GREEK SERIES FOR COLLEGES AND SCHOOLS

EDITED
UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

HERBERT WEIR SMYTH, Ph.D.
ELIOT PROFESSOR OF GREEK LITERATURE IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY
PLATO'S

EUTHYPHYRO

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

WILLIAM ARTHUR HEIDEL, Ph.D.

PROFESSOR IN IOWA COLLEGE

NEW YORK :: CINCINNATI :: CHICAGO

AMERICAN BOOK COMPANY
TO

MY PARENTS
Eight or nine years ago I was much impressed by the difficulties that beset the teacher who undertakes to introduce the student to Plato by offering him first the *Apology of Socrates*. There is no disputing the desirability of reading that noble defense of the typical sage. But when the Freshman begins the study of it, there occurs at once to his mind the inevitable question, why the Athenian dicasts should have tried and condemned so exemplary a citizen. Having at best a vague knowledge of the personality and method of Socrates, he obtains no intelligible answer to his questionings. For neither the *Apology* nor Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, which is sometimes read, affords the needed insight. After some experimenting with other works, I repeatedly tried the *Euthyphro*. The success of the attempt was highly gratifying, since it met with no serious obstacles but the difficulty of finding a suitable edition. Therefore I determined at once to do what I could to supply a book such as I had desiderated. The design, so long ago conceived and so often postponed to more urgent duties, is now accomplished. How well or ill I have done my work may be left to the judgment of the teachers into whose hands the book shall fall.

In the preparation of the notes, the editions of Wohlrab, Fritzsche, Schanz, and Adam were consulted with profit, and here and there a good suggestion was derived from Forman's *Selections from Plato*. But constant reading of the other dialogues of Plato and diligent use of Ast's *Lexicon Platonicum* supplied the materials from which it was my most difficult task to make the proper selection. For the bibliography, included in the Appendix, I am chiefly indebted to Fritzsche's edition; but I have been at great pains to supplement the list of works there cited and to make it fairly complete to the present year.

At an earlier stage in the evolution of the book, the notes profited by the generously offered suggestions of my friend, Dr. W. H. Wait, of the University of Michigan; and latterly, in preparing the manuscript for the printer, I have received much helpful criticism from the editor of the series, Professor Herbert Weir Smyth, of Harvard University. To these scholars and to other friends who have placed me under lasting obligations by their kind offices, I would express my sincere gratitude.

W. A. H.

Grinnell, Iowa.
INTRODUCTION

§ 1. PLATO

Plato was born in the year 427 B.C. In later times his disciples celebrated the 7th day of Thargelion (May 27) as his birthday. Whether he was born at Athens or on the island of Aegina, where his father possessed an estate, cannot now be determined.* His father, Ariston, claimed descent from King Codrus; and his mother, Perictione, who was a sister of Charmides, traced her lineage back to Solon. He had two brothers, Adimantus and Glaucon, whom he introduces to us in his Republic, and a sister Potone, whose son, Speusippus, succeeded his uncle in the headship of the Academy.

In his youth Plato enjoyed all the educational advantages to be had in Athens, and distinguished himself in all branches. He excelled in gymnastics to such a degree that he won the prize in wrestling at the Isthmian games. In music also he was proficient, writing dithyrambs and tragedies, besides other forms of poetry. It is related of him that he abandoned poetry, to which he was disposed to devote his life, for the pursuit of philosophy, on the occasion of his meeting with Socrates, an event which occurred in his twentieth year. Although he valued his former teacher, Cratylus the Heraclitean, and afterward dedicated to his memory a dialogue that derived its title from his name, yet the enthusiastic devotion of his mature manhood was kindled by Socrates, with whom he was closely associated until his master's trial and death, in 399. For him also he erected a monument more enduring than bronze in his numerous dialogues; for in all but one he has introduced the genial and heroic character of Socrates, who was to him the embodiment of philosophy and philosophical method.

Shortly after the death of the master, according to an ancient report, Plato, with other disciples of Socrates, betook himself to
Megara, where there gathered about the person of Euclides, the philosopher, a circle of congenial companions. Subsequently he made journeys to Cyrene and Egypt, and three to Syracuse, in Sicily, in the years (approximately) 388, 367, and 360. The former were undertaken in pursuit of knowledge; the latter, made at the solicitation of Dion and Dionysius, in the hope of finding or preparing a fit soil in which to plant the political and social reforms on which Plato's heart was set. Aristocrat as he was by birth and temper, he could not sympathize with the headless democracy of Athens which had taken the life of Socrates; but the aristocracy of his day was hardly more to his liking. Thus cut off from participation in the actual conduct of affairs in his own city, he turned elsewhere for a field in which to exercise his political instincts. And though his efforts came to naught, his writings, notably the Gorgias and the Republic, have been a power for political righteousness and moral reform in all ages.

After his return from the first voyage to Sicily, presumably about 385, Plato founded his school, first in the gymnasium in the precincts of the hero Academus, then in a garden of his own in the immediate vicinity. Here he gathered about himself many of the most promising youths of Greece, chief among them Aristotle, and instructed them, without exacting a fee, just as Socrates had done. Later, the exigencies of instruction led him to resort to the lecture method. Meanwhile, not only to fix the results of discourses held between master and disciples, but also to satisfy his artistic instincts and obtain a larger audience for his thoughts, he wrought assiduously at his dialogues, and published them from time to time.

All Plato's writings, by a lucky chance, have been preserved, and in them we possess the most important body of artistic prose bequeathed to posterity by the Greek people. Not only are his thoughts a perennial source of inspiration to philosophy, to which they constitute the best introduction, but they afford a powerful stimulus to right living. Nowhere are better-wrought characters to be met, not even in the masterpieces of the drama; and the evolution of the argument, conducted before our eyes, has all the fascination of one's own endeavors after truth. All the skill of the consummate artist is manifested also in the style, which varies with the mood and the theme, and possesses the
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freedom of the well-bred man who does, as if by instinct, the proper thing. The poetic color with which Plato occasionally invests his thoughts adds freshness to the discourse, and is employed chiefly as an adjunct to the dramatic conduct of the plot.

Forty-two dialogues and thirteen letters have come down to us under the name of Plato; but all of the latter, and perhaps fifteen of the former, are not genuine. There remain enough to support the great reputation of Plato as a writer and a philosopher. He died, upward of eighty years of age, in 347 B.C.

§ 2. Socrates

Socrates, the son of the statuary Sophroniscus and the midwife Phae-narete, was born at Athens, presumably in 469 B.C. He learned, and for a time practised, the art of his father; but he soon became aware of a higher vocation, and thenceforward devoted himself to philosophy, which to his view was hardly to be distinguished from religion.

The ancient accounts of his personal presence present to us a singular figure in the midst of the stirring life of Athens. In spite of his singularities, he was in all respects a dutiful citizen. While he sought no distinction by political activity, he fought courageously at Potidaea, Delium, and Amphipolis in the Peloponnesian war; and as prytanis, or temporary chairman of the Senate, he resolutely blocked for a time the unconstitutional procedure in the case of the generals who were brought to trial after the battle at the Arginusan Islands, in 406 B.C. His judgment and his inner oracle (δινόνον σημείον) told him that politics were not his proper sphere. He had a high calling, a divine mission to fulfil; it was his task to prepare the way for a social state founded on justice and unprejudiced insight, in which man should come to know his own vocation and to realize it in his life.

He was not a professed philosopher, neither was he a Sophist; but the unthinking did not discriminate. He had probably received little formal instruction; but he had certainly heard on occasion some of the foremost philosophers, such as Protagoras and Parmenides. On the other hand he declined to be known as a teacher, and hence received no fees. He professed indeed to have no knowledge that could be conveyed or purveyed. In his quaint manner, he said that he followed
the profession of his mother and practised intellectual midwifery (μακευτική). That is to say, being only a man in quest of truth, he willingly availed himself of the privilege of the skilled practitioner to assist to the birth whatever germs of truth lay in the minds of his fellows.

He was fond of the Delphic injunction, γνῶθι σέαντόν, “Know thyself.” Of all the men then living he had most perfectly taken his own intellectual measure. He knew his limitations, and this constituted him the wisest man of his age. This self-knowledge gave him a telling advantage in discussion, and by keeping him always well within the truth, led to habitual under-statement and to the habit of mind proverbially known as his “irony.”

The Sophists, so far as they had a philosophical doctrine, taught that nothing universally or necessarily valid could be said of anything. In other words, they contended that there was no knowledge of things in their true natures. Socrates, who perceived the pernicious character of such teaching, was indeed willing to grant that there was no knowledge of things in their true natures, but he could not concede that such knowledge was impossible. “Granted that we have not the truth,” we may fancy him saying to the Sophists, “then it behooves us to seek it; and we shall surely find it if we will only clarify our thinking and free our thoughts of inner contradiction. For, in this modified sense, man is, as you are fain to say, the measure of all truth and untruth.” So he made, as Aristotle well said, two conspicuous contributions to philosophy: first, the inductive procedure, i.e. a method of ascertaining our true meanings by citing concrete examples, and of correcting our notions by adducing negative instances; second, definitions, the scientific statement of one’s meaning in reference to a thing, by including all essential and excluding all non-essential marks. Convinced as he was that the true function of the intelligence is to ascertain the ends to which we should direct our conduct and the means by which they may best be attained, he believed that to do our duty we need only to know it. Hence he declared that virtue is knowledge and vice is ignorance; or, more concretely, that no one is voluntarily bad. It is no wonder that, entertaining this belief, he devoted himself with singular enthusiasm to the God-given mission of awakening in men this saving insight.
This position has been fiercely assailed ever since the days of Aristotle, and by some it has even been regarded as a transparent sophism. So to consider it were, however, a wholly unpardonable misapprehension. It was manifestly true of Socrates himself that to know the truth was to live it. And the whole edifice of moral education is founded on this assumption. Unless morality may be inculcated by instruction, civilization does not bear within itself the seeds of moral progress. The real question is that which relates to the method of instruction; and it must be granted that present-day methods do fall far short of the ideal. Greek education, however, did, at least in theory, what we moderns do not even seriously attempt. It was calculated to cultivate equally the passive—i.e. the receptive or intellectual—nature, by music, which, as understood by the Greeks, comprehended also the arts and letters; and the active—i.e. the responsive or moral—nature, by gymnastic. And so this doctrine of Socrates and Plato, which indeed merely formulated the principles basic to Greek society, provoked no strong protest until Greek education, together with the whole framework of Greek society, had been undermined. And Aristotle, its first critic, was in his sympathies scarcely more than half a Greek.

It is unnecessary here to discuss the trial and death of Socrates. The conservative and unreflecting forces of society brought his activity to a sudden end, in a general reaction, in the year 399 B.C. Whether the men who sat in judgment on his life repented of their decision, we have no means of knowing; but succeeding generations have canonized him in a way that shows that his real significance for mankind was more nearly akin to that of the founder of a religion than to that of a philosopher.

It was meet that the greatest of his disciples should write the Euthyphro, a dialogue in which the master is made to discourse in a solemn hour on the problems involved in man's reverence for the Divine.

§ 3. EUTHYPHRO

Of Euthyphro, who is represented in our dialogue as meeting Socrates at the court of the King Archon and discoursing with him on the true nature of piety, we know ultimately only what may be learned
from Plato. Apart from our dialogue, he is mentioned also in the *Cratylus*. There he is characterized as a reckless etymologist, whose distinctions are often far-fetched and ridiculous. In the *Euthyphro* he is a ἀδελφός, seer, devoted to matters of religion and orthodox to a fault. He says of himself that he is commonly ridiculed when he utters a prophecy in the public assembly; but such is his conceit of superior knowledge that he attributes their treatment of him to the ignorance of the people. It was, indeed, in consequence of his extreme orthodoxy and his disposition to govern his conduct in accordance with analogies derived from his exceptional knowledge of the behavior of the gods, that he was led to bring against his father the strange and fanatical action for manslaughter, which affords occasion for our dialogue.

Dramatically, he is, of course, employed primarily as a foil to set off the character and the conduct of Socrates. There is, first of all, the contrast between the intellectual slovenliness of Euthyphro and the acute philosophical method of Socrates. But this characteristic Euthyphro shares with many others whom Plato has sketched in his minor dialogues. There is, however, a second contrast which possesses for us far greater significance. Euthyphro represents the old-style piety which, founded on the traditions of the fathers, has not reflected upon its own sanctions and entertains no doubt of their validity. The piety of Euthyphro is well-intentioned, but it is unenlightened; and so, in the special case of his relations to his father, leads him into a course of conduct which seems to be the reverse of pious. Socrates, on the contrary, is the type of the new piety. Although he is punctilious in the observance of the forms of the religion of the Athenian state, he feels bound to scrutinize and question traditional ideals and sanctions, applying to them the standard of the higher moral ideal to which he has attained. To Socrates the conduct of Euthyphro seems inexcusable; but it is inevitable that the people, who share Euthyphro's views and ideals, should regard with grave suspicion Socrates's activity in unsettling the minds of the Athenian youth. Bigoted as Euthyphro is in other respects, he is generous in his regard for Socrates, and recognizes him, in spite of their difference, as the saving influence of the city (see 3 A).
§ 4. THE CONTENTS OF THE DIALOGUE

Socrates and Euthyphro are represented as meeting at the court of the King Archon. In response to a question, the former explains that he has come to this place, which lies so far from his accustomed haunts at the Lyceum, bent on business connected with the indictment lodged against him by Meletus. He speaks ironically of the impeachment and contemptuously of his accuser. As for Euthyphro, he professes to see in the indictment only additional evidence of the jealousy with which seers are regarded by the people; for they laugh at him whenever he prophesies in the assembly. But ridicule, Socrates avers, is not a matter of much consequence when compared with an indictment on a capital charge. Euthyphro is niggardly of his wisdom and keeps his own counsels without endeavoring to make proselytes, whereas Socrates has a benevolent way of pouring out his thoughts to all comers, and so incurs the suspicion of having obtained a following. This circumstance probably accounts for the difference in the people's attitude toward them: they laugh at Euthyphro, but strike at Socrates with intent to kill (2 A–3 E).

Euthyphro expresses his confident expectation that the matter will end in nothing, and that he himself will have equal success in his suit. Seeing his eagerness to tell of his own case, Socrates requests Euthyphro to explain its nature. We learn then that Euthyphro is prosecuting his father for manslaughter. A poor day-laborer on their farm in Naxus had, in a drunken quarrel, slain one of their slaves. Thereupon his father had bound the murderer and cast him into a ditch, intending to defer a final disposition of his case until instructions on that subject should be obtained from the interpreters of religion at Athens. Meanwhile, as was to have been expected, the man died of neglect and exposure, before the messenger returned. Euthyphro therefore holds his father responsible for his death and deals with him as with one defiled with bloodguiltiness (3 E–4 E). There is thus at once suggested the question whether it is consistent with piety for a son so to prosecute his father. Does Euthyphro so well know the nature of piety as to be assured of the propriety of his own conduct? In that event it were well for Socrates to become his disciple; for,
knowing what piety is, he must necessarily practise it; and therefore he would most naturally escape the prosecution of Meletus. What then is piety, and what is impiety? (4 E–5 D).

Euthyphro then responds with the first definition: "Piety is doing as I am doing, prosecuting any one who is guilty of any great crime, whether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may be; and not to prosecute him were impiety." The conduct of Zeus and Cronus in punishing their fathers affords, in his judgment, a striking proof of the correctness of his answer (5 D–6 A).

Socrates, who scruples to accept as true these tales of mythology, asks whether his failure to do so may not be the reason for his being considered guilty of impiety. Euthyphro assures him that he believes not only these stories, but others also which are far more wonderful than these,—tales of hatred and wars and much besides, that would fill Socrates with amazement. Socrates had rather defer the thrilling disclosures for the present, and follow up the question just now of so much consequence to him, what is piety? For, assuming the correctness of Euthyphro's contention that his conduct is pious, that is only an instance, and there must be other pious actions; we require not a special case, but a general definition (6 A–6 E).

Euthyphro essays a second definition: "Piety is that which is dear to the gods; that which is not dear to them is impious or unholy." Socrates remarks that Euthyphro has avoided the errors in form of which he had previously complained, but that it remains to be seen whether the definition is true in substance. The pious and the impious are diametrically opposed one to the other. That which is dear to the gods is pious, that which is not dear to them is impious. But Euthyphro has said that there are dissensions among the gods, and these quarrels must arise from differences of opinion. On what subjects? Not about number or weight; for such differences may be decided by referring to an easy test. These quarrels must have to do with such questions as those relating to right and wrong, which cannot be so readily adjudicated. Hence, as gods and men love that which they deem noble and just and hate the opposite, the gods may very likely be at variance here, some loving an action that others hate. It would not be surprising, therefore, if in prosecuting his father Euthy-
Euthyphro should be doing that which is agreeable to Zeus, but disagreeable to Cronus; and thus the pious and the impious, instead of being diametrically opposed, would seem to coincide and become identified. In order to obviate this difficulty, Socrates proposes an amendment to the definition, which Euthyphro willingly adopts: "Piety is that which all the gods love; and the contrary, that which all the gods hate, is impious" (6 E–9 E).

The second definition, thus amended, should be subjected to careful scrutiny. In order to test it Socrates propounds a significant question: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious; or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" Euthyphro is sorely perplexed, and Socrates undertakes to elucidate the problem by giving an illustration. It is a question of cause and effect, which terms are roughly identified with an act (= cause) and the resultant state (= effect). It is shown that the state does not precede the act, but follows it. By a series of substitutions of terms in admitted equations, it is inferred that the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious. The fact that the gods love piety does not, therefore, add anything to our knowledge of the nature of piety; and Socrates informs Euthyphro that, in defining piety as that which is loved by the gods, he has drawn attention to an accidental attribute rather than to the essence of the concept (9 E–11 B).

When Socrates exhorts him to renew the attempt, Euthyphro acknowledges his confusion, and complains that the argument wanders about, leaving its moorings. Socrates then, as Euthyphro despairs of his own powers, undertakes to guide the inquiry. He begins by asking the question, "Is not all that is pious necessarily right?" Yes. "Is, then, all that is right also pious? Or, is it indeed true that all that is pious is right, whereas the converse proposition is not true, viz. that all that is right is pious? And is one part of that which is right pious, and is another part something else?" Euthyphro does not quite grasp the question. Socrates then gives him an elementary course in defining terms by referring a species to a genus, illustrating the procedure by showing the relation between the concepts "reverence" and "fear." Euthyphro then concedes that "the right" is the genus and "the pious" the species; and, as there are other species, Euthyphro
is led to submit a third definition: "That part of the right which attends to the gods is pious; but the part that attends to men constitutes the remainder of the right" (11 B–12 E).

"Good," says Socrates; "but what do you mean by tendance? Surely you do not use the word as you would in speaking, say, of horses. For tendance has for its object the benefit and improvement of that which is tended." Euthyphro grants that piety does not improve the gods, and therefore interprets his definition as having in view such attention as servants bestow upon their masters. Socrates then styles it "ministration to the gods." Immediately there is raised a further question: What end do the gods seek to accomplish through the ministrations of men? Medicine ministers to the restoration of health, shipbuilding to the building of ships; but to what end does piety avail? "Many and fair," says Euthyphro, "are the objects which the gods effect by the ministrations of men."—"Yes," replies Socrates; "that may also be said of husbandry, for example, which, however, aims chiefly at producing food from the soil, and of generalship, which looks chiefly to victory in warfare. In like manner, I should like to know the chief end which the gods have in view in employing men's service."—"It were a rather long task to learn all about so great a matter," replies Euthyphro, and therewith returns to the commonplace view of daily life. "I should rather say that if one knows how to gratify the gods in word and deed, by prayer and sacrifice, such conduct is pious, and proves the salvation of private homes and commonwealths; whereas the reverse of that which is gratifying, is impious, and overturns and ruins everything" (12 E–14 B).

"You might have answered my question in fewer words," Socrates rejoins; "but you turned away precisely when you had reached the point. But as the questioner must follow where the answer leads, I must content myself with what you offer. Your fourth definition then, as I gather, is to the effect that piety is the science of prayer and sacrifice; that is to say, of asking and giving to the gods." This would make of it a science of commerce between gods and men. Unless the gods derive some benefit from the transaction, man must have the advantage of them in the bargaining; for we receive all true
blessings at their hands. Euthyphro explains that the gods require honor alone from men. But honor, as Socrates remarks, is agreeable and dear to the gods. Hence, piety once more appears, opinion, view, to be that which is agreeable to the gods,—a statement which was dismissed before. Once more the argument is walking away. The two positions are incompatible. Either we were not right before, or else, if we were, we are now in error. Hence we must resume our inquiry afresh and ask, What is piety?

But Euthyphro will have no more of it. He is in haste to depart, and Socrates cannot prevail upon him to stay. Thereupon Socrates gives utterance to his disappointment at not being able to learn what piety is, so that he might clear himself of the charge brought by Meletus (14 B-16 A).

§ 5. THE PLACE OF THE EUTHYPHRO IN THE ECONOMY OF PLATO'S WORKS

Dramatically, the position proper to the Euthyphro is between the Theaetetus and the Apology. At the close of the former dialogue Socrates says he must go to the court of the King Archon to answer the charge of Meletus. At the beginning of the Euthyphro we find him there meeting the seer. His business is to take the initial steps of the trial which is to call forth his Apology. It was evidently this fact that led Aristophanes of Byzantium (cf. Laert. Diog. 3. 62) to place the Euthyphro between the Theaetetus and the Apology in his fourth trilogy, and Thrasyllus (cf. Laert. Diog. 3. 58) so to arrange his first tetralogy as to make the Euthyphro precede the Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. Obviously, if one considers its dramatic setting and the argument as it has been sketched, our dialogue must be in some way closely related to the Apology; but scholars appear to have bestowed upon this question much less attention than it deserves.

The apologetic strain in the Euthyphro has been noted ever since the time of Schleiermacher, and of course its outward relation to the trial of Socrates is too evident to escape notice. But most scholars have thought that the Euthyphro was written at a time when the threat of bringing Socrates to trial was first made, before his friends fully realized the seriousness of his danger. This view finds its chief support in the difference in the emotional tone with which Plato refers to
is lecal of Socrates in the Euthyphro as compared, for example, with to thròrgias. But this fact may be accounted for equally well on remaer hypothesis. Grote has already refuted this view; but we 
ill soon see that it becomes wholly untenable when the real relation 
between the Euthyphro and the Apology is perceived.

Let us first recall to mind that in the indictment brought against 
him Socrates was charged chiefly with irreligion and impiety. All the 
other counts specified were subordinated and reduced to this. How-
ever faulty the plea of the Apology may be, when considered from the 
legal point of view, Socrates, unquestionably, in his defense, puts forth 
every effort to meet this charge. He does not confine his argument 
to a rebuttal of the evidence presented by the prosecution; he en-
deavors to establish directly and by positive proof that his mode of 
life is not only passively conformable to the laws and religious observ-
ances of the state, but that it is aggressively pious and has received 
the signal approval of heaven. He refers to the oracle given by the 
Delphian Apollo in response to the question of his devoted Chaerephon, 
and is at especial pains to prove that he bears a commission to live 
and labor as he does, a commission expressly given by the god who 
reigned supreme in the hearts of the religious Greeks of that day. And 
it is this life of aggressive piety that he fondly calls "his ministration 
to the god" (τὴν ἔμην τῷ θεῷ ὑπορεσίαν, Apol. 30 A).

In recent years a principle governing the interpretation of the dia-
logues of Plato has obtained among scholars almost universal recogni-
tion. It may be thus stated: In determining the positive doctrine 
which Plato desired the reader to infer from the argument of any 
dialogue, we must take for our point of departure the positions taken 
and left finally unrefuted. If now we address ourselves to the Euthy-
phro, we perceive that the third of the four definitions propounded 
was not refuted. On the contrary, Socrates called attention to it in 
the most dramatic way. When Euthyphro loses courage after his 
second definition has proved untenable, Socrates essays to guide the 
inquiry and leads up directly to the conclusion. But Euthyphro, who 
has defined piety as ministration to the gods, fails to answer the 
important question, to what end the gods direct the ministrations of 
men. Then Socrates rebukes him for taking refuge in a commonplace
instead of meeting the point upon which the success of the inquiry depends. All this conspires to prove that the third definition affords the key to the meaning of the dialogue. This, then, is the definition, 12 Ε: τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὡς Σωκράτες, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὑπερ, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν. Socrates, however, draws attention to the vagueness of the term θεραπεία and Euthyphro substitutes ὑπηρετικὴ for it. Later on (14 D) Socrates refers to it as αὕτη ἡ ὑπηρεσία τοῖς θεοῖς.

If now one returns, with this definition in mind, to the Apology, one cannot but be struck by the phraseology in which Socrates there voices most forcibly the conviction on which he bases his claim to innocence and piety (30 A): ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεὸς, εὖ ἵπτε, καὶ ἐγὼ ὁ δῆμος σεβάντι πω ἥμιὼν μεῖζον ἁγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θέω ὑπηρεσίαν. It should now be clear that Plato wrote the Euthyphro after the Apology, with a view to giving a theoretical statement of that which was merely implicit in the defense of Socrates.

Since, however, the date of the Apology cannot be definitely fixed, we thus gain only a relative terminus post quem. Attention has recently been directed afresh to a fact that may lead to somewhat more specific results. Euthyphro's indictment of his father is dramatically made contemporary with the trial of Socrates. Now the nature of this indictment was such that it must have been brought, if at all, almost immediately after the commission of the manslaughter with which his father was charged. But, as Euthyphro's father was presumably a cleruch on the island of Naxus, the alleged crime must have been committed at least four or five years earlier, since, with the loss of all the Athenian colonies in 404 B.C., the cleruchs also would be dispossessed. We have here, therefore, one of Plato's familiar anachronisms, admitted for dramatic effect. The anachronism would be all the greater if, as Bergk conjectured, Eupolis, in his comedy entitled Προσπάλτιον, satirized the litigious disposition of Euthyphro. The dramatic specification of this disregard of time is sufficiently apparent, but in any case the anachronism remains, and compels us to date our dia-

logue a considerable number of years after the trial of Socrates. As it must be done, we destroy the artistic structure by emphasizing uth of detail.
The same general result is reached if we consider the tone in which Plato, in the *Euthyphro*, touches upon the trial of Socrates. So marked is the difference in this regard that it is quite probable that the *Gorgias* was written before our dialogue. Again, the reference of the ὄσιον to the δίκαιον and so to the later fourfold category of virtues, suggests that Plato had definitely advanced beyond the semipopular enumeration of five virtues in the *Protagoras* (349 B). It seems impossible to assign the *Euthyphro* a place after the *Republic*; but certain critics have pretended to find the text for the homily in our discourse in the famous utterance on the immoralities attributed to the gods, which is to be found in *Republic*, 378 A B. Other critics have dated the *Euthyphro* after the first books of the *Republic*. On the whole it seems wiser at the present stage of the inquiry to refrain from definite conclusions. So far as the study of style and the tabulation of certain characteristic particles have proceeded, they support the general view here presented. The *Euthyphro* is most intimately linked with such dialogues as *Gorgias, Protagoras, Symposium, Charmides, Laches, Lysis*, and the *Republic*.

§ 6. THE IMPORT OF THE EUTHYPHRO

The value of the dialogue has sometimes been called in question. It may therefore be proper here to consider what contribution it makes to philosophical problems. The upshot of the argument is, as we have seen, that piety is man’s ministration to God directed to the accomplishment of some object supremely great and fair. This statement is open, in the abstract, to two interpretations: one from the point of view of Plato, the other on the basis of Socrates’ own conceptions. As we turn to the *Apology* for some indication of the glorious object which man by his obedient service assists God in realizing, we think naturally of the impressive words to which we have already referred (*Apol.* 30 A): ταύτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὕτε, καὶ ἐγὼ οὐκομιν οἶδαν πω ὑμῶν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οἶδεν γὰρ ἅλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων μήτε συμμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπός ὡς ἀριστη ἔσται. We are familiar with Socrates’ cure of souls; it is his mission to clarify men’s
passions and to right their lives by ridding their minds of false conceptions and by assisting the birth of true insight. This is for him the Kingdom of God for which he was called to prepare the way. This is the activity which Plato ascribes to Socrates in the Gorgias, 521 b, and pronounces to be the only exercise of true statesmanship to be witnessed at Athens. And at the close of that dialogue the myth clearly shows that this statesmanship is identical with the observance of the perfect piety.

For Socrates, then, this is as far as we may safely pursue the matter. But we are now concerned with Plato, as the author of the Euthyphro. The question as to the ἐφιγνον (specific end) accomplished by the ministrations of man, which Socrates raises in Euthyphro, 13 E, when considered in its ultimate bearings, points unmistakably to the systematic development of Plato's thought. The only answer to Socrates' question is, therefore, that the ἐφιγνον to be effected by man's service of God is the realization of the Good,—not the realization of this or that particular good. What to Socrates could have meant no more than preparing the way for the Kingdom of God, to Plato, with his constructive and legislative mind, meant a positive and definite attempt to lay the foundations and to establish the government of the City of God. For the Good, with Plato, is essentially the ideal of a life in a perfect social system, conducted on principles of true insight into the nature and meaning of things. Such an attempt was made in an ideal way in the Republic and the Laws, in a practical way in his visits to Syracuse.

Now, according to Plato, philosophy is the endeavor to realize the Good in all things. Philosophy and religion join in the demand that we flee from the evil and take refuge with the Good. We must approximate to Deity as nearly as we may, and this approximation is brought about by justice, piety, and insight (Theaetetus, 176 A B). This perfect philosophic life we have learned from the Republic to call the life of righteousness, the life of virtue in itself complete. In the Euthyphro piety is singled out as a special aspect of that philosophic and virtuous life; the ὑπατίον is defined as μέρος δικαιόν τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν. We may say, then, that the Good is a power that operates to its own realization in the social world through the insight-
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guided efforts of mankind. That it is a true man's function to bear his part in this self-realization of the Good is, in a word, the ethical import of the Republic. The Euthyphro adds the conscious reference to Deity, the thought that this philosophic life is a service in a personal relation as a willed coöperation. Taking due account of the formal peculiarities of the Greek terminology, the definition thus reached may be paraphrased somewhat as follows, "Religion is the intelligent and conscientious endeavor of man to further the Good in human society, as under God." The Good and God are not here expressly identified; but the line of distinction between these two conceptions was in Plato's thought almost if not quite effaced. If we take account of this circumstance and make explicit the implication of the argument, we may say that religion is the devoted service of the Ideal, consciously conceived as God. We thus attain to a thought which, while undeniably lying in the direct path of Platonic philosophizing, has not been superseded by any pronouncement of modern philosophers of religion.

The result thus stated is in substantial accord with the definition of piety extracted from Plato by Bonitz, Platonische Studien, p. 234, "If we thus supplement with Platonic thoughts our dialogue at the point where it is characteristically interrupted, we reach the definition that piety is nothing but perfect morality, only in such sort that man is conscious of being therein the ministering instrument of the divine activity." Not quite so satisfactory is the statement of Schanz, Einleitung, p. 13, "He is pious, who accommodates his will to the divine will, who becomes an instrument of the divine will." Here there is a possible difference between the Good and the divine will, whereas Socrates emphasizes the thought that piety is not dependent for its essential nature on the pleasure or the will of Deity.

Although most of the above suggestions of doctrine were derived from other works of Plato, they are not only consistent with, but even called forth by, hints contained in the Euthyphro. In the first place, Socrates declines to credit unworthy tales of the gods (6 A, 6 D). Again, he implies that we must conceive of them as being virtually agreed on moral questions, and suggests that man cannot do aught to make them better. Finally, he asserts that all good and perfect gifts
come from them (15 A). All of which hints unmistakably at the Platonic doctrine that God is good (Rep. 379 B ff.) and that, because he is good, he does only that which is good (Tim. 29 E).

We thus perceive that there are made in the Euthyphro certain positive suggestions of great significance for the theory of religion. But there are other thoughts, positive as well as negative, scattered throughout the dialogue, which are deserving of consideration. Attention has been already directed to the first attempt at a definition of piety, as that which Euthyphro is doing. Whatever may be our view of the evolution of religion, so much at least is plain: the commands of religion come originally as specific injunctions, "thou shalt," or "thou shalt not." Broad principles of action, such as Jesus' commandment to love God and one's neighbor, invariably come late. Hence the religious conscience is clear on details, but suffers considerable latitude in their formulation. The case of Euthyphro is typical for all time. Moreover, in this particular case, he illustrates a danger to which all scripture (if we may so call the Greek mythology) is exposed. The text to which he appeals in support of his treatment of his father was not designed to serve such a purpose. Man, in an unreflecting state, expresses his own moral standards in the tales he tells. If he conceives a new truth he invents a new tale. Only when he becomes reflective does he criticise the old one. At any time the public conscience is likely to be too laxly disciplined to respond unitedly to a new appeal; hence in all ages the conflict of ideals and the variety of applications of religious sanctions must be marked.

The disagreement between Euthyphro and his kindred on the one hand and Socrates on the other, as to his treatment of his father, is a case in point. His belief in the dissensions among the gods, on which he bases his action, is another. Euthyphro is simply the unreflecting religionist, who is unaffectedly orthodox. His only pride is in his superior knowledge. But Socrates, who conceives of the gods first of all as good, cannot help applying to them his ideal of goodness, and by reflection comes to disbelieve the common creed in the interest of the divine nature. He shows that the dissidence in ethical judgments, so characteristic of polytheism, must give place to unanimity, at least if we are to have a rational view of piety. This is only one illustration
of the thousand ways in which the growth of the ethical ideal and the moralization of religion, which was in progress in the days of Socrates and Plato, prepared the way for a purer monotheism.

Euthyphro's second definition also deserves attention. It pronounces that pious which is agreeable to the gods. There can be no doubt that the Greeks, almost to a man, would have adopted this view. It is the characteristic expression of any revealed religion. That virtue is conformity to the will of God, — varied in phrase, but identical in intention,— all systems of Christian ethics declare. And there can be no serious objection to the statement if two points are duly guarded: first, God must be conceived to be essentially rational and free of caprice, and, secondly, there must not be left any possibility of a divergence between the rational Good and the will of God. These conceptions were not current in Plato's time; hence, he could not accept the definition.

His higher view, moreover, was not to be attained simply by clarifying the notions already entertained by the people. Had this been possible, Plato's contribution to the history of religious thought would not have been so original, although its value to his people would perhaps have been enhanced. When Socrates assumes the conduct of the discourse (11 E), he is made to direct it to a consideration of the relation between the concepts ὄσιον and δίκαιον, in which Euthyphro concedes that the former is subordinate (as species to genus) to the latter. There can hardly be a serious doubt that to the popular view these concepts were entirely coördinate; and, indeed, Plato himself, in the Protagoras and the Gorgias, when speaking in the popular language, so regarded them. This fact, however, only serves to show more clearly the originality of Plato's thought; for the conception is thus set into relation with the fourfold virtue comprehended under δίκαιοσύνη, according to the scheme of the Republic. This omission of ὄσιότης from the list, as an independent and coördinate virtue, does not, however, betoken a diminution of interest in religion; it rather marks the elevation of all man's conduct to a higher plane, on which all duty is seen in the light of a service of God.

The service of the gods, which constitutes the essence of virtue in general and of piety in particular, is not however a service of ca-
precious masters, as we have already seen, since their wills are sup-
posed to be at one. But Plato goes still farther. In a discussion of
some subtlety (9 Eff.), Socrates leads up to the thought that the pious
is pious not because it is agreeable to the gods,—though he does not
question that it is agreeable to them,—but, contrariwise, is agreeable
to the gods because it is pious. Whatever may be our judgment upon
the argument that conducts us to this conclusion, there can be no
doubt as to the significance of the conclusion itself. It plainly asserts
the autonomy of the human spirit even in matters of religion. In
other words, it means that the content of our moral creed,—the de-
termination of what is or is not duty,—does not depend upon the will
or the pleasure of God. Duty is constituted duty by the spirit—
human or divine—that apprehends it as that which is ultimately and
absolutely Good. The human spirit is made to evolve its own moral
ideal, which is ipso facto supposed to appeal to an approving Deity.
The coincidence of man's ideal with the will of God thereby becomes
the ultimate postulate of the moral life.

Apart from these important contributions to religious thought, the
Euthyphro possesses also a certain logical interest. From all of Plato's
works it becomes clearly apparent that there was in his day not even a
beginning of technical logic except as he himself laid the foundations.
Hence his dialogues contain much that to us seems extremely ele-
mentary. In the Euthyphro, the following suggestions toward a logical
theory are offered: 1. Socrates shows that an example is not a defi-
nition (6 D). 2. In two instances (8 A f. and 13 A f.) he teaches
Euthyphro that ambiguities of expression are to be excluded from the
definition. 3. The categories of antecedent and consequent, cause and
effect, are noted and employed (10 A ff.). 4. In the same connection
the categories of the active and the passive are indicated, and the
difference between predication that is merely temporary and predica-
tion that is permanent is brought out, pointing the distinction between
accident and essence. 5. Socrates illustrates the method of defining
terms per genus et differentiam.

After completing this survey of the Euthyphro, we may safely say in
conclusion that none of the briefer Platonic dialogues can be compared
with it for the value of its suggestions toward philosophical theory.
ABBREVIATIONS

B. = Babbitt’s Grammar of Attic and Ionic Greek, 1901.
GL. = Gildersleeve’s Latin Grammar (third edition, revised and enlarged), 1894.
GMT. = Goodwin’s Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb (enlarged edition), 1890.
GS. = Gildersleeve’s Syntax of Classical Greek, 1901.
HA. = Hadley’s Greek Grammar (revised by Allen), 1884.
RD. = Riddell’s Digest of Platonic Idioms, in the Appendix to his edition of Plato’s Apology, 1877.
I. 1. **ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ** [ἡ περὶ ὦσίου, πειραστικός]: the dialogues of Plato, with few exceptions, derive their titles from the names of the chief interlocutors, apart from Socrates, e.g. Euthyphro in our dialogue. The sub-title, ἡ περὶ ὦσίου, was probably added by the scholars of Alexandria, although Thrasyllus, who lived at Rome in the time of Augustus and Tiberius, and arranged the works of Plato in tetralogies, seems to have thought that they originated with Plato. 2. πειραστικός = **tentative** assigns the dialogue its place in a scheme, according to which the dialogues of investigation (ἐρημικοὶ) are either obstetric (μακεντικοί), tentative (πειραστικοί), probative (ἐνδεικτικοί), or refutative (ἀνατρεπτικοί). The ‘tentative’ dialogues were valued for their capacity to rid the mind of false notions by disproof and purification (cp. τὸ ἐλεγχτικὸν καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον καθαρτικόν. Albinus, *Eisagoge*, p. 150. in Hermann’s *Plato, Vol. VI*.). The other ‘tentative’ dialogues are the *Charmides*, *Meno*, and *Ion*. See Grote’s *Plato*, I., pp. 158–161.

The scene of the dialogue is in, or before, the porch of the King Archon.

5. τῇ νεώτερον: **HA. 649.** 2 Α Up to his seventieth year Socrates had not been a party to a lawsuit (*Apol. 17 D*); hence Euthyphro’s surprise at finding him here. 6. τὰς ἐν Δυκεῖω . . . διατριβὰς: ἐν Δυκ. attrib., cp. **HA. 666 a**; **G. 952. 1** : **B. 451. 1**. The **Δύκειον** was a famous gymnasion situated on the right bank of the Ilisus in the precincts of *'Απόλλων Δύκειος*, which lay just outside and east of Athens. Here Socrates loved to resort, and here Aristotle subsequently founded his school. The scene of the *Lysis* and of the *Euthyd.* is laid here, and hither Socrates
diatríbeis peri tήn toû basilewos stoán: ou γάρ πον kai σοί γε δίκη τις οὐσα τυγχάνει πρὸς τὸν basileá ὦσπερ ἐμοί.

10 ΣΩ. Όυτοι δὴ Ἀθηναῖοι γε, ὁ Εὐθύφροι, δίκην αὐτήν καλοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ γραφήν.

ΕΥΘ. Τί φής; γραφήν σὲ τις, ὡς έοικε, γέγραπται· οὐ γάρ ἐκεῖνο γε καταγνώσομαι, ὡς σὺ ἔτερον.

2 Α betakes himself from the feast of Agathon. *Sympos. 223 D.* διατριβαί here means only his haunts; cp., too, diatríbeis in 1.7. It is not said that Socrates is engaging here in philosophical disputation, which is freq. the sense of these terms; for the dialogue gives no hint of other auditors of the discourse, and Euthyphro would have no occasion for surprise if Socrates had changed only the scene of his pursuits. Socrates is evidently bent on business. On the διατριβή as a literary form, see Hirzel. Der Dialog, 1., p. 369 ff.

7. τήν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν: the ἀρχων basileís was the second of the nine Athenian Archons. He had charge of state matters involving religion, such as the mysteries, the Δήμωι, and all gymnastic contests. He had jurisdiction in all cases concerned with impiety and blood-guiltiness. His porch, or court, was at the west end of the ἁγόρα, — the first on the right on entering the market-place from the Ceramicus. A στοά was properly a colonnade: the στοά βασίλεως appears to have had three rows of columns, and is supposed to have exerted a strong influence on the architecture of the Roman and Christian basilica. — ou γάρ πον κτλ.: ‘you also. I dare say (πον), do not have,’ etc. For ou γάρ πον ... γε, cp. 4 B. 13 A. 14 E. and ou γάρ πον 7 E. On οὐσα, see HA. 984; G. 1586; B. 660. Ν. 8. πρὸς: αἵμα. 9. ὦσπερ ἐμοί: the case of Euthyphro was a δίκη φόνου, and as such came under the jurisdiction of the basileús. Note his eagerness to tell about his own case. Cp. 3 E. 10. Όυτοι δὴ ... γε ... γραφήν: γε strengthens the neg., not Ἀθηναῖοι. Athenian jurisprudence recognized two distinct classes of actions at law: (1) ἀγων ἰδίως, δίκη ἰδία, or simply δίκη, a private action; (2) ἀγων δημόσιος, δίκη δημοσία, or γραφή, a public prosecution. The action laid against Socrates was of the latter sort. Roughly, the two classes correspond to civil and criminal trials in our own courts. 12. γραφήν ... γέγραπται: for γραφήν, ΗΑ. 715; G. 1051 (cp. 1125); B. 331; for σε, ΗΑ. 725; G. 1076; B. 340: the pron. is emphatic. 13. οὐ γάρ B
ΣΩ. Οὗ γὰρ οὖν.

15 EΥΘ. Ἀλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος;
ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε.
EΥΘ. Τίς οὖτος;
ΣΩ. Οὔτ' αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γιγνώσκω, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τὸν ἄνδρα· νέος γὰρ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνώς.

20 ὁνομάζουσι μέντοι αὐτόν, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, Μέλητον. ἐστι δὲ τῶν δήμων Πιθεύς, εἰ τινὰ νῦ ἐχεῖς Πιθέα

2 B . . . ἔτερον: 'for I shall not think so ill of you as to suppose that you have indicted another.' We should have expected σοῦ with καταγγέλσαι, as in Men. 76 C, but the clause ὡς σοῦ ἔτερον renders it unnecessary. For the regular constr., cp. Ar. Eq. 46; Lys. 4. 14; for the rarer second gen., Lys. 13. 65; cp. Thuc. 3. 16. Here ἔτερον = ἄλλον (cp. ἄλλα σὲ ἄλλος: in l. 15). see RD. § 45: B. 492. With ἔτερον supply γραφῆν γέγραψαι.

14. οὗ γὰρ οὖν: 'why, no.—certainly not.' 15. ἄλλα σὲ ἄλλος: sc. γραφήν γέγραπται. The question, being quite unnecessary, marks Euthyphro's surprise. Above we had ὡς σοῦ ἔτερον.
16. πάνυ γε: expresses entire assent; in like manner, καί πάνυ γε and πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 18. οὐδ' αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γιγνώσκω: I myself am not very well acquainted with the man.—οὗ πάνυ τι = not quite; HΑ. 702 b; G. 1016; RD. § 139. The indef. pron. τίς, when joined with adjs., indef. numerals, and advs., serves to make distinct the idea conveyed by these words, rendering them now more, now less, emphatic. 2 B acc. to the sense or the connection. 19. ἀγνώς: pass. In this expression, as well as in the foregoing νέος τίς and the following ὡς ἐγώμαι, Socrates shows his contemptuous indifference to his chief accuser, Meletus, who was supported by Anytus and Lyco (his συνήγαγοι). See Αpol. 23 E. Of Meletus little is known but what we learn from the Luth. and the Αpol., it being difficult or impossible to identify him with any one of the men of the same name known through other sources. Some have thought him either the poet Meletus (Ar. Ran. 1302, cp. Αpol. 23 E) or that poet's son. Anytus, however, was one of the most influential men in the restored Democracy, being a colleague of Thrasybulus (Isocr. 18. 23). In his hostility to the Sophists he wrongfully included Socrates, and probably did much toward his condemnation. According to Αpol. 23 E. Lyco was an orator, and as such he doubtless contributed his professional services to the prosecution. 21. τῶν
Mέλητον οἶον τετανότριχα καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐγένειον, ἐπίγρυπον δὲ.

ΕΥΘ. Ὅυκ ἐννοῶ, ὡ Σώκρατες. ἀλλὰ δὴ τινὰ 25 γραφὴν σε | γέγραται;

ΣΩ. Ἦντινα; Ὅυκ ἀγεννη, ἐμούγε δοκεῖ: τὸ γὰρ νέον ὄντα τοσοῦτον πράγμα ἐγνωκέναι οὐ φαῦλον ἔστιν: ἐκεῖνος γὰρ, ὡς φησιν, ὁδὲ, τίνα τρόπον οἱ νέοι διαφθείρονται καὶ τίνες οἱ διαφθειροτεστὶς 30 αὐτοὺς. καὶ κυνδυνεύει σοφός τις ἐιναι· καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν κατιδῶν ὡς διαφθειροτος τοὺς ἕλι-

2 B ἅμων: partitive gen., closely akin to the chorographic. Schanz makes δῆμος = δημοτης. The deme Πίτθος belonged to the tribe Κεκροτίς, and (acc. to Burrian, Geogr. von Grieckh., I. 345) probably lay a little northeast of Athens, between Pallene and Gar-gettus. 21. νό ἔχεις: remember; but ἐν νό ἔχειν c. inf. = purpose.

22. οἶον: by attraction (HA. 997. 1002; G. 1036) for τοιοῦτον, οἶον τετανόθριε ἐστὶ. κτλ. — τετανότριχα: 'with long, straight hair.' — οὐ πάνυ εὐγένειον: 'with none too good a beard.' 23. ἐπιγρυπον: i.e. Roman-nosed. The prep. ἐπὶ seems to mean 'slightly.' Cp. ἐπίστιμος. ἐπίχαρμος. etc.

24. ἐννοῶ = νὸ ἔχω. — ἀλλὰ δῆ: C 'but, then.' 26. ἥμτινα: acc. instead of nom., retaining the case-form of the question; cp. Gorg. 449 E: περὶ λόγους . . . τοιῶν τοιτοῦ δΓΓοργία; When a question is repeated by the one to whom it was addressed, it is regularly put into the indir. form; hence ἥμτινα. not τινα. 26. οὐκ ἀγεννῆ: 'one that speaks well for his character and nurture,' ironi- 2 C cal, as is all the praise of Meletus. — τὸ γὰρ . . . ἐγνωκέναι: 'for the fact that, young as he is, he has apprehended a matter of such magnitude.' HA. 958 f.; G. 1541 ff.; B. 637. 27. οὐ φαύλον: 'no small thing.' Cp. Crat. 390 D: in Symp. 213 C οὐ φαύλον πράγμα. See Frohberger on Lys. 10. 2 (App.). 28. τίνα τρόπον: HA. 719 a; G. 1060; B. 336. 29. οἱ νέοι διαφθείρονται: see Apol. 24 B: Σώκρατης φησιν (sc. ο Μέλητος) ἀδικεῖ τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὐς ἡ τύλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα. ἐτέρα δὲ διμόνια κα νά. It is thus seen that Socrates is here glancing at the phraseology of the formal accusation lodged against him. — οἱ διαφθειροτεστὶς: HA. 966; G. 1560: B. 650. 1. 30. κυνδυνεύει: here = δοκεῖ, as freq. in Plato; cp. 8 A. 11 A. D. The original sense has faded, and the verb makes a polite assertion. 31. Διαφθειροτος: agrees with ἐμοῖ, implicit in ἐμὴν, HA. 691; G. 1001; B. 477, n.
32. **αὐτόν**: for position, see HA. 673 b.— **ὡς πρὸς** . . . **πόλιν**: usually in Plato, when two objects are compared, in prepositional phrases the second prep. is omitted, if the comparison precedes the thing compared [cp. HA. 1007; G. 1025]. Schanz cites Prot. 337 E, Theaet. 170 A, Rep. 414 E, 520 E, 545 E, Tim. 27 B, 81 B, 91 D, Legg. 905 B. But the prep. is repeated, as here, Rep. 440 D, 553 B, 573 E, Phaedo 82 E, 115 B, Phaedr. 255 D, Tim. 73 D, 86 A, Theaet. 206 D. In Phaedo 67 D, and Tim. 79 A, the Ms. reading is in doubt. For the use of **πρὸς**, cp. below, 3 B, and Apol. 18 B: **ἔρως γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς**. The comparison of the state to a mother is common: see Crito, passim, Rep. 414 E, 575 D, Aesch. Septem, 16 ff.

33. **τῶν πολιτικῶν**: neut. How intensely ironical this passage is, may be seen by comparison with Gorg. 521 D, where Plato, in similar terms, describes Socrates as the only true statesman. 34. **ἔρως γὰρ ἄστιν**: this *properly* means first caring for the young; **ἔρως** is repeated 2 C with emphasis in order to define it.

35. **τῶν νέων** . . . **ἐπιμεληθῆναι**, 1) **ὅπως**: HA. 742, 885; G. 1102, 1372; B. 356, 593. In the repetition of **ἐπιμεληθῆναι** just before Μέλητος, there is clearly an intentional play on words, found also Apol. 25 C, 26 B. Schanz (Einleit., p. 11) calls attention to the following expressions, which serve to characterize Euthyphro as an etymologist: the distinction of δέκη and γραφή, 2 A: **ἀφ’ Ἑστώς ἀρχεσθαι** 3 A; the puns on διώκω. 3 E, and ἐπομεί, 12 A; the point on ὅρων and καθορῶν, 5 C: the paronomasia Δαιμόλυν . . . Ταυτάλων, 11 D. See RD. § 323. 37. **ἐικός**: regularly followed by aor. inf. 38. **καὶ δὴ καί**: HA. 1042 c; B. 441. N. 1.

39. **ἐκκαθαίρει** : *severs out*, continuing the metaphor suggested in ὠσπερ γεωργὸν ἀγαθὸν and τὰς βλάστασιν. — **τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστασιν**: those tender shoots, the young. If the text is sound, as it seems to be, **τῶν νέων** must be gen. of designation. HA. 729 g; G. 1086. The comparison and the thing compared are run to-
40 οὐς φησιν: ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπιμεληθείς πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων ἁγαθῶν αἴτιος τῇ πόλει γενῆσεται, οὐ γε τὸ εἰκός ἔμβηναι ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἀρξαμένως.

II. ΕΥΘ. Βουλούμεν ἂν, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλ' ὄρρωδω, μὴ τοῦναντίον γένηται. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ἄφ' Ἑστίας ἀρχισθαι κακονυγεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀδικεῖν σέ. καί μοι λέγε, τί καὶ ποιοῦντά σέ 5 φησι διαφθείρειν τούς νέους; }

3 A gether. · As often in Plato, constr. and diction are poetic, prob. intended to remind us that Meletus was a poet. Cp. Eur. Med. 1098: τέκνων . . . γλυκερὸν βλάστημι'. Soph. O.T. 717.

40. οὐς φησιν: 'to quote his words,' cp. below, 3 B, l. 9.

Not a real quotation, though it is intended to make it so appear; so also, l. 7, φησὶ γὰρ με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν. Cp. οὐς δ' σοι λόγος, below, 8 D. 10 D. — ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο: next thereafter. Note the pleonasm. — δῆλον ὅτι: clearly, H.A. 1049. 1 a.

42. οὐς γε . . . ἀρξαμένῳ: 'if the natural result follows from such a beginning.' τὸ εἰκός is subj.; often the art. is omitted and εἰκός is pred.: cp. l. 37, 2 D. The difference of constr. matters little to the thought.

II. 2. ἀτεχνῶς: 'actually.' The word is almost confined in use to Plato and comedy, serving to introduce proverbs, metaphors, hyperbolic phrases, — in short, any expression not quite invariable. In effect, therefore, it often asks pardon for using a strong expression which may not be quite dignified. somewhat as Engl. 'as it were.' This may readily be seen by comparing such a collocation as that, e.g., in Αριστ. 30 E. ἀτεχνῶς, εἶ καὶ γελοιοτέρον εἶπεν. Its sphere is colloquial. Here it introduces the proverb ἄφ' Ἑστίας ἀρχισθαι, which suggests that Socrates was really the Holy of Holies in the Athenian state. In all sacrificial libations a beginning was made, in order to begin properly, with Hestia; for this goddess, as the deified hearth, represented the focal point of family and state. In Athens, as elsewhere, there was in the πρωτεύον a κοινὴ ἑστία τῆς πόλεως, the center of the city's religious life. On the proverb, see Roscher. Ausführl. Lexicon der griech. und röm. Mythologie, Ι. ii., pp. 2615 ff. 4. καὶ μοι λέει: just tell me. This use of καὶ with inv. is common. — τί καὶ ποιοῦντα: 'what in the world does he charge you with doing to corrupt the young?' Cp. τί γαρ καὶ φήσομεν, below,
Here γάρ is used as in οὗτοι . . . ἀποδεχώμεθα, 9 E, meaning 'simply,' and denoting more strongly than ὁς that there are mental reservations; and γε further strengthens ὁὗτοι. It is possible, however, that γε really belongs to ὁς; cp. Rep. 432 B. ὁς γε οὐτοί διὰ καί, and many other passages.


— ποιητὴν . . . θεῶν: Meletus was a poet, hence the phrase, used to caricature him. It heightens the effect of the absurdity (ἁτομα) of the charge and makes it appear more spiteful. The wording of the charge in Xen. might refer with equal propriety to the grotesque insinuations in Ar. Clouds; but the term δική suggests to Euthphro the thought of Socrates’ δική.

8. οὐ νομίζεται: νομίζειν denotes not only belief in the existence of the gods (ἡγεῖσθαι), but adds the idea of νομίζω,—religious conformity. recognizing, acknowledging: it therefore expresses most fully the Greek con-
10 ΕΥΘ. Μαχθάνω, ὁ Σώκρατες· ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαι-
μόνιον φῆς σαντῷ ἐκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι. ὡς οὖν κα-
νοτομοῦντος σου περὶ τὰ θεία γέγραπται ταύτην τὴν
γραφήν, καὶ ὡς διαβαλῶν δὴ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ δικαστή-

9. ὡς φησιν: returns to the φησι which opened the sentence, and adds a doubt as to the alleged motives of Meletus. Cp. the repetition of φησι Prot. 345 CD. From the language of this passage no conclusion can be drawn as to the importance attaching to the several counts of the indictment. Here the question merely is: How, on the view of Meletus, is Socrates corrupting the youth? The answer is, By setting an example of irreligion. (On the indictment, see the Introd. to Schanz's edition of the Apol.) An ulterior motive is indeed hinted at in ὡς φησιν, but whether it was the personal motive mentioned Apol. 23 E. cannot be determined.

10. μανθάνω... ὃτι δὴ: 'ah, I apprehend. It is, forsooth, because;' etc. ὃτι δὴ is to be referred to φησι γὰρ με ποιήτην ἐδώ ςθεν. Cp. 9 B, below.
— τὸ δαμόνιον: Plato (Apol. 31 D) and Xenophon (Mem. 1. 1. 2) take the same view of the case as Euthyphro. The psychological phenomenon is still unexplained. It was clearly, to Socrates, a private substitute for μαντικὴ—an in-
spiration or illumination coming 3 B from the gods. It was an agency of the gods (τὸ τοῦ θεῶν σημείων, Apol. 40 B), not itself a divinity. Acc. to Plato, it exercised only the power of veto; acc. to Xenophon, it even prompted to action, not only on the part of Socrates, but also of his friends. The difficulties in the way of a rational interpretation of the phenomenon are enhanced by the circumstance that Plato appears to employ it occasionally in a spirit of pleasantry to lend interest to the character of Socrates in the dramatic development of a dialogue; while Xenophon, for other reasons, is not an unimpeachable witness. For fuller discussion, see Riddell, The Apology of Plato. App. A: Zeller, Phil. der Griechen, II. i., 474–491; Gomperz, Griech. Denker, II. 70 ff. 11. γίγνεσθαι: 'occurred.' Note that γίγνεσθαι is the standing expression for the occurrence of the δαιμόνιον. — κανοτομοῦντος: cutting a new drift, a mining term; others, with less reason, consider it as referring to new coinage. In Plato it is always used metaphorically, of revolutionary innovation. Cp. 5 A, 16 A. 13. ὡς διαβαλὼν: HA. 969 c, 978: G. 1563, 4. 1574; B. 653, 5; 656, 3.
37

Euthyphro, an
does not wish to
challenge, or even
answer, his accu-
dator. He might be
called a religious
advocate, or an
apt pupil, or an
adept in religious
lore. But in any
view of his inspira-
tion (μανία), he
seems to have been
mad. An apparent
conversion is made,
then practically
withdrawn. It refers
to the preceding
statement, but is
not a contradiction
with the following
instance.

16. Euthyphro, as
a μάντις, might be
so called in view
of his inspiration
(μανία). See CP.
Phaedr. 244 BC; but
the scoffers meant
that he was mad.

17. When Euthyphro
is so-called, an
instance of the
so-called palin-
dromic construction
is made, then
practically
withdrawn. It refers
to the preceding
statement, but is
correlative with the
following.

18. Euthyphro, as
a μάντις, might be
so called in view
of his inspiration
(μανία). See CP.
Phaedr. 244 BC; but
the scoffers meant
that he was mad.

19. Euthyphro, as
a μάντις, might be
so called in view
of his inspiration
(μανία). See CP.
Phaedr. 244 BC; but
the scoffers meant
that he was mad.
τοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἂν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικῶν τῆς αὐτοῦ ἐς τοιαύτα τοιαύτα ποιεῖν τουτοῦ, ὥσ ὑμοῦνται, ἐιτ' οὖν φθόνω, ὥς σὺ λέγεις, ἐιτε δὲ ἄλλο τι.

ΕΥΘ. Τούτου οὖν πέρι ὅπως ποτὲ πρὸς ἔμε ἔχουσιν, οὐ πάνυ ἐπιθυμῶ πειραθῆναι.

3 C 4. μὴ μέντοι: μὴ because of the implied cond. — διδασκαλικῶν . . . σοφίας: for gen. cp. HA. 754 b. Socrates says, Apol. 33 A, that he never was the teacher of any man (ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδεὶς πώς τι ἐγενόμην); Plato here saves himself by saying οἴωνται. But nothing more is meant than having adherents, and this Socrates undoubtedly did. Critias and Charicles (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 31) published an edict, directed primarily against Socrates.—λύγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν, not to teach the art of argument. Socrates disclaimed ability to teach, because he professed to know nothing capable of being taught, and because he believed that truth could be reached only through cooperation of minds—his so-called philosophical midwifery. μακεντικὴ, which required dialogue (διαλέγεσθαι, from which διαλέκτικὴ is derived). The notion, moreover, is here introduced by Plato, chiefly to prepare the way for the demand to be instructed by Euthyphro. 5. ὅν δὲ ἄν . . . : the clause is virtually in the dat. with θυμοῦνται, HA. 764. 2; G. 1160; B. 376.—3 C τοιαύτας, as often (cp. 4 C, 4 D, 6 B, etc.), refers vaguely to what precedes. 6. εἰτ' οὖν φθόνῳ . . . . εἰτε: emphasis on first alternative, cp. RD. § 307. The formula εἰτε . . . εἰτε with οὖν occurs repeatedly, οὖν standing usually after the first εἰτε (as here and Apol. 27 C, Prot. 333 C), once after the second (Soph. Phil. 345), and Apol. 34 E after both, without material difference to the thought. Note the simple dat. φθόνῳ, followed by διὰ c. acc. 8. τούτου οὖν πέρι: regarding his capacity as a teacher; for πέρι cp. HA. 109 a; G. 116. 1; B. 68. — ὅπως ποτὲ: just how. This use of the indef. ποτὲ should be noted; it is esp. common in Plato with forms of τίς, when a definition is required, as e.g., in 11 A below. ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὄνομ, ὅτι ποτὲ ἔστιν. Cp. esp. Meno 72 B ἐρωμένου μελήτης περὶ οὐσίας, ὅτι ποτὲ ἔστιν. Other words are similarly used, as e.g., τίς δ' 13 D. τί δήποτε' 15 A. As ποτὲ is here reinforced by δή, it is often associated with καί; cp. Gorg. 455 Α φήρε δή, ἰδοὺ μεν τι ποτὲ καὶ λέγομεν [see Frohberger
10 ΣΩ. ἠσώς γὰρ σὺ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν καὶ διδάσκειν οὐκ ἔθελεν τὴν σεαυτοῦ σοφιὰν· ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι, μὴ ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας δοκῶ αὐτοῖς ὁτιπερ ἔχω ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν. οὐ μόνον ἄνεν μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεῖς ἄν ἡδέως, εἰ τίς μου ἔθελοι ἀκούειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν, δὲ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον, μέλλοιεν μου καταγελᾶν, ὡσπερ σὺ φῆς σεαυτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἄν εὑρήσῃς ὅτι παῖζοντας καὶ γελῶντας ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ διαγαγεῖν. εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται, τούτ' ἡδή ὁπῃ ἀποβῆσεται ἄδηλον πλὴν ὕμων τοῖς μάντεσιν.

31 on Lys. 12. 29 (App.)]. Again, κάı alone may take its place: cp. Gorg. 474 C καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ δημοῦ εἰδέ- ναι ὅτι ποτ᾽ ἔρεις with Gorg. 467 C ἀλλ' ἔθελοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδὼ ὅτι λέγεις.

10. σὺ μὲν . . . ἐγὼ δὲ: the pronouns give only so much emphasis as is necessary for the contrast. 12. φιλανθρωπίας: see the paper by Higginson. Proceed. Amer. Phil. Ass'n. V. 20 ff. 13. ἐκκεχυμένως: G. 366. 14. ἄνεν μισθοῦ: Ἀπολ. 23 C Socrates says he is in extremest poverty (ἐν πανί μυρία εἰμὶ;) but he regards it as dishonorable to require pay for his counsels and instruction, if so it may be called (Gorg. 520 E), and converses freely (ἐκκεχυμένως) with all who may desire (.Ἀπολ. 33 A). He repeatedly emphasizes his own refusal of pay in contrast with the conduct of the Sophists, whom he loves to ridicule (.Ἀπολ. 19 D. 31 B. Ῥεπ. 337 D. 344 E). — προστιθεῖς ἄν ἡδέως: equiv. to προστιθείναι ἄν ἡδέως, the part. 31 being preferred because more nearly parallel to ἄνεν μισθοῦ; the verb is used abs., hence no need of supplying μισθοῦ. 16. μέλλοιεν . . . σπουδάσονται: note the mixed cond. The change from the ideal opt. to the indic. marks the latter alternative as the more likely to take place. Cp. 9 C. Att. prose regularly makes the fut. of σπουδάζω in the mid. Cp. B. 507. On the use of the mid., see Rutherford. The New Phrynichus. p. 138 and pp. 376 ff. He says, p. 138: “All verbs expressing the exercise of the senses, or denoting any functional state or process, have the inflections of the mid. voice either throughout or in the fut. tense.” σπουδάζω does not strictly fall into this classification, but may be regarded as somewhat analogous. There are, however, many semi-deponents of which Rutherford takes no account. 19. τούτῳ E ἡδή: 'here we come to a matter
EYΘ. 'ΑΛΛ' ἵσως οὐδὲν ἔσται, ὥς Σώκρατες, πράγμα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιζεῖ τὴν δίκην, οἴμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμὴν.

IV. ΣΩ. Ἐστὶν δὲ δὴ σοι, ὥς Εὐθύφρον, τίς ἡ δίκη; φεύγεις αὐτήν ἡ διώκεις;

EYΘ. Διώκω.

ΣΩ. Τίνα;

EYΘ. Ὅν διώκων αὐτὸ δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πετόμενον τίνα διώκεις;

3 E which,' etc. Cp. Rep. 436 A τάδε δὲ ἡδή χαλεπῶν. Here ἡδή, as οὔπω (Rep. 353 C, 370 D) and οὐκέτι (e.g. Rep. 430 D, 468 B, Legg. 792 C), applies to an ideal limit, not to objective time; the reference is to a stage of the argument not yet reached (οὔπω), or reached (ἡδή, sometimes, in neg. clauses, οὐκέτι); cp. οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἐπὶ τούτο ἐρωτᾶς, Gorg. 503 A), or already past (οὐκέτι). Rep. 348 E (ἡδή and οὐκέτι) and Gorg. 486 E. 487 E. are good examples to study. Note the emphasis on τούτω.—ὅπῃ ἀποβάσσεται . . . τοῖς μάντεσιν; cp. Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 6 περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄδυλων ὅπως ἀποβήσωστο μαντευσόμενος ἐπεμπεν (sc. τὸ Σοκράτης) ἐι τοιχεῖα. Socrates facetiously adopts the phraseology of the soothsayers. By saying ὅμως, he declines to be classed with Euthyphro: contrast ἡμᾶν πᾶσιν τοῖς τοιχοῦσι. 3 C.

22. σὺ τε . . . ὅμαι δὲ: a slight anacoluthon (on which see Frohberger on Lys. 25. 34 App.), not infrequent when the second member is to be emphasized: here it marks Euthyphro's eager-ness to direct attention to his own case. Cp. note on ὅστερ ἐμοί. 2 A. — κατὰ νοῦν: to your mind. This sample of Euthyphro's prophetic powers is not calculated to win respect; but the kindly wish is father to the thought. — δίκην: Euthyphro again employs the generic term, for the more specific, γραμφήν; see note on 2 A. — καὶ ἔμε: HA. 940 b; B. 630. x. The idiomatic phrase ὅμαι δὲ καὶ is frequent in Plato, taking sometimes the acc. and sometimes (as ὅμαι may be parenthetic) the nom. Cp. Lach. 180 A ὅμαι δὲ καὶ Λάχητα τούτῳ and Rep. 608 D ὅμαι δὲ καὶ σὺ.

IV. 1. Ἐστὶν δὲ δῇ: note that δὲ δῇ, as usual, marks the transition to a new subject. Say, 'well, then, but what of your trial?' For δὲ δῇ, see 4 B. 4 E, 7 C. 13 B. 2. φεύγεις αὐτήν ἡ διώκεις: tech. terms in law. HA. 820; G. 1241; B. 513; for αὐτήν, see HA. 715 b; G. 1051: B. 333. 5. αὖ: again: see 3 C. 6. τί δὲ: 4 A merely announces a question.
ΕΥΘ. Πολλοῦ γε δεὶ πέτεσθαι, ὃς γε τυγχάνει ὃν εὖ μᾶλα πρεσβύτης.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὕτως;

ΕΥΘ. 'Ο ἐμὸς πατήρ.

ΣΩ. 'Ο σός, ὃ βελτιωτεῖ;

ΕΥΘ. Ηάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. 'Εστιν δὲ τί τὸ ἐγκλημα καὶ τίνος ἡ δίκη;

ΕΥΘ. Φόνου, ὃ Σώκρατες.

'Ἡράκλεις! ἢ πον. ὁ Ἐνθύφρον. ἀγνοεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπη ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει... οὐ γάρ οἴμαι γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πράξαι, ἀλλὰ | πόρρῳ ὃν ἡδὴ σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος.

4. A Cp. 7 D.—πετόμενον τινα διώκεις: a pun, διώκω standing in both the legal and the literal sense; in the latter the phrase is proverbial, as we speak of 'a wild-goose chase.' Cp. Euthyd. 291 B.


ΕΥΘ. Πόρρω μέντοι νὴ Δία, ὦ Σῶκρατες.

20 Εστὶν δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκείων τις ὁ τεθνεὼς ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ πατρός; η δῆλα δῆ; οὐ γὰρ ἂν που ὑπέρ γε ἀλλότριον ἐπεξήγεισθὰ φόνου αὐτῷ.

ΕΥΘ. Γελοῖον, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ὅτι οἶει τι διαφέρειν, εἴτε ἀλλότριος εἴτε οἰκεῖος ὁ τεθνεώς, ἀλλ' οὗ τοῦτο 25 μόνον δεῖν φυλάττειν, εἴτε ἐν δίκη ἐκτεινεὶν ὁ κτείνας εἴτε μή, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκη, ἐὰν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπεξιέναι, ἐάντερ ὁ κτείνας συνεστίος σοι καὶ ὁμοτράπεζος ἦ.

4 B σοφίας ἐλαύνειν. The metaphor in ἐλαύνοντος is derived from the race-course.


20. τῶν οἰκείων τις: acc. to Greek law, all δίκαιο φανείκα i.e. prosecutions for manslaughter, etc., had to be brought either by the person assailed or by his kindred. The case of Euthyphro is therefore quite exceptional, as will appear in the sequel. It has been conjectured that the workman (πελάτης, see 4 C) stood to Euthyphro in the relation of an hereditary dependent, so that the latter could legally represent him as if he were his slave. See Meier u. Schoemann. Att. Process. I. 199. X. 10.


22. φόνου: HA. 745 a; G. 1121; B. 367. 23. διαφέρειν: i.e. to him as a moral agent; in point of law, there was a great difference.

25. φυλάττειν: 'regard, consider'; by a natural catachresis, almost = σκοτεῖν. Cp. Apol. 28 B ἄλλ' οὐκ ὅτι δεῖ (οἶει δὲ) ἐκέινο μόνον σκοτεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερα κτλ. 26. εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκῃ: there were certain circumstances that constituted a φόνος δίκαιος, or justifiable homicide, e.g. killing one unintentionally, or in self-defense; killing an adulterer: and possibly tyrannicide. Cp. Dem. 23. 51 ff.

27. ἐάντερ ὁ κτείνας: Euthyphro considers the desire to avoid contact with bloodguiltiness a sufficient motive for violating tradition and the formal requirements of the law relative to bringing forward an accusation. He alleges none of the altruistic motives for punishment mentioned Gorg. 480 D. For the μᾶςμα resulting from fellowship with the murderer and the criminal generally, see Antipho, Tetral. 1. 1. 10; Or. 5. 10; Horace. C. 3. 2. 26 ff. κτείνας, for the regular Att. ἀποκτείνας, is a bit of legal archaisms, as may be seen in Demosthenes, passim.
...and prob. 43.

30. έπει ο γε ἀποθανών πελάτης τις ἂν ἐμός, καὶ Ὁ γνωργοῦμεν ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ, ἐθητευεν ἐκεῖ


30. ἐπεί . . . γε: concessive, as below, 8 D. 9 B, 11 D; so also Crat. 410 A; Thracet. 142 C; Symph. 187 A; Gorg. 471 E.

This use of ἐπεί is very like Lat. cum concessive and adversative. The conj. merely indicates the existence of a relation; when the cause is not sufficient, we call it concessive or adversative.

Cp. GL. §§ 586 f. — πελάτης: here = θής (15 D. cp. θητεῖων in 1. 31. and 9 A.), a free day-laborer. As the victim was a freeman, the legal right of Euthyphro to represent him in court may well be doubted. But, doubtful as it is, it is not impossible. Cp. Dem. 47. 68–70.

The suggestion that the πελάτης was legally a client seems to rest upon an anachronism; for that use of the term does not occur before the Roman conquest of Greece. But the paid laborer was at Athens little better than a slave (Lys. 12. 98), and, in the days of Augustus, Dionys. Hal. (Antig. 2. 9) says that the Athenians treated the πελάται as purchased slaves. 31. ἐγεωρ-γοῦμεν ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ: Naxus, the largest of the Cyclades, became subject to Athens about 473 B.C., whereupon κληρονόμοι were established there. (Cp. Boeckh. Staatsans. der Athener, I. 2. 540 a.) It is prob., but not certain, that Euthyphro's father was one of them; and since the power of Athens over the island ceased after Aegospotami (September, 405), his holdings as κληρονόμος also would have been lost. There remain to be accounted for, on that supposition, about five years before 390, when Socrates was tried. Whether statutes of limitation would here apply to vitiate the suit brought by Euthyphro is one of the moot-points of Attic law. Possibly Euthyphro's case had no standing in court; or, again, Plato may here be guilty of one of the anachronisms which he admits for dramatic effect.
παρ' ἡμῖν. παροινήσας οὖν καὶ ὑργισθεὶς τῶν οἰκετῶν τινὶ τῶν ἥμετέρων ἀποσφάττει αὐτὸν· ὁ οὖν πατήρ συνδήσας τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, καταβάλων εἰς τάφρον τινά, πέμπει δεύρῳ ἄνδρα πευ- σόμενον τοῦ ἐξήγητού, ὅτι χρείη ποιεῖν. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῶν χρόνων τοῦ | δεδεμένου ὀλυγώρει τε καὶ ἴμελεί ὃς D ἄνδροφόνου καὶ οὐδέν ὅν πράγμα, εἰ καὶ ἀποθάνοι· ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἔπαθεν· ὑπὸ γὰρ λιμοῦ καὶ ρίγους καὶ 40 τῶν δεσμῶν ἀποθνῄσκει πρῶν τοῦ ἀγγελον παρὰ τοῦ ἐξήγητού ἄφικέσθαι. ταῦτα δὴ οὖν καὶ ἄγανακτέi 0

4 C 32. οἰκετῶν τινὲ: note the hyperbaton of τινὲ to improve the rhythm; similarly, Ἀπολ. 33 D. Cp. Ποργ. 451 AB. 33. ἀποσφάττει: ἀπό- suggests a cruel and brutal deed. 36. τοῦ ἐξήγητοῦ: see below, 9 A.; for the gen., see ἩΑ. 750; G. 1103; B. 365. The ἐξήγηται (τῶν δοτῶν) were three in number, and were charged, among other offices, with the duty of direct- ing complainants how to pro- ceed in the difficult cases having to do with bloodguiltiness. It seems prob. that the members of this college were chosen by the Delphic oracle from a list of nine placed in nomination by the state. Here only one, their president, is mentioned. See Schöll, Hermes 6, pp. 36 ff. 37. τοῦ δεδεμένου: ἩΑ. 742; D G. 1103; B. 356.—ὡς ἄνδροφόνου: sc. ὄντος, in the pred. This is not a gen. abs., as some have thought. 38. οὐδέν ὅν πράγμα: acc. abs., ἩΑ. 973; G. 1569; B. 658. The acc. abs. is here subjoined to a dependent part.; sometimes, as 4 D Ῥεφ. 604 B. Xen. Mem. 2. 2. 13, Thuc. 7. 25. 7, acc. abs. and gen. abs. are combined, often for special reasons. Cp. 1. 44 f. — εἰ καὶ ἀποθάνοι: even if he should die. The opt. marks the event as, from his point of view, unlikely; καὶ denotes death as the worst that could befall him. 39. οὖν: the event is a natural conse- quence. Similar phrases are freq., as Ὅρν. 155 B ὅ οὖν καὶ ἐγένετο (cp. Εὐθυδ. 283 A. Ῥεφ. 564 C) marking transition.—ὑπὸ ... ἀποθνῄσκει: note pass. force. ἩΑ. 820: B. 513; GS. 171: ὑπὸ per- sonifies. GS. 166. Cp. 12 A. 40. πρὶν ... ἄφικέσθαι: ἩΑ. 955: G. 1470 f.; GMT. 621, 622, 626. 41. ταῦτα: ἩΑ. 719 c; G. 1060. The common constr. is ἄγανακτεῖν τιν. or ἐπὶ τιν. — καὶ ἄγανακτεῖ: καὶ denotes Euthyphro's wonderment at their displeasure; he thinks it quite unreasonable. Note ἄγανακτεῖ ... ὅτι: elsewhere in Plato (Ἀπολ. 34 C. Ποργ. 482 D, 518 C,
te pathe Kai oi 'alloi oikeioi, oti egw uper tou aidro-
phonou to patre phonou epexeferchomai, ou te apokteinavtei,
wfs fasov ekeinou, ou't ei oti malista apektewen, an-
drophonou ge ontos tou apodanontos, ou deiv frounti-
xein uper tou toiovtou: anoison gar | eivai to viou E
patre phonou epexeiveni: kakwas eidotes, oj Swhrates,
to theon ws eixe tou oisioi te peri kai tou anosiou.

Sigma. Sun dethe prous Diou, o Evoudrnon, outosei
akribow oiei epistasthaini peri twon theion. opte eixe,
kaiv onsivn te kai anosiwv, woste touv outw
praxhtenvon, ws ou legies, ou foabei diakozomenos

4 D Lach. 194 A. Legg. 903 D) ei is
used. Cpr. HA. 926: G. 1423 f.;
B. 598 i; GMT. 494-496. Gorg.
519 B. ws. A similar showing is
discovered by referring to Ast's
Lex. Plut. for other similar
expressions, such as aga-po (no case
of oti,). xalpatiwn (Rep. 480. ei;
Menex. 236 C, anv; Euth. 6 A, oti),
thetai (o7i or eain sixteen
times. oti four times), deiv
theti (o7i six times, oti twice).
But Ast's enumeration is incomplete.

44. ou't ei oti malista apektewen:
nor. were it never so true
that he had killed him.' Here
oti malista does not really
intensify the verb, but merely
emphasizes the condition as a
whole: similarly, below, 9 C,
Menou 80 D. Cral. 435 A. Charm.
160 C, Alc. 1. 106 A. 113 D. See
note on 15 B. Compare mali-
sta and qfpoqra ye in answers.

45. ou deiv: here deiv is Att.
for deon, acc. abs. Note the
pleonasm of ou after ou'te, and
see RD. § 263: "The object of 4 D
the pleonasm is, after premising
the neg. as an announcement of
the general form of the sent.,
to place it also in close contact with
the word which it immediately
concerns." — frountizeiv uper tou
toiwvh: cp. 3 C oudeiv autow
xh frountizeiv. 46. anoisoiw: E
unholy. The dialogue deals with
Holiness, and this is the first real
mention of the theme, although
Euthyphro has before (4 C) used
the word afosiois. Socrates
is not slow to catch the word and
avail himself of it to lead up to
the discussion of the principle
at stake. 48. to theion ws ech:
what the divine law is in regard
to', a case of prolepsis. HA.
878: so also peri twon theion, opte
exel. 1. 50. The phrase is forced.

51. oisivn te kai anoisivn: te
kaiv regularly connect opposites
as well as similars. The kaiv
before oisivn is explicative, not
connective.
τῷ πατρί, ὁπως μὴ αὐ σὺ ἄνόσιον πράγμα τυγχάνης πράττων;

55 ἘΥΘ. Οὖδεν γὰρ ἂν μου ὀφελος εἴη, ὃ Σῶκρατες, οὖδέ τῷ ἂν διαφέροι | Εὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἄκριβῶς ἐιδεῖν.

V. ΣΩ. Ἀρ′ οὖν μοι, ὃ θαυμάσιε Εὐθύφρον, κράτιστὸν ἔστι μαθητή σῷ γενέσθαι καὶ πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς τῆς πρὸς Μέλιτον αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλεῖσθαι αὐτὸν λέγοντα, ὅτι ἐγώ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ τὰ θεία περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμην εἰδέναι, καὶ νῦν ἐπειδὴ με ἕκεινος αὐτοσχεδιάζοντά φησι καὶ κανοτομοῦντα

4 Ε 53. ὁπως μὴ αὐ σὺ: for ὁπως μὴ after verbs of fearing, see HA. 887 a; G. 1379; B. 594. N.; GMT. 279. Schanz, ad loc., cites as further examples, Phaedo 77 B, 84 B, Symp. 193 A. Alc. II. 150 B. But Symp. 193 A edd. read διασχισθομέθα. 55. οὖδεν . . . εἴη: 'I should be of no use'; lit., there would be no use of me. Cp. Apol. 28 B, Crito 46 A. 56. τῷ ἂν διαφέροι: ἩΑ. 781 a; G. 1184; B. 388. Note that τῷ is not the art. — Εὐθύφρων: in thus speaking of himself in the third person, Euthyphro displays his self-complacency. Cp. Phaedo 91 C. Homer A 240. Aesch. Prom. 306, Soph. Ajax 98. O.C. 3. Dem. 18. 79. Among poets it is often a rhetorical device, as e.g. in Horace; in Catullus it amounts to a mannerism. Note how Euthyphro passes from the third person to the first in εἰδεῖν. — ἀνθρώπων: ἩΑ. 748; G. 1117; B. 362. 1.

5 Α 1. ἄρ′ οὖν: for the more common ἄρ′ οὖν οὐρ or οὐκοιν, antici- pating an affirmative answer; so also Gorg. 477 A. Phaedo 65 E, Meno 86 A. 89 B. Crat. 388 B. Cp. ἄρα 6 A. for ἄρ′ οὐν. 2. μαθητῇ . . . λέγοντα: ἩΑ. 941; G. 928. 1; B. 631. 1; RD. § 184. 1. 3. αὐτὰ ταῦτα: ἩΑ. 716 b; G. 1034; B. 334. Cp. ἄ προκαλούμην αὐτῶν, 1. 16. — προκαλεῖσθαι: for the procedure in court, see Gow, A Companion to School Classics, § 76. Before the trial (πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς) either party to the suit might offer the other a challenge (πρόκλησις) to take any steps with a view to a settlement, which, if declined, would possibly establish a presumption in favor of the challenger. In this case, the refusal would tend to impugn Meletus’s alleged motives of public interest and make him appear to be acting from personal animosity. 4. οἱ: G. 1477. — ἐμπροσθεν: ἩΑ. 666 a; G. 952. 1. 5. περὶ πολλοῦ: ἩΑ. 803. 1 b; B. 412. 1 B.
περί τῶν θεῶν ἐξαμαρτάνειν, μαθητής δὴ γέγονα σος — καὶ εἰ μέν, ὃ Μέλητε, φαίνην ἂν, Εὐθύφρονα ὁμολογεῖς | σοφὸν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ὅρθως νομίζειν. εἰ
dὲ ἡγοῦν καὶ μη δικάζον: εἰ δὲ μή, ἐκεῖνω τῷ διδα-
sκάλῳ λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἦ ἐμοί. ὡς τοὺς πρεσβυ-
tέρους διαφθείροντι, εἰμὲ τε καὶ τὸν αὐτῶν πατέρα, εἰ-
μὲν διδάσκοντι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ νουθετοῦντί τε καὶ
cολάζοντι — καὶ ἂν μή μοι πείθητα μηδὲ ἀφῆν τῆς
dίκης ἢ ἄντ’ ἐμοῦ γράφηται σὲ, αὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγειν
ev τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, ἀ προνοικόλυμην αὐτόν:

ΕΥΘ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὃ Σῶκρατες, εἰ ἄρα μὲ ἐπιχειρή-
σειε γράφεσθαι, εὐρομή ἄν, ὡς ἐμιμαῖ, ὅπη σαθρὸς ἡ
ἐστὶν, καὶ πολὺ ἄν ἡμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος
ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγὼ τοι, ὃ φίλε ἐταίρε. ταῦτα γυγώστικον
μαθητῆς ἐπιθυμῶ γενεσθαι σῶς, εἰδῶς. ὅτι καὶ ἄλλος
ποῦ τις καὶ ὁ Μέλητος οὕτως σὲ μὲν οὐδέ δοκεῖ ὃραν.

51: 9. τὰ τοιαῦτα: Ἡ.Α. 718; G. 1058; B. 330. 10. εἰ δὲ μή:
‘otherwise.’— τῷ διδασκάλῳ: virtually in appos. with ἐκεῖνο. 
Cp. the common constr. of ἄλλος. 11. λάχε δίκην: see Gow. ὀφ. cilt.,
p. 132. n. 2: “It would seem that plaintiffs' balloted for the order
in which their cases should be taken; hence δίκην λαχέιν was
practically to lodge a claim at law.” 12. διαφθείροντι: note the
double meaning, explained by δι-
δάσκοντι and κολάζοντι. 14. ἀφὴ
tῆς δίκης: cp. τοῦτον ἀφόμη στ. 
9 C. 15. λέγειν: depends on κρά-
tιστον. 5 Λ. 1. 17. εἰ ἄρα:
Ἡ.Α. 1048. 1. ἄρα emphasizes
C the cond. 18. ὅπη σαθρὸς ἐστὶν:
‘his weak spot’; cp. Dem. 4. 44
eὐρίσκει τὰ σαθρὰ . . . τῶν 5 C
ἐκείνων (sc. Φιλιπποῦ) πραγμάτων
αὐτὸς ὁ πόλεμος. 19. πολὺ ἄν
πρότερον κτλ.: ‘it would sooner
be a question of him than of me.’ On the hyperbaton of
πολὺ, which limits πρότερον, see
Ἡ.Α. 1062. Note the sudden
change from the ideal (εἰ . . .
ἐπιχειρήσειε . . . εὐρομή ἄν) to the
contrary-to-fact condition
(ἄν . . . ἐγένετο), vividly declar-
ing the confidence of Euthyphro
that the case will not arise. The
opposite change takes place, e.g.
22. See below on 9 C. 23. ὁ
Μέλητος οὕτως: the tone is con-
temptuous. οὕτως marks him,
with all his previously men-
25. υνυν ουν προς Διος λεγε μοι, ο νυν δη σαφως ειδεναι διυσχυριζουν. ποιον τι το ευσεβες φης ειναι και το ασεβες και περι φονου και περι των αλλων; η ου | ταυτων έστων εν παση πραξει το όσιον D αυτω αυτω, και το ανουσιον αυ του μεν όσιου παν των τουναντιων, αυτω δε αυτω ομοιον και έχουν μιαν τινα

5C tioned qualities, as present to the minds of the interlocutors, though not there in persona. Cp. τοιτους τοις συκοφάντας. Crito 45 A, likewise scornful. — ουδε δοκει ρην . . . κατεδευν: ουδε goes with ρην. There is here a play on words. ρην = 'espy,' καθορην = 'see through.' Cp. Gorg. 479 B, 524 E. 525 A. κατα- has here the same force ('throughout,' 'through and through,' 'from head to foot'), as in καταπετακται, 6 C. There may be a further point in the hint at έπιμελείσθω contained in Μελητος (Μελητος αμελης!); see above on 2 D. 24. ζωτε: HA. 927; G. 1450; B. 595.

25. νυν δη: just now. 26. ποιον τι: of what nature? But ποιος alone often expresses a sense of 'contrast between the suggestion and the fact,' sometimes humorous, sometimes ironical or ignignant. — το ευσεβες = το δοσιον in the Euth. 28. ταυτων έστιν κτλ.: on ταυτων and ομοιων, see HA. 773 and a; G. 1175: Β. 392. 2. on αυτω, see HA. 688; G. 997.

29. του μεν όσιου παν τουναντιον: quite the opposite of the holy. In Plato ο έναντιος, when applied to qualities, usually is constr. with the gen. 30. έχουν μιαν τινα ιδεαν κτλ.: 'possessing as a whole some one characteristic aspect in reference to its being unholiness.' This is untechnical language. Cp. Μενο 72 C ουτω δη και περι των αρετων: και ει πολλαι και παντοδαπαι εισιν. ει γε τι ειδος ταυτων απασαι έξουσι, δε ο εισιν αρεται, just so also in respect of the virtues: even though they be numerous and manifold, they yet possess one and all some one identical aspect in view of which they are virtues. There is here no reference to hypostatized Ideas; only the definitional essence is required. In the common Socratic manner. No inference as to the date of the dialogue can be drawn from this usage, as it may occur in any work, even side by side with the more technical sense; cp. Rep. 435 B και δικαιος άμα δικαιωμα τωλεως κατ αυτω το Της δικαιοσυνης ειδος ουδεν διοι- σει, αλλ ομοιος εσται. The efforts to detect a significant difference between ειδος and ιδεω have failed. Cp. ιδεω. ειδος, and μορφη. Rep. 380 D. See App.
idean kata tηn anostoteta pavan, otiper an melly anostion einai;

EYΘ. Pante, d'pou, o Sowkrates.

VI. Θ. Leye d' th phi's einai to oston kai to anostion;

EYΘ. Leye toinw, oti to mev oston estin oiper ey' wv paiv, th adikouv ti he peri founous he peri 5 ierwv klopas he ti allo ton toinwv e'amartanto.

5 D 31. otiper ktl.: 'whatever is to be, is to pass for, unholy'; for melly, see H.A. 8.46: G. 1254: B. 533. 33. pante d'pou: a formula, expressing strong affirmation, freq. in answers.

VI. 1. leye d': note d' (then) with the inv., as freq. Cp. 7 A, 10 A, 12 D (bis), 13 E.

First Definition of Holiness: 'Holiness is doing as I am now doing.' Socrates has endeavored to prepare the way for a definition of holiness by winning assent to the statement that there is in all cases of holiness a constant characteristic which is of the essence of holiness. His next step is to seek to arrive at that constant and essential notion. Euthyphro does not see the significance of the principle he has admitted, and hence adduces what could at best be only a particular exemplification of holiness instead of disclosing the essence of holiness, as requested. His failure is not, however, without value. Had he better apprehended the procedure of definition, he could not have expressed so naively the popular notions which he entertained, and which are held by the unthinking even in our day. Before addressing himself to the proposed definition, Socrates expresses his disbelief of the legends which impute unworthy actions to the gods, and suggests that this may be the reason of his being brought to trial for impiety. Moreover, it is no uncommon thing to have the respondent offer particular instances in lieu of the required general definition. Fritzsche (Proleg. ad Menon., p. 21, n. 6) cites as examples Meno 71 E. Thcact. 146 C. Lach. 190 E. Hipp. Ma. 287 E. Note that toinw introduces a definition, as in 6 E. 12 E.

4. t' adikeyn . . . e'amartano: the second part., with the dependent phrases he peri founous . . . toinw, explains adikeyn: adikein merely implies that the defendant committed the deed, whereas e'amartano adds the notion of culpability. The language is rather formal. 5. he ti allo: depends on peri, as does klopas.
In Phaedo, the interlocutor Socrates questions Euthyphro, who says that the worst deed is that which God most approves. Socrates asks how Euthyphro knows this, and Euthyphro responds that God sees everything. Socrates then asks why God would see something that is not God. Euthyphro explains that God sees because the deed is approved by God. Socrates presses this point, and Euthyphro admits that he is not sure about it. Socrates then turns to the question of why God would punish someone for a deed that God sees. Euthyphro says that it is for the sake of those who do not see as God sees. Socrates presses this point as well, and Euthyphro eventually concedes that God punishes for hidden reasons.

In the section at hand, Socrates has already established that some actions are right and others are wrong, and he now presses Euthyphro to explain why he holds this view. Euthyphro first attempts to explain the concept of 'right' in terms of God's approval, but Socrates challenges him to explain why God would approve something without being aware of it. Euthyphro then tries to explain the concept of 'wrong' in terms of God's disapproval, but Socrates presses him further to explain why God would disapprove something without being aware of it. Euthyphro finally concedes that he does not know why God would disapprove something without being aware of it, and Socrates uses this concession to argue that Euthyphro's view of right and wrong is arbitrary and not based on any rational principle.

In the wider context, this exchange is significant because it raises some of the most fundamental issues about ethics and morality. Socrates' questions challenge the idea that right and wrong can be defined in terms of God's approval or disapproval, and he suggests that such a view is not grounded in any rational principle. Instead, he suggests that we should look for a more rational and principled way of understanding right and wrong, one that is not based on arbitrary divine fiat.


... they express opinions inconsistent with each other in approving the actions of the gods and condemning mine. The fifth century B.C. was a period of transition. The foundations of the old faith were crumbling, and a moralized creed was supplanting it. Xenophanes and Pindar had been aware of the unworthy character of the gods, as portrayed in the mythology, and had protested against the myths. Aeschylus set himself to reinterpret them in a sense conformable to his higher moral ideal. Sophocles remained neutral, and Euripides seems to have favored now the old, now the newer creed. Aristophanes carped at the new, without supporting the old. Among the men of greatest enlightenment, Socrates and Plato mark the virtual overthrow of the old polytheism. The multitude, however, seem to have been but lightly touched by the reformation. Euthyphro, as a man of the people, does not question the traditional faith. See Gomperz, Griech. Denker, II. 1 ff. Cp. the interesting discussion in Auct. ad Herenn. 2. 25. 39.

note the hyperbaton. HA. 1062. 6 A 21. δυσχερώς πως ἀποδέχομαι: I scruple to accept; for this sense of δυσχερώς, see Polit. 294 A ἐμελλὼν γὰρ σε διερωτήσεις παῦσαι πότερον ἀποδέχεσθαι πάντα. ἢ τί καὶ δυσχεραίνεις τῶν λεχθεόντων and Eur. Med. 733 μὴν ὁδὸν πέτασθαι; ἢ τί σοι τὸ δυσχέρες: In such connections πως, as the adv. to the indef. pron. τίς, limits its adv., and here renders it more emphatic; see note on οὖν πάνω τ. 2 B. The early Christian Fathers inveighed passionately against the immoralities imputed in Greek mythology to the supreme gods; but they added nothing to the protests of the ancient Greeks themselves (cp. Plat. Rep. 377 E ff., 408 C; Isocr. 11. 38 and Eur. passim). Eur. (fr. 294. 7) made bold to say εἰ θεός τι δρῶσιν αἰσχρὸν, οὐκ εἰσίν θεοὶ. If gods do ought that's base, no gods are they. Cp. Rep. 408 C ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὰ προερήματα οὖ πιθομέθεα αὐτοίς ἁρμότερα. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θεοὺς (sc. νῦν) ἢν, οὐκ ἢν, φάσομαι. αἰσχροκερδῆς. εἰ δ' αἰσχροκερδῆς. οὐκ ἢν θεοῦ. 22. εἰ καὶ σοι κτλ.: note the redundancy of expression. Where two persons are juxtaposed, καί is often placed with
tauta evndokei tw ev | eiidoi peri ton toinotow, anagy- 
kη δη, ws eouke, kai hmnin evngxoreiv. ti gar kai
25 phisovme, ou ye autoi omlologoumen peri auton mended
eiadena; alla mou eite prois Filion, ou ws alithwos
ηgei tauta ouwos gegovena;
EYΘ. Kai eti ge toinon thaimasioterá, o Sow-
krates; o oio polloi ouk ἵσασιν.
30 ΣΩ. Kai pollemo ana hygei su ei evna tw oini ev
tois theois prois allhlyous, kai eixpras ge deivnas kai
6 A each, as in rel. clauses with ἧστερον
and ἦστερος. Here the ἐν in
ἐννοδεῖ further reënforces καί
. . . kai. Cp. Politi. 277 A de
δε μη σοι μων τατα, ἀλλα καροι
metα σου κουν ἐννοδεῖν. Note
reduplication of the neg., 4 D
above, of γε. 13 E. and of τω,
24 (App.); 19. 4 (App.). On
ημιν = ἔμοι'. see GS. 54.
B
24. ti gar kai phisovme: indeed,
what am I to say? See note
on 3 A. 1. 4. 25. autoi: prob.
goes with eiadena, though it may
belong to omlologoumen. — μηδεν
eiadena: we might have expected
oiden acc. to HA. 1024. G.
1611; but see GMT. 685.
Cp. 12 B aiδεωθυ δε μηδεν.
26. ἀλλα: 'nay,' freq. with inv.
Διος, 'by Zeus, patron god
of friendship.' As here, Gorg.
234 E prois Διος φιλιων. — ws
alithwos: ws in this connection
seems to be the abl. of the
art., and ws alithwos almost
= tη alithewia. But see Krüger,
Gr. Sprachl. 69. 63. 8. Schanz
gives the formula alithwos : ws 6 B
alithwos :: alithewia: tη alithewia.
He also notes that Plato, who
affected the phrase, ceased to
employ it in his latest works
(Phil., Pol., Tim., Legg.), but
used alithwos with alithewia and tη
alithewia instead. 29. o oio polloi
ouk ἵσασιν: as μάντις, Euthyphro
lays claim to recondite knowl-
edge of things divine not shared
by the profanum vulgus. His
source of information was doubt-
less the Orphic writings (see
Isocr. 11. 38 f., Lobeck, Agla-
kal . . . τε . . . kai: the kai before
pollemov is continuative; τε after
λεγετω is correlative with the
next kai' and τε in τα τε αλλα
is correlative with kai δη kai —
αρα: for postponement of αρα,
— τω oini: in reality. HA.
779 b. This formula alone, as
Schanz has shown, occurs in
Plato's earliest works, and in
the latest works gives place to
οντως, with which it alternates
in the intermediate group of
dialogues.
μάχας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα πολλά, οἶα λέγεται τε ύπο τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ ύπο τῶν ἀγαθῶν γραφέων τά τε ἅλλα εἰρά ἡμῖν καταπεποίκιλται, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις

Παναθηναίοις ὁ πέπλος μεστὸς τῶν τοιούτων ποικιλμάτων ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν; ταῦτα ἀληθῆ φῶμεν εἰναι, ὁ Ἐυθύφρον;

6 B 33. καὶ . . . καταπεποίκιλται: we might have expected οἷος after καὶ to conform to οἷος above; but Plato begins here to break with his first constr., which he wholly abandons at καὶ δὴ καὶ. Cp. ῾Ερ. 378 ζ πολλοῦ δεὶ γεγυμνωμαχίαις τε μινθολογητέων αὐτῶν καὶ ποικιλτέων, καὶ ἄλλαις ἐξήραις πολλάς καὶ πυντοδιπάς θέων τε καὶ ἱρών πρὸς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείων αὐτῶν. κατα- suggests that the ornamentation is extensive and thoroughly done.

— ἀγαθῶν: slightly ironical.

C 34. εἰρά: means 'sacred objects' in general, not temples, as some have understood it. This is shown by the collocation ταὶ τε ἄλλα εἰρά . . . καὶ δὴ καὶ . . . ὁ πέπλος. — καὶ δὴ καὶ: see note on 2 D. — τοῖς μεγάλοις Παναθηναίοις: for the dat., see HA. 782; G. 1192; B. 385. The festival of the Panathenaea was the most ancient and most important held at Athens. It was celebrated yearly, but from the time of Pisistratus the Great Panathenaea were held in the third year of every Olympiad. in the month of Hecatombaeon (July-August). The occasion commemorated the union of Attica under Theseus, and was sacred to Athene, the patron deity of Athens, on whose traditional birthday, the 28th of the month, the festivities culminated in a grand procession to the Acropolis. The representation of this procession on the frieze of the Parthenon is justly celebrated. All the free inhabitants of the city participated in it, and escorted to the temple of the goddess on the Acropolis the splendid saffron-colored robe, the ἁπλος. This garment had been begun nine months before by four virgins (ἀξερηφόραι), and was richly embroidered by skillful maidens and matrons (ἐργαστίναι) with representations of the battle of the Giants and other scenes in which the goddess figured prominently. The ἁπλος was carried at the head of the procession, spread on yards as a sail for a ship, which was moved on wheels, and was then draped about the statue of Athene Polias in the Erechtheum. See Frazer's Ἐνωνας 2. 574. 36. ἀνάγεται: ἀνα- because the Acropolis, as its name implies, is high ground; ἀγεται because of the procession accompanying the ἁπλος. Cp. also ῾Ερ. 327 A.
ΕΥΘ. Μη μόνον γε, ὁ Σώκρατες: ἀλλ’ ὀπερ ἄρτι εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλα σοι ἐγώ πολλά, ἐάνπερ βούλη. περὶ 40 τῶν θείων διηγήσομαι, ἀ σού ἀκούων εὖ οἴδ’ ὦτι ἐκπλαγήσει.

VII. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζομι: ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν μοι εἰς ἄθις ἐπὶ σχολῆς διηγήσει: νῦν δὲ, ὀπερ ἄρτι σε ἡρόμην, πειρώ σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν. οὐ γάρ με, ὦ ἐταίρε, τὸ πρότερον ἰκανῶς ἐδίδαξας ἐρωτη- 5 σαντα τὸ ὁσιον, ὦτι ποτ’ εὖ. ἀλλά μοι εἰπεῖς, ὦτι τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὁσιον ὦν, ὦ σού νῦν ποιεῖς, φόνον ἐπεξιών τῷ πατρί.

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἔλεγον, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἱσως. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ ἄλλα 10 πολλὰ φής εἶναι ὁσια.

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ γάρ ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὦτι οὐ τοῦτο σοι διεκελεύομην, ἐν τι ἡ δύο με διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν ὁσίων, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνῳ αὑτὸ τὸ εἴδος, ὦ πάντα τὰ ὁσια ὁσιά ἔστιν; ἐφησθα

6 38. μη ἄλον (sc. ταυτά) γε (sc. φαθ’): μη’ is deprecatory, RD. § 136; for μη μόνον γε . . . ἄλλα: see RD. § 157.— ἄρτι: refers to 6 B. 39. περὶ τῶν θείων: here almost = περὶ τῶν θεῶν, which text is implied in the Armenian Version. 40. εὐ οἴδ’ ὦτι: certainly. HA. 1049. 1 a. Here εὐ οἴδα is parenthetical, and ὦτι is superfluous. Cp. Apol. 37 B ὥσ εὐ οἴδ’ ὦτι κακῶν οὐντον and Dem. 9. i πάντων οἴδ’ ὦτι φημαντων γ’ ἄν, and see Frohberger on Lys. 13. 9 (App.).

VII. 1. οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζομι: I should not be surprised. Note that Socrates does not deny ἐκπλα-

γήσει. 2. διηγήσει: jussive fut., 6 C HA. 844; G. 1265; B. 583, n. 1: GMT. 69. 5. ὦτι ποτ’ εὖ: see note D on 3 D. 8. ἔλεγον: GMT. 57.

9. ἀλλὰ γάρ: introduces an objection; γάρ is not for, HA. 1050. 4 d; B. 441. n. 2; RD. § 147. The collocation is common. Cp. 9 C. 14 B. 14. εἴδος . . . ἱδέα: see note on 5 D. Here the terms are evidently identical in meaning. It is the notion that is desired. — the conception, or the essential characteristic in virtue of which things are, and are called, what they are. Here ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἴδος; and ταύτην . . . αὑτὴν . . . τήν ἱδάν. below, 1. 18, have no
15 γάρ που μιᾶ ιδέα τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια: ἦ οὐ μενμονεύεις;  
ΕΥΘ. Ἑγώγε.  
Σ. Ταύτην τούνων με αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ἰδέαν, τὶς ποτὲ ἐστὶν, ὅνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτὴ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἃν τοιοῦτον ἦ, ὃν ἃν ἦ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τίς πράττῃ, φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, ὃ δὲ ἃν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ.  
ΕΥΘ. 'Ἀλλ' εἰ οὖτω βούλει, ὄ Σῶκρατες, καὶ οὖτω σοι φράσω.  
25 Σ. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν βούλομαι γε.

6 D reference to hypostatized Ideas (see note on 5 D), but αὐτὸς marks the notion as at once essential and by itself, that is, distinguished from all else.

E: 19. εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων κτλ.: looking to it and employing it as a model. ἀποβλέπω in untechnical language means 'to have regard to,' 'to glance at': cp. Phaedo 115 C. Symp. 220 E. Here the notion is only a norm serviceable as a test to insure correct thinking. Cp. Gorg. 474 D τί δὲ τὸδε: τὰ καλὰ πάντα . . . εἰς οὓδεν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἐκάστοτε καλὰ; 'But, sir.—all objects of beauty, do you not look to some model and so pronounce them beautiful on each occasion?' See also Gorg. 503 D. Meno 72 C. But the figure of the παραδείγμα played a large part in Plato's thought. For him the object of thought and 'being' or 'reality' are of necessity identical: hence, by a natural inference, the norm of true thinking becomes the absolutely real. 6 E This is the foundation for the traditional Theory of Ideas. Good instances of the technical use of παραδείγμα are Parm. 132 D, Rep. 472 C, and Tim. 28 A: but the untechnical meaning may be found in any dialogue, as e.g. Legg. 630 C. Note that ἐκείνην and αὐτῇ refer to the same object. RD. § 49. Usually ἐκείνος is employed for second mention, as in 14 D, but instances of the reverse order are not infrequent. Cp. Frohberger on Lys. 14. 28 (App.). For constr. of παραδείγματι, see HA. 777 a. 20. ὃν: for τοίτων ἂν, HA. 996; G. 1032. 24. φράσω: 'will declare, make clear.' Cp. 10 Α ἄλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσμοι συ- φέστερον φράσω καὶ 6 C πειρῶ συφέστερον εἰπεῖν. 25. ἄλλα μὴν . . . γε: 'but, indeed. I do wish.'  
SECOND DEFINITION: 'What is agreeable to the gods is holy; what is not, is unholy.'
EUY. "Esti toinew to men tois theois prosofiles osion, to de mhe | prosofiles anosion.

ΣΩ. 30. Παγκάλως, δ' Ευθύφρον, και ως εγώ εξητουν ἀποκρίνασθαι σε, οὕτω νῦν ἀπεκρίνω. εἰ μέντοι ἀληθές, τοῦτο οὕτω σίδα, ἀλλὰ σὺ δῆλον ὅτι ἐπεκδιδάξεις, ως ἔστιν ἀληθῆ ὁ λέγεις.

ΕΥΘ. Πάνω μέν οὖν.

VIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἐπισκεψόμεθα, τί λέγομεν. τὸ μὲν θεοφίλες τε καὶ ὁ θεοφιλής ἀὔθρωπος ὅσιος, τὸ δὲ θεομιστες καὶ ὁ θεομιστὴς ἀνόσιος οὔ ταύτων δ' ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντιώτατον τὸ ὁσιον τῷ ἀνοσίω. oyx ouitws (eirhetai);

ΕΥΘ. Οὐτω μέν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εὖ γε φαίνεται εἰρήσθαι; |

VI. 1. τὶ λέγομεν: cp. τὶ 7 A λέγει. 9 E. The question asked is whether what is said be true or false: cp. the phrases. τὸ λέγειν 'to speak truth.' οὔ δέ εἰς λέγειν 'to say what is not true,' and Hipp. Mac. 296 A ὡς φοβοῦμαι. τὶ ποτ' αὖ λέγομεν. 'I am greatly concerned whether what we now say be true or false.' Probable τὶ δὴ οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου. 10 C. is to be understood in the same sense. 2. ταύτων . . . τὸ ἐναντιώτατον: both words in pred., but the former regularly has the art. the latter often, esp. when, as here. it = the diametrical opposite: cp. τὰν τοῦναντίον. 5 D. Note the postponement of δὲ to third place, possibly to avoid οὖ δὲ, as Schanz suggests, though the combination does occur, as e.g. Rep. 328 C. 5. oyx ouitws (eirhetai); cp. 5 D.
EYΩ. Δοκώ, ὡ Σώκρατες. [εἰρήται γάρ.]

ΣΩ. Όνκοιν καὶ ὅτι στασιάζονσιν οἱ θεοὶ, ὡ Εὐθύ-φρον, καὶ διαφέρονται ἄλληλοις καὶ ἔχθρα ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἄλληλους, καὶ τούτο εἰρήται;

EYΩ. Εἴρηται γάρ.

ΣΩ. ᾿Εχθραν δὲ καὶ ὅργας, ὡ ἄριστε, ἣ περὶ τίνων διαφορὰ ποιεῖ; ὥδε δὲ σκοπῶμεν. ᾿ἀρ’ ἄν εἰ διαφε-

Ροϊμεθα ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ, ὅποτερα πλεῖω. ἣ περὶ τούτων διαφορὰ ἔχθροις ἄν ἡμᾶς ποιοῖ καὶ ὅργιζοθαί ἄλληλοις. ᾿η ἐπὶ λογισμὸν ἐλθόντες περὶ γε τῶν τοιούτων ταχῦ ἄν | ἀπαλλαγέωμεν;

EYΩ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Όνκοιν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος εἰ διαφεροῖμεθα. ἐπὶ τὸ μετρεῖν ἐλθόντες ταχῦ παν-

σαιμεθ’ ἄν τῆς διαφορᾶς:

8 B. δοκώ: here = δοκεὶ μου, it seems so to me. There are numerous examples: as. e.g., Rep. 473 D. 554 B. The Greek tended strongly to use pers. expressions for impers. See note on 14 B. 10. ἄλληλοισ: ΗΑ. 772: Γ. 1175; Β. 392. Contrast ΗΑ. 748; Γ. 1117: Β. 362. 1. εἰρήται γάρ: in 6 A fl. γάρ is often thus used in brief answers. Сρ. καὶ γάρ ἐστιν 6 D. 12. ἔχθραν δὲ καὶ ὅργας: noteworthy, because such expressions are usually assimilated to the same number: here ὅργαίδμεραι are probably conceived as particular outbursts of passion resulting from the disposition. ἔχθρα. Сρ. Eur. Med. 1150 ὅργας ἀφήμει καὶ χύλον νεώνιδος. 14. ἀρ’ ἄν . . . ἄν: for repetition of ἄν, see ΗΑ. 864; Γ. 1312; Β. 439, ν. 2; GS. 467. 15. ὅποτερα πλεῖω: 7 B plur., because several aggregates are compared, and the decision is reached by reducing them to number. 17. ἥ: does not here introduce the second part of a double question proper. We should say, ‘should we not rather,’ etc. The second clause excludes the first. — περὶ γε: for position of γε, see ΗΑ. 1037. 1 a. 20. περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος: the terms are correlates and together make out the single notion. size: hence the art. is not repeated. So in 1. 25, περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρον τε καὶ κοινοφόρον, i.e. weight. 8 D περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων. When the art. is repeated the substantives are viewed as independent of each other, or they may be contrasted.
ΕΥΘ. 'Εστι ταύτα.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπὶ γε τὸ ἱστάναι ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἐγώμαι,
25 περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κονφοτέρου διακριθέ¬
μεν ἂν;
ΕΥΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; 
ΣΩ. Περὶ τῶν δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα
κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἔχθροί γε ἂν ἀλλήλοις
30 εἶμεν καὶ ὀργιζούμεθα; ἵσως οὐ πρόχειρον σοὶ ἐστιν,
ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ λέγοντος | σκόπει, εἰ τάδε ἐστὶ τὸ τε δίκαιον θ
καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ
κακὸν. ἀρα οὐ ταῦτα ἐστιν, περὶ δὲν διενεχθέντες καὶ
οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἰκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθέιν ἔχθροι
35 ἀλλήλοις γυγνόμεθα, ὅταν γυγνόμεθα, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ
καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι πάντες;
ΕΥΘ. 'Ἀλλ' ἐστιν αὐτῇ ἡ διαφορά, ὁ Σώκρατες,
καὶ περὶ τοῦτων.
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ οἱ θεοὶ, ὁ Εὐθύφρων; οὐκ εἴπερ τι δια¬
40 φέρονταί, διὰ ταῦτα διαφέροντ' ἂν;

7 C See Krüger. 58. 2. 1 : RD. § 237. 
Note 9 C τὸ ὀσιν καὶ μή. 15 E τὰ
tε ὀσιν καὶ μή. 12 E τὰ τε ἐνθεὶ
καὶ οὔσα καὶ τὰ μή. 22. τῆς δια¬
φορᾶς: ΗΑ. 748; G. 1117; B. 362. 1.

24. τὸ ἱστάναι : weighing. 
Usually the verb has some addi¬
tion, such as ζυγ. ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ, ἐν
tῷ ζυγ. οὐ σταμμ. As here, 
Ar. Pax. 1249. 28. περὶ τίνος
dε . . . καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν: ΗΑ. 1012; G. 1601. The phrase ἐπὶ
tίνα κρίσιν = ἐπὶ τίνος κρίσιν by a
transference quite common in Lat.: cp. ob eam iram. Livy
21. 52, and similar examples. 
31. ἐμοὶ λέγοντος: for the gen.
abs.. see τὸ δὲ σου ἐνενόρησα 7 C
ἀμα λέγοντος. 9 C.—τὸ τε δίκαιον D
. . . καὶ κακὸν: in appos. with
tάδε. For the omission of the
art.. see note above on l. 20. Cp.
Gorg. 450 D οἶν ᾗ ἀριθμητικὴ
cαὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ
πεπτερικῆ γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλάι
tέχναι. For the thought, cp. Alc.
I. 111 E ff. 35. ὅταν γυγνόμεθα: 
not quite, but almost = ἐκάστοτε.
The limitation is important, since it
is quite possible to differ with¬
out hatred. 37. αὐτῇ: in the
pred. and = τοιμιᾷ. 39. τί δὲ
οἱ θεοὶ: ‘but what of the
gods?’ Cp. τί δὲ ἡ ναυπηγοῖς
ὑπηρετικῆ; 13 D, and Ἀρόλ. 25 A
ΕΥΘ. Πολλῇ ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἄρα, ὦ γενναίε | Εὐθύφρον, ἐ ἀλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια ἡγούνται κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἁγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ: οὐ γὰρ ἂν πον ἐστασιάζου ἄλληλοις, εἰ μὴ περὶ τοῦτων διεφέροντο· ἤ γάρ;

ΕΥΘ. Ὠρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀπερ καλὰ ἡγούνται ἐκαστοι καὶ ἁγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ταῦτα καὶ φιλοῦσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τοῦτων μισοῦσιν;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δέ γε, ὡς σὺ φῆς, οἱ μὲν δίκαια ἡγούνται. οἱ δὲ ἄδικα: περὶ α καὶ ἀμφίσβητοντες | στα- σίαζοντες τε καὶ πολεμοῦσιν ἄλληλοις. ἄρα οὐχ οὖτω;

ΕΥΘ. Οὔτω.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔσχεκέν, μισεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν καὶ φιλεῖται, καὶ θεομισή τε καὶ θεοφιλή ταῦτ' ἂν εἰη.

7 D τι δέ οἱ βουλευταί: τι δέ here is akin to the usage seen in 4 A and 8 B. Cp. also τι δέ δή, 14 A. — εἴπερ τι διαφέροντα: note the restriction, which is regular with εἴπερ; it implies disbelief of the alleged dissensions among the gods. Cp. the clauses with εἴπερ in 8 DE. The clause states the general hypothesis, and διαφέροντα ἂν is the apod. of a particular ideal supposition, not expressed, which is based upon it. Cp. Άπολ. 29 D. See note on ταῦτ' ἂν εἰη, 8 A.

41. πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ: Plato is fond of reënforcing ἀνάγκη, in the manner of colloquial speech. with such words as ἀπασά (Rep. 381 C), πάσα (Phaedo 67 Α), and μεγάλη (Rep. 485 E), besides 7 D πολλῆ, which occurs most freq. 43. ἀλλοι ἄλλα: ΠΔ. 704 a. E 46. ἦ γάρ: 'is it not so?' 52. ταῦτα δέ γε: γε belongs to ταῦτα, yielding its normal position to δέ. Other instances of δέ γε are 10 E, 13 B, 14 A. 57. ταῦτ' ἂν εἰη: for accent of 8 A ταῦτ', see ΠΔ. 107; G. 120. The opt. is potential: the deferential hesitation is assumed in the interest of urbanity, not to express a real doubt. Cp. 13 D ὑπηρετικὴ τις ἂν, ὡς ἔσχεκνε, εἰη θεῶς; 14 E ἐπιστήμη ἄρα αἰτη- σεως καὶ δότεως θεῶς Ὀμόστησ ζ ἂν εἰη; 14 E ἐμπορική ἄρα τις ἂν εἰη. On this use of the potential opt., see ΠΔ. 434-436. The
ΕΥΘ. Ἐοικέν.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁσία ἄρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἀν εἴη, ὦ
60 Εὐθύφρον, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.
ΕΥΘ. Κινδυνεύει.
IX. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὁ ἤρομην ἀπεκρίνω, ὥς θαυμασία. οὐ γὰρ τούτῳ γε ἤροτων, ὁ τυγχάνει ταυτὸν ὃν ὁσίον τε καὶ ἀνόσιον. ὃ δὲ ἀν θεοφιλεῖς ὦ, καὶ θεομετοχαί ἐστιν, ὥς ἐοικέν. ὡστε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ὦ σὺ ἐν ἑνὶ ποιεῖς τὸν πατέρα κολάζων, οὐδὲν θαυμαστῶν, Β ἐὰν τούτῳ δρῶν τῷ μὲν Διὸ προσφιλές ποιεῖς, τῷ δὲ Κρόνῳ καὶ τῷ Ὀὐρανῷ ἔχθρον. καὶ τῷ μὲν Ἡφαίστῳ φίλου, τῇ δὲ Ἡρᾷ ἔχθρον· καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος τῶν θεῶν ἐτέρῳ ἐτέρῳ διαφέρεται περὶ αὐτὸν, καὶ ἐκείνων κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ.

8 A tone of diffident question or assertion is peculiarly appropriate to Socrates, since he professes to seek instruction from Euthyphro.

60. τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ: · on this view ·; others understand, · acc. to your definition. · λόγος clearly = · definition · in 9 D. The opinion is not adopted by Socrates, and contradicts 7 A.

61. κινδυνεύειν: see note on 2 C.

IX. 2. ὅ τυγχάνει κτλ.: · that which, while self-identical, is holy as well as unholy ·; cp. 5 D. 7 A. Here ταυτὸν ὃν go together, and the ὃν usual with τυγχάνει is omitted, on which see HA. 984 a.; GMT. 902. 3. δὲ δὲ ἀν θεοφιλεῖς ὦ: HA. 914 B.; G. 1431; GMT. 532. 4. ὡστε: consequently; cp. 9 C.

6. τούτῳ δρῶν: just as ὦτος (cp. 7 B καὶ τούτῳ εἰρηται) and ὦτῳ (cp. 9 D ἐὰν τούτῳ ὑποθέμενος ὦτῳ . . . διδαξεῖς) are used in referring to that which has just been described, so too δρῶν resumes the verb, as we use · do ·; τούτῳ (or αὐτῷ) δρῶν is the standing phrase for · to do so. · See Morris on Thucyd. 5. 2. Note ποιεῖν in ὦ σὺ ἐν ἑνὶ ποιεῖς τὸν πατέρα κολάζων. 1. 5. and δρῶν in τις ἐστιν ὃ ἀδικῶν καὶ τί δρῶν, 8 D. 8. τῇ δὲ Ἡρᾷ ἔχθρον: Hera cast her son Hephaestus from Olympus into Oceanus because he was born lame; he, in revenge, sent her a golden throne with secret chains with which she was bound when she sat upon it. See Hom. Σ. 394–405. Pausan. i. 20. 2. Allusion is made to the legend also in Rep. 378 D. 9. καὶ ἐκεῖνοι: sc. τούτῳ δρῶν τῷ μὲν φίλον ποιεῖς τῷ δὲ ἔχθρον. Here ἐὰν τις ἄλλος implies a plurality of gods; hence the plural.
ΕΥΘ. 'ΑΛΛ' οὕμαι, ὃ Σώκρατες, περὶ γε τοῦτον τῶν θεῶν οὐδένα έτερον έτέρω διαφέρεσθαι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι ἐκείνων, ὡς ἂν ἀδίκως τινὰ ἀποκτείνῃ.

ΣΩ. Τί δεί; Ἀνθρώπων, ὃ Εὐθύφρον, ἢ δὴ τώδες ἢκουσας ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὡς τὸν ἀδίκως ἀποκτείνατα ὡς ἂν ἀδίκως ποιοῦντα ὡς οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται ταῦτα ἀμφισβητοῦντες καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις. ἀδίκουντες γὰρ πάμπολλα, πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγουντες τὴν δίκην.

ΣΩ. 'Ἡ καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὃ Εὐθύφρον, ἀδίκειν, καὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ὁμοσ οὐ δεῖν φασὶ σφᾶς διδόναι δίκην;

8 C 12. έτερον έτέρω κτλ.: *maintain, in opposition one to another, that he ought not.* For the dat., see HA. 772; G. 1175; B. 392. 2. Cp. ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὡς . . . οὐ δὲ, l. 15, and l. 26 λέγειν οὐδ' ἀμφισβητεῖν. ὡς οὐχι. The phrases are treated like ordinary verbs of denying (HA. 1029 a) and approximate, as the last-quoted passage shows, to simple indir. disc. 13. ἐκείνον, ὃς ἂν: see note on δ' ἂν θεοφιλές ἡ 8 A. Cp. also 9 AD. — ἀδίκως: Euthyphro is begging the question.


— ἀμφισβητοῦντες: HA. 981; G. 1580; B. 660. 20. πάντα ποιοῦσι: like πάν ποιεῖν. freq. implies unscrupulousness; cp. ποιοῦργος, ποιοῦργειν. 21. φεύγουντες: conative, HA. 825; G. 1255; B. 523. Cp. Ἀπολ. 38 D. The verb has not its technical meaning of 'being a defendant.' See Gorg. 479 B. 22. ὁμολογοῦσιν . . . ἀδίκειν: usually ἀδίκοιμοιτες; the inf. here probably because of the following part., HA. 981; G. 1581: B. 660. I. N. Cp. Arist. Rhet. 1358b 30 ff. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἂν ἀμφισβητήσανεν, οἰνὸν δ' ἀκαζόμενον ὡς οὐ γέγονεν ἢ οὐκ ἐβλασφην· ὥστε δ' ἄδικειν οὐδέποτε ἂν ὁμολογήσειν· οὔδέν γὰρ ἂν ἐδει δίκης. About the rest sometimes they would not enter denial, e.g., the defendant would not deny that the thing had occurred, or that he had dealt the blow; but he would never admit that he was in the wrong. See, however, Auct. ad Hereinn. 2. 16. 24. 23. οὐ δεῖν φασί: accent and position mark φασὶ for emphasis; the normal order occurs, l. 28, οὐ φασῖν ἀδίκειν.
ΕΥΘ. Ουδόμος τούτο γε.
25 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν γε ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι. τοῦτό γάρ, οἴμαι, οὐ τολμᾶτε λέγειν οὐδ’ ἄμφισβητεῖν, ὡς οὐχί, εἰπέρ ἀδικοῦσί γε, | δοτέον δίκην· ἀλλ’, οἴμαι, D οὐ φασίν ἀδικεῖν. ἤ γάρ.
ΕΥΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
30 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἔκεινό γε ἄμφισβητοῦσιν, ὡς οὐ τῶν ἀδικοῦντες δεῖ διδόναι δίκην· ἀλλ’, ἐκεῖνο ᾳως ἄμφισβητοῦσι, τὸ τίς ἔστιν ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ τί δρῶν καὶ πότε.
ΕΥΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
35 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτά γε ταῦτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόνθασιν, εἰπερ στασιάζουσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἁδικών, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, καὶ οἱ μὲν φασίν ἄλλους ἀδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ...
οὐ φασὶν; επεὶ ἐκεῖνο γε δῆπον, ὦ θαυμᾶσθε, οὐδές οὔτε θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων | τολμᾷ λέγειν, ὡς οὐ τῷ Ἑ
40 γε ἄδικοντι δοτέον δίκην.

ΕΥΘ. Νάι, τούτῳ μὲν ἄληθες λέγεις, ὦ Σωκράτες, τὸ κεφάλαιον.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐκαστὸν γε, οἶμαι, ὡς Εὐθύφρων, τῶν πραχθέντων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν, εἴπερ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν θεοὶ. πράξεως τινος πέρι διαφέρομενοι οἱ μὲν δικαίως φασίν αὐτὴν πεπράχθαι, οἱ δὲ ἄδικως· ἄρ' οὐχ οὔτω;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνω γε.

Χ. ΣΩ. Ἡθι νυν, ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρων, δίδαξον καί ἐμέ, ἵνα σοφότερος γένωμαι, τί σοι τεκμηρίῳν ἔστιν, 9

8 D 38. δῆπον: assuredly, more E confident than ποιν. 39. τολμᾷ λέγειν: 'has the effrontery to say.' — τῷ γε ἄδικοντι: ΗΑ. 991; G. 1597; B. 666. Here γε indicates that his guilt is admitted; for its position, see ΗΑ. 1037. 1 a. 40. δίκην: ΗΑ. 990; G. 1597; B. 666. 41. τούτῳ μὲν ἄληθες λέγεις: note μὲν solitarium. With the form of the sent. cp. Gorg. 461 D τῶν τούτῳ λέγεις = τί ἔστι τούτῳ ὀ λέγεις. Alc. I. 109 B δανίων τούτῳ γε ἐρωτᾶς, and above 3 C οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἄληθες εἶρηκα. ΗΑ. 618, and 1012 a. But ἄληθες λέγεις (like ἄληθή λέγεις) is practically = ἄληθεν; cp. Μενο 98 B. Lach. 186 A, Dem. 7. 43. 42. τὸ κεφαλαίον: 'in the main.' ΗΑ. 626 b; B. 318. The reservation is due entirely to embarrassment, not to any exception that he intends to urge. 45. πράξεως τινος πέρι: explanatory asyndeton. ΗΑ. 1039. The emphatic position of πράξεως E denotes that the gods differ among themselves in their judgment of the action, not about administering or withholding punishment of admitted guilt. For πέρι, see ΗΑ. 109 a; G. 116. 1; B. 68.

X. 1. Ἡθι νυν: 'come now.' νυν is illative, not temporal. B. 582. Χ. 2. τὶ σοι τεκμηρίῳν ἔστιν: Socrates here asks for a demonstrative proof that the gods one and all judge the conduct of Euthyphro’s father to be wrong. Since the τεκμηρίον is an infallible mark or criterion, the question is tantamount to a demand for a definition of the essential nature of the ὀσιον, as against the accidental mark of being agreeable to the gods (θεοφιλές). In stating the question, the repellent details are purposely dwelt upon, to emphasize the need of a criterion.
διερευνώντες τά διακρίτας τεθνάναι, ὦν θητεύων ἀνδροφόνοις γενόμενος, ἐνδεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ
deσπότου τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, ἐφάση τελευτήσας διὰ
tὰ δεσμά, πρὶν τὸν ἐνυδήσαντα παρὰ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν
περὶ αὐτοῦ πυθέσθαι, τί χρῆ ποιεῖν, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ
tοιούτου δὴ ὀρθῶς ἐχεῖ ἐπεξείναι καὶ ἐπισκήπτεσθαι
φονοῦ τὸν ὑὸν τῷ πατρί. ἦθι, περὶ τούτων πειρῶ τί

μοι σαφῆς ἐνδεικεῖσθαι, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πάντες
θεοὶ ἧγοονται ὀρθῶς ἐχεὶν ταύτην τῆν πράξιν· κάν

Β μοι ἰκανῶς ἐνδεικτηκαί ἐγκωμιάζων σε ἐπὶ σοφία ὀψῆ-
pοτε παύσωμαι.

ΕΥΘ. 'Ἀλλ' ἵσως οὐκ ὅλιγον ἔργον ἐστίν, ὦ Σω-
krates: ἐπεὶ πάνυ γε σαφῶς ἔχομι ἀν ἐπιδεῖξαι σοι.

9. 3. πάντες θεοὶ: in 9 E we
read πάντες οἱ θεοὶ: the phrases are practically equivalent; for
distinctions, see HA. 672. — ἐκεῖνον . . . ὦν ἂν: see note on 8 A.
— τεθνάναι: pass., see HA. 820;
B. 513. Note ἀποθανόντος. l. 5,
and see HA. 530. 4 a. 5. φθάσῃ
tελευτήσας: HA. 984; G. 1586;
B. 660. N. φθάνειν may be constr.
c. inf. after πρῶτον or after ἐπτερον
ἡ, πρῶτην, or η. 6. τὰ δεσμὰ: only
here neut. in Plato; cp. δεσμοῖς
Rep. 378 D. See Rutherford,
New Phrynichus, p. 353. — τῶν
ἐξήγητῶν: see note on 4 C. Here
the entire college is meant: before
only its president was referred to.
8. ἰθί: note the tone of contempt.
— ἐπισκήπτεσθαι: techn. term in
Att. law for denounce. This verb,
like ἐπεξείναι and ἐγκαλεῖν, takes
the dat. of the person and the
gen. of the charge. 9. τὸν υὸν
tῷ πατρί: note the forceful juxta-
position; cp. 4 E.— ἦθι: resumes 9 A
ἰθί νυν. l. 1. 10. παντὸς μᾶλλον:
'beyond a doubt'; originally,
'more than anything.' 11. καν: B
and if. 12. ἐγκωμιάζων . . . παύ-
σωμαι: HA. 981; G. 1580; B.
281 C. 291 A. Synp. 206 B. Memo
70 A. 14. οὐκ ὅλιγον ἔργον: cp.
Rep. 369 B. Phaedr. 272 B. Soph.
217 B. See 14 B πλείονος ἔργον
ἔστίν. Euthyphro is trying to
evade the difficulty. 15. ἐπεὶ
πάνυ γε: on ἐπεὶ . . . γε. here
and in l. 17. see note on 4 C.
— ἐπιδεῖξαι: Socrates has used
ἐπιδεῖξαι = ἀποδεῖξασθαι. prove
by argument. It is tempting to
consider this as a fine bit of
characterization of Euthyphro,
who desires, like the Sophists, to
persuade Socrates in a set speech
(ἐπιδεῖξις); but the inference is
not necessary, as ἐπιδείκνυμι is
used elsewhere just as ἐνδείκνυμι
Σω. Μανθάνω· ὅτι σοι δοκῆς τῶν δικαστῶν δυσμαθέστερος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ἐκείνοις γε ἐνδείξει δῆλον ὅτι, ὡς ἀδικά τε ἐστὶν καὶ οἱ θεοὶ ἄπαντες τὰ τοιαῦτα μισοῦν.

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε σαφῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάνπερ ἄκουσί γε μοι λέγοντος.

XI. Σω. Ἀλλ' ἄκουσοντι· ἐάνπερ εὑ δοκῆς | λέγειν. τὸδε δέ σου ἐνενόησα ἀμά λέγοντος, καὶ τὸς ἐμαυτὸν σκοπῶ· εἰ ὃτι μάλιστα με Ἐυθύφρων διδάξειν, ὡς οἱ θεοὶ ἄπαντες τὸν τοιοῦτον θανάτον ἤγονται ἀδικον εἶναι. τί μᾶλλον ἐγὼ μεμάθηκα παρ' Ἐυθύφρωνος, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ὁσίον τε καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον;

is said to have stood deep in 9C thought from one dawn to the next. The Sophists introduced an age of subjectivity in the sense of that which is not rational, and cannot be communicated (see Gorgias); Socrates represents the rational subjectivity which seeks in the mind the criteria, not only of knowledge, but of reality. And dialectic, the logical instrument for the attainment of truth, is, according to Plato, a dialogue of the soul with itself (Theaet. 189 E. Soph. 263 E). This is merely a theoretical statement of that which Socrates habitually practised. — εἰ ὃτι μάλιστα: see note on 4 D. — Ἐυθύφρων...παρ' Ἐυθύφρωνος: familiar tone; repetition for emphasis.

4. διδάξειν...μεμάθηκα: the perf. stands for a fut. pl., GS. 234. The change from the regular opt. is in the interest of vividness.
(θεομισές μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ὡς ἐσικεῖν, εἴῃ ἀν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτῳ ἐφάνη ἄρτι ὁρισμένα τὸ ὁσιον καὶ μὴ· τὸ γὰρ θεομισές ὅν καὶ θεοφιλές ἐφάνη· ὁστε τούτου μὲν ἀφιήμι σε, ὡς Eὐθύφρων· εἰ βούλει, πάντες αὐτὸ | ήγεισθων θεοὶ ἀδικον καὶ πάντες μισούντων. ἀλλ' ἄρα τοῦτο νῦν ἐπανορθώμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς ὃ μὲν ἄν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον ἐστώ, ὃ δ' ἄν φιλῶσιν, ὁσιον· ὃ δ' ἄν οἱ μὲν φιλῶσιν, οἱ δὲ μισῶσιν, οὐδέτερα ἡ ἀμφότερα; ἄρ' οὐτω βούλει ήμῖν ὁρίσθαι νῦν περὶ τοῦ ὁσιον καὶ τοῦ ἄνοσιον;

ΕΥΘ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὡ Σώκρατες;
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἐμὲ γε, ὡ Eὐθύφρων, ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ τὸ

9 C 7. θεομισές μὲν γὰρ κτλ.: parenthetical. Socrates has said that he has conceived the thought that even if all the gods regarded the deed in question as unjust, he would not have ascertained the nature of the holy and the unholy. That, he remarks parenthetically, would only prove that all the gods hated the deed, not (he implies) that the deed was unholy, because, owing to the confusion of θεομισές and θεοφιλές, reference to the love or hatred of the gods (τοῦτῳ) had failed to discriminate between the holy and the unholy. Hence he will rule out this count and demand a defense of it (ὁστε τοῦτου μὲν ἀφιήμι σε). Cp. ἀφιέ (με) δίκης 9 B). He then resumes his new line of thought abruptly in εἰ βούλει. See App. 8. ἄρτι: refers to the argument in 6 E ff. 10. εἰ βούλει: explanatory asyndeton, HA. 1039. Cp. Ἐνθυδ. 285 B. 11. ήγεισθων ... 9 D μισούντων: the inv. makes an assumption for the sake of argument. GMT. 254. 12. ἐπανορθώμεθα κτλ.: 'amend our definition to the effect that.' 14. δ' δ' ἄν οἱ μὲν κτλ.: the clause retains in full its original cond. force; if taken as a serious admission of the existence of such objects, it would set aside the definition it purports to explain. Even the condition is purely formal. 15. οὐδέτερα: HA. 635 a; RD. §§ 17, 42. Cp. ἦ δῆλα δῆ, 4 B. 16. ἡμῖν: HA. 769; G. 1186; B. 380. 17. τί γὰρ κω-

λύει: note the nonchalant tone. Cp. Charm. 163 A τί γὰρ κωλύει: ἔφη. Οὐδὲν ἐμὲ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. 18. τὸ σὸν σκότει, εἰ: virtually = σκότει. εἰ στὸ γε, as Schanz says. With τὸ σὸν one may supply μέρος. 'interest,' but the expression is phraseological. For εἰ, see HA. 1016; G. 1605; B. 578.
σὸν σκόπει, εἰ τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος οὐτω ῥᾴστα μὲ

didάξεις ὡ ὑπέσχου.

ΕΥΘ. 'Ἀλλὰ ἐγώνε ἑαυτῷ ἄν τοῦτο εἶναι | τὸ ὅσιον, ἔ
ο ἄν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, ἔ ἄν
πάντες θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπισκοπὸμεν αὐ ὁ τοῦτο, ὡ Ἐνθύφρον,
εἰ καλῶς λέγεται, ἢ ἐδώμεν καὶ οὖτω ἡμῶν τε αὐτῶν
ἀποδεχόμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εὰν μόνον φῇ τίς τι
ἐξειν οὖτω, ἐξυγχρο ὑποτευτεῦσ ἑσεῖν: ἢ σκεπτέον, τί λέγει
ὁ λέγων;

ΕΥΘ. Σκεπτεόν. οἶμαι μέντοι ἐγώγε τοῦτο νῦν
καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

Χ. Σ. Τάχ', ὡ γαθέ, βέλτιον εἰσόμεθα. ἐν-

vόσον γὰρ | τὸ τοιόνδε· ἄρα τὸ ὅσιον, ὡτὶ ὅσιον

19. τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος: 'on that assumption': ὑπόθεσις is an
assumption made for purely dia-
lectical purposes to be employed
consistently until it may break
down. With οὖτω, which re-
sumes τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος, the con-
sequence or result is emphasized
by the verb. GMT. 857. Cp.
Phaedo 67 DE. 115 A.

Second Definition Amended:
'Holiness is what all the
gods love; unholiness, on the
contrary, is what all the gods
abhor.' At this point one of the
incidental gains of the dialogue
is reached: it is virtually con-
ceded that if the traditional re-
ligion is to be made available as
a support to moral conduct, the
caprice of the polytheistic deities
must be eliminated by assuming
that they are in agreement on all
essentials. But this is practi-
cally monotheism.

25. καλῶς λέγεται: see note on
παγκάλως. 7 A. — οὖτω . . . ἀπο-
δεχόμεθα: οὖτω = offhand, orig.
spoken with a wave of the hand.
See on ὡς οὖτω γ' ἀκοῦσαι. 3 A.
— ἡμῶν . . . αὐτῶν: ΗΑ. 742;
G. 1103; B. 356. 26. εὰν μόνον
. . . ἐχειν οὖτω: the clause is the obj.
of ἀποδεχόμεθα; ἐχειν οὖτω
and the following ἐχειν are phrase-
ological = to be so. 27. τί λέγει:
see note on τί λέγομεν. 7 A;
but λέγει may merely = mean.

1. τάχ': . . . εἰσόμεθα:
tάχα here = soon. Att. prose
uses τάχα with the fut. only in
this sense. Cp. Gorg. 450 C.
Phil. 53 E. Minos 314 C. Soph.
247 D. 2. ἄρα τὸ ὅσιον . . . 10 A
ὁσιον ἔστω: in the first case, τὸ
θεοφίλες would be only an acci-
έστιν, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἡ ὦτι φιλεῖται, ὦσιὸν ἔστιν;

5 ΕΥΘ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὦτι λέγεις, ὥ Σῶκρατες.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι σαφέστερον φράσαι. λέγομέν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρον καὶ ἀγόμενον καὶ

10 A dental quality of τὸ ὦσιὸν; in the second, it would constitute its essence. That is to say, if holiness were holiness because the gods loved it, then the fact of the gods' loving an act would be the first and essential point to determine in deciding whether the act was or was not holy; but if the gods loved holiness because it was holy, then its being holy would be a fact without the gods' loving it, and hence their loving it would not affect its nature. Of these alternatives, the first is established in the following argument; and hence it is proved that the second definition, even in its amended form, is inadequate. There is, however, a great gain achieved by the discussion at this point; for the argument virtually means that the essence of holiness is independent of the will of Deity, —that is to say, that the human spirit is as truly autonomous in the field of religion as in the field of philosophical truth generally, where it has always asserted its independence. Unfortunately the argument is not at first sight clear. Socrates sets up a series of distinctions, first between the active and the passive (10 A). This is done to prepare the way for the inquiry. 10 A The passive is singled out because it is necessary to the question, ἄρα τὸ ὦσιὸν ὦτι ὦσιὸν ἔστιν φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἡ ὦτι φιλεῖται ὦσιὸν ἔστιν; Noting the correlation of active and passive further emphasizes the verbal nature of the passive, as stating an act. Then a distinction is made between the passive verb φιλεῖται and the pass. part. φιλοίμενον when used periphrastically with the copula ἔστι (10 B ff.). The form φιλεῖται is used to denote the act, while the part. expresses the general character which is predicated in consequence of the (habitual) occurrence of the act. Then (10 D) φιλοίμενον ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν is identified with θεοφιλεῖς and later (11 A) with οἶον φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν. Cp. GS. 191 and W. J. Alexander, Participial Periphrases in Attic Prose, A. J. P. 4. 291 ff.

7. λέγομέν τι φερόμενον: this form of question is common in Plato, when he desires to lay the basis for an argument. See, in the Gorgias alone. 454 C, 463 E, 494 B, 495 C. Cp. Fritzsche ad Menon. 75 D. It appears to have been borrowed from Socrates; see Xen. Mem. 2. 2. 1;
As usual, the examples are chosen from the sphere of concrete fact, where the relations are easily grasped.

9. ἔτερα ἀλλήλων: H.A. 753 g; G. 1140; B. 362. 2. Cp. ἔτερων ἐτέρῳ διεφέρεται, 8 B. — ἡ: how, wherein. 13. πῶς γὰρ οὗ: common answer in strong assent. Cp. 10 D and πῶς δ’ οὗ; 14 A. γὰρ is of course confirmatory. 14. λέγε δὴ μοι: the student may find the meaning somewhat simplified if he will resort to some such device as the following: translate τὸ φερόμενον with what is carried; φέρεται, by putting it actively, with somebody carries it; and φερόμενον ἐστὶν with has the quality of ἀ to being carried. Say, ‘Tell me whether what is carried has the quality of being carried because somebody carries it, or for some other reason?’ Similarly in what follows. — διότι: chosen B here and in the following passage, instead of ὅτι, in order to point the parallel with δ’ ἀλλό τι. 16. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο: cp. 10 D, 12 D. Note the chias tic order. RD. § 305. The first question is emphatically affirmed after denying the second. See Deuschle-Cron on Gorg. 453 D. 21. τὸ ἐναντίον: H.A. 626 b; G. 915; B. 318; RD. § 18.
25 μενον. ἀρα κατάδηλον, ὃς Εὐθύφρον, ὃς Βούλομαι λέγειν; | Βούλομαι δὲ τόθε, ὅτι, εἰ τι γίγνεται ἢ τι ἐστιν πάσχει, οὐκ ὃτι γιγνόμενον ἐστὶ, γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ὃτι γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον ἐστὶν· οὖθ' ὃτι πάσχον ἐστὶν, πάσχει, ἀλλ' ὃτι πάσχει, πάσχον ἐστὶν. ἦν οὖν ἔπεισεν οὕτω;

ΕΥΘ. Ἐγωγέ.  
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ἡ γιγνόμενον τὶ ἐστὶν ἢ πάσχον τι ὑπὸ του;  
ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

35 ΣΩ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἀρα οὕτως ἔχει, ὡσπερ τὰ πρότερα· οὖθ' ὃτι φιλούμενον ἐστὶν, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ ὅν φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ὃτι φιλεῖται, φιλοὺμενον;  
ΕΥΘ. Ἄναγκη.
ΣΩ. Τῇ δὴ οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ οὐσίου, | ὃς Εὐθύφρον;  
ΕΥΘ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὅσιὸν ἐστὶν, ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι;  
ΕΥΘ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

45 ΣΩ. Διότι ἀρα ὅσιὸν ἐστὶν, φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' οὖθ' ὃτι φιλεῖται, διὰ τοῦτο ὅσιὸν ἐστὶν;  
ΕΥΘ. Ἐοικεν.

10C 27. πάσχει: ‘has something done to it’; used to convey what we mean by putting a verb into the passive. Cp. Theaet. 157 A and Gorg. 476 B ἀρα εἰ τις τι πανεί, ἀνάγκη τί εἴη καὶ πᾶσχον ὑπὸ τοῦτον τοῦ τοιούτου; where the entire argument should be compared. Note that the subj. of πάσχει (i.e. τι) is omitted. Cp. ἡ πάσχον τι in l. 33 below.

32. γιγνόμενον τι: like πάσχον, 10C in the pred. The variety of expressions is used because in some of the verbs the ‘passive’ idea is not prominent. 36. ὑπὸ ὅν: for ὑπὸ τοῦτον (ὑπὸ) διν. For the prep., see HA. 1007; G. 1025, 1032; B. 487, N. 40. ἄλλο τι D φιλεῖται: ἄλλο τι = ἄλλο τι ἦν. 15 C, nonne? Cp. HA. 1015 b; G. 1604; B. 573, N.; RD. § 22.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δή διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, φιλοῦμενόν ἐστὶ καὶ θεοφιλές (τὸ θεοφιλές).

50 ΕΥΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλές ὁσίων ἐστὶν, ὥς Εὐθύφρου, οὐδὲ τὸ ὁσίων θεοφιλές, ὥς σὺ λέγεις, ἀλλ’ ἕτερον τοῦτο τούτον.

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς δή, ὥ τ' Σώκρατες;
ΣΩ. Ὅτι ὄμολογούμεν τὸ μὲν ὁσίων διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι, ὤτι ὁσίων ἐστὶν, ἀλλ’ οὐ διότι φιλεῖται, ὁσίων εἶναι· ἥ γὰρ;

ΕΥΘ. Ναι.

ΧΙ. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ γε θεοφιλές ὤτι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλές εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὤτι θεοφιλές, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι.

ΕΥΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ εἰ γε ταύτ’ ἴν, ὡ φίλε Εὐθύφρου, τὸ
It [its being θεοφιλὲς is the effect of the gods’ loving it].

Now, taking these propositions as the basis of our argument, let us assume the identity of τὸ ὀσιὸν and τὸ θεοφιλὲς (their identity being necessary to the truth of Euthyphro’s contention), which will require that either term may at will be substituted for the other in any proposition. On this hypothesis, then,

If the gods’ loving τὸ ὀσιὸν is the effect of its being ὀσιὸν (A), then
the gods’ loving τὸ θεοφιλὲς would be the effect of its being θεοφιλὲς;

and

If τὸ θεοφιλὲς, being θεοφιλὲς, is the effect of the gods’ loving it (B), then
τὸ ὀσιὸν, being ὀσιὸν, would be the effect of the gods’ loving it.

But this is obviously not the case; for, acc. to our hypothesis, (B) the one (τὸ θεοφιλὲς), being of a character to be loved by the gods (θεοφιλὲς), is the effect of the gods’ loving it; whereas,

(A) the gods’ loving the other (τὸ ὀσιὸν) is the effect of its being of a character to be loved by the gods.

10. Εὐναντίως ἔχετον: ‘they are the opposite one of the other.’

The terms are not logical contradictionarys; but in the scheme here adopted one is the cause, the other is the effect of φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν. Aristotle employed the adv. as his tech. term for contradiction.— ὡς ὅντε: HA. 974; G. 1570; B. 658, n. 12. ὀσιὸν φιλεῖσθαι: HA. 1000; GMT. 759.

See note on 10. A. 1. 2. 14. τῇ μὲν οὐσίαν . . . πάθος δὲ τι: the passage shows that these terms were not yet common currency (cp. Phaedo 65 D. 78 C. 92 D, Meno 72 B). The οὐσία of an object is the sum of those qualities which must be included.
δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὅτι πέπονθε τούτο τὸ ὄσιον, 
φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων | θεῶν· ὅτι δὲ ὃν, οὕτω εἶπες. B 
eĩ οὖν σοι φίλον, μὴ μὲ ἀποκρύψῃ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν εἰπὲ 
ἔξ ἀρχῆς, τί ποτε ὃν τὸ ὄσιον εἰτε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν 
eἰτε ὁτιδή πάσχει· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τούτου διουσόμεθα· 
ἀλλ' εἰπε προθύμως, τί ἔστω τὸ τε ὄσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνό-
σιον;

ΕΥΘ lovely. Ἀλλ', ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἐγώγει, ὅπως 
σοι εἴπω ὁ νῦν. περιέρχεται γὰρ πώς ἦμιν ἂν ὁ ἄν 
25 προθύμωθα, καὶ οὐκ ἔθελε μένειν ὁποῦ ἄν ἰδρυσώ-
μεθα αὐτῷ.

ΣΩ. Τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, ἐοικεν

11 A in its definition as being essen-
tial [i.e., what a thing ‘is’ when one 
wishes to define it]; every 
other quality or possible predi-
cate, as being non-essential or 
‘accidental,’ is styled a πάθος. 
A similar mistake, in offering a 
πάθος for the ἄνασω, is made by 
Polus in Gorg. 448 C (cp. 448 E).

16. ὅτι πέπονθε: added to 
explain the new term πάθος, 
whereas φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων 
θεῶν serves to define ὅτι. See 
note on πάσχει. 10 C. 17. ὅτι 
δὲ ὃν: sc. φιλεῖται. Cp. τί 
pοτε ὃν . ὃν . . . φιλεῖται. 1. 19. 
The stress falls on ὃν as rep-
resenting the unfamiliar term 
ὁσιώ. It seems difficult to re-
duce the use of the interr. and 
the indef. rel. in indir. questions 
to a rule. Often both are used 
side by side, as Gorg. 448 E τὸς 
καὶ ὃντων followed immediately 
(449 A) by τὸς . . . καὶ τῶν. 
Morris on Thuc. 1. 136. 4 says,

"The rule is to say οἶδα σε ὃς εἰ. 11 B 
and οὐκ οἶδα σε ὃστις εἰ. But 
ὁστις is not seldom found after 
an affirmative, and ὃς sometimes 
after a negative." In Plato the 
exceptions are very numerous.

18. ἀποκρύψῃ: Η.Α. 724: G. 
1069; B. 340. 20. εἰτε ὁτιδὴ 
πάσχει: 'has any πάθος whatso-
ever': for ὁτιδή, see Η.Α. 1002 B.

23. ὅπως . . . εἴπω: here εἶπο
is the interr. subj. in indir. 
disc., GMT 677. 24. ὁ νῦν: 
cp. Lach. 194 AB. — περιέρχεται:
'walks about': cp. 15 B. βαδίζον-
tes. 27. τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου 
. . . Δαίδαλον: cp. Meno 97 DE. 
Anciently in Greece, though with 
far less regularity than in Egypt, 
the arts and trades passed from 
father to son: hence certain 
guilds called themselves by pa-
tronymics, as e.g., the Οὐριάδα, 
or rhapsodes, who collectively 
called Homer their eponymous 
ancestor. See Symp. 186 E.
εἶναι Δαίδαλον τὰ ύπό σοῦ | λεγόμενα καὶ εἰ μὲν c 
αὐτὰ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον καὶ ἐπιθέμην, ὅσως ἂν με ἐπέ-
σκωπτες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἐμοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑκεῖνου ἐξυγγέ-
νειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν τις αὐτὰ θῇ. νῦν δὲ σαί γὰρ ἀι ὑποθέσεις εἰσίν. ἀλλοῦ δὴ τινος δεῖ σκόμματος· οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλουσι σοὶ μένειν, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ σοι δοκεῖ. 

35 ἘΥΘ. 'Εμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ σκόμ-
ματος, ὡς Σῶκρατες, δεῖσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα· τὸ γὰρ 
περιεῖναι τούτοις τοῦτο καὶ μὴ μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ 
οὐκ ἐγὼ εἰμὶ ὁ ἐντιθεῖς, ἄλλα σὺ μοι δοκεῖς ὁ Ὃ

11 B Alc. I. 121 A. Socrates here 
humorously refers to the fact that 
both his father Sophroniscus and 
he belonged to the guild of stat-
uaries, who might properly call 
Daedalus their ancestor. Some 
improvements in the design of 
statues, by which they were re-
presented with arms free from 
their sides and with legs sepa-
rated, were ascribed to Daedalus. 
See Ernst Kuhnert, "Daidalos, 
Ein Beitrag zur griech. Künst-
lergesch..." Jahrb. für Phil., N.F. 
15, p. 185 ff. Similar stories 
abound in the legends of the 
saints originating in the Middle 
Ages; and even the myth of 
Pygmalion and Galatea, what-
ever its connection with the 
rites of Adonis, must have grown 
out of some such motif. See 
Overbeck, Gesch. der Plastik, 1. 
36. 

C 30. ὡς ἄρα: freq. introduces a 
statement ironically, disclaiming 
responsibility for it. — κατὰ τὴν 
ἑκεῖνου ἐκρατεῖν: 'on acc. of my 
relationship to him'; ἑκεῖνου is quite natural, as συγγενής also 
takes the gen., HA. 754 d; 
G. 1144. 31. ἔργα: 'works 
of art,' a common meaning. 
32. νῦν δὲ σαί γὰρ... εἰσίν: 
'but as it is, why, the postulates 
are your own.' On γὰρ, see HA. 
1050. 4 a. There is no ellipsis. 
Examples of νῦν δὲ... γὰρ are 
numerous: Apol. 38 B, Lach. 
184 D, 200 E, Prot. 347 A, 
Charm. 175 B, Symp. 180 C. 
See Frohberger on Lys. 13. 62 
(App.); RD. § 149. With νῦν 
δὲ cp. 11 A above. 34. αὐτῷ 
σοι: emphatic only, not reflexive, 
HA. 687. 36. δεῖσθαι: 'call for.' 
37. τοῦτοις τοῦτο: τοῦτοις de-
pends on ἐντιθεῖς, and τοῦτο goes 
with τὸ περιεῖναι. the hyperba-
ton being employed for the sake 
of the paronomasia. HA. 1062. 
38. δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος: sc. εἶναι. D 
Cp. οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον σοι δοκεῖ l. 51, 
Theaet. 176 C. Δαίδαλος has 
the art, because he has already 
been mentioned. See App.
Δαίδαλος· ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ γε ἔνεκα ἐμενὲν ἀν ταῦτα οὔτως.

ΣΩ. Κυνδυνεύω ἃρα, ὃ ἑταῖρε, ἐκεῖνον τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐνόπετος γεγονέναι τὴν τέχνην τοσοῦτον, ὡσώ ὁ μὲν τὰ αὐτῶν μόνα ἐποίει οὔ μένοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς ἐμαυτοῦ, ὡς ἐοίκε, καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια. καὶ δὴ τοῦτό μοι τῆς τέχνης ἐστὶ κοιμητότατον, ὅτι ἄκων εἰμί σοφός. ἐβουλόμην γὰρ ἃν μοι τούς λόγους μένεων καὶ ἀκινήτως ἰδρύσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὴν Δαίδαλον σοφία τὰ Ταντάλου χρήματα γενέσθαι. καὶ τούτων μὲν ἄδην· ἐπειδή δὲ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, αὐτὸς σοι ἐξιμπρο-

11 D

39. ἐμοῦ γε ἔνεκα: 'if it depended on me'; cp. the colloq. phrase 'for all of me.' 42. τὴν τέχνην: H.A. 718; G. 1058; B. 337.—τοσοῦτον. ὡσώ: ὡσώ stands here by attraction to τοσοῦτον, acc. to the usual phrase, although we should rather have expected ὡτι. as in τοῦτῳ. ὡτι. Ἀρ. 21 D. 29 B. The constr. really amounts to an anacoluthon; and it would be easy to recast the sentence. We may imitate the Greek by saying, 'I am so much more skillful, inasmuch as,' etc. Schanz compares Xen. Cyr. 6. 2. 19. 43. οὐ μένοντα: H.A. 726; G. 1081. 45. τῆς τέχνης: depends on τοῦτο. Cp. Thuc. 2. 36. 4 ὅπερ τῆς τέχνης ἐπίστευεν. — σοφός: here = δεῖνος, above; so, too, in 1. 47 σοφία = 'skill, art.' 47. τὰ Ταντάλου χρήματα: the typical Dives appears in Plato under various names: Tantalus, Darius, Polycrates, Cinyras, and Midas. Here Tantalos is evidently chosen for the paronomasia with Δαίδαλον. 48. γενέσθαι: 11 D the μο', in 1. 46, continues here. — τούτων μὲν ἄδην: enough of E that, like Lat. sed hinc hactenus. 49. τρυφᾶν: 'to be indolent,' originally as a result of high-living or self-indulgence. Contrast ξύνετεις σαντον. 12 A. Cp. 12 A τρυφῆς ὑπὸ πλοῦτον τῆς σοφίας. — ξυμπροθυμίσομαι. οὕτως: 'I will aid you that you may,' etc. Thus far Euthyphro has attempted to define holiness, but now is reduced to a confession of his inability. Socrates, therefore, assumes a new rôle, and, whereas he has hitherto devoted himself chiefly to criticising Euthyphro's definitions, now leads up to one which is all but reached, only to be left unattained because Euthyphro cannot follow him. This fact is doubly significant: first, because it indicates that the contemplated answer to the question as to the nature of holiness is to be sought by following up this clue; and,
secondly, because Plato, in his minor dialogues, does not allow Socrates to dogmatize, but leaves the final solution of the problem that has been started to the reflection of the reader.

50. ὅπως ἂν μὲ διδάξης περὶ τοῦ ὀσίου. καὶ μὴ προσαποκάμης· ἵδε γάρ, εἶ ὅν ἀναγκαῖον σοι δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ ὀσίον.

ΕΥΘ. Ἔμουγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' ὅν καὶ πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον ὀσίον; ἤ τὸ μὲν

In this discussion δίκαιον bears the wider sense of 'right,' and the question is: What is the precise relation of holiness (religion) to the wider sphere of ethical conduct or moral obligation? Owing to the circumstance that the question of piety and impiety was to be reviewed by the court, something of the legal sense of δίκαιον may here attach to the term. It will be instructive to compare the definitions of the righteous and the pious (holy) man attributed to Socrates. Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 4
55 ὁσιον πάν | δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον οὐ πάν ὁσιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὁσιον, τὸ δὲ τι καὶ ἄλλο;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐχ ἔπομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῖς λεγομένοις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν νεότερος γέ μου εἰ οὐκ ἐλάττων ἢ ὁσιον σοφῶτερος ἀλλ’, ὦ λέγω, τρυφᾶς ύπὸ πλοῦτον τῆς σοφίας. ἀλλ’, ὦ μακάριε, ἔξυπτεε ναυτῶν καὶ γὰρ ὄ να δὲ χαλεπὸν κατανοήσαι ὦ λέγω. λέγω γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἐναντῖον ἢ ὁ ποιητής ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιήσας —

11 Ε ὁ ἄρα τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς νόμιμα εἰδὼς ἀρθὸς ἀν ἡμῖν εὐσεβῆς ὀφειμένος εὖ; Then we should be right in defining the pious man as the one who knows what is lawful in respect of the gods? Ἰβιδ. 4. 6. 6 ἄρθῳ ἀν ποτε ἄρα ὄρισθη οἵρισίμενον δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ περὶ ἀνθρώπων νόμιμα; Then we should be right in defining the righteous (just) as those who know what is lawful in respect of men? Note, first, that the two virtues are entirely coordinate, having mutually exclusive spheres. Note, also, that Socrates, as is his wont, reduces the virtues to a specific form of knowledge. In the Euthyphro the virtue of piety is a specific form of the general exercise of righteousness, and knowledge does not enter into the definition. But see the fourth definition, 14 C. Gorg. 507 Α (καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπων τὰ προσήκοιτα πράττον δικαίον ἀν πράττον. περὶ δὲ θεοὺς ὁσιον) is purely Socratic.

A 56. τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ: sc. τοῦ δικαίου. 'one part of the right.' —τὸ δὲ τι καὶ ἄλλο: τι modifies τὸ. to mark its indef. character. 12 Α ΗΑ. 654 a.: cp. Hippiarch. 230 Α τοῦ κέρδους τὸ μὲν τι ἀγαθόν ἐίναι, τὸ δὲ τι κικόν. ἄλλο here is pred. (= 'is different') and καί is adv. 57. οὐχ ἔπομαι: metaphorical: in his rejoinder, Socrates takes it literally, in order to play on the words. Cp. Ἀρ. 39 B. 58. οὐκ ἐλάττων: here = γο- σοῦτω. 59. ὦ λέγω: for the pres., see Krüger 53. ι. 2. The usage is common, esp. with ὅπερ, ὀσπερ, and ὅς. The reference is to 11 ε.: ύπὸ πλοῦτον: cp. 4 D. 60. ὦ μακάριε: see note on 3 B. —ἔξυπτεε ναυτῶν: 'brace up.' Cp. our colloq. phrase, 'to pull oneself together.' 61. λέγω γὰρ δὴ: 'You see (γὰρ δὴ) I say the reverse,' etc. 62. τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ: ΗΑ. 1045. 1 b: RD. § 173. Cp. Phaedo 115 D. Gorg. 481 C. etc. —ὁ ποιητῆς ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιήσας: note the paronomasia. ὁ ποιη- τῆς usually means Homer: not so in this instance. ὁ ποιήσας probably reflects Plato's uncertainty as to the poet's name. The poem in question is the Cypria (so called because it originated on Cyprus?). one of the
65 ἐγὼ οὖν τούτῳ διαφέρομαι τῷ ποιητῇ. εἴπω σοι ὅτι;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δοκεὶ μοι εἶναι, ἵνα δέος, ἐνθα καὶ αἰδώς·

πολλοὶ γὰρ μοι δοκοῦσι καὶ νόσουσι καὶ πενίας καὶ ἁλλὰ πολλὰ τοιαύτα δεδίότες δεδέναι μὲν, αἰδεῖσθαί δὲ μηδὲν ταῦτα, ἃ δεδίασων. οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Ἁλλὰ ἵνα γε αἰδώς, ἐνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ἔστων ὅστις αἰδοῦμενος τι πράγμα καὶ αἰσχυνόμενος

75 οὐ πεφόβηται τε καὶ | δεδοικεν ἁμα δόξαν ποιηρίας; C

ΕΥΘ. Δεδοικε μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀρ’ ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν· ἵνα γὰρ δέος,

ἐνθα καὶ αἰδώς· ἁλλὰ ἵνα μὲν αἰδώς, ἐνθα καὶ δέος;

12 Α· ‘epic cycle,’ having for its subject the events which preceded the story told in the Iliad. Its authorship was in doubt even among the best-informed critics of antiquity.

63. Ζήνα δὲ τὸν θ’ ἔρξαντα:
of Zeus, who hath created and begotten the world, thou wilt not speak; for where fear is, there also is reverence. The poet seems only to have meant that fear and reverence forbid one to speak of Zeus; but Plato here, as elsewhere, does not scruple to do violence to the poet’s thought if he may thereby point his own moral. Cp. Lysis 212 E, Prot. 339 B foll., Lach. 191 B. In the argument αἰδώς is a species of the genus δέος. 12 A

65. τούτῳ . . . τῷ ποιητῇ: the B words go together; for the dat., see HA. 772; G. 1175; B. 392.

68. οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι: εἶναι = ‘to be true,’ as Adam says; but he is prob. in error when he says that εἶναι has the same meaning in ἁλλ’ ἵνα γε αἰδώς,

ἐνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι. in 1. 73.

70. δεδέναι: HA. 849 b; G. 1263; B. 535; GS. 230. So πεφόβηται. 1. 75.— αἰδείσθαι δὲ μηδὲν: see notes on μηδὲν εἰδέναι, 6 A, and on οἴδει, 8 C.

77. οὐκ ἀρ’ . . . ἁλλ’ ἵνα . . . οὐ C μέντοι: note the palindromic turn. Cp. notes on 3 C above. καίτοι . . . ἁλλ’ ὁμοι, and 13 D, οὐχ ὑγούμενος.
12 79. ἵνα γε: cp. l. 73, above. 

γε follows ἵνα in order to em-
phasize the precise relation, just
as is done by ἵναπερ in 1. 81. 
Cp. εἰ γε, τοι ἢ, and διότι γε, 
to D. — ἐπὶ πλέον κτλ.: 'for
fear has greater (logical) exten-
sion than reverence.' 
81. πε-
ριττόν: περιττόν (= odd) and
ἄρτιον (= even) were familiar to
the Greeks as the constituent
elements of number: cp. Gorg. 
451 B. 85. τὸ τοιούτον κτλ.: 
'It was something of that sort I
meant when I asked.' He refers
to 11 E foll.

XIV. 1. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο: cp. 12 D 
Meno 87 C τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτα. 3. τὸ 
ποιὸν μέρος: the art. calls for a
strict definition. Cp. Gorg. 463 C 
oriously: 9. ὁ ἄρτιον ἄριθμός: 
6. εἶπον
ἀν: for the aor., see HA. 895 b: 
B. 606; GMT. 414. — σκαληνὸς 
. . . ἱσοσκελής: note that arith-
metical relations are represented
by geometrical. This is not un-
common in Greek, and for ob-
vious reasons: first, the Greeks
were strong visualizers, and
therefore developed geometry
before arithmetic; again, their methods of numerical notation were so inadequate and cumbrous (they only approached algebraic symbols quite late in their history), that all problems capable of a geometrical solution were treated preferably by that method. Note that, in the triangles, the base line is disregarded altogether. The principle of διχοτομία (equal division by two), which was represented by πέρας(ἀπεριον, περιττὸν) ἁρτοιον, πετράγωνον(ἐτερόμηκες, ἰσοσκελές)(σκαληλέον [see Ritter-Preller 55], played an important part in the mathematical speculations of the Pythagoreans, in which Plato took a lively interest.

12 D. 

Note the constr. 12. μεμαθηκότας: cp. Gorg. 488 Α ἐγὼ γὰρ εἰ τι μὴ δρόθος πράττω κατὰ τῶν βιῶν τῶν ἐμαυτῶν, εὖ ἵσθι τούτο ὡστε οὐχ ἐκὼν ἐξαμαρτάνω ἀλλ' ἀμαθὴς τῇ ἐμῇ. If I do aught amiss in the conduct of my life, rest assured that I do not so intentionally but through ignorance.' These words of Socrates formed Plato's ethical creed as well. To know, for them, was to do. (Cp. the note above on 11 E.) Hence if Meletus is convinced that Socrates is better instructed, he must trust him in future and not prosecute him for impiety. See Introd. § 2.

Third Definition: 'Holliness is that form of right conduct which relates to the service of the gods.' Euthyphro heartily adopts the suggestion of Socrates that τὸ ὀσίον is a species of the genus δίκαιον and proceeds to distinguish this species from other species by giving the specific differentia. As there is great ambiguity in the term θεραπεία, Socrates sets out to disclose and remove it. It is interesting to note that the Stoics who, like Euthyphro, laid great stress on divination and the formal aspects of religion, are quoted as saying (Laert. Diog. 7.
XV. Σω. Καὶ καλῶς γέ μοι, ὃ Εὐθύφρον, φαίνει λέγειν ἄλλα | σμικρῶς τινος ἐτὶ εὐδείς εἴμι. τὴν 13 γάρ θεραπείαν οὖπω ἔννημι ὡς τὼν σοφομάζεις. οὐ γάρ ποὺ λέγεις γε, οδαίπερ καὶ αἵ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα θερα- 5 πείαι εἰσιν, τοιαύτην καὶ περὶ θεοὺς. λέγομεν γάρ ποὺ — οἶνον φαμέν, ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἑπίσταται θερα- πεύειν, ἄλλα δ ἰππικός ἢ γάρ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάννυ γε.

Σω. Ἡ γάρ ποὺ ἰππική ἵππων θεραπεία.

ΕΥΘ. Ναί.

Σω. Οὐδέ γε κύνας πᾶς ἑπίσταται θεραπεύειν, ἄλλα ὁ κυνηγητικός.

ΕΥΘ. Οὔτω.

Σω. Ἡ γάρ ποὺ κυνηγητική κυνῶν θεραπεία.

ΕΥΘ. Ναί.

Σω. Ἡ δὲ γε βοηλατική βοῶν.

ΕΥΘ. Πάννυ γε.

Σω. Ἡ δὲ δὴ ὁσίότης τε καὶ εὔσεβεία θεῶν, ὃ Εὐθύφρον; οὔτω λέγεις;

12 E 119) εἶναι τὴν εὔσεβειν ἑπιστή- μον θεῶν θεραπεύων, which, as in- troducing ἑπιστήμη, is nearer to the Socratic view. Cp. note on 11 E.

XV. 1. καλῶς: see note on 13 A 7 A. 2. σμικρῶς κτλ.: cp. Pro- tag. 329 B σμικρῶς τινος ἐνδείξείς εἰμι πάντ' ἔχειν. τὴν γάρ θερα- 5 πείαν κτλ.: a case of prolepsis, ἐπι- τυχα, for which we might have had τινά (see note on 11 B), classi- fies; cf. GS. 130. So in Lat. quis is roughly used for qualis; cp. οἰκίαπερ. l. 4. and τοιαῦτα, l. 5. τινα and τοιαῦτα, 13 D. 6. οἶνον: cp. οἴνον τοιοῦτος, 13 B. RD. § 16. The constr. is changed to avoid a didactic statement: 13 A an illustration, in the true So- cratic manner, has the prefer- ence, in order to lead up gradu- ally to the inference. 9. ἰππική: ἱππί: τέχνῃ: just so, too. κυνηγητική, βοηλατική, etc.— ἰπποῦν θεραπεία: cp. Alc. l. 122 A. Gorg. 515 C ff., Meno 93 D. 16. ἡ δι βοηλα- τική βοῶν: ἱππί: θεραπεία: the same word is to be supplied with θεῶν. l. 18. Socrates loved to ring the changes on a few homely examples drawn from the life of herdsmen, cobbler, etc., and so became the butt of ridicule: see Gorg. 491 A, Symp. 221 E, Xen. Mem. l. 2. 37.
20 ΕΥΘ. 'Εγώγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοίνων θεραπεία γε πᾶσα ταυτών διαπράτεται; οἷον τοιόνυν ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τινὶ ἐστὶ καὶ ὀφελίᾳ τοῦ θεραπευομένου, ὥσπερ ὅρᾶς δὴ, ὅτι οἱ ἤπαι ὑπὸ τῆς ἰππικῆς θεραπευόμενοι ὀφελοῦνται καὶ βελτίως γίγνονται. ἦ οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι;

ΕΥΘ. 'Εμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ οὶ κύνες γε που ὑπὸ τῆς κυνηγετικῆς, καὶ οἱ βόες ὑπὸ τῆς βοηλατικῆς, [καὶ τάλα πάντα] οὐσαύτως; ἦ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ οἰεὶ τοῦ θεραπευομένου τήν θεραπείαν εἶναι;

ΕΥΘ. Μά Δῷ οὐκ ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' ἐπ' ὀφελίᾳ;

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἡ ὁσιώτης θεραπεία οὔσα θεῶν ὀφελίᾳ τέ ἐστι θεῶν καὶ βελτίως τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖ; καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ἕνυχωρήσαις ἄν, ὃς ἑπειδὰν τί ὀσιον ποιῆς, βελτίως τινὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀπέργαζει;

ΕΥΘ. Μά Δῷ οὐκ ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. Οὔδε γὰρ ἑγώ, ὦ Εὐθύφρουν, οἴμαι σε τοῦτο λέγειν· πολλοῦ καὶ δέω· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἔνεκα καὶ ἀνηρόμην, τίνα ποτὲ | λέγοις τήν θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν, οὐχ ἠγούμενος σε τοιαύτην λέγειν.

45 ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ὁρθῶς γε, ὦ Σῶκρατε· οὐ γὰρ τοιαύτην λέγω.

ΣΩ. Εἰν· ἀλλὰ τίς ἐθέων θεραπεία εἰή ἢ ἀν ἡ ὁσίότης;

ΕΥΘ. Ὅπερ, ὦ Σῶκρατε·, οἴ δοῦλοι τοὺς δεσπότας θεραπεύοντον.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· ὑπηρετική τίς ἀν, ὥς ἐοικεν, εἰή θεοὶ.

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

XVI. ΣΩ. Ἔχοις ἀν οὖν εἴπειν, ἡ ἱατροῖς ὑπηρε-

much more as ye are nearer of 13D kin to me. For such, I assure you, is the command of God, and I am persuaded that never has there befallen you in our city a greater blessing than this my ministration to the God (τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν, cp. Euth. 14 D αὕτη ἡ ὑπηρεσία . . . τοῖς θεοῖς).” By interpreting our passage in the light of the foregoing, we obtain an insight into the meaning of both. Socrates’ life is the type of the holy life; and when Socrates asks for the end to be realized by man’s ministration to Deity, the answer is suggested by the end which he sought to attain. For in Apol. 30 A (continuing where we just left off) he said, “For I go about with no other business but this, to plead with you, young and old, not to have more regard for your bodies nor for wealth than for the soul, that it may be as good as possible.” See the Introd. §§ 5 and 6.
Here is broached the matter of the ἔργον, which has great significance to Plato's thought. It is that which is effected by an action, and, indeed, that which, as an end, determines the means to its accomplishment. Originating in art, the term acquired a large use in ethics, and, with Plato and Aristotle, always looks to the Good as the supreme end of rational and moral endeavor. Cp. Rep. 352 E-353 B. Gorg. 468 B. 499 E for its connection with τὸ ἀγαθὸν and ἀρετή. Cp. also Gorg. 503 E, Crat. 389, and Xen. Oecon. 1. 2. In the note on p. 83 attention was called to Socrates' cure of souls, which he regarded as the object of its greatest moment (cp. Gorg. 477 B foll.); with the reference to the ἔργον, the final goal of holiness is raised a step higher, and the realization of the Supreme Good in human society is suggested as its object. That, however, is the assimilation of the individual soul to God (Theaet. 176 AB) and, for society, the ultimate approximation to the ideal of righteousness sketched in the Republic. Euthyphro does not catch the hint.
EUΘ. Πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, ὃ Σῶκρατες.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ὅι στρατηγοὶ, ὃ φίλε· ἀλλ' ὡμῶς 14 τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ῥαδίως ἄν εἶποις, ὅτι νίκην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀπεργάζονται· ἡ οὖ;

EUΘ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Πολλὰ δὲ γ', οἴμαι, καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ· ἀλλ' ὡμῶς τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστὶν τῆς ἀπεργασίας ἡ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφῆ.

EUΘ. Πάνιν γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται; τί τὸ κεφάλαιον ἐστὶ τῆς ἐργασίας;

EUΘ. Καὶ ὀλύγον σοι πρότερον εἶπον, ὃ Σῶκρατες, 30 ὅτι πλείονος ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀκριβῶς | πάντα ταῦτα ὡς Β ἔχει μαθεῖν· τόδε μέντοι σοι ἀπλῶς λέγω, ὅτι ἐὰν 13 E. 18. πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ: Euthyphro, not knowing precisely what to say, takes refuge in generalities. 14 Analytics. 19. οἱ στρατηγοὶ: again one is forcibly reminded of Socrates’ plea before the court; see Apol. 28 DE. 20. τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν: a case of brachylogy; cp. τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τῆς ἀπεργασίας, l. 24. It is possible, but not probable, that κεφάλαιον (sc. ἔργον) is an adj. Schauz supplies τῆς ἀπεργασίας; without the addition, αὐτῶν is to be construed like τῆς τέχνης, 11 D. See App. 23. οἱ γεωργοὶ: cp. Rep. 333 A. 24. αὐτῶν: hyperbaton.

27. τί δὲ δὴ: see note on 7 D.—τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν: cp. Gorg. 509 D τί δὲ δὴ τῶν ἀδικεῖν; this is a free use of the gen., to premise mention of a thing, RD. § 27. For other examples, see Rep. 459 B, 470 A, 515 B. Phaedo 78 D, etc. There is no ellipsis 14 A of peri, as some have thought. 28. τῆς ἐργασίας: cp. ἀπεργασίας, above, l. 24. It is common thus to employ the simple for the compound verb or noun when it has just been used. For examples in Plato, see Crītē 44 D, Phaedo 104 D, Theaet. 178 A, Soph. 267 A f., etc. In Euripides, Med. 1252 κατ' ὁδεῖ' ἵδετε. Αἰκ. 400 ὑπάκουσον ἄκουσον, Bacch. 1065 κατίγγεν ἤγεν ἤγεν οἰς μέλαν πέδουν. 29. ἐλίγον . . . πρότερον: in 9 B: for ὀλύγον, see Η.Λ. 781 α. 30. πλείονος ἔργον: cp. 9 B ἀλλ' οἶως αἰκιδιλόγον ἔργον ἐστὶν, where see note.—πάντα ταῦτα κτλ.: B 'to learn how all these matters stand.' 31. ἀπλῶς: 'simply,' 'without qualification.'—ἐὰν μὲν κεχαρισμένα: not a new definition, but a rhetorical restatement of that offered in 12 E.
mēν κεχαρισμένα τις ἐπίστηται τοῖς θεῶις λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενός τε καὶ θύων, ταῦτ' ἐστι τὰ ὅσια, καὶ σῴζει τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς τε ἱδίους οἰκοὺς καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων. τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τῶν κεχαρισμένων ἄσεβη, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἀνατρέπει ἀπαντα καὶ ἀπόλλυσιν.

XVII. ΣΩ. Ἡ πολύ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων, ὦ Εὐθύ−φρον, εἰ ἐβούλου, εἰπὲς ἃν τὸ κεφάλαιον ὃν ἢρώτων. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ πρόθυμός με εἰ διδάξαι. δῆλος εἰ. καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἓπειδή ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡσθα, ἀπετράπου. ὥ εἰ ἀπεκρίνω, ἰκανῶς ἃν ἴδῃ παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ὀσιότητα ἐμεμαθήκη. νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἔρωτῶντα τῷ ἔρωτωμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὅπῃ ἃν ἐκείνος ὑπάγῃ. τι

14 B 32. λέγειν κτλ.: εὐχόμενος takes up λέγειν, as θύων takes up πράττειν. 34. σῷζει τὰ τοιαῦτα: this remark is aside from the subject, and is not regarded by Socrates. It is a favorite commonplace with the moralists; cp. Minos 314 D, Arist. Rhet. 1360a 19, Polit. 1286 7 ff., 1287a 18, Heraclitus apud Laert. Diog. 9.2. As the Greek state was founded on religion, its salvation was believed to depend on the piety of the citizens. Cp. the noble ode of Horace, C. III. 6. Strangely enough, some critics have regarded this trite saying as the key to the definition of holiness. 36. ἀνατρέπει: cp. Crito 50 B.


κα. Crito 44 D, 46 D; and see 14 B note on 7 B. 4. ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡσθα: C 'you were hard by it'; 'you were hot,' the children say. Socrates exhausts his vocabulary in trying to convince Euthyphro that the true definition of holiness is to be found by following the clue just obtained, rather than by grasping at a new one. See the notes on 13 D. 6. ἐμε−

μαθήκη: for the tense, see HA. 895; G. 1397; B. 660; cp. Apol. 36 C. — νῦν δὲ . . . γὰρ: see note on 11 C. — τὸν ἐρωτῶντα κτλ.: following the lead of the argument is a commonplace in Plato (Rep. 365 D, 394 D, 410 B, 415 D, Phaedo 82 D, 115 B, Gorg. 527 E, etc.). See App. 7. ἐκεῖνος: refers to τὸ ἐρωτωμένῳ. — ὑπάγῃ: ὑπο− suggests that one is following a path whose end is not in sight. The suggestion is in harmony with the thought of following the argument. Cp. Phaedo 82 D.
δὴ αὖ λέγεις τὸ ὀσιὸν εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὀσιότητα; οὐχὶ ἐπιστῆμην τινὰ τού θύεων τε καὶ εὔχεσθαι;

ΕΥΘ. Ἐγώγη. 
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ θύεων δωρεῖσθαι ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸ δ’ εὔχεσθαι αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεοὺς; 
ΕΥΘ. Καὶ μάλα, ὡς Σῶκρατες. 
ΣΩ. Ἐπιστῆμην ἄρα αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς ὁσιότης ἄν εἰη ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου. 
ΕΥΘ. Πάνω καλῶς, ὡς Σῶκρατες, ἔννηκας ὡ εἴπον. 
ΣΩ. Ἐπιθυμητὴς γὰρ εἰμι, ὡ φίλε, τῆς σῆς σοφίας καὶ προσέξω τὸν νοῦν αὐτῇ, ὡστε οὐ χαμαὶ πεσεῖται ὁτι ἄν εἴπης. ἀλλὰ μοι λέξον, τίς αὐτή ἡ ὑπηρεσία ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς; αἰτεῖν τε φῆς αὐτοὺς καὶ διδόναι ἐκεῖνοι; 
ΕΥΘ. Ἐγώγη. 

14 C Fourth Definition: 'Holliness is the art or the science of sacrifice and prayer.' This definition is closely akin to that attributed to Socrates by Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 4 (see note on 11 E) and it is probable that it fairly represents the common unphilosophical views of the Greeks. Socrates extracts it from the last proposition of Euthyphro, omitting the notion κεχαριμένα, only to show that it is inherent in the general view, in 15 B. Compare 14 B ἐπίστηται . . . εὐχόμενος τε καὶ θίων with our definition, ἐπιστῆμην τινὰ τοῦ θύεων τε καὶ εὔχεσθαι. The term ἐπιστήμη adds nothing new; for ὁσιότης has already been regarded as τέχνη = ἐπιστήμη; cp. τεχνικῶν, 14 E. 
14. αἰτήσεως: sc. παρὰ θεῶν. 
15. ὁσιότης: without the art., 14 D HA. 660; G. 944. Cp. τὴν ὁσιότητα, 14 C. above, 1. 5. and ἡ ὁσιότης, 14 E. I. 10. 17. ἐπιθυμητής . . . τῆς σῆς σοφίας: contrast with this colorless phrase the vivid expression in Meno 70 B ἐραστάς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ. Cp. Rep. 600 D. See App. 18. ὡστε . . . πεσεῖται: the metaphor is derived from arrows that miss the mark and fall in vain to the ground; cp. Pind. Ol. 9. 13 and schol. 19. ὑπηρεσία: Socrates is glancing at 13 D, and thereby clearly shows that he does not regard Euthyphro’s latest attempt as a definition of holliness proper, but only as a special description of man’s ministrations to Deity. 20. αὐτοὺς . . . ἐκεῖνοι: see note on 6 E.
to enlightened minds, was com-
mon among primitive peoples
and still serves to explain certain
ceremonies. See Deussen, Allge-
meine Gesch. der Philosophie, 1.
1. 91 ff. 12. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἡδιον
κτλ.: Socrates resents conces-
sions made to his pleasure rather
than to the truth: for truth is not
a respecter of persons. Cp.
Rep. 595 C, Phaedo 91 A, C,
15. οὐδὲν γὰρ ... ἔκεινοι δῶσιν:
the views of Socrates on Provi-
dence are given by Xen. Mem.
1. 4 and 4. 3. A Christian
scholiast refers to James 1. 17.
“Every good gift and every
perfect gift is from above, and
cometh down from the Father
of lights.” Cp. the utterance of
Democritus, fr. 13 (Mullach).
15 Α 16. α δε παρ' ήμων κτλ.: the unexpressed antecedent of α is a free acc. (or nom.? cp. Phil. 27 E), cp. Phaedo 65 D τι δε δη τα τουδε. Note the fuller form in 1. 21 ωφελεισθαι απο τουτων α παρ' ήμων λαμβανονσων. For τι, see HA. 716 b; G. 1054. 21. ωφελεισθαι απο τουτων: 'they derive benefit from.' ωφελεισθαι c. εκ and απο with reference to things, c. υπο and παρα (rare) with reference to persons. Cp. απο with λαμβανο (Apol. 25 E), ἀπολαίων (Apol. 31 B), πάσχω (Phaedo 83 B). 23. τι δηποτ': τοις θεοις are regarded as constituting essentially a unit, hence τι rather than τινα; cp. GS. 132. Socrates requires not an enumeration but a statement of the character of our gifts to the gods. 25. τιμη τε και γερα: note the free nom. in enumeration. GS. 8. Or possibly 15 οιει may be parenthetical. Sacrifices were actually called τιμαι (cp. Lat. honores), γερα, and χαριτες. 26. αρτι: i.e. in 14 B. 27. κεχαρισμενον . . . φιλον: Euthyphro’s use of κεχαρισμενα, 14 B. and χαρις. 15 Α. has occupied Socrates’ thought all the while, though he has temporarily disregarded the point. Now by an adroit turn he makes Euthyphro identify these terms with φιλου and so shows him that the argument has traveled round in a circle to the point of departure, in 6 E. 29. παντων γε μαλιστα β φιλον: this may be merely a strengthened superlative, ‘nothing quite so dear,’ as in Charm. 158 E: but it seems better to take it as an emphatic assertion that it is φιλου at all events, whether it be ωφελμου or not. Cp. Gorg.
Σ. Τούτο ἀρ’ ἐστὶν αὖ, ὡς ἐσικε, τὸ ὄσιον, τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον.
ΕΥΘ. Μάλιστα γε.
XIX. Σ. Θαυμάσει ὃν τάυτα λέγων, ἐὰν σοι οἱ λόγοι φαίνονται μὴ μένοντες ἀλλὰ βαδίζοντες, καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτούς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς ὁν πολὺ γε τεχνικότερος τοῦ Δαίδαλον καὶ κύκλῳ περιόντα ποιῶν; η’ οὐκ αἰσθάνει, ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν περιελθὼν πάλιν εἰς ταῦτον ἣ ἤκει; μέμνησαις γάρ που, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν τὸ τε ὄσιον καὶ τὸ θεοφιλεῖς οὐ ταῦτον ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, ἀλλ’ ἐτέρα ἀλλήλων· ἡ οὐ μέμνησαι.
ΕΥΘ. Ἐγώγε. Ἔγωγε.
Σ. Νῦν οὖν οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον φῆς ὄσιον εἰναι; τούτῳ δ’ ἄλλο τι η’ θεοφιλεῖς γίγνεται; ἡ οὐ; ἘΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.
Σ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἄρτι οὐ καλῶς ὠμολογοῦμεν, ἡ εἰ τότε καλῶς, νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τιθεμέθα.
ΕΥΘ. Ἐοικεν.

the ground for the previous state- 15 B ment. 5. ὁ λόγος κτλ.: for the thought, see Theaet. 200 C, Hipparch. 231 C. Clitopte 410 A. 7. εἰν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν: 10 DE. C 12. ἄλλο τι η’: ΗΑ. 1015 b; G. 1604: B. 573. N. — γίγνεται: ‘turns out to be.’ 15. ἄρτι: in 10 E.—καλῶς . . . ὀρθῶς: see note on 7 A.

CLOSE OF THE DIALOGUE:
‘Our quest has been futile; let us begin anew.’ ‘Excuse me; I have a pressing engagement. Some other day.’
XX. Σω. Ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀρα ἡμῖν πάλιν σκεπτέων, τι ἔστι τὸ ὅσιον· ὡς ἐγώ, πρὶν ἄν μάθω, ἐκών εἶναι οὐκ ἀποδειλιάσω. | ἀλλὰ μὴ με ἀτιμάσῃς, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν ὃτι μάλιστα νῦν εἰπὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οἴσθα γάρ, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων, καὶ οὐκ ἄφετέος εἰ, ὦσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς, πρὶν ἄν εἴπης. εἰ γάρ μὴ ήδησθα καρφῶς τὸ τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἄν ποτε ἐπεξεργάσας ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς θητὸς ἀνδρα πρεσβύτην πατέρα διωκάθεων φῶνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἄν ἐδεισασ παρακινδυνεύειν, μὴ οὐκ ὅρθως αὐτὸ ποιήσοις, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἥσχυνθη. νῦν δὲ εὗκ ὑδα ὑτι

15 C  XX. 2. ὑσ: HA. 925; G. 1505; B. 598.—πρὶν ἄν μάθω: HA. 921, (924 a); G. 1471. 2; B. 637.—ἐκόν εἶναι: HA. 956 a; G. 1535; B. 642. 1; GMT. 780.  
Cp. B. L. Gildersleeve in A. J. P., 1889, 381 f. “It may well be contended that in all these passages εἶναι serves the purposes of a larger ἅ—which particle, by the way, is absent from nearly all the passages in which the restrictive εἶναι occurs.”

4. παντὶ τρόπῳ... ὑτι μάλιστα: double intensive, because Euthyphro is remiss (τρυφώ). Cp. Gorg. 496 C and εἱ μάλα σκεφάλμενος ἀποκρῖνον. 5. εἴπερ τις ἄλλος: HA. 905; B. 615. 6. ὦσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς: cp. Hom. δ 384 ff.: Euthyd. 288 B. Ion 541 E. All sea-divinities possessed two characteristics which render the comparison of Euthyphro with them especially fitting: they had the gift of prophecy, and they had the power to change at will from form to another. Cp. the representations on figured vases of Peleus’ wooing of Thetis. For Thetis, see Apol. 28 C. Hom. Σ 70 ff. 8. οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως: ‘it is impossible that,’ phraseological; virtually an adv. = nullo modo. 9. ἀνδρὸς θητὸς ἀνδρα πρεσβύτην: HA. 625 a. Note the emphatic juxtaposition. —πατέρα: ‘and that your father.’ Note the emphatic order. 10. διωκάθειν: HA. 494: G. 779.—τοὺς θεοὺς: obj. of ἄν ἐδεισά, and παρακινδυνεύειν is an epexegetic inf. likewise depending on it. 11. μὴ οὐκ... ποιήσοις: one of the very rare cases of the fut. opt. after verbs of fearing, GMT. 131. 12. ἥσχυνθης: supply ἄν from the foregoing verbs. The omission is more common with the opt., GS. 450. Cp. Phaedo 87 E. Anterast. 135 C. 136 C.
σαφῶς | οἷς εἰδέναι τὸ τε όσιον καὶ μή· εἰπὲ οὖν, ὁ Ἑ βέλτιστε Εὐθύφρον, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃ ὦτι αὐτὸ ἡγεῖ.

15 ΕΥΘ. Εἰς αὖθις τοῖνυν, ὡς Σώκρατες· νῦν γὰρ σπεῦδω ποι, καὶ μοι ὥρα ἀπιέναι.

ΣΩ. Οἰα ποιεῖσ, ὡτε ταῖρη! ἀπ' ἐλπίδος ὡς καταβάλων μεγάλης ἀπέρχει, ἡν εἴχον, ὡς παρὰ σοῦ μαθῶν τὰ τε ὀσία καὶ μὴ καὶ τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον γραφῆς ἀπαλλάξομαι, ἐνδειξάμενος ἐκεῖνο ὦτι σοφὸς ἡδή παρ' Ἐυθύφρονος τὰ θεία γέγονα καὶ ὦτι οὐκέτι ὑπ' ἀγνοίας 16 αὐτοσχεδιάζω οὔδὲ κανονιμῷ περὶ αὐτά, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὦτι ἀμεινὸν βιωσοῖμην.

15 D 13. σαφῶς οἷς εἰδέναι: cp. ἀκριβῶς οἷς ἐπίστασθαι. σαφῶς limits εἰδέναι, and οἷς is used to suggest that it is a mere (unfounded) opinion. Cp. Αριστ. E 29 A. 15. εἰς αὖθις: 'some other day.' Cp. 6 C τινὰ μὲν μοι εἰς αὖθις ἐπὶ σχολῆς διηγήσει. 16. ὥρα ἀπιέναι: Ἡ.Α. 952 G. 1521; B. 641; for the omission of the copula, see Ἡ.Α. 611 a; GS. 83 ff. Laert. Diog. 2. 29 says that Socrates induced a certain Euthyphro to desist from prosecuting his father. Though there is a mistake in the nature of the charge, acc. to his account, there can be no doubt that our Euthyphro is meant. Hirzel, Der Dialog. 1. p. 196, n. 1, suggests that the variant ἔνναις in Laert. Diog. 2. 29 for ἔννοιαν or) φῶν, acc. to Euth. 4 A. was due to some other Socratic dialogue, rather than to a comedy, as Bergk supposed. De Reliquiis Comœdinarum Atticarum Antiquarum, p. 357 ff. 17. οἷα ποιεῖσ: Ἡ.Α. 1001 a. The words express 15 E disappointment. Cp. Charin. 166 C. Alc. 1. 113 E. Phædo 117 D. — ἀπ' ἐλπίδος κτλ.: cp. Phædo 98 B. Socrates has based two hopes on the expectation of being duly instructed by Euthyphro: first, the hope of exemption from trial (ὡς... ἀπαλλάξομα. GMT. 136; cp. Eur. El. 919); again, the hope of leading a better life with truer insight (ὥτι ἀμεινὸν βιωσοῖμην, GMT. 128; cp. Thuc. 6. 30). Socrates, no doubt, was genuinely disappointed; but it is customary, in Plato's minor dialogues, to leave the main question unanswered. 19. καὶ... καὶ ὅτι 16 A καὶ: 'both...' and especially.' — ἀπαλλάξομαι... βιωσοῖμην: note the change from dir. to indir. disc. For the constr. see note on ἀπ' ἐλπίδος. l. 17. The doubling of conjunctions is not unexampled; cp. Xen. Cyr. 5. 3. 30; Anab. 5. 6. 19; 7. 4. 5. Inversely, ἤτι... ὡς, Ἰππ. Μα. 281 C.
APPENDIX

§ 1. BIBLIOGRAPHY

a. General Works on Plato Dealing with the Euthyphro


b. General Editions of Plato's Works


Stephanus, H.: Paris, 1578. All recent Plato texts are printed with page 93.
and letter (A, B, C, D, E) of this edition added in the margin, and all citations are made in accordance with them.

Ast, F.: Platonis quae Extant Opera, Lipsiae, 1819–1832.
Hirschig, R. B.: Platonis Opera, Graece et Latine (Didot), Parisiiis, 1846–1856.
Burnet, J.: Platonis Opera, Oxonii, 1900. (Not yet completed.)

c. Special Editions containing the Euthyphro

d. Special Works dealing with the Euthyphro


WALSER, J.: *Platons Euthyphron oder die Erörterung über die Frömmigkeit*, Hammerstadt, 1866.


WECLEWSKI, S.: *De Platonis Euthyphrone*, Conitz, 1875.


RIESER, O.: *De Platonis Euthyphrone*, Frauenfeld, 1880.


§ 2. CRITICAL NOTES ON THE TEXT

A detailed report of the readings of the Mss. has been given with great precision by Schanz and Fritzsche, to whose *adnotatio* the scholar is referred. A careful study of the text of Burnet (Oxford, 1900) and of Schanz’s smaller critical edition (Leipzig, 1887) as compared with the large edition (Leipzig, 1875), shows how unwilling critics now are to follow slavishly any one class of Mss.
It is well known that the works of Plato were divided for convenience into two volumes, the first of which contained the first seven tetralogies, the second containing the remainder. The best Ms. for the first volume, as is universally acknowledged, is the Clarkianus of the Bodleian Library, Oxford. For the second volume, the Parisinus is admittedly the best. Burnet suggests the possibility that the Marcianus (T) — which shares, though not quite equally, with the Clarkianus (B) the distinction of affording the critical basis for the first volume — is really the lost first part of the Parisinus. It may therefore be in order to give a brief account of these two Mss.

The Clarkianus 1 or Bodleianus (B), a parchment written in the year 895 (so Burnet; Schanz says 896), contains the first six tetralogies of Thrasyllus. It is admitted by all to be the best representative of the first class of Mss., to which Schanz in his large critical edition deferred in all cases of doubt. The Ms. suffers chiefly from two classes of errors: first, from mistakes of the copyist, which, not being masked by false learning, are readily detected and corrected; second, from omissions, which may be recovered by reference to T. In matters of detail, B is fairly accurate, but requires to be corrected here and there, when the right reading appears only in inferior Mss.

The Marcianus 2 (T), the leader of the second class of Mss., is a parchment, written in the twelfth century or earlier, discovered and collated by Schanz, who at once perceived its great worth. The scribe who wrote it was more than ordinarily intelligent, and made few mistakes of an egregious sort. There occur, however, numerous transpositions, which are easily corrected by reference to B: In the vast majority of points the text of the Euthyphro is now fully made out, and the disagreements between B and T have been finally weighed; but there still remain a number of passages in which the indications are by no means clear. In such cases the editor follows B or T according to his best judgment of the requirements of the context.

In offering the following critical notes, the object has been twofold. In the first place, it appeared desirable to single out the principal points at which the text may still be fairly said to be in doubt, and to exhibit the readings of B and T. But, again, it was only natural that account should be taken of the text presented in the best recent editions. In so doing, it became necessary to take sides, and sometimes to take issue with scholars whose critical judgment is deservedly held in high esteem. The text here presented exhibits only one novelty, viz. the reading ἀλλοις ἀδικεῖν for ἀλλή-λοις ἀδικεῖν in 8 D. and this was suggested as a possibility, though not adopted, by Adam. Where no note is given, the text of Wohlrab's recen-

1 See Schanz, Novae Commentationes Platonicae, Wirsung, 1871, pp. 105-118.
sion of Hermann’s Teubner edition (Leipzig, 1881) is followed. The following abbreviations, not previously explained, have been employed.\(^1\)

S. = Schanz’s larger critical edition, of 1875.
S\(^2\). = Schanz’s smaller critical edition, of 1887.
Fr. = Fritzsche.
Wb. = Hermann-Wohlrab.
A. = Adam.

2 A. \(\omega\) Ευθύφρων: B and T always show \(\omega\) Ευθύφρων; Edd., excepting Bur., read \(\omega\) Ευθύφρων with the vulgate. B and T frequently err in such matters. Fritzsche \(\textit{ad loc.}\) cites numerous instances of similar character from the Mss.

\(\gamma\rhoα\phiν\) σε \(\tau\iota\ς\) Fr., A., Bur.: \(\gamma\rhoα\phiν\) σε \(\tau\iota\ς\) Wb., S. σε is clearly emphatic.

2 B. \(\gamma\γραπ\p\tau\alpha\iota\); A., Bur., rightly: \(\gamma\γραπ\p\tau\alpha\iota\); Wb., S., F.

\(\omicron\sigma\upsilon\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu\); \(\omicron\sigma\upsilon\upsilon\gamma\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu\); T, wrongly; for \(\omicron\sigma\upsilon\) receives all the necessary stress from its juxtaposition with \(\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu\).

\(\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\tau\iota\nu\) \(\pi\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu\); Cobet, following Schaefer \(\textit{ad Dion}.\) Hal. \(\textit{De Comp. Verb.}\), p. 328, omits \(\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\tau\iota\nu\), since he deletes the prepos. wherever the comparison precedes the thing compared. See \(\textit{Var. Lect.}\), p. 165.

3 A. \(\tau\omicron\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\n
ποῦ ὑπὲρ γε ἄλλοτρίου Τ., followed by S²., A., Bur., rightly, I think, because the γε naturally places the stress on ἄλλοτρίου (W. has ἄλλοτρίου γε); ποῦ γε ὑπὲρ ἀ. Β., followed by Wb., S., Fr.

4. καὶ ὁ κτεῖνας Mss.; χῶ κτεῖνας S²., without good reasons.

4. C. χρήθη B (first hand), rightly, restored by S., followed by Edd.; χρή Τ.

4. E. μου Heusde, followed by Edd.; μοι BT. The former reading only is allowable.

5. B. καὶ ὁρθῶς νομίζειν ἐμὲ Β., followed by S., Fr., Wb.; καὶ ὁρθῶς . . . καὶ ἐμὲ Τ., followed by A. Bur. brackets the first καὶ and reads καὶ ἐμὲ.

διδάσκοντι . . . νουθετοῦντι . . . κολάζοντι restored by Madvig from inferior Mss.; διδάσκοντα . . . νουθετοῦντα . . . κολάζοντα BT.

εἶ ἀρα με B, followed by S., Fr., Wb., A.; ἐμὲ Τ, followed by Bur. As the emphasis naturally falls on εἶ, με is to be preferred.

5. C. ἑγένετο B, followed by S., Fr., Wb., A., Bur.; γένοιτο Τ. See the Notes.

ἀξέως B; ἀξέως ἀτεχνῶς Τ. ἀτεχνῶς is evidently out of place, and is probably a marginal remark, calling attention to the somewhat forced point in κατεῖδεν, transferred erroneously into the text. So, too, S². Bur. conjectures ἀτεχνῶς, which does not give an acceptable sense.

5. D. πᾶν τούναντίον S².; παντὸς ἐναντίον Mss. As S. remarks, since τὸ ὀσίων precedes without a modifier, one should expect no modifier with τοῦ ὀσίων in view of the strong contrast; whereas a strengthening of ἐναντίον is quite in place. Cf. Protag. 332 A.

κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα Τ., followed by Wb., Fr., S².; κατὰ τὴν ὀσιότητα B, followed by A. S. follows B, but brackets the words. κατὰ τὴν (μη) ὀσιότητα Bur., following the Armenian Version. It seems to me that the lection of Τ is clearly correct. The only objection to it arises from the mistaken assumption that the words contain a reference to hypostatic Ideas, among which one of absolute negation would seem to be out of place. The assumption should not, however, be made since the matter was thoroughly discussed by Bonitz (Platonische Studien, 3. Aufl., pp. 240 ff.). The definitional notion only was referred to by Plato, and if it is possible to define τὸ ἀνόσιον, as Plato everywhere implies, one may certainly say κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα. It is evident that the doubts of modern critics, such as Schaarschmidt and Wagner, had occurred to the ancients. This appears from the variants of T and B, and, still more, of the Armenian Version. Most instructive of all is the forced interpretation of the scholiast: κατὰ τὴν ὀσιότητα· ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀμοιοῦς, παραπλησίως τῇ ὀσιότητι. As all this confusion arose from the mistaken notion that Plato referred to hypostatic Ideas. Adam should not have adopted the reading and the interpretation of the scholiast.

5. E. τοῦ νομίμου Baumann, followed by S².: τοῦ νόμου Mss. νόμος cannot here mean the law of Athens, as Adam suggests. It must mean that which is universally accepted; but it is questionable whether the word will bear such an interpretation. Schanz conjectured τοῦνόμου, and Hirschig τοῦ
Baumann's τοῦ νομίμου gives the required sense, and seems to be the most likely reading.

6 A. οὖνεκα S², followed by A.; οὖν οὖνεκα B T, followed by Bur., who brackets οὖν; οὖν ενεκα S., Wb., Fr.

7 A. ἀληθις inferior MSS., followed by Wb.; ἀληθις B, followed by S., Fr., A. Bur.; ὅς ἀληθις T. For a discussion, see Wohlrab's Crit. App. and Jordan in Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 1876, p. 781. Supposing the lection ἀληθις, which is clearly the most appropriate, ἀληθις may be accounted for in several ways. First, by simple assimilation to πιγκάλως; then, if ὅς were written above -ἐς, ὅς ἀληθις (T) would naturally arise. Again, it is conceivable that ὅς ἀληθις was added in the margin to draw attention to the emphasis on ἀληθις: In that case, ὅς ἀληθις (T) may easily have supplanted ἀληθις, because it was supposed to be a var. lect., and, being incapable of interpretation, ἀληθις (B) would be the resultant reading.

7 B. δοκω, ὧς Σώκρατες. [ἐρημται γάρ.] Naber introduced the brackets. The entire passage is desperate. See Fritzche and Schanz (with the Addenda). ὁδε Fr., S². A., B.; ὠδε S., Wb.

7 C. μετρεῖν T, followed by Wb., Fr., S²., A., Bur.; μέτριον B; μέτριον inferior MSS., followed by S.

ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν Edd., excepting S²., who reads ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν. The change is not necessary.

7 D. τί δε οἱ θεοί, ὡς Εὐθύφρον; so I punctuate with Bur.; others punctuate τί δε; οἱ θεοὶ, κτλ. Cp. the passage, 14 A.

διὰ ταῦτα B, followed by S., S²., Wb., Fr., A.; δι' αὐτά ταῦτα T, followed by Bur. The emphasis is not needed.

8 A. ὅ τυγχανει B T, followed by Edd., except Schanz, who conjectures ο. See the Notes.

8 C. οὐ δεῖν φασί S., A., Bur., rightly, as φασί is emphatic; οὐ δεῖν φασί Wb., Fr.
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8 D. οὐκ ἄρα ἐκεῖνό γε . . . Ἀλήθη λέγεις Schanz brackets these words, following the suggestion of Schenkl. in Zeitschr. für österreich. Gymn., XI., p. 178; but the passage cannot be spared for the thought.

άλλους ἀδικεῖν W. A. Heidel; ἀλλήλους ἀδικεῖν Mss.; ἀλλ' ἀλλους Adam. This is a difficult passage, of which no satisfactory explanation has been offered. Wohlrab interprets καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀδικοῦντες οἱ μὲν φασίν ἀδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὐ φασίν, which, I suppose, must mean. ‘Though they wrong one another, some say that they (themselves) are in the wrong, others say that they (themselves) are innocent.’ This is to me incredible. Fritzche interprets ἀδικοῦσιν ἀλλήλους. καὶ οἱ μὲν φασίν (ἀδικεῖσθαι). οἱ δὲ οὐ φασίν (ἀδικεῖν). This is intelligible; but it is truly, as he says, ‘mira brevitatis!’ Besides, one is obliged to do violence to the text in order to reach this interpretation. Schanz merely says ‘ἀλλήλους, hier die einen die andern.’ The sense would then be, ‘Some accuse each other; others say that they (themselves) are innocent.’ The disjunction is exceedingly lame, and cannot be accepted. Adam’s ἀλλ’ ἀλλους needlessly complicates the situation. The situation is simple: certain gods (not necessarily including all gods) differ in their judgments touching others (whether gods or men does not distinctly appear): one set of gods says, ‘they (ἀλλοις, a third party) are in the wrong’; the other set says, ‘they are not.’ The frequent confusion of ἀλλους etc. with ἀλλήλους etc. in Mss. is sufficiently known.

8 E. τὸ κεφάλαιον B; τὸ γε κεφάλαιον T, followed by Bur.

9 C. τὸ γὰρ θεομοσίας ὅν καὶ θεοφιλίας ἐφάνη bracketed by Kleist, followed by Wb., S². Adam brackets all from ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο οὐ ἐφάνη. The difficulty arises, I believe, from a misapprehension. The bracketed words are required, because without them the second definition, in its first and unmended form, is not disposed of. Socrates has had a sudden inspiration. He sees that they are wasting time over unprofitable talk, and he desires to introduce an objection to the real purport of the definition, to which he therefore suggests an amendment. He is unwilling, however, to part with the last theme without clinching, in a word, his objection to the self-contradictory definition. This he does in a parenthesis, extending from θεομοσίας μὲν γὰρ to ὥ Εὐθύφρον, whereupon he resumes his first announcement of the new thought that has come to him in the emphatic and abrupt words, εἰ βούλει κτλ. See the Notes.

ὠστε τοῦτο μὲν T, followed by Wb., Bur., rightly, as I think, because Socrates wishes to suggest that he has a more fatal objection to urge; ὥστε τοῦτο B, followed by S., Fr., A.

εἰ βούλει B, followed by S., A., Bur.; καὶ εἰ βούλει T, followed by Wb., Fr.

9 D. ἡγεσθων B (second hand); otherwise the Mss. generally show ἡγεσθωσαν, which Fr. adopts. The inv. ending -ωσαν is not found on inscriptions before 300 B.C. See Meisterhans, Grammatik der Att. Inschriften³, § 63 d.
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νῦν ἐπανορθώμεθα inferior Mss.; νῦν ἐπανορθούμεθα Τ; ὁ νῦν ἐπανορθούμεθα Β, followed by Bur. The reading of B, which makes the sentence anacoluthic, may very well be the original text.

10 C. ἦ τι πάσχει B, followed by Edd.; ἦ εἰ τι πάσχει τι Τ. Cp. ἦ πάσχον τι in l. 33, below.

υπὸ ὄν Mss. For the hiatus, see Cic. Orat. 44. 151 and Fritzsche ad Menon. 77 A.

10 D. (τὸ δεοφιλές) added by Bast, followed by Edd., excepting Wb. in the Teubner text. In his (third) annotated edition Wb. also accepts Bast’s conjecture, pronouncing it indispensable.

10 E. αὐτῷ τοῦτῳ Τ; αὐτῶν τοῦτῳ Β.

11 D. σὺ μοι δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος Edd.; σὺ μοι δοκεῖς, ὁ Δαίδαλος Adam, who thinks the omission of εἶναι in such a case unusual. But see οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον σοι (sc. εἶναι) δοκεῖ δικάων εἶναι, 11 E, and cp. Gorg. 505 E. Adam’s punctuation yields an added point, but it is certainly more natural to supply εἶναι than εἰσιθέναι, as he proposes. But 15 B seems to favor Adam’s view.

11 E. [δείξαι] : omitted by some Mss. and deleted by Hermann, who is followed by S., Wb., A., Bur.; Fr. adopts Bekker’s conjecture διδάξαι and reads δείξαι, ὅπως ἂν μὲ διδάξαι.

12 A. ἔλαττων B, followed by S., Wb., Fr., A.; ἔλαττον Τ, followed by Bur. As οὐκ ἔλαττων η ἀρχαιολογία thus virtually = τοσούτῳ, it is to be preferred.

οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν Mss.; οὐδέν χαλεπὸν Naber.

τὸν θ’ ἐρξαντα B (second hand), followed by S., Wb., Fr., A.; τὸν θέρξαντα B (first hand); τὸν στέρξαντα Τ. Adam suggests θερξαντα, while Burnet reads τὸν [θ’] ἐρξαντα.

12 B. ἐθέλεις ἐπείν BT, followed by S., Wb., Fr., A.; ἐθέλει νείκειν Bur., deriving his suggestion from νείκειν (schol. T) and ἐθέλειν εἰκεῖν (schol. ap. Cram. Anecd. Par. 1., p. 399).

12 C. αἰδὼς δέους B, rightly; αἰδοῦς δέος T.

12 E. ἢν καὶ Μελήτῳ ... ὥστα καὶ τὰ μή Mss. It appears to me that the words are uncalled for and really out of place here, although the sentiment is appropriate in 5 A f. and 15 E f. The use of the art. in καὶ τὰ μή may suggest a spurious addition, since we find simply καὶ μή in 9 C and 15 E (bis).

13 B. ἦ δὲ γε βοηλατικῇ T, rightly followed by Bur.; ἦ δὲ β. B.

13 D. ήτερ T, followed by S., Fr., A.; ήμπερ T, followed by Wb., S2, Bur. The dative relieves the stiffness of the sentence.

13 E. καλλιστὰ γε B, followed by S., Fr., Wb., A.; καλλιστα T, followed by Bur.

14 A. τὸ κέφαλαιον αὐτῶν Mss.; τὸ κεφαλαιον τῆς ἀπεργασίας αὐτῶν Schanz.

ἐργασίας B; ἀπεργασίας T. See the Notes.

14 C. ἐρωτώντα T; ἐρωντα B.

ἐρωτωμένω Arm. Vers. and inferior Mss.; ἐρωμένῳ B T.

The reading of T, τὸν ἐρωτώντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ, shows how easily the text
could be corrupted, and how little weight can attach to the Mss. The confusion between the words is common, and it is as easy to obtain ἐρωτώντα from ἐρωτώντα by quasi-haplography as ἐρωτώντα from ἐρωντα by quasi-dittography. If there was an attempt to correct the text, it is altogether more likely that a scribe, knowing the reputed amativeness of Socrates, would make the change from ἐρωτώντα to ἐρωντα than the reverse. Indeed, the colorless phrase ἐπιθυμητής . . . τής σής σοφίς, in 14 D (contrast ἐρωτής ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ. Meno 70 B and Rep. 6οο D). may well have prompted the change, though it cannot really support it. How colorless ἐπιθυμητής is, may be seen by referring to a few examples. In Rep. 475 B it denotes one who aspires to honor; in Xen. Mem. I. 2. 60 and Xen. Apol. 28 the word means an adherent of Socrates. Legg. 643 Ε. πανδεών. ποιώδιν ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἐραστήν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον affords a striking illustration. Plato first uses the weak term ἐπιθυμητής, and then, with conscious exaggeration, adds ἐραστής. The presence of ὑπάγῃ (see the Notes) makes for ἐρωτομενψφ rather than for ἐρωμενψφ. Hence I follow Schanz.

15 B. πολύ γε Β.; πόλυ Τ.
15 C. οὐ μέμνησαι Β.; οὐδὲ μέμνησαι Τ.
ὁμολογούμεν B (corrected): ὁμολογούμεν B (first hand). T.
τί ἔστι τὸ ὀσιον Β.; τί ἔστιν ὀσιον Τ.
15 D. προσέχων B. followed by Edd.: προσχών Τ.: προσσχών Bur.
16 A. δύτι Mss., bracketed by S., followed by Wb., Bur.; omitted by S2.
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ά = ἀπὸ τοῦτων 15 A.
ἀγανακτό. ὅτι 4 D.
ἀγῶν δημώσιος 2 A n. / ἀγῶν ἰδιὸς 2 A n.
ἀδην (καὶ τοῦτων μέν) 11 E.
ἀδοιμαί 12 B.
ἀδώς (example) 12 B ff.
ἀδείνομαι 12 B. 15 D.
ἀάνηι (sc. παρὰ θέων) 14 C.
ἀίτω 14 C.
ἀκινήτωσ 11 D.
ἀκολουθῶ 14 C.
ἀκριβῶς μαθεῖν 14 A.
ἀκρόπολις 6 C.
ἀκών 11 D.
ἀληθὴ λέγεις (in answers) 8 D (bis).
10 E, 14 E. / καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω 13 E.
ἀλλα (τὰ τε) . . . καὶ δὴ καὶ 6 C.
ἀλλὰ with inv. 6 B, 14 D. / ἀλλὰ postponed after voc. 3 C. / ἀλλὰ γὰρ 6 D, 9 C, 14 B. / ἀλλὰ . . . γε 8 E, 12 B. / ἀλλὰ δὴ 2 B. / ἀλλὰ ἵσως . . . ἀλλὰ 3 E. / ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ . . . γε 10 D. / ἀλλὰ μὴ . . . ἀλλὰ 15 D. / ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε 6 E. / ἀλλὰ τὶ 14 D.
ἀλλήλως for ἄλλως in Mss. 8 D App.
ἀλλό τὶ = ἄλλο τὶ ὑπὸ 10 D.
ἀλλο τὶ ὑπὸ 15 C.
ἀλλότριος 11 D.
ἀμα with gen. abs. 9 C.
ἀμελῶ 4 D.
ἀμφισβητῶ, ὅς οὐ. 8 B, 8 C, 8 D. See διαφέρομαι, ὃς οὐ.

ἀν with part. 3 D. / ἀν repeated 7 B. / ἀν to be supplied from preceding clause 15 D.
ἀνάγκη 6 B. / ἀνάγκη (in answers) 10 C. / πολλῆ ἀνάγκη (in answers) 7 D.
ἀνάγω 6 C.
ἀνατρεπτικός 2 A n.
ἀνατρέπω 14 B.
ἀναφοράς 4 D (bis), 9 A.
ἀνείν μαθῶν 3 D.
ἀνοικτός (? ὀνοτός, μὴ ὀνοτός) 5 D
App.
ἀντιδιωκομαί 14 E.
ἀπαλλάττομαι 15 E.
ἀπεργάζομαι 13 E. 14 A.
ἀπέρχομαι 15 E.
ἀπλῶς 14 B.
ἀπό (ὁφελεῖσθαι ἀπό) 15 A. (ὁφελεῖ ἀπό) 14 E.
ἀποβλέπω εἰς 6 E.
ἀποδεικνύω 15 C.
ἀποδέχομαι 6 A. / ἀποδέχομαι with gen. 9 E.
ἀποδιορίσκω 11 C.
ἀποκρύπτομαι 11 B, 15 E.
ἀποκτείνω 4 D (bis). See κτείων.
Ἀπόλλων Ἀικείος 2 A n.
ἀποσφάγτω 4 C.
ἀποτρέπομαι 14 C.
ἀρα postponed 6 B. / ἀρά γε 6 A. / ἀρα ἢνα . . . ὑ ἢνα μὲν . . . ἢνα δὲ
GREEK INDEX


γέρα, sacrifices, 15 A.

γεωργίων (example) 14 A.

γιγνομαι (of the occurrence of the δαιμόνιον) 3 B.

γραφή vs. δική 2 A n.

δαιμόνιον, τό, 3 B.

δὲ following τε 3 E. / δὲ γε 7 E, 10 E, 13 B. / δὲ γε . . . ἀλλ᾽ ὄμως 14 A.

Cp. καὶ γὰρ . . . ἀλλ᾽ ὄμως 13 E. / οὗ δὲ γε 13 A. / δὲ δὴ 3 E, 4 B, 4 E, 7 C, 13 B.

δείδω 12 B.

δεῖν. Attic for δεῖν. 4 D.

δέομαι, 'want,' with παρὰ and gen., 14 D, 14 E.

δέος (example) 12 B.

δεσμαί. τά, (only occurrence of this plural in Plato) 9 A.

δῆ (scornful) 9 A. / δῆ with inv. 5 D, 7 A, 10 A, 12 D (bis), 13 E (bis). / δῆ οὖν καί 4 D. / οὗτοι δῆ . . . γε 2 A. / γὰρ δῆ 12 A. / πῶς δῆ 10 D.

δῆλον οτί 3 A, 7 A, 9 B, 13 E (bis).

δῆλος εἰ asyndetic 14 B.

δημοτής 2 B n.

δῆμων (τῶν) Πιθεὺς 2 B.

δῆμον 8 D.

δὴ διὰ βραχυτέρων 14 B.

διακελεύομαι 6 D.

διακρίνω 7 C.

διαπράττομαι 13 B.

διατριβή 2 A.

διατριβῷ 2 A.

διαφέρω with gen. and dat. 4 E. / διαφέρομαι with dat. 7 B, 8 B (bis). / διαφέρομαι, ὡς οὖ 8 B. See ἀμφισβητῶ, ὡς οὖ.

διαφθείρω, play on two senses of, 5 B.

διαφορά 7 B, 7 D.

δηγοίμαι 6 C (bis).

δισχρησμαί 5 C.

δικάζομαι with dat. 4 E.
ἐπεξέρχομαι (sive ἐπεξείνω) tine tinos
4 B. 4 D. 4 E. / ἐπεξείνω tine (alì-
cui rei) 4 C.

ἐπι- in comp. 2 B n. / ἐπὶ λογισμῶν
(tò μετρεῖν, tò ἑστάων) ἐρχεσθαι
7 B. 7 C (bis). / ἐπὶ τῶν κρίσων
ἀριστερᾶς 7 C. / ἐπὶ ἀγαθῶν τίνι
... καὶ ὥφελω 13 B. 13 C. Σφ. ἐπὶ
βλάβη 13 C. / ἐπὶ αὔτῷ εἶναι 14 C. /
ἐπὶ σχολῆς 6 C.

ἐπίγραμμος 2 B.

ἐπιδεικνυμὶ 9 B.

ἐπιθυμητὶς τῆς σῆς σοφίας 14 D.

ἐπίσταμος 2 B n.

ἐπισκέπτομαι with gen. and dat. 9 A.

ἐπισκόπω 9 E.

ἐπιστήμη τίς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ εὐχεσθαί
τὸ ὁσιον 14 C. / ἐπιστήμη αὐτήσεως
καὶ δόεσος θείου ὁσιότης 14 C.

ἐπιτρέπω 5 E.

ἐπιτιχον. ὀ. 4 A.

ἐπίχαρις 2 B n.

ἐπιχειρῶ 15 D.

ἐπιμακρύνω 12 A. 12 C.

ἐργασία (following ἀπεργασία 13 E)
14 A.

ἐργασίαναι 6 C n.

ἐργὸν 13 D. 13 E. / ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάγκα-
λον ἐργὸν 13 E. / οὐκ ὀλίγον ἐργὸν
9 B. / πλείονος ἐργῶν 14 A. / τὸ
ἐν τοῖς ἐργάζεται ἐργά 11 C.

ἐρέων. τόν. 12 A.

ἐρῶμαι 6 C.

ἐρωτάμενος (? ἐρωτάμενος) 14 C App.

ἐρωτῶν (ʔ ἐρωτῶν) 14 C App.

ἐτέρωs with gen. 10 A (bis). 10 D.
11 A. / ἐτέρωs = ἄλλος 2 B. / ὦ
ἐτέρω τοιαύτα 6 A.

εὐγένειος 2 B.

εὐνοϊος 3 B.

Ἐθνὸκρύφων ... παρ' Ε. ἐθνόκρυφον 9 C.

ἐν λέγεων 9 B.

ἐν μάλα 4 A.

ἐν οἴνοι ὀτι 6 C.

eὐςεβεία 13 B.

eὐςεβής = ὀσιός 12 E (bis).

ἐχομαι 14 B. 14 C (bis).

ἐχθρα καὶ ὀργαί 7 B.

Ζεῦς φίλιος 6 B n.

ζητητικός 2 A n.

ἡ γὰρ 7 E. 8 D. 8 E. 13 A. / ἡ ποι
4 A.

ἡ, 'or rather;' withdrawing the pre-
vious quest., 11 E. / ἡ δήλα δή
4 B.

ἡ 10 A.

ἡγεσθαι θεούς vs. νομίζειν θεούς 3 B n.

ηῆ 3 E.

ἡντιν in answer, retaining the case-
form of the quest.. 2 C.

Ἡράκλεις (exclamation) 4 A.

θεοματίζει 9 C (bis).

θεοφάλις 9 C. 10 D (four times), 10 E
(bis), etc.

θεραπεύω, ἡ τῶν θεῶν = τὸ οσιον
12 E.

θεραπεύω 13 A.

θῆς 15 D.

θητεῖω 4 C. 9 A.

θύῳ 14 B. 14 C (bis).

ἰατρός (example) 13 D.

ἰδὲ γὰρ εἰ 11 E. Σφ. σκόπει εἰ 7 D.
9 D.

ἰδω (not hypostatic) 5 D. 6 D.

ἰδρύωμαι 11 B. 11 D.

ἳθι with inv. 8 E, 9 A.

ἳναι 'where,' 12 B ff. / ἰναιpé 12 C. /

. ἰνα γε 12 B.

ἰναι καὶ 12 E.

ἰππικις, ἡ (example) 13 A.

ἰππικός, ὁ (example) 13 A.

ἰππός (example) 13 A f.

ἰσοσκελής (sc. ἀριθμὸς) 12 D.
καθαρτικός 2 A n.
καθοράν τσ. ὅραν 5 C.
καὶ with inv. 3 A. / καὶ μᾶλα 14 C. / καὶ αὐτός 6 B. / καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ 8 C. / καὶ ἄλλος τοῦ τις καὶ 5 C. / καὶ . . . καὶ . . . te . . . καὶ . . . δή καὶ 6 B. / καὶ δή καὶ 2 D, 6, 16 A. / καὶ . . . δή 10 B. / καὶ γάρ 6 D, 12 A, 14 B. / καὶ γάρ . . . ἄλλα ὄμοις 13 C. Ἐρ. καίτου . . . ἄλλα ὄμοις 3 C. / καὶ . . . γάρ τοι 3 B. / καὶ μὴν . . . γε 12 A. / καὶ δήτα 11 D. For καὶ . . . γε and καὶ . . . γε τοῦ, vide s. v. γε.
κανονισμῷ 3 B, 5 A. 16 A.
καίτοι . . . ἄλλα ὄμοις 3 C. Ἐρ. καὶ γάρ . . . ἄλλα ὄμοις 13 E.
κακῶς εἰδότες 4 E.
καλῶς = ὀρθὸς, ἄληθὸς, 9 E (bis), 12 E, 15 C. Ἐρ. παγκάλως.
καται- in composit., with γαγνώσκω, 2 B, γελῶ 3 C (bis), βάλλω 4 C.
κατά- in composit., with γαγνώσκω, 2 B, γελῶ 3 C (bis), βάλλω 4 C.
κατά τὸν 8 C. / κατά τὸν σὸν λόγον 7 E. / κατά τὰ αὐτὰ 8 B.
κατάδηλον 10 B.
κατανω 12 A.
καταπνό 6 A.
Κεκροπίς (tribe) 2 B n.
κεφάλαιον, τὸ, adv., 8 E. / τὸ κεφά- λαιον αὐτόν 14 A. Ἐρ. τοῦτο τῆς τέχνης 11 D. / τὸ κεφάλαιον τῆς ἐργασίας 14 A. Ἐρ. τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτὸν τῆς ἀπεργασίας 14 A.
κεχαρισμένος, adj., 14 B (bis), 15 A.
κανδυεύω = δοκῶ 2 C, 8 A. 11 A, 11 D.
κύκλῳ περιμέναι 15 B.
κυνηγητική, ἡ, (example) 13 A.
κυνηγητικός, ὁ, (example) 13 A.
κύων (example) 13 A.
λαγχάνω δίκωρ 5 B.
λέγω, 'command,' 12 E. / λέγομεν τι
ktl. in introducing a new subject 10 A.
λόγοι. ὁ, ἡ μᾶς περιελθὼν πάλιν εἰς ταὐ- τῶν ἔκει 15 B.
Λύκευον 2 A.
μᾶ Δλ. οὖν ἐγὼγε 13 C (bis).
μακρυτικός 2 A n.
μάλιστα γε 15 B. / εἰ οτι μάλιστα 4 D, 9 C. / πάντων γε μάλιστα φίλον 15 B.
μανθάνον 13 D. / μανθάνων οτι 3 B.
μέν 9 B. / μανθάνω παρά with gen. 15 E.
μάντις 3 E.
μέλλω 5 D.
μέν solitaryum 3 C, 8 E, 9 C. / μὲν γάρ . . . ἄλλα γάρ 9 C. / μὲν οὖν 3 D, 8 C, 12 C, 12 D.
μέντοι νη Δύω 4 B.
μέρος (logical subdivision) 12 D ff. / τὸ τοῦ μέρος 12 D, 12 E. / τοῦ μέρος 12 D. / μέρος τὸ ὁσιον τοῦ δικαίων 12 D.
μὴ οὖ after verbs of fearing 15 D. / μὴ διστάτης 5 D App. / μὴ μοῦν γε . . . ἄλλα 6 C.
μηδέν for οἶδε with inf. after verba sentiendi et declarandi 6 B, 12 B.
μᾶςμα 4 C.
μόνα for μοῦν 6 C App.
μόριον (logical subdivision) 12 C.
ναί 8 E, 10 D, 10 E, 13 A, 13 B, 13 E. / ναί μὰ Δύω 5 B.
ναπθηγός (example) 13 D.
νεκτέρον 2 A. Ἐρ. Πρωτάγ. 310 B.
νίκη ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ (example) 14 A.
νομίζω 3 B, 5 E.
νομίμος 5 E (see App.).
νοῦθετω 5 B.
νοῦ 11 B.
νυν, illative, 8 E.
νῦν δὲ 11 A, 11 C, 14 C. / νῦν δὲ
... γάρ 11 C, 14 C. / νῦν δὴ 3 D.
νῦν 9 E.
νῦν ἔχειν = ἐννοεῖν 2 B.

οἷα τοῦτος 15 E.
οἷα (? parenthetical) 15 A.
oikia (example) 13 E.
oiκόδομος (example) 13 E.
oίκος. οὐδος. 14 B.
oῖμαι δὲ καὶ 3 E. Κρ. οἷα 15 A.
oῖόν velut 12 D. 13 A. / οἵον τοιόνυν 13 B. / οἵον τετανύμηχα = τοιοῦτον, οἶος τετανύβρις ἐστὶν 2 B.
oῖόν φιλεύσατοι 11 A (bis).
oῖόστερ καὶ 13 A.
oλίγον ἔργον 9 B.
oλίγον πρῶτον 14 A.
oλιγορθον with gen. 4 D.
oμόσει ἱνα 3 C.
oμοτράτεις 4 B.
oμοσ with part. 8 C.
oν omitted with τινχάνω 8 A.
oπερ οὖν καὶ 4 D.
oπγ ἀποβήσεται 3 E.
oπόστερα πλεῖω 7 B.
oπός with fut. indic. 2 D. / οπός μὴ with verb of fearing 4 E.
oργαί 7 B.
oργίζομαι with dat. 4 C, 7 B, 7 C.
ορθὸς νομίζεσαι 5 B.
oρίζω 9 C. 9 D.
oς γε, causal. 4 A, 6 B.
οὐσιον. το. vid. s.v. Pelly. / οὐ ταῦτον δ' ἐστίν, ἄλλα τὸ ἐναντιώτατον. τὸ ὀσιὸν τῷ ἀνοιχῇ 7 A. / ἀρα τὸ ὀσιὸν οτὶ ὁσιὸν ἐστίν φιλεύσαι υπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἦ ὁτι φιλεύσα ὁσιὸν ἐστίν; 10 A. / μῦριον γαρ τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὀσιὸν 12 D. / τὸ ὀσιὸν καὶ μῆ 9 C, 15 E (bis). / τὰ ... ὀσιὰ καὶ τὰ μῆ 12 I. 14 C.

ἐπιστευόν 5 E.

ἐταν γεγυμεθα = ἐκάστοτε 7 D.
ἐτι with superl. 2 D. 4 D, 9 C. / ἐτι introducing orat. recta 5 A. / ἐτι after verbs of feeling 4 D. / ἐτι δὴ 3 B.
oὐκ, ἀλλὰ 10 B, 10 D. / οὐκ ... ἀλλὰ ... οὐ μάντοι 12 C. / οὐκ ἐστὶν ὀσιῶς 15 D. / οὐ πάνω 2 B, 3 D. Κρ. οὐδ' ... πάνω τί 2 B. / οὐκ ἐλάττων ἦ = τοσούτω 12 A.

οὐδίμως τοῦτο γε 8 C.
oὐδ' αὐτός 2 B. Κρ. καὶ αὐτός. / οὐδὲ, 'neither,' 12 A. / οὐδὲ δοκεῖ δράν 5 C.

οὐδέν (an emphatic οὐ) 8 C. / οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθεῖς εὑρηκα 3 C.

κρ. τοῦτο ἀληθεῖς λέγεις 8 E. / οὐδέν πράγμα 3 E. 4 D. / οὐδέν γὰρ ἥμιν ἐστὶν ἄγα-

θὸν ὅτι ἄν μὴ ἐκεῖνοi (sc. οἱ θεοί) δόσιν 14 E. / οὐδέν ἤδιον ἐμοκύ 

14 E.

οὐδέτερα ἢ ἀμφότερα 9 D.

οὐσία 11 A.

οὐτος in the pred. 7 D. / οὐτος scorn-

ful 5 C. / οὐτος epanaleptic 7 B, 8 B. 10 B. 14 B. / τοῦτο τῆς τέχνης 11 D.

οὐτος epanaleptic 6 A. 9 D. / οὐτω with part. condit. 5 E. / οὐτω = sic temere 3 B. 9 E. / οὐτος as an an-

swer 8 A. 13 A. / οὐτω μὲν οὖν 7 A.

οὐτωσι 4 E.
oὐχὶ 14 C. 15 B.
oφέλος, οὐδέν, 4 E.

παγκάλως 7 A.

πάθος ... ὁτι πέπονθε 11 A.

πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς 11 B. Κρ. ἐξ ἀρχῆς 

πάλιν 15 C.

πάμπολλα 8 C.

Παναθήναια, τὰ μεγάλα, 6 C.
pantapa-siv 11 A.
pantachou 12 D.
pantin 5 D.
panv ye 2 B, 7 E, 8 E, 9 B (bis).
10 B, 10 C, 12 B (bis), 12 C, 13 A,
13 B, 14 A, 15 C.
paviq m'en on 7 A, 13 D.
papa with pers. dat. 4 C / papa with
pers. gen., e.g. with deomai, 'need.'
14 D. 14 E; with lauousw 14 E.
15 A (ler); with unthav 9 C, 12 E,
14 C; with apsos yéown 15 E.
pardewn 6 E.
parkaivnev 15 D.
paprou 4 C.
pas, various forms of plur., e.g. pantes
theoi 9 C; theoi pantes 10 D; pantes
oi theoi 9 D; oi theoi apantes 9 C /
pant toinávtei 5 D / pant (pantai)
pou 8 C (bis) / panti trósw 15 D /
pantos mållon 9 A / pantow ge
málanta filon (not a strengthened
superl.) 15 B.
pasxw, denoting the passive rela-
tion. 10 C (ler) / pasxw yit o 10 C.
pavomai with part. 8 C, 9 B.
permatikos 2 A n.
pelatys 4 C.
peri pollov poiónmai with inf. 5 A.
perírewmai 11 B.
periuai 11 C, 15 B (bis).
perittón, to, as a subdivision of árti-
mós, 12 C.
petómenon to in diáko (proverb) 4 A.
Piebéis, belonging to the deme Pít-
thos, 2 B.
pleon (épi), of logical extension,
12 C.
pleonektó with pers. gen. 15 A.
plódon (example) 13 E.
plóyntos tis sofias 12 A.
poeiti's, ó, 12 A.
poiklma 6 C.
póos tis 5 C / pódo mérpos 12 D / to
pódo mérpos 12 D, 12 E.
politikía. tó 2 C.
póly, hyperbaton of, 5 C. 14 B / polli
ánagky in answer. 7 D / polli kai
calá 13 E / pollw kai déw 13 C /
pollw ye dé with inf. 4 A.
poneia 12 C.
pórros sofías elávven 4 B.
posel. after interr. pronouns and ad-
verbs, 3 D n.
pvágma, 'act,' 'deed,' 4 E.
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