas; nevertheless, into whatsoever particulars it informs it carries along with it one of these opposites; so that the particulars are called not only by the name of their own idea, but by the name of this opposite also; nor can they admit the other opposite without ceasing to be what they are. For instance three particulars are three by participation in the ideal triad; but they are also odd, because the triad always carries with it the idea of oddness. Consequently they can never admit the idea of even without ceasing to be three. Of this a number of other examples are given. It might be thought that in the last chapter we had already a sufficient account of these ideas. But in the present chapter one important addition is made. Now we not only say of the ἄλη ἄτα that they ἔχει τὰ ἑαυτία, but also that they ἐπιφέρει τὰ ἑαυτία εἰς δ’ τι ἀν κατάσχη. This is a necessary corollary to the foregoing; but Plato desires to bring it out as prominently as possible, because this is the point at which the whole argument is aimed. Thus the gist of this
chapter lies in its application of the principle to concretes.

8. ἀ δ τι ἐν κατάσχης] 'which, whatever they occupy, compel that have not only its own idea, but always that of some opposite as well'. The word κατάσχη marks the fresh point: what the idea occupies or informs can be nothing else but particulars.

9. την αὐτοῦ ἱδέαν] i.e. ἐκείνου δ τι ἐν κατάσχῃ. Wohlrab strangely remarks 'αὐτὸν bezüglich auf den Plural ἀ'. To say nothing of the grammar, this makes sheer nonsense, representing the idea as the idea of itself. Plato's meaning is plain enough. The ideal triad, for instance, occupying the concrete three, forces the latter to receive not only the special idea, τρία, but also the idea of a certain opposite, περιττῶν.

10. ἐναντίου ἄν τινος] There is so much confusion in the ms. that it would be rash to assert confidently what is the true reading. This however gives precisely the sense required and differs from the best mss. only in the omission of αὐτός.

Notwithstanding that αὐτός has overwhelming ms. authority I cannot believe it genuine. The only plan for making sense of it is to read δὲ with Schmidt for ἄν. But the phraseology 'but it also has need of some opposite' is so glaringly inappropriate that it is incredible that Plato wrote it. I have therefore with the Zürich editors ejected αὐτός, which Schanz retains within brackets. Ast's ἄν δὴ τινὸς is not bad, possibly accounting for the corruption δὴνος.

13. ἐκεῖνη τῇ μορφῇ] see on 103 E.

14. εἰργάζετο δὲ ἡ περιττότης] The ms. reading ἡ περιττή is surely indefensible. Plato never uses such a phrase as ἡ περιττή ἱδέα, which would indeed be something very like nonsense. Probably he wrote either ἡ τοῦ περιττοῦ or ἡ περιττότης: the latter, which was suggested to me by Mr Jackson, I have ventured to adopt, as the mildest remedy I can find for an evident corruption. Compare 105 C οὐκ ἐρῶ γὰρ ἢν περιττότης.

15. ἐπί τα τρία] i.e. three particulars.

17. ἀνάρτιος ἂρα ἡ τριάς] The word
"Ο τούνν ἔλεγον ὀρίσαιν, ποια οὗκ ἐναντία τινὶ ὄντα ὄμως οὐ δέχεται αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον, οἷον νῦν ἢ τριὰς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὗκ οὔσα ἐναντία οὗδεν τι μᾶλλον αὐτῷ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον αἰε ᾧτὸ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἢ διὰς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τῷ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα 105 5 πάμπολλα—ἀλλ' ἄρα δὴ, εἰ οὔτως ὀρίζει, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἄλλα καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὁ ἀν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἔκεινο, ἐφ' ὦ τι ἀν αὐτὸ ὑπ' αὐτὸ τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέχεσθαι. πάλιν δὲ ἀναμμηνήσκον οὐ γὰρ χείρον πολλάκις ἀκούειν. τὰ πέντε την τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέχεται,

10 οὔτε τὰ δέκα την τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον' τὸῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλω <οὐκ> ἐναντίον, ὄμως δὲ τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ οὐ δέχεται. οὔτε τὸ ἡμίλιον οὔτε τάλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἡμίσυν, τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, Β

ἀνάρτιον is used instead of περιττή to denote the opposition to ἄρτιον involved in the number three: the full significance of this mode of expression will be clear when we come to take the case of ψυχῆ.

1. ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι] Heindorf says 'ἔλεγον in his, ut saepe, idem fere est quod ἐκέλευν'. Cf. Aeschylus Agamemnon 925 ἔλεγα κατ' ἀνδρα, μήθεν, σήμεν ἤμε.

2. οὔ δέχεται αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον] There seems no reason for omitting τὸ ἐναντίον. 'The opposite itself' is distinguished from the idea which is not, but implies, an opposite: and this is all that is meant by the word αὐτό. Cf. 103 B. This seems to be the view of H. Schmidt (krit. Comm. ii p. 58), who understands αὐτό 'nicht in dem streng philosophischen Sinne an sich'. Stallbaum's plan of taking τὸ ἐναντίον in opposition to αὐτό is clumsy.

5. ὤρα δὴ εἰ οὔτως ὀρίζει resumes the sentence begun at 6 τούνν ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι, the construction of which is left imperfect.

μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον] 'that not only does the opposite refuse to admit its opposite, but whatever imports an opposite into that to which itself comes—that very importing idea can never admit the opposite of that which is imported'. Sokrates here speaks highly ξυγγραφικῶς.

Not only will odd refuse to admit even, but the triad, which imports the idea of odd (ἐκεῖνο ὁ ἀν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον) into whatsoever it enters, will itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρων) never admit even, the opposite of oddness which is imported by it (τὴν του ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα). ἐκεῖνο is to be joined with ἐπιφέρη. The present definition differs from that in 104 B in the introduction of the word ἐπιφέρων, which denotes that the principle is now being applied to concretes which are informed by the ideas.

10. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλω <οὐκ> ἐναντίον] The insertion of οὐκ is absolutely necessary: there is no sense in which the number ten can be said to be contrary to anything else. Cf. 104 C ἄλλα καὶ ὥσα οὐκ ὄντα ἄλληλος ἐναντία ἐχει αἱ τάνταλα: and 104 E. Stallbaum's defence of the vulgate apparently fails to satisfy even himself.

12. οὔτε τὸ ἡμίλιον] 'nor will ⅓ and the rest of the fractions whose denominator is 2 accept the idea of whole; nor yet will ⅔ and the fractions whose denominator is 3'. These last examples do not seem very felicitous, since we have no such definite contrast of opposites as in the case of odd and even. We must however take it thus: ⅓ and ⅔ are not opposites to anything; they contain how-
ever the idea of fractionality, which is opposite to that of integrity, therefore they will never admit the latter.

to ἡμισυ. Schanz brackets this as a gloss.

105 ὅ—ὅ, c. lvi. We are now enabled to advance beyond our first simple and safe hypothesis. When we are asked what by its immanence makes a thing hot, we shall no longer answer heat, but fire: similarly we shall assign fever as the cause of sickness, not disease; the monad as the cause of numerical imparity, not oddness. Applying this rule, when we ask what is the cause of life in the body, Kebes answers soul; for soul contains in her the principle of life which is opposite to death; whence soul can never combine with death.

We now see the significance of Plato’s insistence on his point that some ideas which are not opposites yet refuse to combine with certain opposites. Soul is not opposite to anything; but she stands in the same relation to the idea of life as fire does to that of heat and the triad to that of oddness.

It is to be noted that a fourth term is added in this chapter. Hitherto we have had three, e.g. περισσότης, τράς, τρία: the general idea, the special idea and the particular informed by the latter: now in addition to these three we have σῶμα in which the particular resides; the fever that seizes on us is not the idea of fever, but a particular fever, which corresponds to τρία, while the idea of fever corresponds to τράς. Similarly the soul that quickens a particular body corresponds to τρία. Now since this fourth term is itself in no wise material to the argument,—it matters nothing to the immortality of soul whether or not she resides in a body—I conceive the point of it is to emphasise the fact that these particulars too, πυρετός and ψυχή, carry with them the ideas of νῦσος and ἔννοια, and consequently refuse to admit their opposites. Hitherto it has only been the special idea which ἐπιφέρει the general idea.

3. καὶ μὴ μοι ὅ ἄν ἐρωτῶ] —and do not answer in the terms of the questions I put, but following the examples I shall give you’ i.e. to the following question, what makes a thing ἑρμω; the answer must be, not ἑρμωτής, but πῦρ. The reading in the text has the best ms. authority and gives the best sense.

5. τὴν ἄσφαλὴν ἑκείνην] Cf. 100 ε ἄσφαλες εἶναι καὶ μὲν καὶ ὁποῖον ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ ἔγνεσθαι καλά. For the use of ἄσφαλες cf. Ῥίτους ζωά μακρῷ πρὸς ἄλθειν ἄσφαλεστερον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι χρυσόν.

6. εἰ γὰρ ἔρωτοι με] —were you to ask me what must be inherent in a body to make it hot’. Stallbaum seems right in bracketing ἐν τῷ: we thus have the same phrase three times over, with a slight variation in the order of the words. Schanz and others include ὕδατι in the bracket; but it seems quite as much in place here as in the two passages below.
οὐκ ἐρώ ὅτι ὑπὸ ἄν νόσος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἄν πυρετός: οὐδ' ὕπ' ἄν ἀριθμῷ τί ἐγγένεται, περιττός ἐσται, οὐκ ἐρώ ὑπὸ ἄν περιπτώσης, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἄν μονάς, καὶ τάλαλα υἱῶν. ἀλλ' ὃρα, εἰ ἦδη ἰκανῶς οὐσθ' ὑπὸ τί βούλομαι. Ἄλλα πάντα ἰκανῶς, ἔφη. Ἀποκρύνον δὴ, ὑ δ' ὅς, ὑ ὑπὸ τί ἐγγένεται σώματι, ἔδω ἐσται; ὁμι ὑπὸ ψυχή, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ τοῦτο ὑὔτως ἔχει; Πῶς γὰρ ὑξί; ὑ δ' ὅς. Ἡ ψυχὴ ἀρα ὑπὸ τὸ ἄν 

1. ὑ ὑπὸ πυρετός] i.e., he will specify the particular kind of sickness instead of using the general term: as Prof. Geddes puts it, the species is substituted for the genus.

2. ὑ ὑπὸ μονάς] Similarly, instead of assigning περιπτώσης as the cause of oddness in a number, he will assign the idea of that particular odd number, whatever it may be: μονάς, like πυρετός, is merely given as an example.

6. ὑ τὸ ὑπὸ αὐτῆς κατάσχη] It is to be noted that the usage of κατάσχη here is different from that in 104 d. The soul does not occupy the body in the sense in which πρᾶxis occupies τρᾶ: the triad is the cause why the three are three, the soul is not the cause why body is body, but the cause why it is alive. The difference lies in this: the triad is the idea of three; the soul which quickens the body is not the idea of soul, but a particular soul, just as the fever is a particular fever. Thus we have the following terms (1) the idea of life, (2) the idea of soul, which carries the idea of life to particular souls, (3) the particular soul, which vivifies the body, (4) the body in which is displayed this vivifying power. It is true that an ideal soul is a metaphysical monstrosity; but we cannot escape it here, first because otherwise Plato's elaborate parallel breaks down, secondly because in the earlier Platonism an idea of soul is inevitable. Wherever there is a group of particulars called by the same name, we are told in the Republic, there is an idea corresponding: therefore since there are particular ὑσχαλ, there must be αὐτῷ ὑ ὑπὸ πρᾶ.

This is one of the errors which Plato rectifies in his later dialogues; for the present we must bear with it. The whole point of this sentence is that not only the idea of soul but also a particular soul ἐπιφέρει ἐπί, and accordingly τὸ ἐναντίον ὑ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἐδὲ ὑ μὴ ποτὲ δέχεται.

105 d—106 d, c. lv. As then that which will not admit even is uneven, so that which will not admit death, namely soul, is deathless. Now if the negation of even or of heat or of cold necessarily implied indestructibility, then three and snow and fire would not perish at the approach of the opposite to the idea contained in them, but would merely withdraw from it. This however is not the case: these negations do not imply indestructibility; therefore three and snow and fire can cease to exist at the approach of the opposite. But the negation of death does imply indestructibility: soul therefore, on the approach of death, not only refuses to admit it, but also refuses to perish: soul is thus not only deathless but indestructible. Indeed if the eternal principle of life could perish, then there is nothing in existence that should not perish.

We have seen that πῦρ and τρᾶ, on the approach of cold or evenness, had two alternatives open to them, either ὑπεκχωρεῖν or ἀπόλλυσθαι: what is not open to them is δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον. Therefore if in any case ἀπόλλυσθαι were identified with δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον, it would necessarily be precluded. In the foregoing instances this is not so: ἀπόλλυσθαι is not identical with δέχεσθαι ψυχῶν nor with δέχεσθαι ἀρτίων. Consequently both alternatives are open to πῦρ and τρᾶ. But in the case of ψυχή this identification actually occurs: δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον is for the principle of life
δέχεσθαι θάνατον: ἀπόλυσθαι is the same as δέχεσθαι θάνατον: therefore, since δέχεσθαι θάνατον is precluded, so also is ἀπόλυσθαι; else we should find soul doing what we have agreed is impossible, viz. admitting the opposite idea to the idea contained in it.

6. τι νῦν δὴ ταῦτα] ταῦτα is in bcd, omitted by Z. and St. Schanz cites Alciab. Ι 109 c πρὸς ταῦτα ἄρα, τὸ δὲ δικαίον, τοὺς λόγους ποιήσει.

10. ἁθάνατον ἄρα ἢ ψυχή;] It is necessary to distinguish very carefully the meaning of ἁθάνατον. All it denotes here is δ ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται: it is that which contains the opposite idea to θάνατος, as ἁνάρτιον contains the opposite idea to ἁρτιόν. It signifies in fact not what soul is but what she is not; and for the present we must dissociate the word from the positive notion of imperishability. We are now merely expressing the particular ἐναρτιόν which soul will not admit; that the exclusion of this ἐναρτιόν involves indestructibility is an inference we do not reach until we declare that ἁθάνατον = ἀνάλεθρον. Wittenbach accurately says ἀθάνατον hic dicitur ὅ ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται: ἀνάλεθρον, quod superveniente contrario oik ἀπόλυται'. For a somewhat similar subtlety compare Aristotle Topica VI vi 145b21 foll. where ἁθάνατον is regarded as logically distinguishable, though not actually separable, from ἀφθαρσών.

11. τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδείχθαι φῶμεν] What has been demonstrated is, not the eternal existence of soul, which is a subsequent inference, but that soul contains the opposite idea to death. Dead soul would be analogous to cold fire or even three. It must be borne in mind that ψυχή means the principle of life: a dead vital principle is a contradiction in terms. That this is only a preliminary step to the final induction is marked by the τοῦτο μὲν.

14. ei το ἄθερμον] If το ἄθερμον were necessarily indestructible — that is, if ἄθερμον were the opposite idea to ἄθερμον, then snow, as containing ἄθερμον, would not have the alternative of perishing on the approach of its opposite; it must withdraw whole and unmelted. χιὼν ἀπολυμένη would then be as impossible as χιὼν θερμή is now.
2. *εἰ τὸ ἄψυχρον*] The correction ἄψυχον, suggested by Wytenbach, seems to me certain. In order to formulate his antitheses with the utmost precision, Plato has coined the words ἀνάρτιον and ἀδηρμον, to express the direct opposites of ἀρτίον and θερμῶν: it seems hardly doubtful that he also coined the word ἄψυχον to express the direct opposite of ψυχῶν, ἄψυχον, as Wytenbach says, is the counterpart of ἀδηρματον, not of ἀθέρμων; and in a passage where Plato is choosing his terms with such extreme nicety the slightest failure in fitness is not to be tolerated. It is surprising that Wytenbach’s admirable correction has been so completely ignored by subsequent editors. Mr Jackson, independently of Wytenbach, made the same emendation. ἄψυχον is confirmed by the corrupt reading ψυχῶν in Stobaeus ad. 1 814.

5. *εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀδάνατον*] The inference that soul is immortal is not yet definitely drawn, but is based upon the two statements made in this sentence, (1) soul is ἀδάνατον, i.e. she cannot combine with death and so become dead soul; (2) therefore if ἄδανατον involves ἀνώλεθρον, soul is ἀνώλεθρον, i.e. she cannot perish. When these two propositions are put side by side, it becomes obvious that the refusal of the soul to admit death implies her indestructibility, since we know that ἄδανατον does involve ἀνώλεθρον.

7. *οἷς έσται τεθηκαία*] It is noteworthy that τεθηκαία has a different sense here from that of τεθηκαίος in the discussion at 71 c: there it implied merely the state of separation of soul and body, but here denotes the actual destruction of the soul.

14. *εἰ τούτῳ ἡμολογητοι*] sc. τὸ ἀνάρτιον ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι: that in the case of ἀνάρτιον, ἀπολλυσθαι is equivalent to δέχεσθαι τὸ ἑναντίον, sc. ἀρτίον.

18. *πρὸς τὸ ἀδάνατον*] At last we have the inference definitely stated. Since soul will not admit the opposite of its imma-
nent idea, and since that opposite is death, soul, being deathless, must be imperishable.

2. σχολὴ γὰρ ἂν] Here we have the fundamental postulate on which the whole argument rests: viz. that energy cannot be annihilated. All other things being but forms of energy, may make way for their opposites, since their conversion into the opposite state involves not destruction but simply modification of energy. But vital principle is energy itself, therefore its conversion into the opposite state would mean conversion into non-energy, i.e. annihilation of energy. Plato is simply applying to spirit the principle which the older physicists laid down for matter, and which Lucretius formulates in the words 'ex nihil nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti'. Similarly we have in 72 D ἐὰν γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ἑσώτερα, τὰ δὲ ἐξώτα βιοῦσι, τὰ μηκανῆ τὰ υφὶ πάντα κατακαλυθῆραι εἰς τὸ τεθνήμενον; Compare Phaedrus 245 D ποιοῦ ὃ' οὔτ' ἀποκλειθοίσιν ὁστε γίνεσθαι δυνατὸν, ἣ πάντα τε οὐράνιον πάσαν τε γένεσιν συμπε- σοῦσαι στήραι καὶ μέποτε αὐθέν ἄχεν ὅθεν κινθήσεται γενήσεται.

μὴ δέχοιτο] It is easier to feel the correctness of μὴ than to explain it grammatically. The meaning is 'hardly could there be anything else incapable of destroying itself, if the immortal, being eternal, will admit it'. μὴ δέχοιτο φθοράν is in fact equivalent to ἐὰν τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον φθοράν. Wohlrab compares Cratylus 429 D πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ὁ Σώκρατες, λέγων γε τις τὸ τοῦτο, δὲ λέγει, μὴ τοῦτο λέγων; Add Gorgias 310 D τίνα ἂν πρὸτον ἐγὼ μεγά δυναλθεῖν καὶ μείζονι με ἄδικον.

3. εἰ...δέσται = εἰ εἴθελοι οἱ μέλλει χεῖσθαι. The distinction between εἰ with future indicative and εἰν with subjunctive is apt to be overlooked. The former is constantly used as an equivalent to εἰ μέλε- λει, or even εἰ χρῆ, with infinitive; and the substitution of εἰν would be, as here, impossible. It was easy to multiply instances, but one may suffice: Aristophanes Frogs 1460 εὕροκε μὴ Δί, εἰπ' ἄνα- δοσει πάλιν, 'you must find something, if you mean to go on earth again'. Cf. Timaeus 31 A. This usage is recognised by Prof. Goodwin, moods and tenses § 49, 1, note 3: he however regards a number of cases as falling into the class of ordinary future conditions equivalent to εἰν with subjunctive (§ 50). I cannot but think that such cases are very rare: nearly if not quite all of the instances he quotes might be taken the other way: especially Isokrates Archidamos § 107, where εἰ δὲ φησινομεθα is, I conceive, precisely parallel to ἣν ἑθελομεν ἀποδηνήσεωι: 'if we mean to be cowards'.

Here it may be convenient to give concisely a synopsis of the reasoning in chapters 1—iv. After agreeing that the truth of immortality will be best established if we can show that it is a legitimate deduction from the theory of ideas, we set forth thus: (1) particulars partake successively, or even simultaneously, of contrary ideas, but the idea itself can never admit its opposite, but at the approach thereof either withdraws or perishes: and this applies both to ideas as existing in nature and as immanent in particulars: (1) there is a second set of ideas, not being themselves opposites, but containing opposite ideas; no such idea can admit the opposite of the idea it contains, but either withdraws or perishes; e.g. the triad contains the idea of odd and cannot admit that of even: (3) particulars which one of this second class of ideas informs can never admit the opposite of the contained idea; e.g. three things can never be even: (4) if
LVI. ‘Ω δέ γε θεός, οἴμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἴδος καὶ εἰ τι άλλο άθικόν ἐστιν, παρὰ πάντων ἀν ἀμ- 
λογοθετεὶς μηδέποτε ἀπολυσθαί. Παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νῦ Νές ἐφη 
ἀνθρώπων τέ γε καὶ εἴτε μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγγύμαι, παρὰ θεόν. ‘Οπότε δὴ 
τό ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιάφθορον ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ τι φύσις ἢ, εἰ ἀθάνατος ἐ 
τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἀν εἴη; Πολλὴν ἀνάφηκ. “Ἐπίοντος 
ἁρα θανάτῳ ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπον τὸ μὲν θητόν, ὡς ἐοικεν, αὐτὸν ἀποκρη- 
σκεῖ, τὸ δ’ ἀθάνατον σῶν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οὖχεται ἄπτων, ὧν 
ἐπεκαίρησαν τῷ θανάτῳ. Φαίνεται. Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἁρα, ἐφη, ὁ
Κέβης, ψυχή ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ άντι ἐσσοται ἡμῶν 107 ἀντι ψυχὸν ἐν Ἡλίῳ. Ὅμικον έγωγε, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐφη, ἐχω παρὰ 
ταιτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδε τη ἀπίστευτοι τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ’ εἰ δη 
Σιμμίας ἡ τις ἄλλος ἐχει λέγειν, εἰ ἐχει μὴ κατασχήσας ὡς οὐκ 
οἶδα εἰς ἄντινα τις ἄλλον καίρον ἀναβάλλοιτο ἥ τον νῦν παρόντα,

in any such instance refusal to admit the 
opposite necessarily involved indestructi-
bility, we could predicate immortality of 
that which refused to admit it; e.g. if ref-
usal to admit evenness involved inde-
structibility, three would be imperishable; 
but since this is not so, three may perish 
at the approach of evenness: (κ) but in the 
case of soul refusal to admit the opposite 
of its contained idea does involve inde-
structibility, since the contained idea is 
life, whose opposite is death; and that 
which will not admit death is imperish-
able: soul therefore on the approach of death has not the option of perishing, 
but must adopt the other alternative, ὑπεκα-
κωρεῖν. Else, if the principle of life perished, 
nothing could be found to resist destruc-
tion.

106 D—107 B, c. livi. Thus from the 
general principle that all things which re-
fuse to admit death are indestructible we 
infer that soul can never perish: when 
death comes upon a man, his mortal part 
perishes, but his soul withdraws, making 
way for death, while she herself is saved 
alive. It must be then that our souls live 
in Hades. Kebes is now fully convinced: 
Simmias cannot controvert the reasoning 
of Sokrates but still feels misgivings; 

whereupon Sokrates encourages him to sift 
the matter until he is thoroughly satisfied.

1. ὁ δὲ γε θεός We must identify 
θεός with absolute universal mind, the νοος 
βασιλεὺς of the Philebus, the mythical δη-
μοφορός of the Timaeus. Eternity cannot 
be ascribed either to the deities of popular 
worship or to those of Plato’s cosmology: 
see Timaeus 41a, where they are thus 
addressed by the creator: δ’ α’ καὶ ἐπετερ 
γεγένησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστε αὐ’ ἀθυ-
τοι τό πάμπαρ, ο’ τι μὲν δη λυθήσετε 
γε οὐδε τείξεσθε θανάτου μόρας, τῆς ἐμῆς 
βονοθείος μεῖνοι ἐτί δεσμοι καὶ κυριω-
τέρον λαχῶντες ἐκείνων, ο’τ’ ἐγγύνεθη 
ἐξεύρεσθε. In the final development of 
Plato’s system we find that God, the 
idea of life, and universal soul are iden-
tical: ψυχή alone of all things is αὐτοκι-
νητον καὶ ἀθάνατον. This identification 
however is not to be found in the Phaedo: 
it belongs to the consummated idealism 
of the Philebus and Timaeus.

8. ἀπολυσθαί] Here again the word 
denotes annihilation; not as in 71 C. 
καὶ ἀδιάφθορον] The distinction made 
in the last chapter between ἀθάνατον 
and ἀνώλεθρον must be carefully borne 
in mind.

14. εἰς ὄντων...ἀναβάλλοιτο) It is
needless, as I think, to insert ἀν: this use of the optative both in direct and indirect questions is established by a number of indubitable instances, and probably ought to be retained in some other cases where the editors introduce ἀν. It seems rash to assume in the face of much strong ms. evidence that the old use of the optative had entirely died out in Attic Greek. With the present example Wohlrab compares Euthydemos 296 ε. οὐκ ἔχω ὑμῖν τὰς ἀμφάβεθησεν. A case in direct interrogation is Gorgias 491 b τί γιάθετα αἰώνων καὶ κάκων εἶη; In both these passages some would insert ἀν; but it is not so easy to dispose of cases like Aeschylus Choephoro 172 and several other passages in tragedy. In Soph. Oed. Col. 170 the Laurentian has τις τες φροντίδος ἔλθει; The force is very much the same as that of the ‘deliberative’ subjunctive; but there is a distinction closely analogous to that drawn by Prof. Goodwin between ἠν γένηται and εἰ γένεται: the optative expresses a conception less vivid and more vague. The following words ἦ τὰν νῦν παρώντα are very needlessly bracketed by Hirschig.

3. τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθενείαν ἀτιμάζων ‘through distrust of human fallibility’. Cf. 85 d. The contrast between the clear-headed logician Kebes and the somewhat vague-minded Simmias is well brought out here. Kebes, sceptical as he is, has found an argument that in his judgment is free from flaw; he therefore freely accepts its consequences: Simmias still hesitates, not because he can find any defect in the reasoning, but rather because the ‘child in him’ cannot be soothed by reason. A good piece of dialectic does not come home to him as to his friend. Sokrates, it may be noticed, while commending his caution, points out what it ought to lead to: not to sighing over human weakness, but to a vigorous examination of the ὑποθέσεις.

5. οὐ μόνον γε [yes, Simmias, and not only so, but, besides what you have just so rightly suggested, you should also, however secure they may seem to you, nevertheless reexamine our first premises’. COPE. There seems no sufficient reason for ejecting ταῦτα τε εἰ λέγεις as Hirschig would do: nor can Ast’s ταῦτα γε εἰ λέγεις be commended.

7. ὅμως ἔπισκεπτέα σαφέστερον] I have followed Schanz in accepting this correction: the vulgar ἔπισκεπτεία involves an anacolouthon so harsh as to amount to bad writing.

καὶ ἐὰν αὐτάς] ‘and if you succeed in analysing them satisfactorily, you will follow up the reasoning, so far as it is possible for man to follow; and only when the result becomes perfectly plain will you cease to prosecute your search’.

καὶ τούτα αὐτὸ σαφές γένηται, i.e. if the security of the ὑποθέσεις and the validity of the deductions from them become plain, then only you will be justified in relaxing your efforts.

107 B—114 C, cc. Ixii.—Ixxii. Now follows the myth setting forth the conformation of the earth and the fate of souls in the underworld. Seeing that the soul is immortal, earnest indeed should be the care we bestow upon her training; for
upon that will depend her happiness and misery for all time. The ways of Hades are many and intricate; but the soul that has studied death will find herself at home there, and guided by her attendant genius to the place of judgment will pass her appointed sojourn in the companionship of gods: but the impure will be without friend or companion. To realise what regions the soul enters after death, we must understand the true form of the earth. It is a sphere in equilibrium at the centre of the heavens: the part we inhabit is but a small cavity on its surface, filled with the coarser sediment of air which gathers in it. We have no idea that we dwell in such a hollow, but fancy we are on the surface and that our atmosphere is the true air: but could we mount to the surface, we should see how murky and impure is our dwelling compared with that bright region. We should see the earth's surface splendid with zones of the most brilliant colours, of which ours are a faint image, glowing with flowers and trees and precious stones, all bathed in purest aether, untouched by decay: and the dwellers thereon are free from age and sickness, and the gods come to dwell among them. There are many other hollows on the earth besides ours, greater and less, having subterranean communication; but the greatest of all is called Tartaros, which is pierced right through the earth from side to side. From this all rivers issue forth and into it they all return: and a great pulse sways up and down Tartaros, carrying with it all the air and liquid that are therein, and it replenishes now the rivers that are on one side the earth, now those on the other. All the rivers fall again into Tartaros at a lower point than they flowed out; but not lower than the centre, from which in all directions it is an ascent. Of these rivers the four greatest are Okeanos, Acheron, Pyrphlegeon, and Styx, which flow in many tortuous windings, some beneath the earth and some on its surface. So when the souls of the departed come to judgment, they whose lives have been moderately good proceed to Acheron and dwell there till they are cleansed of any guilt that clings to them; but they whose wickedness is past cure are hurled into Tartaros, whence they come forth no more. All whose guilt is heinous but not yet beyond remedy dwell in Tartaros for a year, and then are cast forth by one of the rivers, on whose banks they meet those they have wronged. Then if they can win the pardon of these, they come forth and are purified; but if not, they return to Tartaros for another period; and this they continue to do until they have gained their pardon. But all that have lived in perfect holiness ascend to the earth's true surface, where they dwell henceforth in bliss and purity.

6. ἐν ὧν καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν] a short expression for ἐν ὧν ἐστὶν ὁ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν.

The editors quote several similar phrases: Wytenbach says he could fill a book with them.

7. εἰ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει] 'if we mean to neglect her'.
κακοὶς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἀμ' ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς· νῦν δ' ἐπειδή ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὐσα, δ' οὐδεμιὰ ἂν εἰς αὐτὴ ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὀσ βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην ἰηνεόσαι. οὐδὲν ἄκρι ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς "Λιδοὺ ἡ ψυχή ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, δ' δὶ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὀφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείσε πορείας. λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὄσ ἀρα τελευτήσαντα ἐκάστου ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμον, ὅπερ ξύνει εἰλήχει, οἳ ἄγεν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δὴ τὰ τόπον, οἱ δὲ τοὺς συλλεγέντας δ' ἀδικασμένους εἰς "Λιδοὺ πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνοις ἐκείνους ὃ δὴ ἔρε προστετακται τοὺς ἐνθείδε ἐκείσε πορεύσαι: τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὅν δὲ τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας ῥ πρύχον τοῦ ἄλλος ἐξερ πάλιν ἡγεμών κομίζει ἐν πολλάς χρόνον καὶ μακραῖς περίοδοις. ἐστὶ δὲ ἄρα ἡ

1. ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας A vicious soul would be well rid of her vice even at the cost of her existence. But in Latus 938 a death is regarded as a remedy for those whom milder measures will not serve: οὐτ' ἂν οὕτως ἐπικεκλοφέρων [ai dêxai], ἡμαν ταῖς οὕτω διατεθέσαι ψυχαῖς διακροντες. And in 854 c suicide is recommended to the incurable sinner as his only relief: καὶ έἀν μὲν σοι δράως παῦτα λοφῆ τί το νόσημα— εἰ δὲ μή, καλλίω ἡμαν σκεφτόμενος ἀπαλλάττω τοῦ βίου. We may perhaps regard death as offering a chance of turning over a new leaf.


8. ὁ ἐκάστω δαιμόνι] Olympiodoros denies that each soul has a distinct daimon for sundry reasons, one of which is ὅτι τοῦ βίου λυθέντος ἀργίσει ὁ λαχῶν ἐκλειπει διοικεῖν τὸν βίον. But there can be no doubt that he is wrong: cf. Republic 620. δεικνύει δ' ἐκάστο πν ἐνέκτε δαίμονα, τούτων φίλακα ἐνακτώτευτο τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἰρεθέντων. We have a different sort of daemonic supervision in Politicus 274 ὑ τοῦ κεκτημένου καὶ νόμοντος ἡμᾶς δαίμονον ἀπερεμικλάβετε ἐπιμελείας. In Timaeus 90 A, the rational part of the soul is said to be a man's daimon. In Latus 730 a we find a ξένος ἐκάστων δαίμων καὶ θεός, who protects strangers.

8. ἐστιν τῶν εἰλήχει] In Republic 617 ε, on the other hand, we read οἷς ὑμᾶς δαιμόνων λήσται, ἀλλ' ἱματις δαιμόνα αἰρήσεσθε. But, as Olympiodorus explains, a daimon was assigned to the life chosen by the soul, so that either phrase might be used; though where Plato is so strongly insisting upon the perfect freedom of choice, he naturally selects δαίμονα αἴρεσθαι. No doubt the other was a popular phrase, cf. Theocr. iv 10 αδ' τῶν εὐλεκρώ μᾶλα δαιμόνων, δι μὲ λελόγχει: and Plato there takes the opportunity of protesting against it.

10. μετὰ ἡγεμόνοις] The two ἡγεμόνες in the daimōn, whose duties seem to cease when he has conveyed the soul to the place of judgment. In ότι δὲ above, the form of the adverb is determined by τούς εὐλεγέντας, though in sense it belongs quite as much to διαδικασμένους.

13. ἐν πολλάς χρόνον καὶ μακραίς περίοδοις] Plato does not here specify the number and length of these periods:
but in Phaedrus 248E foll. we learn that each soul must fulfill ten millennial periods, except that of the philosopher, who is let off with three. Cf. Findar Olympia. II 68 ὅσια δ' ἐκτίμασαν ἔστρις | ἐκάτεροι μελαντεῖς ἀπὸ πάμπαι ἄδικων ἐχεῖν | ψυχᾶν, ἐτελεῖν Διὸς ὁδὸν παρὰ Κρόνου τύρσιν. In Republic 615a we have also a χιλιάτις πορελα, and the reason for this number is assigned. Every man must be required tenfold for his good and evil deeds; and calculating human life on the liberal estimate of 100 years, Plato devotes 1000 to his reward and punishment. The Egyptians made the period 3000 years (Hierod. II 123); Empedokles goes as far as 30,000 for a murderer, εἰτε τις ἀμπακάρης φίλος φίλα γυνα μισήν | τρία μαν μναίας ώρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλλήλοισα | γενόμενον παντοιά διὰ χρῶν εἶδε θυτών.

1. ἀπλήν ὠμον] This expression seems to have been proverbial. The verse of Aeschylus has not been preserved.

5. ἀπὸ τῶν ὀσίων τε καὶ νομίμων] 'judging by the funeral offerings and ordinances on earth', δια και νόμωμα are the offerings made in honour of the departed. As these were made on the shrines of Hekate at the τρίῳδον, Plato seems to infer by analogy that the road to Hades is also forked. Cf. Gorgias 524a δια τίνα ὃν, ἐτειλάν τελευτῆσαι, δικάζοντιν ἐν τῷ λειμωνί, ἐν τῇ μακρόθε εἰς ἢς φέρετον τῷ ὄντα, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς τάρατρον. The old reading θυσίων is now universally discarded.

7. οὐκ ἄγγειτ τὰ παρόντα] Wytenbach well observes 'agnoscit cam sibiam ante meditatio mortis et philosophia cognitam'.

8. ὑπὲρ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν εἴπον] 81c ἢ λεκται πάλιν εἰς τῶν ῥατῶν τῶν, φόβου τοῦ αἰείδου καὶ "Λιδίου, ὅσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματα τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυκλοφορεῖν. Plutarch de genio Socrates § 22 in a curious myth expands the notion of the present passage: his imagery is however chiefly borrowed from the Phaedrus.

11. ὑπέρ αἱ ἀλλαὶ] so the mss. Schanz adopts Cobet's ὑπέρ.

15. αὐτῇ δὲ πλανᾶται] 'she strays by herself'.

πορελα οὐχ ὡς ὁ Δισχύλου Τῆλεφος λέγει ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ἀπλην ὠμον φήσει εἰς "Λιδίου φέρειν, ἢ δ' οὕτω ἀπλῆ οὕτε μία φαίνεται μοι εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμόνων ἐδει' οὐ γὰρ πού τις ἂν διαμάρτων οὐδαμόσε μίας ὡδοῦ οὐσῆς. νῦν δὲ ἐοίκε σχίσεις τε καὶ περιόδους 5 πολλάς ἔχειν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀσίων τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνδίδε τεκμαρ- ρόμενος λέγει. ἦ μὲν κοσμία τε καὶ φρονίμους ψυχή ἐπεται τε καὶ οὐκ ἄγγοει τὰ παρόντα' ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὑπὲρ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν εἴπον, περὶ ἐκείνω πολλῶν χρόνων ἐπτομένη B καὶ περὶ τῶν ὀράτων τῶν, πολλὰ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, 10 βία καὶ μόρια ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἶχεται ἀγορένη. ἀφικομένην δὲ ὑπερ αἱ ἀλλαὶ, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ τί πεποιη- κυνὰ τοιοῦτον, ἢ φόνων ἄδικων ἡμέμεναν ἢ ἄλλ' ἄτα τοιαύτα εἰργαζομένην, ἄ τούτων ἀδελφα τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἔργα τυχ- χαίει ὄντα, ταύτην μὲν ἄπασ φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπται καὶ οὕτε ἐξωμετόρος οὐτε ἢγεμόνων ἐθέλει γίνεσθαι, αὐτῇ δὲ πλανᾶται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένῃ ἀπορία, ἐν δ' τίνες χρόνοι γένονται, ὃν ἔθνοι- των ὑπ' ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν' ἢ δὲ
καθαρώς τε καὶ μετρίως τῶν βίων διεξελθούσα, καὶ ξυνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεών τυχόσα, ἤκησεν τὸν αὐτὴν ἐκάστη τότον προσ-ηκομα. εἰςὶν δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαυμαστοὶ τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὐτὴν ὑπετέλεσεν ὦτα νά δοξάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν, ὅς ἔγω ὑπὸ τούς πέπειμαι.

5

D. LVIII. Καὶ ὁ Σιμών, Ὄδε ταῦτα, ἐφη, λέγει, ὡς Σώκρατες; περὶ γὰρ τοῦ γῆς καὶ αὐτῶς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκῆκοα, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἂ σε πείθει ἢ δέως οὐν ἂν ἀκούσαμι. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὃ Σιμών, οὐχὶ Γλαύκου τέχνη γε μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἢ γ᾽ ἐστίν ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπωτέρον μοι φαίνεται ἡ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τοῦ τέχνην, καὶ ἀμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἵσος οὐδ’ ἂν οἴος τε εἴην, ἀμα δὲ, εἰ καὶ ἡπιστάμην, ὃ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμὸς, ὃ Σιμών, τῷ μὴκε τοῦ λόγου ἁ οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ. τὴν μέντοι ἱδέαν τῆς γῆς, οὐκ πέπεισαν εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδὲν με κωλυεῖ λέγειν. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐφη ὁ Σιμών καὶ ταῦτα ἄρκει. Πέπεισαν τοῖς, ἡ δ᾿ ἡς, ἔγω, ὡς πρῶτον μὲν, 15 εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ περιφερής οὐσα, μηδὲν αὐτὴν δεῖν μήτε

109 ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μὴτε ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηδεμίας τουατίς. ἀλλὰ ἰκανήν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἰσχεΐν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ

4. οὕτε ὡσι δοξάζεται i.e. not so small as is supposed: cf. 83 B οὐδὲν τοιούτων κακῶν ἐπαθεν, and Sophist 217 E.

5. ὑπὸ τίνος πέπεισμα] Some think that Anaximandros is meant, because he first made a map of the world. But there is no evidence that his description of it had anything in common with Plato's; and it seems very doubtful whether a reference to any definite person is intended. Plato is fond of giving an air of antiquity to his fables by referring them to some suppositional author; e.g. the Αἰγυπτιος λόγος in Phaedrus 274 c, and the legendary war between Athens and Atlantis, Timaeus 24. Wagner strangely takes πίνακες to be neuter.

6. οὐχὶ Γλαύκου τέχνη] The origin of this proverb is obscure. Wohlrab supposes that the sea-god Glaukos is meant, the patron of sailors. None of the ancient authorities however take this view, but oscillate between various artificers bearing this name; the most distinguished of whom seems to have been Glaukos of Chios, mentioned by Herodotus (i 25), who invented the art of soldering metal. The diverse theories will be found in Heindorf's note.

12. μοι δοκεῖ] see on 77 A.

18. τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ] Plato's assumption is that the earth has no natural tendency to move in any one direction; and the substance of the universe, being homogeneous, offers it no inducement to move this way or that: were the surrounding mass of various density in different parts, the earth might move in the direction where the least resistance was offered; as it is, it remains poised in the centre of a uniform mass. It must be observed that Plato is putting this forward, not to show that the earth must necessarily abide in the centre, but that there is no reason why it should not. A similar theory is attributed to Anaximandros by Aristotle de caelo 11 xiii 295b 11 εἰσὶ δὲ τίνες οἳ διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα φαιν αὐτήν μένειν, ὡσπερ τῶν ἀρχαίων ὁ 'Αναξι- 

μανθός' μᾶλλον μὲν γὰρ οὔθεν ἂν ἡ κάτω

11
δινυτίο πάντη καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τῆς ἱσορροπίαν ἱσορροποῦν γὰρ πράγμα ὁμοίου τινός ἐν μέσῳ τεθεῖν οὐχ ἔξει μᾶλλον οὐδ’ ὢτ’ οὐδ’ οὐδ’ ὡθεῖν ὁμοίως δ’ ἔχουν ἀκλίνες μενεί. πρῶτον μὲν, ἡ δ’ ὡς, τοῦτο πέπεισμαι. Καὶ ὁρθὸς γε, ἐφη ὁ Σιμιάς. Ἔτι τοῖνυν, 5 ἔφη, πάμμεγα τι εἰναι αὐτό, καὶ ἥμασ οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι Ηρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος εἰς σμίκρῳ τὴν μορίον, ὡσπερ περὶ τέλμα β μύρμηκας ή βατράχους, περὶ τὴν θάλασαν οἰκοῦντας, καὶ ἄλλους ἀλλοθε πολλοὺς εἰς πολλοὺς τοιούτοις τόποις οἰκείν. εἰναι γὰρ πανταχὺ περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὴ κοίλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ἱδέας 10 καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς ἀ ξενερρυκέναι τὸ τ᾽ ὦδορ καὶ τῆν ὁμίχλην καὶ τῶν ἀέρα: αὐτής δὲ τῆς γῆς καθαρῶν ἐν καθαρῷ κεῖσθαι τῷ οὐρανῷ, εἰς ὥσπερ ἔστι τὰ ἀστρα, ὅτι ᾧ αἰθέρα ὁμολείου τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν C περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα εἰσθώτων λέγειν οὔ δὴ ὑποστάθηνεν ταῦτα εἰναι καὶ ξυρρεῖν ἂει εἰς τὰ κοῖλα τῆς γῆς. ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦντας εἰς τοῖς 15 καίοις αὐτῆς λεηθεῖναι καὶ οἰσθαι ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκείν, ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ τις ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγιοι οἰκών οὐσοῦτο τέ ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάσσης οἰκείν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος ὅρων τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀστρα τῆς θάλασσαν ἠγοίτο οὐρανὸν εἰναι, διὰ δὲ βραδυτήτα τε καὶ ἀσθενεὶαν μηδετῶποτε ἐπί τὰ ἁκρα τῆς θαλάσσης αφυγόμενος μηδὲ D ἔωρακος εἰς, ἐδώς καὶ ἀνακύψας ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης εἰς τὸν ἐνδάδε τότον, ὅσο καθαρὸτερος καὶ καλλιον τυγχάνει ὅν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσα, μηδὲ ἄλλου ἀθρόκως εἰς τὸν ἐωρακότος. ταῦτω δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἥμας πεπονθέναι οἰκοῦντας γὰρ ἐν τοῖς κοῖλοι τῆς γῆς οἴσθαι ἑπάνω αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τοῦτον οὐρανὸν

η εἰς τὰ πλάγια φέρεσαι προσήκει τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσῳ ἱδρυμένον καὶ ὁμοίον πρὸς τὰ ἐσχατα ἔχουν, ἣμα δ’ ἄδυνατον εἰς ταύνοις ποιεῖν τὴν κίνησιν ὡστ’ εἰς ἀνάγκης μένειν. Compare Timaeus 62 ε γὰρ τι καὶ στερεῖν εἰς κατὰ μέσον τοῦ παντός ἱσοτάλεις, εἰς οὐδεν ἂν ποτὲ τῶν ἐσχατῶν ἐνέχεισθαι διὰ τὴν πάντη ὁμοιότητα αὐτῶν: the theory of the Timaeus is however different.

6. ἐν σμίκρῳ τῶν μορίων] We are conceived as inhabiting a depression or cavity scooped out of the earth's surface, small and shallow when compared with the extent and mass of the earth; but still wide and deep enough to prevent us from ever scaling its sides. Many other such hollows exist on the earth, but we

are of course cut off from all communication with their inhabitants, as well as with the dwellers on the true surface. Evidently Plato's estimate of the earth's dimensions was immense.

11. αὐτήν δὲ τὴν γῆν] i.e. the real surface of the earth, as distinguished from the hollows.

13. ὃ δὴ ὑποστάθην] i.e. our atmosphere is the sediment of aether, which collects in the depressions on the earth's surface. ταῦτα = ὄδορ καὶ ὁμίχλην καὶ ἀέρα.

24. τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν] We are in the same plight as the supposed dwellers at the bottom of the sea; who, looking up through the water at the stars, would fancy that the sea above them was the heaven: so we, looking up through
the air, fancy it is that wherein the stars move, and that the air is heaven.

1. τὸ δὲ [ἐστιν ταῦτον] No satisfactory defence of the words ἐστιν ταῦτον has been made: nor is Heindorf’s τὸ δ’ ἐστιν ταῦτων attractive. Hermann, after Baier, reads τὸ δὲ δεινότατον: but there is no special aptness in this. Hirschig suggests ταῦτον, but I think Schanz, following Rückert, is right in bracketing ἐστιν ταῦτον and retaining τὸ δὲ, which is exactly the connecting link we want: ‘but the truth is that.’ τὸ δὲ occurs in this sense Thedetus 157 A, Sophist 244 A, Laws 642 A, 667 A, Meno 97 C, &c. ἐστιν ταῦτον might be the insertion of a copyist who did not understand the idiom.

3. εἰ τίς αὐτοῦ] i.e. if we could either climb the sides of the hollow in which we dwell, or fly up through the air to its surface and peep up, as fishes do out of the sea.

4. κατιδέων ἀνακύψαντα] Most editors have ἀν ἀνακύψαντα, but ἀν is wanting in the mss. It could, it is true, easily have fallen out in that position; but since κατιδέων is presently repeated with ἀν, it seems to me hardly necessary to insert the particle here.

5. ὡς τοῦτοι καὶ μῦθον λέγειν] Schanz retains ἡ γῆ with the best mss. But the meaning is, whenever any earth is present in the sea, the result is βόρβορος.

15. εἰ γάρ δει καὶ μῦθον λέγειν] After this some mss. and editions have the pointless addition καλῶν: the word however is absent in the Bodleian and other mss. and is certainly to be omitted.

19. ὡστερ ἀι δωδεκάκυκτοι σφαίραι] The number twelve refers to the twelve signs of the zodiac, as is clear from Titicus 55 C ἐτὶ δὲ ὁδὸς ἐντικάλαθης μᾶς πέμπτης, ἐτὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐν ὁδῷ αὐτῆς καταχρῆσθαι ἐκεῖνο διαφόρως: ‘and whereas there remained yet a fifth figure, God used it as a model for the universe in describing its signs.’ The πέμπτη ἐντικάλαθης was the dodecahedron: cf. Titicus
σφαιραί, ποικίλη, χρώμασιν διειλημμένη, ὅν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα ὀσπερ δείγματα, οἷς ἰδὶ οἱ γραφεῖς καταχρόνται· ἐκεῖ γ’ ἐν δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ ἐτί ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαροτέρων ή τούτων τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀλουρῆ γίνει καὶ θαυματοσθῆν τὸ κάλλιο, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδῆ, τὴν δὲ ὀστε λευκή γῆν ή χίονας λευκοτέραν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων συγκειμένην ὁμαστέως, καὶ ἐτί πλειόνων καὶ καλλίτων ἡ ἔσται ἡ καθαρὰ ποικίλαμεν.

καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταύτα τὰ κοίλα αὐτῆς ὕδατος τε καὶ ἀέρος ἐκπελα ὀντα, χρωμάτος τι εἴδος παρέχεσθαι στιλβοῦντα εν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων ὁχρώματος ποικίλα, ὥστε ἐν τι αὐτῆς εἴδος συνεχές ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὐσίᾳ τοιαύτῃ ἀνὰ λόγον τὰ φωμενα φύεται, δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τους καρπούς· καὶ αὐτὸ τὰ ὄρη ὁμαστέως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχεις ἀνὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγον τὴν τε λειώματα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίων· διὰ καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λευκίδα εἶναι ταύτα τὰ ἁγασάμενα μόρια, σάρδια τε καὶ λύστιδας καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ υἱὸν ὁ Ἑ. τι ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων καλλίων. τὸ δ’ αὐτῶν τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὅ ποτε οἱ λίθοι εἰσὶν καθαροί καὶ οὐ κατεθνεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι ὀσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνον καὶ ἁλμής [ὑπὸ] τῶν

Locus 98 Ε τὸ δὲ διωκάκεδρον εἰκόνα τοῦ παντὸς ἔστάσατο, ἐγγίστα σφαιρας ἐνὸς.

The last words, ἐγγίστα σφαιρας ἐνὸς, are a foolish addition by the compiler of the Timaeus Locus: for the dodecahedron has nothing to do with the shape of the universe, which is a perfect sphere modelled after the image of the αὐτὸ χρων: it merely affords the type for the duodenary division of the zodiac. In the present passage the διωκάκεδρον σφαιρα, a ball covered with patches of leather variously coloured, is used to represent not only the twelve signs, but also the variegated surface of the earth. A great store of erudition on the virtues of the number twelve is to be found in Wyttenbach's note.

8. καὶ γὰρ αὖτα ταύτα] 'even these very hollows, being full of water and of air, display a kind of colour that gleams amid the dazzling diversity of the rest; so that the earth's form appears as one unbroken surface of varied hues'. To an observer viewing the earth from above even such hollows as that wherein we dwell would appear as patches of colour, iridescent we may suppose; so that the many-coloured surface would not be marred by any blots of obscurity. συνεχές is regarded by Heindorf and others as adverbial: perhaps however we might treat εἴδος συνεχές as practically one word, which is qualified by ποικίλον.

15. ταύτα τὰ ἁγασάμενα] 'the stones that here are so much prized'. For this sense of ἁγασὰν compare Politicus 286 Ν ἀνταίρεων ἀλλ’ ὁ πρῶτον ὁ λόγος ἁγασᾶς παραγείλει.

19. ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἁλμῆς) If the common reading is genuine, we must translate: 'marred by the corruption and brine produced by the sediment that has gathered here'. But the repetition of ὑπὸ before τῶν δείφρα ἐξωφρηνηκτῶν is rather awkward. Schanz 'brackets ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἁλμῆς as a gloss upon ὑπὸ τῶν δείφρα ἐξωφρηνηκτῶν. Heindorf inserts
deúro ἕνεφρυγκῶτων, ἃ καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῆ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις
tektois ἀίσχι τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. τῇ δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν
ekatosmíaic τούτοις τε ἄπαισι καὶ ἐτί χρυσῷ καὶ ἄργυρῳ καὶ

toῖς ἄλλοις αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτοις. ἐκφανὴ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ἀντα
pολλὰ πληθεὶ καὶ μεγαλὰ καὶ πολλαχοὶ τῆς γῆς, ὡστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν 5
eiναι θέαμα εὐδαιμονῶν θεστῶν. ξώδα δὲ ἐπ' αὐτῇ εἶναι ἄλλα τε
πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαία οἰκοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ
περὶ τὸν ἀέρα, ὥσπερ ἡμέρας περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, τοὺς δ' ἐν νῆσοις
ἀς περιπρεπῶν τὸν ἀέρα πρὸς τῇ ἡπείρῳ οὐσίας καὶ ἐν ἀλῷφω, ὃ παρ' ἡ
μῖν τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ ἡ θάλασσα ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέρα χρείαν, ιο
τὸ τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἀέρα, δὲ ἡμῖν ἄρη, ἐκεῖνοις τὸν αἰθέρα. τὰς δὲ
όρας αὐτῆς κράσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὡστε ἐκεῖνοις ἀνόσους εἶναι
καὶ χρόνον τε τῆς πόλις πλεῖο τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὅψει καὶ ἀκοῇ
καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πάσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἠμῶν αφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ
ἀποστάσει, ὑπὲρ ἀν τὸ ἔδαπτος ἀφέστηκεν καὶ αἰθήρ ἀέρος πρὸς 15
καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἄλσος τε καὶ ἑρά αὐτῶς εἶναι, ἐν

111]  ΦΛΙΔΩΝ. 165

After the second υπό, and Stallbaum substitutes ἀπό. I have followed the
suggestion of Wytenbach in bracketing the second υπό only.

4. ἐκφανή γὰρ] they are exposed to view on the surface, not, as with us,
hidden in mines.

7. τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα] i.e. round the edges of the hollows, which are filled
with air. Others again dwell on islands amid the aerial ocean, their bases plunged
beneath the air but their surfaces encompassed with aether.

11. ἄρη] The article is wanting in the mss. and supplied by Bekker. I
have, on the suggestion of Schanz, written it as a crasis.

12. κράσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην] Compare the description of the climate of ancient
Attica, Timaeus 14 c, where Athene chooses the site of her city τῆς ἐκρασίας
tῶν ὀρῶν ἐν αὐτῷ κατίδοσα, ὅτι φρονιμω-
tάτους ἀνάβας ὠσί.

13. ὅψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει] This reading has the all but unanimous
support of the mss. Heindorf with one
ms. reads ὁφρησεί for φρονήσει, saying
'ingenii praestantiam non sane tam
obiter uno verbo memorasset Plato, nec
post φρονήσεως mentionem addidisset haec
καὶ πάσι τοῖς τοιούτοις'. These arguments
do not seem very cogent; and it is hardly
credible that Plato should have omitted
to ascribe superior φρονήσις to his dwellers
in aether. Schanz justly compares Repub-
lis 367 c ὸὸρω ἀκούεις φρονις. In
fact ὅψει καὶ ἀκοῇ stand for ἄλθησιν. 'In
sight, hearing, and intelligence [i.e. both
in bodily and mental power] they excel
us in the same proportion as air excels
water and aether air in purity'. Z. adopts
ὁφρησεί.

16. ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι ὕκητάς θεοῦς
ἐιναι] i.e. in these temples is the very
presence of the gods themselves; whereas
we have but their statues. 'And they
had groves and temples of the gods,
wherein the gods in very truth were
dwellers, and voices and prophecies and
visions of them, and of this kind was
their communion with them, face to
face'. τοιαύτας = personal communion.
ἀυτοῖς πρὸς αὐτοῖς should be taken in
the most emphatic sense, literally 'the
people themselves with the gods them-
selves'.
οἷς τῷ ὀντὶ οἰκήται θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ 
αἰσθήτεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας γίγνεσθαι αὐτῶς πρὸς τῷ 
αὐτῶς καὶ τὸν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα ὧδεθαι ὑπ’ 
αὐτῶν οὐ τυγχάνει ὡς, καὶ τὴν ἀλήθη εὐθαμονίαν τούτων ἀκό- 
5 λούθην εἶναι.

ΙΧ. Καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν ὄντως περικέναι καὶ τὰ περὶ 
τὴν γῆν τῶν δώρων νῦν ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἑγκολα ἀρτῆς κύκλῳ 
περὶ ὅλην πολλοὺς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους 
μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν δομείς οἰκοδομεῖ, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους δύναται τὸ χάσμα 
10 αὐτῶν ἐλαττών ἔχειν τοῦ παρ’ ἠμῶν τόπου, ἔστι δ’ οὐς καὶ βραχύτερους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους τούτους δὲ δ’ 
πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν εἰς ἀλλήλους συνυπερήχεσθαι τοῦ πολλαχῇ καὶ κατὰ 
στενότερα καὶ εὐρύτερα, καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν, ἢ πολὺ μὲν ὕδωρ 
ρέων ἢ ἐκ ἀλλήλους ἢ στρεφέρι εἰς κρατήρας, καὶ ἀνεάνων 
15 ποταμῶν ἀμέληκα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν καὶ βρεμών ὑδάτων καὶ 
ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμοὺς, πολλοὺς δὲ 
ὑγρὸ πηλοῦ καὶ καθαρωτέρου καὶ τοιούτου καὶ βορβορωδεστέρου, ὡσπερ ἐν 
Σικελία οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ῥύακος πηλοῦ βέβοτες ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Ἑ 
ρύαξ. δὲν δὴ καὶ ἐκάστους τοὺς τῶν πολλάς πληροῦσθαι, ὡς ἂν ἐκά-
20 στους τύχῃ ἐκάστοτε ἡ περιφροι γυμνομένη. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα 
κινεῖν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡσπερ αἰώραν τινᾶ ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῆ ἐστὶ δὲ 
ἀρα αὐτὴ ἡ αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν τοιάνῳ τινά. ἐν τῷ τῶν χασμάτων

9. τὸ χάσμα αὐτῶν] There is a slight anacoluthon; the regular construction would be ἔχωντας. For αὐτῶν B D E give αὐτῶν, which Wytenbach illustrates by Xen. Cyrop. 1 ili 13 πειράσμαι ἀγαθῶν ἢπειρῶν κράσιστος ὡν ἢπειρον κυμα- 
χειν αὐτῷ. There is no lack of instances of a redundant pronoun, but the effect here is harsh. Schanz reads τὸ αἰτῶν 
χάσμα, Heindorf τὸ χάσμα αὐτῶν, which latter I have adopted, as being nearly identical with the reading of С, τὸ χάσμα αὐτῶν.

19. ὡς δὴ καὶ ἐκάστους τοὺς τόπους] ‘wherewith each of the places is filled in 
turn as the stream in its course round chances each time to reach it.’ COPE. The stream, when replenished by the 
aἰώρα presently to be mentioned, makes 
a circuit of these hollows through the 
subterranean channels. ὡς ὡς is Stall- 
baum’s correction for ὡς ὡς, which Z. 
retains.

21. ὡσπερ αἰώραν] ‘all these are moved backwards and forwards by a kind of 
ocillation which exists in the earth’. aἰώρα properly signifies a seesaw move- 
ment, like that of a pair of scales equally 
balanced. It is the name given to a kind 
of gymnastic machine like a swing. By 
the force of this aἰώρα the volume of air 
and fluid in Tartaros is perpetually sway- 
ing to and fro like a pendulum. When 
the mass which is ἄνω surges towards the 
centre, the mass that is κάτω is necessarily 
driven towards the extremity; then the 
latter in its turn recoils towards the 
centre and forces the former towards the 
opposite extremity.


1. *diαμπερές τετρημένον*] Tartaros differs from all the other ἔγκαλα, not only in its far greater magnitude, but in being pierced right through the earth from end to end; whereas the rest are merely depressions more or less deep. The physical theory of the present passage is simple enough. Let us suppose for the sake of clearness that Tartaros is a chasm pierced from the north to the south pole; and let us concede so much to popular usage as to call one hemisphere, say the northern, ἄνω and the other κάτω. For each of these hemispheres the centre of the earth is the lowest point, towards which all things gravitate. Out of Tartaros ramify a number of channels in all directions through the earth, some reaching to the surface, some subterranean throughout their whole length. Now the ἀϊώρα pulsing up and down Tartaros carries with it all the fluid that is therein; and when it rushes northwards, it forces the liquid into the channels of the northern hemisphere; then returning southward it fills those in the southern. Thus the stream is violently impelled through the channel by the force of the ἀϊώρα: but when this force is spent, it obeys the law of gravitation and makes its way back to Tartaros at a lower level than that whence it started. It can however never pass beyond the centre, since that is the absolutely lowest point from whatever direction it is approached, and an ascent from it would be contrary to the force of gravitation.

2. ᾧπερ Ὄμηρος εἶπεν] Iliad viii 14: cf. viii 481.

8. ᾧτι πυθμένα ὅνικ ἕχει] The cause of the ἀϊώρα is that there is no bottom or foundation on which the liquid mass can rest. Were there a solid platform at the centre of the earth, the fluid on either side would settle there and remain stationary. Of this passage a doubtfully accurate statement and a certainly unfair criticism is made by Aristotle meteorologica ii ii 355b 32 foll., cf. i 349b 28. Plato’s doctrine of gravitation, which is incomparably more scientific than anything to be found in Aristotle on that subject, is very clearly expounded in Timaeus 62 c—63 e.

15. ᾧτων οὖν ὑποχωρήσῃ] Many editions, including Z. and St., have ὅμηρωσαν after οὖν: but since it is absent from the best mss. I have omitted it.
I. τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον] Plato considers the expression incorrect, as is indicated by δὴ. Cf. *Timaeus* 63 ε σφέει γάρ δὴ τινι τούτοις διὰ εἰς διελθότας δικῆ τὸ πᾶν ἐναντίους, τὸν μὲν κάτω, πρὸς ὄν φέρεται πάνθ' ὅσα τίνα σώματος ὅγου ἔχει, τὸν δὲ ἀνω, πρὸς ὄν ἀκούοις ἔφερται πᾶν, οὐκ ὀρθῶν οὐδαιμ. νομίζειν. For some very curious reasoning on the other side see Aristotle de caelo II ii 28.5 6 foll.

[τοῖς] κατ' ἑκείνα τὰ ἰερᾶτα] If the text is sound we must translate 'it (τὸ ὕδωρ) flows into the parts about those streams' ; unless with Prof. Geddes we take τοῖς as an instrumental dative, which is hardly probable. But either way the phrase is a singularly awkward one and can scarcely, I think, have been written by Plato; though H. Schmidt defends it, translating 'das zu jenen Strömen Gehörende'. Madvig's εἰσφέρει, which Schanz adopts, leaves the sentence as clumsy as before. Wytenbach reads τόστε for τοῖς, which may be right: Ast brackets τοῖς. Mr Cope translates 'it flows through the earth to the neighbourhood of those streams and fills them, as it were by a pump'. But surely διὰ τῆς γῆς describes the progress of the water after it has entered the channels: it would be a strange expression to apply to its surging up and down Tartaros.

3. τὰ ἐνθάδε] i.e. the rivers in our hemisphere. We are regarded as living in the 'upper' hemisphere: and so said the Pythagoreans, cf. Aristotle de caelo 283b 21. Aristotle himself said our hemisphere was the lower: to Plato of course the distinction is meaningless.

9. ἐπηρτέλειο] i.e. were pumped into the channels: it is needless to read ἐπηρτέλειο with Heindorf.

II. καταντικρὸν ἢ εἰσφέρα] i.e. καταντικρὸν τῆς χώρας ἢ εἰσφέρει. This seems to mean that a stream which issued forth from Tartaros, say in an easterly direction, may, by a circuit of the earth, re-enter it on the western side. Aristotle's version of this (meteorologica 356a 9) is τὰ δὲ καταντικρὸν τῇ θάλασσῃ τῆς ἐκροῆς, οἷον εἰ καταντεῖ κάτωθι, ἀνωθεν ἐκβάλλεν. This is usually regarded as a misstatement on Aristotle's part: but H. Schmidt (krit. Comm. ii 107 foll.) ingeniously endeavours to reconcile it with Plato's words. He lays stress on the fact that Aristotle says, not ἀνω and κάτω, but ἀνωθεν and κάτωθεν; and he explains it thus. A river may issue from Tartaros in the southern hemisphere and in the course of its wanderings pass into the northern, finally discharging itself into the very centre of Tartaros. Thus after rising in the southern hemisphere (κάτωθεν) it enters Tartaros from the side of the northern (ἀνωθεν); but since it discharges itself at the centre, it has not violated the law μέχρι τοῦ μέσου κάθενα, πέρα δ' ὀφ. The weak point in the expla-
δε ἡ παντάπασιν κύκλῳ περιελθόντα, ἣ ἀπαξ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὅπως οἱ ὅψεις, εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν κάτω <καθένα} πάλιν ἐμβάλλει. δυνατὸν δὲ ἐστὶν ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθόταν, πέρα δ’ οὐ’ ἀναντες γὰρ πρόσω ἀμφοτέρου τοῖς ῥέωσι τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν γίνεται μέρος.

ŁXI. Τά μὲν οὖν δὴ ἀλλὰ πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντο-

δαπά ῥέματα ἐστὶν τυγχάνει δ’ ἄρα οὖν ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ’ ἀττα ῥέματα, ὅτα τὸ μὲν μέγιστου καὶ ἔξωτατῳ ῥέον [περι] κύκλῳ ὁ καλούμενος Ὁκεανός ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ καταντικρὶ καὶ ἐναντίως ῥέων Ἀχέρων, ὅς δὲ ἐρήμων τε τῶν ἰον ἄλλων καὶ τὸ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν ῥέων εἰς τὴν Ἀχέρων ἀφικνεῖται τῆν Ἀχέρωνιάδα, ὅσι αἱ τῶν ἰτελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνουται καὶ τινὰς εἰσαρμένους χρόνους μείνασαν, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκτέμπουται εἰς τὰς τῶν ἥξων γενέσεις. τρίτος

nation seems to me this. When the stream has once reached the northern hemisphere, it is subject to precisely the same laws of gravitation as the rivers of that hemisphere; and there is no reason why it should be compelled to descend to the very centre any more than a stream which has risen in the northern hemisphere: yet, if it does not, it has passed beyond the centre, relatively to its source. Schmidt’s theory in fact breaks down, unless we can understand the words μέχρι τοῦ μέσου, πέρα δ’ οὖ relatively to the direction of the stream after it has once begun its downward course, irrespective of its point of issue. Perhaps however Plato had not thought of the case of a river passing from one hemisphere to another while on the surface of the earth: or, as exact science is hardly to be expected in a myth, the rivers may be prohibited from crossing the plane which divides the two hemispheres. Aristotle’s paraphrase sounds like a reproduction of the Platonic passage based on an imperfect recollection of it. The notion, entertained by some, that καταντικρὶ δὴ εἰς ἑτεροῖς means that the stream on discharging itself crosses Tartaros and emerges on the opposite side is assuredly untenable. Schanz, against all mss., has ἐξέπεσεν εἰς ἑτεροῖς.

3. καθῖνα] This word comes to be practically intransitive similarly to ἐμβάλ-

λει: the river is conceived as a power which pours down and discharges its waters. καθῖνα is similarly used of a wind, as we see in Aristophanes Knights 430 ἐξευμ γὰρ σοι λαμπρόν ἡν καὶ μέγας καθεῖν.

4. ἀναντες γὰρ πρόσω] so Heindorf for πρόω. Z. and St. omit πρόω.

8. τέτταρ’ ἀττα ῥέματα] Homer Odyssey X 511,

νὴ μὲν αὐτοῦ κέλσα ἐπ’ Ὁκεανὸν βαθύνθη, αὐτὸς δ’ εἰς Ἀδεών ἵππα ὄμνων εἰρύεται’ ἐνθα μὲν εἰς Ἀχέρων Ἐπιφανείαν τε βρέων

Κοινuity θ’, δὲ δὴ Στυγός ὠδατός ἐστιν ἀπορ-

ράξ.

[περι] κύκλῳ] The only passage cited in defence of this phrase is Plutarch ἑρωτικὸς X 5, where Didot’s edition has περικύκλῳ. The latter is the reading of the best mss. here; but Heindorf justly denounces it as ‘monstri simile’. Stahlbaum’s reference to Latus 964 F is totally irrelevant. Heindorf proposes πέρι, Hermann has πέρι, adverbial: but it seems probable that the word has crept in from the margin.

12. αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων] Cf. 114 A.
1. ἐκβάλλει] 'issues forth'. In the passage of Aristotle already quoted ἐκβάλλει has the opposite sense, 'discharges itself'; it is in fact equivalent to ἐμβάλλει in Plato's account. Aristotle follows the ordinary usage, whereas Plato has formed his compounds to fit his present descriptions.

3. ἔσχατα τῆς Ἀχερουσίας] ‘the boundaries of Tartars’. ἔσχατα is the common word for an end or limit. Ἀδημορία] ‘endlessness’, cf. Plato, Rep. 504 a2: 'οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ποιμνῳ'. Ἐκπροδύναμος] 'emotive' is the correct gloss. ἐμβάλλει] ‘issues forth’. ἐμβάλλει is perhaps better than ἔσχατα as a synonym for ἀπαντᾶ, and ἀπαντᾶ is used in Plato's account of the surface of Tartaros.

4. Perieitōmenos de τῆς γῆς] 'engulfing'. Perieitōmenos is the correct gloss for ἐπηλέπτωτος. The objection to the word θάλασσα is that it is not used by Plato. However, Stobaeus uses the word θάλασσα for the surface of the earth, which, Schmidt notwithstanding, cannot be allowed.

7. κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου] ‘into a lower depth of Tartaros’.

12. ἕν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς] ἕν is absent from most MSS. It is rightly added from Theodoret and certain MSS. by Heindorf, who compares Latin 683 a. The construction is indeed familiar enough.

14. ἀπαντᾶ ἐν τῇ Ἀχερουσία] 'are the convolutions of these rivers are a little perplexing. They issue from Tar- taros on four different sides: Okeanos emerges to the surface and encompasses the whole earth; of its return to Tartaros we are told nothing. Acheron, issuing from the opposite side, flows in the contrary direction, partly on the surface, partly beneath the earth; and before re-entering Tartaros forms the Acherasian lake. Pyri- phlegethon, rising half-way between the two former, not far from its source forms the boiling lake, and after many windings skirts one end of the Acherasian lake before plunging into the profoundest deeps of Tartaros. Its course is entirely subterranean. Kokyotos, flowing in the opposite
direction, ascends to the surface, where it spreads into the Stygian lake; then diving into the earth, it reaches the Acherusian lake from the contrary side to Lyrophlegethon; and making another circuit enters Tartaros opposite to that river. Styx, it will be noticed, is on the earth's surface, whereas the other two lakes are subterranean.

6. ὁ δαίμων] Cf. 107 D.

9. ἀναβάται] 'going on board vessels which, it is said (ὅ), are provided for them'.

12. ἀνίατος ἔχειν] These incurables were cast into Tartaros, not in retribution for their crimes, but as warnings to others; since to Plato punishment is always either remedial or exemplary. So Gorgias 525 C of ὅ 'αν τὰ ἐσχάτα ἀδίκησοι καὶ διὰ ταύτα ἀδίκημα ἀνίατοι γένεσαι, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίνεσαι, καὶ οὗτοι αὕτοι μὲν οὐκέτι ὄνισσαν οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ ἐν ὑπότατοι τῶν τούτων ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἀνυπήργητα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἄτεχνος παράδειγματα ἀντηρεμένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Λίθῳ ἐν τῇ δεσμωτηρίᾳ, τοῦ ἀεὶ τῶν ἄδικων ἀφικυνομένως θέαμα καὶ νουθητήματα. Cf. Republic 616 A.

13. Ιερουσλαία] This was a peculiarly heinous offence: cf. Latus 854 A, where the law thus addresses the sacrilegious, ὁ θαυμασία, οὐκ ἀνθρώπινου σε κακῶν οὐδὲ θείων κυνεῖ τὸ νῦν ἐπὶ τὴν ἱερουσλαίαν προτρέπον λέναι, ὁστός δὲ σὲ τις ἐμφανίζει εἰκαλόραν καὶ ἀκαθάρτους τοῖς ἀνθρώπως ἄνθρώπος ἀνθρώπως, περιφερείμενοι ἀληθινοί.

16. ὅθεν οὕτως [κεβαλώνειν] In the νέκυια of the Republic and Gorgias also incurable criminals are doomed to eternal punishment: and this is natural where Plato is weaving up popular tradition with his own phantasy. But in Timaeus 42 C it is evident that the degenerate soul at any period of her transmigrations has the chance of reformation and final restoration to her original purity; nor is this possibility excluded in Phaedrus 214 C foll.

18. καὶ μεταμέλειν αὐτοῖς] 'and who
have lived the rest of their days in a state of repentance'. The participle μεταμέλον is used absolutely.

1. τοιούτῳ τινι ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ [i.e. their offence is similar to that of the πατραλοίας, in that it was committed in sudden passion and followed by repentance, and different to that of the φώνων αὐτός καὶ παραβόμοι πολλοὶ ἐξεργασάμενοι.]

3. τὸ κύμα] i.e. ἡ αἰώρα.

4. πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας] These terms apply not only to parricides and matricides, but to any one who strikes a father or mother.

6. κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν] It will be remembered that both these rivers enter the Acherusian lake.

12. πρὶν ἐν πεῖρας ὅσις ἑλκυσθάν] This was no doubt suggested by the Athenian law which enacted that a person guilty of involuntary homicide must appease the family of the deceased before he could return from exile: cf. Demosth. Aristocr. p. 644 τῶν ἀλλων ἐν ἐπίκοις χρόνοις ἐκπαιδευτέρας τακτὴν δόσω καὶ φύλαξιν, ἐκιν ἐν αἰδέστημα τινα [7 τίς] τῶν ἐν γένει τοῦ πεπανθότος. It would appear that the injured family could not insist upon more than a year's exile, which was called ἄπεναντισμός. Plato adopts this period in Lato 869 ε ὃς ἀκούσαν γεγονότος τοῦ φώνον ὅτι οἱ τοῦ καθαροῦ γιγνόμεθαν τῷ ὕπατο καὶ ἑναυτῷ εἰς ἔτους τῆς ἐκδομῆς ἐν νόμῳ, cf. 865 ε. In Lato 872 ε we are told that in another life it shall be done to the wilful homicide as he did to his victim: τὸ γὰρ κόσμον μακάριον αἰώνα τὸν ἐκάθαρον ἄλλην αἰών ἐκπανθέτου εὐθέλεις γιγνεσθαι τὸ μακάριον, πρὶν φόνον φόνον ὁμοίω ὁμοίω ὅ ὑδάτασα ψυχὴ τίς καὶ πάσης τῆς ἐνυγγελείας τὸν θυμὸν ἀφιλασιμένην κοιμώσα, cf. 870 ε.

13. δέξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὀνόμα βίωνα] The text is certainly corrupt. Stallbaum's attempt to make βίωνα do double duty is futile, and his quotations are transparently irrelevant. Schanz, following Heindorf, inserts from Theodoret προκεκληθαί after βίωνα. This has some support from Clement of Alexandria, who reads προκεκληθήσας; but it is not satisfactory. For while it is sense to say 'who are deemed to have lived holy', it is not sense to say 'who are deemed to have been judged to have lived holy'. I suspect that Theodoret's προκεκληθάι is merely a clumsy attempt to supply a deficiency which existed in his copy; and that Plato's real word has been lost: possibly ἔχειν after διαφερόντως, unless we should read πρὸς τὸ ὀσίων.
3. ἐπὶ γῆς] so all mss. Eusebius, Theodoret, and Stobaeus have ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς: but the article is not required.

4. καθηράμενα] a genuine reflexive middle: ‘who have purified themselves’.

ἀνευ τε σωμάτων] I conceive this to mean ‘without earthly bodies’: for the most exalted of finite spirits, even the gods, must have body of some sort; that is, they are subject to the conditions of space and time. Cf. Phaedrus 246 c. ἀνευ σωμάτων to Plato signifies freedom from bodily appetites.

114 D—115 A, c. lxiii. To insist that all these details are strictly accurate were folly; yet something like this is the fate of the soul and her habitation after death. Wherefore it is well worth while for a man to bestow all care upon his soul during this life, that she may be free from bodily passions and adorned with true virtue. And now, continues Sokrates, my hour is at hand; and I will go to bathe my body for my burial.

10. τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διασχυρίσασθαι] Plato lays no stress upon the exact details of his description: indeed he is never at any pains to make his various accounts of ‘die letzten Dinge’ precisely correspond: all he is really concerned about is that the virtuous soul is better off in the other world than the vicious.

15. ἐπάθειν αὐτῷ] cf. 77 E ἀλλὰ χρῆ ἐπάθειν αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας, ἐσθα ἐν ἐξε-πάσηῃ.

Συνδ. δὴ ἐγὼν καὶ πάλαι μηκένω τὸν μύθον] This phrase would seem to bear out the view of the myth given in the introduction, p. 8.

19. πλέον θάτερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζασθαι] ‘thinking that they do more harm than good’. For this use of θάτερον cf. Euthydemus 280 E, 297 D. Also Pindar Pythia 111 34 δαίμον ὑ ἐτέρος.
3. ἀλεθεία καὶ ἀλήθεια] 'with freedom and truth'. These terms practically correspond to φρόνησις or σοφία. ἀλεθεία is that state of liberation from the body which enables the soul to grasp ἀλήθεια.

5. ἐκαστὸς πορεύεσθαι] so nearly all ms. Schanz writes ἐκαστος after Stallbaum.

6. φαί ἀν ἀνήρ τραγικός] 'to speak like a hero of tragedy'. The good taste of this parenthesis is admirable. οὗτος ἐιμαρμένη καλεῖ is in perfect keeping with the eloquent passage which is its context: but in applying the phrase to himself Sokrates instinctively feels the risk that it may sound high-flown. And so with these words he passes simply and naturally from his lofty flight of moralizing to the homely, but eminently characteristic, ὥρα τραπέζηα πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν.

8. καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶ παρέχει] 'and not to give the women the trouble of washing my corpse'. This piece of thoughtfulness for others is admirable evidence of the perfect serenity with which Sokrates await his doom.

115 A—116 A, C, lxiv. Kriton now inquires of Sokrates what are his last injunctions. Only that you will take good heed to yourselves, he replies, and put into practice the principles affirmed in our late discourse. But how are we to bury you? asks Kriton. Sokrates answers with a smile, As you please, provided you can catch me. It would seem that all my words have been thrown away, and I fail to persuade you that this Sokrates who now speaks to you will presently take flight to the company of the gods, and that all you will bury is his forsaken body. So, my friends, be surety for me to Kriton, not this time that I shall stay, but that I shall verily depart. But seriously such incorrect language is mischievous: say then that it is my body which you bury, and bury it as seems to you best.


13. ἀπρ ᾧ λέγω] 'what I am always saying; nothing fresh: that if you take good care of yourselves you will best please me and mine and yourselves also in whatever you do, even though you make no promise now; but if you are negligent of yourselves and will not guide your lives along the track of our present and our former discourse, though your promises be never so many and earnest at this moment, you will profit nothing'.
ἐπιμελούμενοι ύμεῖς καὶ ἑμοὶ καὶ τῶς ἕμοις καὶ υμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἀπ' ἀν ποιήτε, καὶ μὴ νῦν ὀμολογήσετε· έαυ δὲ ύμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ἀμελήτε, καὶ μὴ θέλητε, άσπερ κατ' ἱγνη κατά τα νῦν τε εἰρήμενα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζην, οὐδὲ ἔαν πολλά ὀμολογήσετε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε. Ταῦτα μὲν τοιών προθυμησόμεθα, ἐφι, οὔτω ποιεῖν' θάπτωμεν δὲ σε τίνα τρόπον; Ὡτ' ἄν, ἕφι, βουλήσθη, έαντερ γε λάβητε με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ύμῶς. γελάσας δὲ ἄμα ἡσυχθ' καὶ πρὸς ἴμος ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν, Οὐ πεῖθω, οδ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὅσ ἐγώ εἰμι οὗτος ὁ Σωκράτης, ὑνυι διαλέγομενο, καὶ διατάττων ἐκαστον τῶν λεγο- μένων, ἀλλ' οἴεται με ἐκείνον εἰναί, ὅν ὅψεται ὀλγον ὑστερον ὄνοκρόν, καὶ ἐρωτά δή, πῶς με θάπτη, ὅτι δὲ ἐγώ τάλα πολὺν λέγον πεποίημαι, ὦς, ἐπειδὰν πο τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ύμῖν παρα- μενον, ἀλλ' οἰχύσομαι αἰτίων εἰς μακάρων δὴ τίνας εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτα [μοι] δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλος λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἀμα μὲν τί ὑμᾶς, ἀμα δ' ἐμαυντόν. ἐγγυνασθε οὐν με πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἐφι, τὴν ἐναντιαν ἐγγυνὴν ἢ ἤν οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἡγγυνάτο. οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἢ μὴν παραμενείν ύμεῖς δὲ ἢ μὴν μὴ παραμενείν ἐγγυν- ασθε, ἐπειδῶν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλ' οἰχύσεσθαι αἰτίων, ὲνα Κρίτων ῥάνον φέρῃ, καὶ μὴ ὁρῶν μου τὸ σῶμα ἢ καίομενον ἢ κατορτότομον ἀγανακτή ύπερ ἔμοι ὦς δεινὰ πάσχοντος, μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ, ὡς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτη ἢ ἐκφέρει ἢ κατορτύπτει. εὐ γὰρ ίστι, ἡ μελούμενοι=taking heed to your ways, that you may live virtuously and rationally. Cobet would omit κατά before τα νῦν, but Schanz cites Euthyphron 2 C ἐρχεται κατηγορήσων σου ὄσ τοὺς μήτερα πρὸς τὴν πέλιν. 9. ὃς ἑγὼ εἰμι] 'I cannot persuade Kriton, my friends, that the real "I" is that Sokrates who now converses with you and duly arranges every part of his discourse; he imagines I am that which he will presently see as a corpse; and he actually (δὴ) inquires how he is to bury me'. The article is omitted before Σω- κράτης in the best mss. and by some editors. In that case we should take Σω- κράτης as in apposition to οὗτος. Wyttten- bach appositely quotes Λαύριος 959 ἢ το δὲ σώμα ἵδιαλάκμενον υμίν ἐκάστοις ἐπεσθαί, καὶ τελευτησάντων λέγεσθαι καλῶς εἰδόλα εἶναι τὰ τῶν νεκρῶν σώματα, τῶν δ' ἤτα ἴμοιν ἐκαστον οὕτως ἡθάνατον εἶναι, ψχὴν ἐπονομαζόμενον, παρὰ θεῶν ἄλλοις ἀπέλαναι. 15. ταῦτα [μοι] δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλος λέγειν] Schanz brackets μοι after Madvig. We can indeed construe μοι with δοκῶ and αὐτῷ with λέγειν: but this gives hardly so good a sense. 17. οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἡγγυνάτο] Kriton was bail for Sokrates in conjunction with Plato and Kritobulus and Apollodoros. Apology 38 b. 22. εὖ γὰρ [ὦθ.] 'for you must know that incorrect speech is not only offensive on that score alone, but engenders mis- chief in our souls'. An inaccurate mode of expression is apt to produce a loose and careless habit of thinking; Sokrates' great object was to find out what things really are and call them by their right
δ’ ὃς, ὁ ἀριστεὶ Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλὸς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακόν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ θαρρείν τε χρὴ καὶ φάναι τούμον σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν οὕτως ὅπως ἂν σοι φίλον ἢ καὶ μᾶλιστα ῥήμα νόμιμον εἶναι.

5 Ἐν Λαύτα προσώπων εὖκείνοι μὲν ἀνώσται εἰς οἰκήμα τι νόσον οὐς, ὁ Κρίτων εὕπτω υμῖν, ἦμᾶς δ’ εἴκελεν περιπλέον. περιπλέον μὲν ὃν πρὸς ἦμας αὐτῶς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρήνευ καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτε δ’ αὐτοὶ παρῇ τῆς ἐνμορφίας διεξόντες, ὅτι ἦμων γεγονόντα ἐνι, ἀτεχνῶς ἠρεύομενοι, ὅσπερ πατρὸς στέρνει, τε βιον ἐπείδῃ δὲ ἔλουσατο καὶ Β ἵνα δὴ παρ’ αὐτῶν τὰ παιδία—δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ νεῖς σμικροὶ ἦσαν, εἰς δὲ μέγας— καὶ αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες ἄφικοντο, [ἐκείναις] ἑναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεξθείη τε καὶ ἑπιστείλας ἀττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναίκας καὶ τὰ παιδία απείνανε οἴκελευτεν, αὐτῶς δὲ ἦκε παρ’ ἦμας.

10 καὶ ἦν ἦδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου ὑσμῶν’ χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἐνδ. names, by obtaining a precise definition of each thing. That which we speak of as Sokrates is his soul, not his body; although, since the body is all we see, popular usage applies the name to the body even when the soul has quitted it. But, says Sokrates, not only is this in itself a slovenly mode of speech, but it may habitude us to thinking that the body is all that exists of a man.

3. θάπτειν οὕτως] Most of the recent editors make θάπτειν depend upon φάναι. There seems to me no valid reason for doing so; and it makes better sense to take it with χρὴ.

116 ἄ—117 ἄ, c. lxv. Sokrates retires to the bath, and on his return takes leave of his children and household. After a little farther conversation with his friends he is warned by the servant of the Eleven that the hour of his death is at hand. The man warmly testifies to the noble character of Sokrates and departs in tears. Sokrates, after a few kind words concerning him, bids the poison be brought. Nay, remonstrates Kriton, the sun is yet on the mountains; many prisoners have put off drinking the hemlock till far on into the evening: there is no haste. They acted after their kind, answers Sokrates; but I were false to myself, were I so covetous of the little remnant of my life: therefore bring the poison.

11. δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ] cf. Apology 34. D οἰκείοι μοι ἔδω καὶ νεῖς, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς εἰς μὲν μειράκιων ἠδη, δύο δὲ παιδία. In Diog. Laer. 11 26 we are told that the name of the eldest was Lamprokles and those of the two younger Sophronis- kos and Menexenos.

12. αἱ οἰκείαι γυναῖκες] i.e. the women of his family. Probably his wife was not among them, else Plato would have mentioned her. Some suppose that this expression gave rise to the absurd fable that Sokrates had two wives living at the same time; of whom the second, Myrten, daughter or grand-daughter of the famous Aristeides, was the mother of his two younger children: see Diog. Laer. l. l.

[ἐκείναις] ἑναντίον] The ms. vary between ἐκείναις and ἐκείνας, and also in the position of the word, which in many follows ἑναντίον. Since ἐκείνας and the position after ἑναντίον are alike impossible, I read as above; bracketing however ἐκείνας as highly suspicious.

15. ἐνδ] sc. εν τῷ εἰκήματι.
117] ΦΛΙΔΩΝ.

117

ελθών δ' ἐκαθέξετο λελουμένος, καὶ οὐ πολλὰ μετὰ ταῦτα διελέχθη, καὶ ἦκεν ὁ τῶν ἐνδεκά ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς παρ' αὐτῶν, Ὑ Σώκρατες, ο ἐφη, οὐ καταγνώσομαι σοῦ ὅπερ ἄλλων καταγγελώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπάνουσι καὶ καταρωνται, ἕπειδαν αὐτοῖς παραγγέλλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἕγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναίοτάτου καὶ πράττοντο καὶ ἀριστον ἀνδρὰ ὡς τῶν πιότοτε δεύρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐν οἷον ὅτι σὰς χαλεπαίνεις, γνωσίσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἴτιους, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνοι. νῦν, οἴκσα ἡμᾶς ἤτον ἀγγέλλων, χαίρε τε καὶ πειρῶ ὅς ἁράστα φέρει τὰ ἀναγκαία. καὶ ἀμα δακρύσας μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπήλευ, καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψα τρός αὐτῶν. Καὶ συ, ἐφη, χαίρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιησόμεν. καὶ ἀμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ὑς ἀστέιος, ἐφη, ὁ ἀνθρωπός; καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσῆκε καὶ διελέγετο ἐνώτε καὶ ἦν ἀνδρῶν λόγος, καὶ νῦν ὃς γενναῖος μὲ ἀποδικρύει. ἀλλ' ἂγε δὴ, ὁ Κρίτων, πειθόμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἴ τετριπταί εἰ δὲ μή, τρυφάτῳ ὁ ἀνθρωπός. Ε καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, Ἀλλ' οἴμαι, ἐφη, ἐγγυς, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐτὶ ἢλιον ἐλναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὅρεσιν καὶ οὗτος δευκέναι. καὶ ἀμα ἐγὼ οἴδα καὶ ἄλλους πάνυ ὥσε πίνοντας, ἔπειδαν παραγγέλθη αὐτοῖς, διεπνησάντας τα καὶ πίνοντας εὐ μᾶλα, καὶ ἐγγεγομένους γ' εἶνοις ὁν ἀν τίχοσαν ἐπιθυμούντες. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπεβίων ἐτὶ γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἐλείκτως γε, ἐφη, ὁ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοι τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὐς σὺ λέγεις, οἴνται ἡμὰς κερδανεῖν ταῦτα ποιησάντας, καὶ ἐγγυς

3. οὐ καταγνώσομαι] 'I shall not have the complaint to make of you that I make of others'.

8. ὅσον ἔμοι χαλεπάνεις] Some read χαλεπάνεις, but the present is found in the best ms. and gives the best sense.

'̓I know it is not with me that you are angry, but with them; for you know who are to blame for it'. There is a subtle dramatic propriety in these words which is one of the finer touches of this matchless narrative. This man must have had a large experience of criminals and been accustomed to look on the baser side of humanity. He could however appreciate the nobility of Sokrates, so far as it is directly brought before his eyes; but he never thought of Sokrates as bearing no ill-will even against those who were really the cause of his death: this is something outside his experience.

9. ἄ ἢλιον ἄγγελλον] So the best ms. Schanz needlessly reads ἄγγελλον: but ἄγγελλον is equivalent to ἄγγελαν φέρον which we have in Crito 43 c.

12. ὡς στέτοις] 'how courteous the good fellow is; throughout all this time he used to come and talk to me now and then, and was the best of men: and now how honestly he mourns for me'. ἀποδικρύει με as below 117 c ἀπέκλασεν ἐμαυτὸν.

21. ἦτο γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ] 'for there is still time to spare'.

24. ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσομ] Hirschig condemns εἰκότως, for no reason that I can see, though Schanz brackets it.

οὐδὲν γὰρ οἴμαι κερδανεῖ] The ms. authority is stronger for κερδανεῖ, but
here I think Schanz is right in accepting the future. Prof. Geddes defends the present by a reference to Herodotus ix 106; but there Abicht reads ἐμενένε τὲ καὶ μὴ ἀποστῆσας: besides which the construction is different. Plato could very well say οὐδὲν οἷμα κερδαίνειν ἀλλὰ ὄφλησεν, but οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ κερδαίνειν ἡ ὄφλησει seems very doubtful Greek.

2. φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἐτὶ ἐνότος] ‘being chary when the vessel is empty’; a proverbial expression which we find in Hesiod works and days 367 μεσόνα φειδεθάνα, δειλή ὃ ἐνι πυθμένι φειδόν. 117 A—118 A, cc. lxvi, lxvii. The last moments of Sokrates.

10. αὐτὸ ποιήσει] ‘the poison will act of itself’. τοῖς is used in this technical sense by medical writers: Heindorf cites Dioscorides 1 95 τοῖς πρὸς ἄρμακα, ‘is efficacious against poison’. The lexicons also give Strabo 234 λούτρα κάλλαςτα τούτοιτα πρὸς νῖνον. 11. καὶ ὃς λαβῶν] ‘and he took it right cheerfully, Echekrates, without a shudder or any change of complexion of countenance; but looking on the man with bent brows, as his manner was, he asked, What say you of this potion as to pouring a libation to some deity? is it permitted or not?’ Notice the earnest emphasis thrown on the words μάλα ἔσω by the following ὁ Ἐξέκρατες. διαφέρας = changing for the worse, as Prof. Geddes says: the partitive genitives strengthen the force of the negation. ταυρηῦν ἐποβλέψασι describes the fixed piercing gaze habitual to Sokrates, cf. 86 D. For the use of πρὸς Stallbaum compares Symposium 174 B, 176 B. The man’s matter-of-fact reply and his conduct throughout serve to heighten the pathos: he does not mean to be unfeeling, but familiarity with such scenes has produced a certain professional indifference; he seems not to have been personally influenced by Sokrates like the servant of the eleven.

19. ἐπισχέμενος] ‘putting it to his lips’. The active ἐπισχέων is used of giving a draught to another.
καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἴοι τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ ἀδιάκρινεν, ὥς δὲ εἰδομεν πινοῦτα τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλὰ ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστακτὲ ἐχόρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὡστε ἐγκαλυφάμενοι ἀπέκλασαν ἑαυτῶν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκείνων γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τύχην, δ οἴοι ἄνδροι ἑταῖρον ἐστηριμένοι εἶχαν. ὣ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος 5 ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδή οὐχ οἶος τ᾽ ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἐξαινετῆ. Ἀπολλόδορος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαινητο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενοι κλαίων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα ὄντων οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων, πλὴν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐκείνως δὲ, Οία, ἐφ', ποιεῖτε, ὁ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὖν ἥκιστα τοῦτον 10 ἔνεκα τῶν γνωάκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ τοιαύτα πλημμελείον καὶ ἐ γὰρ ἀκίκοα, ὅτι ἐν εὐφημία χρή τελευτάω. ἀλλ' ἦσυχαίν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτερείτε. καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἁγιώνθημεν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν μεν τὸν δακρυόν. ὣ δὲ περιελθὼν, ἐπειδή οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἐβή τα σκέλη, κατεκλίθη ὡπτίοις· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευν ο ἅνθρωπος καὶ ἀμα 15 ἐφαπτόμενοι αὐτοῦ ὠτος ὁ δ' όρατον τοῦ φάρμακον διαλιπὼν χρόνον ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κατεύχεται σφόδρα πιέσαι αὐτοῦ τοῦ πόδα ἦρετο, εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο· ὅ δ' οὖν ἐφ' καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐθις τὰς κυῆς καὶ ἐπαινῶν ὠτος ἥμιν ἐπεδείκνυτο, ὅτι Πυθιότο τε καὶ πηγάδιο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἡπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἐπεδιώκαν πρὸς τῇ 20 καρδία γένεται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχήσεται. ἥδη οὖν σχεδὸν τι αὐτοῦ ἢν

1. κατέχειν] 'we were able to refrain from tears'. This usage of κατεχεῖν is rare: cf. Soph. Oel. Τύρ. 781 καγω βαρύνεις τὴν μὲν οἴοσ ἠμέραν μᾶλις κατέχοις. Below we have the common use, κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα.

2. ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ] 'but in spite of myself my tears began to flow in torrents'.

3. ἀναβρυχησάμενοι] 'then above all bursting into loud sobis, by his weeping and lamenting he utterly broke down every one of the company, save Sokrates himself'. Hirschig would omit κλαίων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν, Schanz brackets κλαίων καὶ: but can any one read the sentence without feeling that its rhythm is hopelessly ruined by either of these needless and mischievous omissions? With κατέλαβε Heindorf compares the Homeric κατεκλάδῃ φίλων ἤτορ: and Stallbaum quotes two passages of Plutarch, Pirikles 37, Demosth. 23, where the word is used as here. The old editions had κατέλαβε: Stephanus conjectured κατέλαβε, which was afterwards discovered in certain mss.

12. ἀκικοα ὅτι ἐν εὐφημία χρή τελευτάν] According to Olympiodoros it was a Pythagorean precept.

15. οὕτω γάρ ἐκέλευν] i.e. ὡπτίοις καταλαθήραι.

16. οὕτως ὁ δ' ὄρατον τοῦ φάρμακον] Schanz brackets these words, but I think they are justly defended and retained by Heindorf.

20. πηγάδιο contracted from πηγάδιον, cf. 77 B.

καὶ αὐτός ἡπτετο] Sokrates himself did the same as the man. This seems to be mentioned simply as evidence of his perfect calmness. Forster proposes αὐθις, supposing that the subject of ἡπτετο is ὁ δ' ὄρατον τοῦ φάρμακον, and Schanz reads αὐθις, presumably on the same hypothesis. Neither alteration is to be commended.
tā perī τὸ ἦτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος, ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ, εἶτεν, ὁ δὴ τελευταίον ἐφθέγξατο, "Ω Κρίτων, ἐφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιοῦ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυώνα· ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσῃς. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἐφη, ἐσταί, ὁ Κρίτων ἀλλ᾿ ὅρα, εἰ τί ἄλλο λέγεις. ταῦτα ἐρωμένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλὰ ὁλὴν χρόνον διαλύσων ἐκκυθῆ τε καὶ ὁ ἄνδρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτὸν, καὶ ὁ τὸ ὀμματα ἐστησέν· ἵδιον δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὄφθαλμους.

LXVII. "Ἡδὲ ἡ τελευτή, ὡ Ἐχεκρατε, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὃς ἦμεις φαίμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ἂν ἐπειράθημεν ἁρίστου τοι καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

2. τῷ Ἀσκληπιοῦ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυώνα] It might have been supposed that the conception of life as a 'fitful fever' was familiar enough to spare us all the unprofitable ingenuity that has been expended on this passage. The last words of Sokrates are in perfect harmony with the whole tenor of his foregoing discourse. His soul is on the point of being liberated from the body and all its attendant infirmities and will presently be restored to her primal purity and health. Corporeal existence is in fact a morbid condition of the soul, for which death is the remedy; wherefore Sokrates vows to Asklepios the sacrifice customary on recovery from sickness. Prof. Geddes aptly quotes Timon of Athens v 1 ‘my long sickness of health and living now begins to mend’. So Olympiodorus: ἧνα τὰ γενοχώρνα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ γενέσι ταῦτα ἐξίσθαι: he speaks too of an oracle which declares τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναγομένας τῶν παῦνα ὦδεν.

6. ἐκνήψῃ: ‘he stirred’: probably some slight spasm or shudder at the moment of dissolution. ἐκνήψῃ is far too mild a word to signify convulsions, as some would have it.

8. Ἡδὲ ἡ τελευτή] The last three lines of the dialogue have been variously assailed by different critics on divers grounds. First Wytenbach, offended by τῶν, proposes τῶν πώποτε. Heindorf would have πάντων, τότε ὃς ἐπειράθημεν. Schanz brackets ἄλως. Hirschig is ac-

tually prepared to cancel all after ἐγένετο. I believe that every word stands exactly as Plato wrote it, and that not one could be altered or omitted without marring the sad music of this solemn close. Wytenbach supports his τῶν πώποτε from Plutarch, but the Platonic passages he quotes have γενομένων, ἀφεκτωμένων &c, which makes all the difference. Moreover he introduces a tone of panegyric, which, though not perhaps exaggerated, is quite discordant with the subdued simplicity which is the chief charm of this wonderful scene, and with the studiously modest ὃς ἦμεις φαίμεν ἄν: this has been remarked by Prof. Geddes. τῶν τότε, as Stallbaum says, ‘solemnis est formula in eusmodi praeconis’, meaning ‘of all his contemporaries’; and for the reference of τότε to a recent period he cites Politicus 263 ε. But probably, as Grote suggests, Plato used the word rather from his own point of view at the time he wrote than from that of the supposed speaker. ἄλως has reference not to τῶν τότε, as Heindorf thinks, but to ἁρίστου: ‘in other respects’ is practically equivalent to ‘moreover’, or ‘besides’: it merely serves to mark the transition from the vaguer to the more definite expressions of praise. Preserving the sentence intact I should translate: ‘such was the end, O Echekrates, of our companion—a man, as we should say, among all then living whom we knew the noblest, ay and the wisest and most just’.
APPENDIX I.

δημοτική καὶ πολιτικὴ ἁρετή.

To the student of Plato's ethics it is obviously important to determine exactly what is to be understood by the popular, as contrasted with the philosophic, ἁρετή, and should there prove to be more than one variety of the former, to distinguish between them. With a view to this, I propose to examine briefly Plato's principal statements on the subject. Besides the passages in the Phædo, 68 d foll. and 82 a, the following extracts seem to me to contain a complete exposition of Plato's views.

i. Republic 554 c. ἂρ όν, οὐ τούτω δήλων, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις έμμβο-

λαιοῖς τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἐν ὃς εἰδοκυμεί δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι, ἐπιμείκει τινὶ ἑαυτῷ βίᾳ κατέχει ἄλλας κακὰς ἐπιθυμίας, οὐ πείθων ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινον, οὐδὲ ἰμερῶν λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ φόβῳ, περὶ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τρέμων; Καὶ πάνυ γ', ἐφι. Καὶ νῦ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δ' ἐκεῖ, τοὺς πολλοὺς γε αὐτῶν εὐθήσεις, ὅταν δὲ ταλλότρια ἀναλίσκει, τὰς τοῦ κηρύξους ἐγγενεῖς ἐνοῦσας ἐπιθυμίας. Καὶ μάλα, ἡ δ' ὅς, σφοδρά. οὐκ ἂρ ἃν εἰ ἀστασίας τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐδὲ εἰς, ἀλλὰ διπλοὺς τις, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἐπιθυμίας ὃς τὸ πολὺ κρατούσας ἂν ἔχω βελτίως χειρισθῶν. Ἡστιν οὕτως. Διὰ ταῦτα δῆ, οἷμαι, εὐσχημονοσ-

τερος ἄν πολλῶν τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰπ' ὀρισχετικής δὲ καὶ ἱρμοσμένης τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθῆς ἁρετῆ πόρρῳ τοι ἐκφεύγαι ἃν αὐτῶν.

ii. Republic 506 λ. οἷμαι γονὶν, ἐπον, δικαίῳ τε καὶ καλά ἄνγεουμενα, ὅτι ποτὲ ἁγαθά ἔστιν, οὐ πολλοὶ τινὸς ἄξειν φίλακα κηρίσθαι ἂν ἑαυτῶν τὸν τούτο ἀγνοοῦντα ματεύσωμαι ὅταν μηδένα αὐτὰ πρότερον γνώσθησθαι ἰκανός.

iii. Republic 500 d. ἀν ὁν τις, ἐπον, αὐτῷ [sc. τῷ φιλοσόφῳ] ἀνάγκη γένηται ἂ ἐκεῖ ὅρα μελετήσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἔκθη καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ μή μόνον ἑαυτῶν πλάτειαν, ἀρα κακὸν δημοιουργόν αὐτὸν οἰεὶ γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ συμπάθεις τῆς δημοσικῆς ἁρετής; Ἡστιά ὁν, ή δ' ὅς. 501 λ. ἐπείτα, οἷμαι, ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνά ἄν ἐκατέρωσ' ἀποβλέποιν πρὸς τὸ τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σωφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον αὕ, δ' ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖν, ἐπι-
APPENDIX I.

Among other passages might be more or less bearing on the subject, e.g. Republic 409 A, 430 B, Phaedrus 256 E, Protagoras 355 C foll., but none, so far as I am aware, which throw any additional light upon it.

In the extract first quoted we have, it is clear, precisely the same conception of the vulgar sort of virtue as in Phaedo 68 D. Plato has been describing, in one of the most scathing passages he ever penned, the character of the ὀλυγαρχικὸς ἄντρ. Such a man sets lucre above all things, he scrapes and hoards and denies himself, subduing all other ap-

1 I have followed the text of the Zürich editors.
APPENDIX I.

petites beneath the master-passion of amassing wealth. And since such habits tend in the main to outward orderliness of conduct, he acquires the reputation of being a worthy respectable man. Yet he is filled with a swarm of ‘drone lusts’, which are commonly held down by the strong hand of avarice, but are suffered to riot unchecked, if this may be done at another’s expense. And all this happens because he has paid no heed to his education. Here we have a perfect picture of a man ἀκολασίαν σεσωφρονισμὸν: in that he controls his sensual appetites he is so far σωφρων, but he controls them only because he is ἀκόλαστος in the indulgence of unbounded avarice. In ii again Plato insists upon the point which is so strongly emphasised in the Phaedo; that no real knowledge of things just and beautiful can exist which is not based on knowledge of the good. We see then in these passages that the δημοτική ἀρετὴ is a morality formed by the mass of mankind for themselves on strictly utilitarian principles, by balancing pains and pleasures, and without knowledge of the good. We observe also that for this Plato has nothing but scorn and sarcasm: he would not indeed deny that a temperance which is the effect of intemperance is better than no temperance at all; but it is at best a base and sordid counterfeit of true virtue.

But in iii we have quite a different picture. Here we see the philosopher himself, as prophet and teacher, creating the δημοτική ἀρετὴ in the souls of his fellow men, by moulding their characters after the image of that justice and beauty whereof he beholds the eternal ideas. As the painter’s glance passes to and fro between his model and his canvas, so is the gaze of the philosopher turned now to his ideal archetype, now to the human image of the divine that he is fashioning. Now it is evident that this virtue can no longer be a contemptible thing, since it is worth the philosopher’s while to pause in his study of the truth, that he may implant it in the hearts of men: it is indeed the highest that the great mass of mankind can hope to attain, who live and die in the darkness of the cave. Again this is no longer an ethical code which the multitude frame for themselves; it is one which the philosopher frames for them: nor does he construct it on any utilitarian basis, but out of his knowledge of ideal truth. Yet as held by them it is still utilitarian, for they accept it on utilitarian grounds: they receive it, not because they know why it is good, for they are without knowledge of the good, but because the philosopher convinces them that it is for their advantage to do so; that by submitting to its restrictions they avoid great evils. As they hold it therefore, it is utilitarian; as he conceives it, not so: thus they are still, though in a far more refined sense, δι' ἀκολασίαν σεσωφρο-
νισρένωι. Plato acknowledges that the morality of the multitude must be utilitarian, since none other is attainable save by the highly trained metaphysician. Therefore, however superior the morality of those who obey this code may be to that of the oligarchical man, it is sundered from that of the philosopher by a fathomless gulf—it is ἀνεν φρονήσεως.

In the next three quotations Plato is speaking of an innate virtue, not springing from reason or any system, but from natural instinct. The most interesting and important of these passages is that from the Μενο, which with its context gives a pretty full statement of Plato’s view. This instinctive virtue is due to no effort of its possessor but to the dispensation of heaven; θεία μοῖρα.1 παραγινομένη—a phrase which is explained in vi by αὐτοφυός.2 Some men are so happily endowed by divine favour that without consciously striving after virtue they lead virtuous lives; they do right without knowing the difference between right and wrong. Now this natural virtue seems at first sight difficult to classify along with either form of δημοτική ἀρετή before described. But a closer examination will show that, however much more attractive it may be, it does not in principle differ from the first. For we observe (1) that the virtue which these θεῖοι follow by the impulse of their own hearts is the ordinary utilitarian virtue, (2) they are just, temperate, &c, simply because these virtues are more natural and therefore more easy and pleasant to them than the opposite vices, not because they choose them as being better: their virtue, when analysed, is an amiable form of selfishness. Therefore they must, harsh as it seems, be classed with οἵ δὲ ἀκολουθίαν σεωφρονισμένοι, and with the first variety, since their virtue is of themselves, not from the philosopher.

The whole discussion in the Μενο brings out two points very clearly: (1) the fundamental difference between popular and philosophic ἀρετή is the same as that between true opinion and knowledge; (2) true opinion, where it is present, leads in the same path as knowledge: the ἱδωτής who has a true opinion about what is right will act in the same way as the φιλόσοφος who knows what is right.3 Therefore the

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1 A careful investigation into the meaning of the phrase θεία μοῖρα will be found in Zeller’s Φιλοσοφία τῶν Ελλήνων ii p. 497 note (3rd ed.). See also Dr Thompson’s note on Τοξίλας 566 εἰ ὁ πόνος εἰκῆ κάλλιστα παραγινεται.

2 This seems at first sight to conflict with the opposition of θεία μοῖρα with φῶσι in the Μενο. But I think that while in the Λαός Plato is contrasting the αὐτο-

3 The ἱδωτής and the φιλόσοφος are aiming at precisely the same thing, viz. the good: only the φιλόσοφος seeks it as it really is, the ἱδωτής as it is adumbrated
APPENDIX I.

popular virtue in its highest conceivable form leads to the same conduct as the philosophic virtue. The difference is that we can trust the latter and not the former: we cannot ensure that a man will always have right opinions; they may at any moment slip away from him like the statues of Daidalos. But the knowledge of the philosopher can never fail him: thence it is that he must come forward as the instructor of mankind; they must not be left to their good instincts, which may betray them, or to their utilitarian codes, which must lower them: they must accept a morality founded on the philosopher’s sure and abiding knowledge of the good.

In vii we have a slight distinction. Here is one who is virtuous by habit and convention. There is however no specific difference between him and the ἀρετή of the Ἔμοι: his conduct is equally influenced by unreflecting impulse, and we must conceive him as naturally well disposed. Plato notes however that this unthinking obedience to custom and tradition may lead to the most disastrous consequences, when a man is placed in a situation where custom and tradition are of no avail. How little value Plato set on this conventional virtue may be gathered from Plato. 82 b, where those who have lived virtuously ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ μελέτης ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ pass at death into the form of some social and peaceable animal, bee, wasp or ant, or at best live again as decent and orderly citizens.

In viii we have the description of a child who is receiving a true education. He is to be surrounded from infancy with an atmosphere of the purest morality, ἀσπερ αἱρα φέρουσα ἐπὶ χρηστῶν τόπων ύγίειαν, till he insensibly glides into harmony with fair reason; music is to sink into his soul, filling it with a love of concord and order: and thus being habituated to all that is noble and beautiful, while still too young to understand the reason why it is so, when in maturer years he at last attains knowledge of the reason, he welcomes it with joy, because all his previous training has fitted him to receive it. Thus we see that the δημοτική ἀρετή in its highest form serves as a propaedeutic for ἀρετή μετὰ φρόνιμους. That is to the philosophic child but an early stage which to the unphilosophic many is their journey's end; the highest level their maturity attains is for his youth a starting-point to the knowledge of the good.

The result then of our investigation is this. While all δημοτική in his own mind: the demotic good is, as Plato says, the shadow of the philosophic. 1 Thus we see the Platonic origin of Aristotle’s conception of ἀρετή ως ἀριστερή λόγος καὶ ὡς ἀν ὀφέλον μηδεσῖν. Nic. Eth. 11 vi 15. Cf. Eud. Eth. 111 v 1232a 36.


d'aretē is radically distinguished from philosophical morality by the fact that it is ἀνευ φρονήσεως, we may I think discern two well-marked varieties of it, represented by extracts i and iii; regarding that of vi and vii as not specifically distinct from i. The first is an ethical code formed (1) by the multitude for themselves, (2) on utilitarian principles, (3) without knowledge of the good; the second is (1) formed by the philosopher for the multitude, (2) not on utilitarian principles, (3) with knowledge of the good, but (4) accepted by the multitude on utilitarian principles and without knowledge of the good. The first Plato regards with unmixed contempt; the second he recognises as the best which the great majority of mankind can attain, and by it he hopes to supersede the other: nay, so much importance does he attach to this, that his philosophers must take it in turns to desist from their own meditations and give their minds to instructing their fellow citizens. We must beware of regarding these two varieties as two successive conceptions by Plato of the δημοτικὴ ἀρετή: they are two distinct kinds, of which one is utterly condemned, the other positively enforced upon the masses.

Finally it may be noted that the perfection of philosophic virtue is only to be found in the perfect philosopher in whom all knowledge and wisdom are consummated, ὁς φιλοσοφίας ἐπ’ ἀκρον ἀπάφης ἐλήλυθε. Plato did not pretend that he or any one else had reached such knowledge; therefore he would admit that his moral code was necessarily incomplete and tentative. But this is only to say that no ethical system based on metaphysical research can be perfect until the object of that research has been fully attained; until, that is, absolute knowledge has been won. And though such knowledge may be unattainable, Plato has still consolation: if philosophy's advance in cognition of the truth be endless, endless also must be her progress in virtue.
APPENDIX II.

The ordinary interpretation of chapter xl viii represents Sokrates, after failing to unravel the secrets of nature by the methods of the physicists, as betaking himself to the contemplation of nature through the medium of λόγος. This view has been set forth with such clearness and precision by Prof. Geddes that I cannot do better than give it in his words. 'Having failed in his first voyage, under the guidance of the physicists, Socrates says that he set out by himself on a second voyage of discovery in search of a solid basis of Being, not by gazing on the outward world of matter, but by meditating on the inner world of thought'....' Socrates had stated that the study of the external world by the senses simply would not conduct to knowledge of causation, and that the effect of such study would be like looking at an eclipse of the sun with the naked eye; viz. dizziness under the dazzling maze of phenomena (cf. λεγγῆς in 79 C, τοπάστρομα in 100 D). Therefore, he goes on to say, as one uses a medium in looking at an eclipse, such as the reflection in water, or the like, so we must proceed regarding the external world, by studying phenomena through media or images, which images can be nothing else than οἱ λόγοι, i.e. principles or reasons intellectually apprehended. This simile however has the disadvantage of representing the intellectual world as the shadow, and not the reality; and therefore Socrates at once anticipates and corrects a misimpression that might arise from the use of such a simile. Perhaps however the process I refer to (viz. τὸ ἐν λόγοις σκοπεῖν) is in a certain respect not parallel with that to which I compare it. For I do not at all admit that the man who looks at things in their principles sees things a whit more by images than one who looks at them in their external effects. “Although it is true,” says Socrates, “that those who look at the sun’s reflection in water see a reflection and nothing more, I do not admit that those who study to obtain a knowledge of Being through

1 The italics are Prof. Geddes’s own.
the medium of the principles in the intellect (οἱ λόγοι) perceive mere reflections of things, and not realities. Therefore the simile I have used is simply an illustration indicating that transition in which I turned from the blinding spectacle of τὰ ἔργα, as studied by the physicists, to the less remote, but not less real, world of οἱ λόγοι, or the intellectual principles of things.”

Now the first remark I have to offer upon the above exposition is that the representation of δεύτερος πλοῦς as a ‘second voyage of discovery’ is not consistent with the perfectly correct explanation of that proverb given by Prof. Geddes himself a little earlier; ‘it signifies a “second resource in default of a better”, and is applied, not to what is absolutely, but to what is relatively, best’. Ast indeed denies this: but that such is the meaning is conclusively determined, not only by the origin of the proverb, but by its use in every one of the passages where it occurs. Sokrates means that having failed in the highest object of his endeavour he betakes himself to this method of λόγοι as the closest feasible approximation to it.

But what is this highest object, the πρῶτος πλοῦς? Certainly not the investigation of phenomena by means of physical science. On the study of phenomena Plato is perpetually heaping the most contumelious epithets, especially in the period to which the Phaedo belongs: even in the Timaeus, great part of which is occupied with physical speculations, the most Plato will say for such pursuits is that they are a sober and harmless recreation in the intervals of more serious studies (59 c). Neither in matter nor in our opinions about it is there any certainty, stability or truth: matter therefore cannot be meant when Sokrates says ἀπείρωσα τὰ ὅντα σκότων. It is true that he guards himself by the provision οὐ γὰρ πάντα ἔγχυσασθεν κ.τ.λ., but this very fact is inconsistent with the theory that phenomena are the ὅντα which Sokrates failed to reach: the λόγοι must in some sense be ἐίκόνες of something, else what is the point of the comparison? Apart from this, Sokrates has in the previous chapter given us two perfectly precise statements: (1) that he had actually tested and discredited the methods of the physicists, (2) that his hope was to discover τάγαθόν καὶ δέον as the ultimate αἰτία; in other words, to construct a teleological theory of the universe. This then is the ‘great and wondrous hope’, which the physicists could not gratify, and which he himself failed to fulfil; and this it is for which the method of λόγοι offers a substitute.

I conceive then that Prof. Geddes has fallen into error as to the nature of the πρῶτος πλοῦς by failing to keep a firm hold upon the meaning of δεύτερος πλοῦς: for I cannot imagine he would maintain
that Plato even for a moment could speak of the study of λόγοι as inferior to the study of phenomena. But I have another very grave objection to his interpretation. He speaks of the ‘dazzling maze of phenomena’, ‘the blinding spectacle of τὰ ἔργα, as studied by the physicists’; and in his exposition the sun symbolises material particulars. But where shall we find such language in Plato? If we turn to a part of the Republic with which our present passage is intimately connected, we shall see something very different. In 508 c we read ὅφθαλμοι οὐσθ’ οἶτι, ὅταν μηκέτ’ ἐπ’ ἔκεινα τις αὐτοῦς τρέπη ὅν ἣν τὰς χρῶς τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἑπέχει, ἀλλὰ ὤν νυκτερινὰ φήγγη, ἄμβλυντος τε καὶ ἕγγις φαίνονται τυφλοῖ, ὅσπερ οὐκ ἔνοψης καθαρᾶς ὅψεως. καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. ὅταν δὲ γ’, οἶμαι, ὃν ὁ ἕλιος καταλάμπῃ, σαφῶς ὁρῶσι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὄμμασιν ἔνουσα φαίνεται. τί μή; οὕτω τούτων καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅδε νῦει; ὅταν μὲν οὖν καταλάμπει ἀλήθεια τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, εἰς τοῦτο ἀπερεάσηται, ἔνοψῃ τε καὶ ἕγνω αὐτῷ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται: ὅταν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ τῦ σκότους κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγαιμένον τε καὶ ἀπολλάμενον, δοξίζει τε καὶ ἄμβλυντα ἀνώ καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον καὶ ἔοικεν αὐτὸ νοῦν ὁμιλεῖντι. Again if we turn to 516 a we find the very same metaphor: the sun moon and stars represent the ideas, and their reflections in water represent these very λόγοι with which we are dealing in the present passage. It is to me absolutely incredible that Plato should have inverted his metaphor, should have reversed the relation of thought and matter. Thought is always to him the region of truth and light, matter of dimness and uncertainty: and that he should even for a moment represent thought as a medium to temper the blinding glare of material existence is in my judgment unnatural and inconsistent with the whole tenor of his language on this subject. Prof. Geddes appeals to the use of ἡλιαφώς and ταράσσομαι, but Plato tells us (Republic 518 a) ὅτι διτταὶ καὶ απὸ διττῶν γύρονται ἐπιταράξεις ὅμμασιν, ἐκ τῶ φωτὸς εἰς σκότος μεθισταμένον καὶ ἐκ σκότους εἰς φῶς. Moreover in the interpretation I am criticising λόγοι are used as helps to the contemplation of phenomena, whereas Plato always treats them as helps to the contemplation of the ideas.

The passage, as I read it, has the following significance. I attempted, says Sokrates, to discover τὸ ἀγαθὸν as the ultimate cause working in nature. But when, after long endeavour, I failed in the struggle, I began to fear that by fixing my gaze too intently on realities I might be blinded in soul, as men are bereft of their bodily vision by gazing on the sun. So I bethought me of framing in my own mind images or concepts of those realities which I desired to study, and in them safely to examine the nature of their types. But though I admit these concepts
are but images of the realities, mind I don't allow that they are so in any
greater degree than material phenomena: both in fact are images;
but whereas phenomena are the images presented to us by our senses,
concepts are the images deliberately formed by our understanding;
concepts therefore are more real than phenomena in proportion as
understanding is more sure than sense. Be that as it may, I did form
these concepts and used them as a standard to estimate the truth or
falsehood of particulars.

Sokrates in fact, since he despairs of actually grasping the eternal
ideas, of which all natural phenomena are symbols, endeavours to form
from those symbols, mental concepts or universals, which shall represent
the ideas to him: they are the ideas as reflected in his intelligence.
The verity of these concepts cannot be thoroughly ascertained, as the
Republic tells us, until the ideas have been actually apprehended and
compared with them: meanwhile they afford the best working hypo-
thesis that can be obtained. No prospect of this verification is held
out in the Phaedo; in the Republic however Plato speaks more hope-
fully.

This interpretation, as it appears to me, establishes the right relation
between the δεύτερος πλοῦς and the πρώτος πλοῦς, gives to Plato's illus-
tration its natural and customary significance, and brings the passage
into complete harmony with the Republic. The objections which I con-
ceive are most likely to be felt to it would no doubt be based upon the
sentence βλέπων πρός τὰ πράγματα κ.τ.λ. The difficulty of the passage
arises, I think, partly from the ambiguity of the term τὰ ὄντα, partly
from a fusion of the symbol with the thing symbolised, and from a
general lack of that precision of language which our familiarity with the
sixth book of the Republic induces us to expect. But we must remember
that Plato is not here professing to give a systematic exposition of his
theory, such as we find in the Republic; we have only a general outline
of the method which is copiously explained in the other dialogue.
Accordingly Plato, while setting up an antithesis between realities and
images, does not stop at this point to explain what realities are opposed
to the images; hence the uncertainty attaching to τὰ ὄντα, which the
physicists would refer to sensible, Plato to supersensual existences.
The meaning he assigns to it is only parenthetically conveyed to us
by his saving clause later on. My reference of τὰ πράγματα to the ideas
I should defend by the use of αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα in 66 ε; and we are in
no wise bound to assign the same meaning to πράγματα and to ἔργον.
The words ἐκάστῳ τῶν αἰσθήσεων are, I consider, to be regarded as purely
metaphorical. In the passage ὅσως μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., Plato seems to betray
a consciousness that the absence of precision in his previous statement is likely to lead to misconceptions: he therefore inserts a parenthesis warning us against supposing that the realities of which he speaks are particulars: these, he says, are εἰκόνες just as much as the λόγοι. But he does not dwell on this point; and his immediate resumption of his narrative with ἀλλ’ οὖν δὴ, 'be that as it may', shows that it is not his present purpose to emphasise it.

The views of other editors agree in the main with that of Prof. Geddes, but show some minor points of difference. Fischer, followed by Stallbaum, regards both λόγοι and ἔργα as εἰκόνες, and translates ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις 'ex effectis aliquius rei'. Ast and H. Schmidt understanding ἔργοις of material objects, deny that λόγοι are εἰκόνες: and the former expressly, the latter by implication, denies that δεύτερος πλοῦς signifies an inferior method. I think the two latter are right about ἔργοις, but in respect of the λόγοι and the δεύτερος πλοῦς Fischer and Stallbaum are unquestionably nearer the truth. But all these views are in my judgment radically vitiated by failure to recognise that a theory of final causes is that which Sokrates had hitherto vainly attempted to reach by apprehension of the ultimate αἰτία itself, and to which he now hoped to make an approximation by the aid of his logical method.

The foregoing exposition assumes the genuineness of every word in the passage. Mr Jackson however has suggested to me that one sentence is open to grave suspicion of interpolation. The whole trouble arises from the words βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμµασι καὶ ἕκαστη τῶν αἰτητῶν ἐπιχειρῶν ἀπετεθαὶ αὐτῶν. Had these words been absent, there would not, I think, have been two opinions as to the interpretation of the passage, which would then run thus. 'Exhausted by the effort to grasp realities', says Sokrates, 'I felt I must beware lest I suffered the fate of those who observe an eclipse of the sun directly and are blinded for their pains. I feared my soul might be blinded by direct vision of the truth: and so I thought it prudent to content myself with the consideration of λόγωι, which are the reflections of the truth in my thoughts. Yet for all that, these thought-images are just as real as the material images of nature: so I am in at least as good a position as the physicist who occupies himself with the symbols of sense'. Nothing can be more plain and simple than the sense thus obtained. Now if we examine the obnoxious sentence, we shall see that it is in itself confused and inaccurate. After τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθεῖν, which gives us the thing symbolised, we have a sudden and perplexing transition to the symbol in βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμµασι: the mind's eye and the body's eye are jumbled most incoherently together; for the depri-
vation of mental vision is given as the result of action on the part of the bodily organ. And in the next breath we have ἐκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἀπεσταλμένοι αὐτῶν, which is not even germane to the metaphor. Surely these are two serious defects. And since we find that the very sentence which hampers the interpretation of the entire passage is in itself, quite apart from the general context, open to damaging criticism, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the whole clause from βλέπων to αὐτῶν is from the hand of the same hazy-minded interpolator who has on some other occasions foisted his own ineptitudes upon Plato. The sentence is precisely what we should expect him to introduce, imagining (as he was quite certain to do) that the πρῶτος πλοῦς was the observation of particulars ¹.

But although I think there are strong reasons for supposing these words to be spurious, I do not in the least rest my interpretation of the chapter on their rejection. The omission renders the passage a much better piece of exposition; but in any case it seems clear to me that the meaning is the same. On this ground I have refrained from bracketing the words in question, since I do not wish it to appear as if my explanation in any degree depended upon expunging them.

¹ It is possible that the bracket ought to begin with ἔδεισα. The words μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθεῖν are not indeed open to the objections which apply to the following, but they are not necessary since the same meaning is conveyed in μὴ πάθομεν κ.τ.λ. Our interpolator may have borrowed from ὅ δ' ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως ὦτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθη, where, it may be noted, the blindness is not said to arise from excess of light. The omission of these words gives a satisfactory sentence: τουοῦτον τι καὶ ἐγὼ διενοθήκην, καὶ ἔδοξε δὴ μοι χρήμα. I do not feel however that the clause ἔδεισα...τυφλωθεῖν is at all on the same footing as the concluding words of the sentence.
GREEK INDEX.

A
άγαπώμενα λυθία, 164
άδολοςχέν, 72
άείδε, 91
άδάνατον, distinguished from ἀνώλεθρον, 153
ἀθρεφον, 153
Ἄθηναίων άνδρες ένδεκα, 103
Ἄδη, 94, 96
αἰθήρ, 162
Αἰσχύλος Τῆλεφος, 160
αιών, 166
άκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων, 113
ἄλλαγη πρὸς ἀρετήν, 68
ἄμοδεν ποῦν, 87
ἀμύτος καὶ ἀπελεστος, 70
ἀν, omission of, 57, 157
ἀναβιώσασθαι, transitive, 111
ἀναβιώσακεναι, 75
ἀναβρυχησάμενοι, 179
ἀνάμνησις, 77 foll.
ἀναπεπταιμένους, 166
ἀνάρτος, 149
ἀνάρπασοδόθγ αρετή, 69
ἄνοιχτος, opposed to νοής, 93
ἀνότεις, 82
ἀναπαδιδόναι, intransitive, 75
ἀντιλογικός, 114
ἀνωθεν, 140
ἀπεκκαταστάσα, 172
ἀπλῆ οἴμον, 160
ἀποβολή ἐπιστήμης = λήθη, 84
ἀποθνῄσκειν, 75
ἀπορρήτος, 57
ἀποσπείσαι, 178
Ἄργεια, 112
ἄρμονια, its meaning, 106
Ἀσκληπίῳ ὑφελομεν ἀλεκτρυών, 180

P.

*Ἀτλαντα, 134
ἀγράφος, 64
αὐτὰ τὰ ἱσα, 80
αὐτὴ or αὐτής ὡς ἱσια, 118
αὐτὸ, referring to feminine substantive, 109
αὐτὸδινθρωτος, not Platonic, 83
αὐτοφυώς, 184
άφοσισθαι, 53
ἀφύς ὡς οἶδέν ἥρμα, 117
Ἄχέρων, 169
ἀψυχον or ἀψυκτον, 154

B
βακχοί, 70
βαρβάρων γέννη, 88
βασκανία, 123
βελτιστίων, Plato's conception of, 36, 131
βόρβοροι, 163

Γ
γελασειοντα, 63
γενεσις εἰς ἐναντιον, 73
γενεσις, as conceived by the physicists, 75
Πλαύκου τέχνη, 161
γύσου, 164

Δ
δαλμων, 159
δεδέναι καὶ δέει, 68
δελυγματα, 164
δειλὴ δ ’ἐνι πυθμένι φειδώ, 178
δέον, double meaning, 134
διέτερον πλοῖσ, 134, 187
δημοτικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή, 97, 181
διὰ τοῦ σώματος, 62

I3
GREEK INDEX.

διαβλέψας, 107
διαγωγή or διάγωσα, 95
diagrámata, 78
diakelésvos, 53
dialektilh, 83
diamubológywmen, 71
diaskebánnta, 87
diafrágs, 132
diethýmwnos, 95, 164
di.epidúhmías étí, 99
díng, 133
dóunai lógon, 84
dózexékásti tois sphiírai, 163

Ε
éggnússasthe, 175
ev tévei tóu téthnávai, 62
eikh fírma, 129
eímpérnhs, 174
ék máis koryfís sýmméwos, 51
ékblállw and émbálleiv, 170
éleuðeúra kai álphdeá, 174
émoi dokei, parenthetical, 86
év eíphíma chrí televtáv, 179
év tis frouurí, 57
év tois ánthrwpón, 93
év philosophía óswn, 49
év ϕ kalómmenos tôn ọ̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̣̀
GREEK INDEX.

μαθεῖν or παθεῖν, 78
μάθηται =άναμνησις, 84
μάλιστα or κάλλιστα, 103
μάλλον reduplicated, 119
μάλλον καί ἐπὶ πάλιν, 119
Μέγαρα ή Βασιλεία, 133
μέθεξις, 34
μελέτη θανάτου, 67, 95
μελετῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρρήκων, 97
μὴ οὖχι after μαλθακοί, 104
μεμιματα, 35
μέμησις, 79
μεμοίρωμεν ἐμὲ, 151
μεσολογγία, 112
μεμίσθα καὶ τάφους, 96
μοι δοκεῖ, parenthetical, 161
μονάς, 152
μορφολογία, 88
μορφή, 147
μονακή, 53
μοῦδα—λόγοι, 54
μόρφωκας ἢ βετράχους, 162

N

ναρθησοφόρου, 70
νεύρα, 94
νόμισμα ὀρθῶν, 69
νοῦν, play on, 129

O

ὁ ἔστω, 83
ὁ ἄμως τοῦ ἀρίθμου, 148
οἰκεῖον ἐπίστημην, 84
ἀναγραφόμενος ἄγιος, 182
δῶρ καὶ παντὶ, 92
ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα, 76
ὁμώψυχα, 90
ὁρατο—αιδές, 91
ὁση = as small as, 161
ὁσιῶν τε καὶ νομιμῶν, 160
ὁσφήρει οὐρ φωνῆσιν, 165
οὐδὲ φρονήσι, 65
οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ, 101
οὐκ ἂν ψήλαιος, 137

πάθημα, 92
παίς ἐν ἡμῶν, 88

παράδειγμα, 35
παρακελεύσθαι, 53
παραλυτεῖν, 63
παραμυθία, 61
παρόντε πένθει, 49
παρουσία, 34
περικύκλῳ, 169
περιμένειν, 50
περιττότης or περιττή, 149
πηγαῖον, 179
πλάνον, 92
Πλάτων, 50
πλάττειν σῶμα, 98
ποδεσόμενοι, 130
ποιεῖν, in medical sense, 178
πονηράς ἀγάλων, 113
πράγματα = ideas, 65, 135
πραγματεία, 58
πρὶν without ἄν with subjunctive, 57
προκεκληθαί, προκεκληθαί, 112
προοίμων, 52
πρὸς τὸ οὖς βιώναι, 172
προσηλοφο, 100
προσπεράφη, 100
Πυρηνεγέθων, 170

P

ῥίας, 166

Σ

σευσφρωνύσθαι δι’ ἀκολογίαν, 68
σηπεδόνα, 126
σηπεδόνα καὶ ἄλμης, 164
σήραγγες, 163
σκιαγραφία, 69
σμικρὸν φρονίσαστε Σωκράτους, 115
Στῦξ, 170
συγγραφεῖς, 143
συλλήπτωρ, 99
συνεχές ποικίλον, 164
σύνοδος τοῦ πλῆθος τεθήκαι, 128
συντεθέντε καὶ συνθέτες, 89
σχεδίας, 104
σῶμα τι πλάττοντες, 98

T

τάλλα = particulars, 142
Τάρταρος, 167
taracterstics, 94
ΓΕΕΚ ΙΝΔΕΧ.

ταυρήδων ὕποβλέψας, 178
tεθηκός, 9
tέλμα, 162
tετάλμηκε, 144
tό δὲ, 162
tὸ δὲ εἶναι ταύτων, 162
tοιοῦτος, 49
tοῖς κατ’ ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἱέματα, 168
tοσοῦτον = so little, 100
tριτημόριον, 151
tῷ διντι, 65

Τ

ὑπέχων οὐ ὑπερέχων, 143
ὑπηρέτης τῶν ἐνδεκα, 177
ὑποβλέψας, 178
ὑπόθεσις, 139
ὑποστάθμης, 162
ὑφάντων, 108

Φ

φαντάσματα, 96
φειδώμενος οὐδὲν ἐτι ἐνότος, 177

φήμας καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις, 166
φιλομαθής = φιλόσοφος, 97
φιλοσώματος, 58
φρονήσει οτ δαφρήσει, 165
φράνσις, 69
φρονεῖ, 57
φύρας οτ φύρσιν, 141
φύρω, φυράω, 129

Χ

χαμαίσιλου, 111
χαμείστως ἑξών τὸ σῶμα, 93

Ψ

ψηλαφῶντες, 133

Ω

'Ωκεανός, 169
ἀρά, 93
ὡς ἄληθῶς, 65
ENGLISH INDEX.

A
Acheron, 169
Aesop, 54
Alkmaion, 126
Alternation of opposites, 9, 73
Ameles, 85
Analyses deceptive, 117
Anaxagoras, 130
Apollodorus, 40, 49, 179
Argives, 112
Aristotle, his dialogue Eudemos, 121
,, misrepresents Plato, 168
,, his conception of virtue, 185
Aristoxenos, 105
Article omitted before proper names, 47
Asklepios, 180
Astronomers, 97

B
Birds do not sing for sorrow, 103
Browning cited, 124

C
Causation, 130
Child, training of, 185
Cock offered to Asklepios, 180
Colours of the earth's surface, 164
Composite and incomposite, 89
Concepts, 33
Conservation of energy, 75, 155
Conversational method, 83

D
Delos, embassy to, 48
Development of Platonic system, 33–35

E
Earth, her position in the universe, 133,
161
,, mythical description of, 162
Echekrates, 38
Egyptian mummies, 94
Egyptians, their belief in immortality, 72
Elean school, 39
Embassy to Delos, 48
Endymion, 76
Epicharmos cited, 62
Equilibrium, 162
Euenos, 52
Everlasting punishment, 171
Extremes rare, 113

F
Future indicative after ei, 155

G
Generalisation, 140
Genitive of material with verb, 170
Ghosts, 96
Glaukos, 161
Gravitation, 167

II
Hair, cutting off, as token of grief, 112
Harmonia, 123
Harmony, 105, 117 foll.
Hegel, 22
Hekakles, 112
Hippokrates, 127
Homer quoted by Plato, 122, 167
Homicide, Attic law concerning, 172
I

Ideas, sole causes, 5
,, earlier theory of, 34
,, of relations, 35, 81, 142
,, their simplicity, 90
,, their relation to particulars, 138
Immortality, its position in the Phaedo, 3, 6, 7
,, its relation to knowledge, 6
,, individual, 21—26
,, extended to all living things, 73
Incurable offenders, 171
Innate virtue, 184
Interpolation, 66, 70, 77, 81, 82, 85, 132, 140, 191
Iolaus, 112

J

Jackson, 33
Juxtaposition and separation, 128

K

Kebes, his criticism, 38
,, his life and character, 41
Knowledge of universals, 33
,, and immortality, 6
Kokytos, 170
Kriton, 42
,, rebuked for incorrect language, 175

L

Lamprokles, 176
Lava, 166

M

Menexenos, 176
Metempsychosis, 18, 96
Monadism, 24
Myrto, 176

N

Neuter, by attraction for feminine, 109

O

Okeanos, 169

P

Parmenides, 106
Penelope's web, 101
Phaedo, 39
Phaedo, structure of, 2
,, relation of arguments in, 8
,, its position in Plato's system, 31
,, compared with Republic, 35
Philolaus, 55
Philosopher, as teacher of the masses, 183
Plato, his indirect method of exposition, 1
,, his mode of marking off his arguments, 13
,, development of his philosophy, 33
,, his Herakleiteanism, 36
,, his teleology, 131
,, mentions himself, 50

R

Reminiscence, 9, 77 foll.
Ritual terms, 70

S

Schleiermacher, 6
Schmidt, 168
Seneca quoted, 40
Sight, the keenest of the senses, 62
Signs of the zodiac, 163
Simmias, 40
,, compared with Kebes, 41
Sokrates, his prominent eyes, 107
,, his patience of objections, 111
,, his dislike of physical speculation, 125
,, his three sons, 176
,, his alleged second wife, 176
,, his influence on the servant of the eleven, 177
,, his last words, 180

Sokratic method, 33
,, period of Plato, 33
Sophist, structure of, 1
Sophokles cited for use of ἤν, 75
ENGLISH INDEX.

Sophroniskos, 176
Soul, simplicity of, 26
    , tripartition of, 27
    , her affinity to the ideas, 12, 91
    , does not admit of degrees, 119
Steinhart, 17
Styx, 170
Subsidiary causes, 132
Suicide, 55
Sun, symbol of true being, 189
Swans, 103

T

Tartaros, 167
Teichmüller, 24
Theactetus, criticism of Protagoras in, 15
Timon quoted, 39
Timon of Athens quoted, 180
Transmigration, 96

U

Ueberweg, 17
Universals, 33
Utilitarianism, 68, 187

V

Virtue, philosophic and popular, 69, 181
    , a harmony of the soul, 120
    , innate, 184
    , conventional, 185

W

Weaver, simile of, 108
Wordsworth, 85

X

Xanthippe, 51

Z

Zodiac, 163